Research

FINANCIAL STABILITY AND THE POLITICS OF REPUTATION (PH.D DISSERTATION)

My dissertation focuses on the political economy of financial regulation in the post-2008 global financial crisis in comparative perspective. The crisis prompted political leaders and financial regulators to take a so-called macroprudential approach to financial regulation — an approach that conceives of the financial system as an integrated whole from which destabilizing risks could emerge. Yet, the practical implementation of macroprudential policies vary widely in their stringency across jurisdictions and across financial sectors. I explain this variation by pointing to the beliefs that regulatory officials hold about the roles of finance and financial regulation, and to their concern for their own reputation vis-a-vis their political principals and various societal actors.

(co-authored with Richard Deeg) “The Political Economy of Financial Regulation in Advanced Industrial Democracies” (2019) in Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science. Sandy Maisel, ed. Oxford University Press.

Ideas, Learning, and Reputation: Politics of Post-2008 Systemic Risk Regulation in the United States.” Working Paper.

(co-authored with Ania Korsunska) “Climate Finance Regime Complex: A Network Approach.” Working Paper.