

The Conditionality of Vote-Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America

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Anti-vote-buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same degree, or does the mass public have a more conditional view of the acceptability of vote buying? We theorize that normative evaluations of vote buying vary based on individuals' understanding of the transaction itself and abstract societal costs associated with the practice. We assess this perspective using survey experiments conducted in several Latin American countries that present hypothetical vote-buying situations for evaluation by respondents, varying the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client and the client's political predispositions. We find that the disapproval of vote buying is highly conditional on the attributes of the hypothetical client and that evaluations of vote buying depend on conceptions of the concrete benefits and abstract costs of vote buying as a part of electoral politics.

Cultural norms are shaped by and help to perpetuate patterns of political behavior (Schwartz 2004; Wedeen 2002). Socialization processes that accustom individuals to a corrupt environment lead to greater acceptance of and involvement in illegal behavior to the point where these become deeply ingrained political beliefs (Fisman and Miguel 2007). Cultural norms can also serve as a check on corruption even in situations that seemingly invite engaging in illegal actions (Della Porta and Pizzorno 1996). This check on corrupt behavior comes from both “inhibiting people from exploiting opportunities” for corruption (Stanholtz and Keotzle

1998) and the vigilance of fellow citizens (Bjorkman and Svensson 2007). This article explores dynamics of approval of vote buying in five Latin American countries and argues that the conditional nature of prohibitions against vote buying weakens the norms against this form of electoral corruption.¹

Vote buying, understood as the exchange of private goods for votes during electoral campaigns, is decried as a widespread form of electioneering that distorts democratic processes in the developing world (Transparency International 2004).² According to this view, vote-buying machines that monitor vote choice invert the mechanisms

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¹Data for the analysis of this project can be found here: [http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/\(Nickerson\)](http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/(Nickerson)).

²Examples of vote buying include handing out money, construction materials, and food. Providing particularistic favors would also constitute vote buying. Patronage and the distribution of club goods are not included in our definition. In the empirical part of the article, we explicitly focus on the exchange of money for votes, although we argue that our theory should also apply to exchanges of other types of particularistic gifts or favors.

of democratic accountability by making citizens subject to the control of politicians (Stokes 2005) and compromise the ability of targeted citizens to freely exercise their political rights (Fox 1994). Critics further contend that vote buying makes poor voters dependent on party brokers to survive. Politicians who reap the fruits of vote buying have few incentives to improve public services and the overall living standards of the poor because they benefit from subjecting certain constituencies to a poverty trap (Magaloni 2006). In short, vote buying is viewed in elite discourse as bad for both democracy and the people receiving the gifts.

Scholars providing qualitative and ethnographic depictions of vote buying offer a different interpretation. Poor people describe the practice as part of everyday “problem solving networks” imbued with “trust, solidarity, reciprocity, caring, and hope” (Auyero 1999, 2000) and structured by necessity and helping relationships (Schedler 2004). While some voters view vote buying as a mechanism to recover public money stolen by politicians (Banegas 1998), those who engage in clientelistic exchanges tend to be more trusting of particular politicians (Cleary and Stokes 2006) and value reciprocity in interpersonal relations (Finan and Schechter 2012), indicating that the provision of particularistic gifts and favors by parties is seen as worthy of reciprocating with political support. That is, vote buying is viewed in a positive light by many of its supposed victims.

An important component of these competing understandings can be reconciled by characterizing vote buying as a classic collective action problem. Each individual transaction is privately enjoyed by the individual voter, while the negative externalities from the sum total of these transactions are born by all citizens. While the distinction between individual actions and system-wide consequences plays an important role in shaping attitudes about the acceptability of vote buying, we argue it is a mistake to view the acceptance of the practice as mere selfishness on the part of voters. The vote-buying collective action problem is complicated by the fact that individual voters interpret the pay-offs differently. Voters may vary in their ability to observe, understand, and believe the collective downsides of vote buying. These differences result not only from the value voters assign to the material benefits yielded by the transaction, but also from the degree to which voters’ social interactions are shaped by feelings of reciprocity, and the extent to which they interpret the world through a partisan lens. These factors condition condemnation of the practice, leading to cracks in the uniform disapproval of vote buying.

Our knowledge about vote-buying norms is limited by the paucity of studies that directly investigate what vot-

ers think about the acceptability of the practice. Several ethnographic studies from a variety of countries relate the perspectives of a handful of individuals, but it is difficult to know the representativeness of the interviews and how the dynamics manifest themselves more broadly. Most existing evidence of mass attitudes regarding vote buying is indirect and relies on cross-country comparisons. Surveys conducted in Southeast Asia as well as many African countries find that a very high percentage of respondents freely admit to receiving goods or favors from political candidates.³ In contrast, in several Latin American countries where ethnographic work indicates vote buying is commonplace, survey respondents routinely report low levels of vote buying.⁴ This difference in willingness to admit receiving gifts suggests different norms surrounding the activity in these cultures, but surveys exploring the dynamics of normative evaluations of vote buying are few and far between (but see Bratton 2008).

We address this gap in the literature by first generating a theoretical framework explaining variations in mass-level normative evaluations of specific instances of vote buying; second, deriving testable hypotheses from this theory; and, third, fielding nationally representative surveys in five Latin American countries to evaluate those hypotheses, which include a variety of experimental manipulations. We argue that the abstract nature of the societal costs associated with vote buying causes certain types of citizens to focus on aspects of these exchanges that raise their level of acceptability by underscoring the positive effects of vote buying at the individual level or by promoting empathy vis-à-vis individuals who participate in the transactions.

Who Disapproves of Vote Buying?

The perceived consequences of political practices help shape a citizen’s normative evaluation of those practices. These consequences can be immediate and concrete or distant and abstract. The ability and willingness to focus on the negative societal externalities of vote buying as opposed to the positive individual-level aspects of the

³Survey data indicate that in 1996, 30% of voters were targeted in Thailand and in 1999, 27% in Taiwan’s third largest city (Transparency International 2004). Data from the AfroBarometer also find very high rates of vote buying (e.g., 44% in Kenya). See Kramon (2010a, 1).

⁴In Mexico, Aparicio (2002) and Lawson et al. (2007) report 7% and 5% of vote buying, respectively; in Argentina, Stokes (2005) reports 7%; in Bolivia, Seligson et al. (2006) report less than 7%; and in Brazil, Transparency International (2004) reports 6%, 3%, and 8% in three different elections.

practice predicts acceptance or condemnation.⁵ Citizens who agree to participate in vote-buying exchanges enjoy immediate consequences, such as accruing material goods during the transaction, consolidating relationships with influential or generous neighbors and community leaders, and avoiding punishment by powerful political machines. Incorporating these elements into evaluations of vote buying is easy. Individuals experiencing these immediate benefits may have difficulty seeing how, for example, the practice undermines the fairness of democratic procedures or distorts vertical accountability. Making sense of the disjuncture between what appears to be a generous act and its harmful net effect on social justice or democracy is a harder task. Whether citizens focus on the societal or individual level is a function of their daily experiences with vote buying, political sophistication, partisan identification, and feelings of reciprocity.

Taken in isolation, an individual vote-buying transaction has a negligible effect on electoral politics in any given country or district. However, an election outcome could be altered if the quantity of gifts provided is very large and persuades people to vote in accordance with the gift rather than their true preferences. In addition, the widespread provision of electoral gifts creates a strong incentive for elected officials to corruptly use public money to fund electoral campaigns, and this corruption decreases the quality of governance. As long as there is a political advantage to employing the strategy—or, a *perceived* advantage—vote buying will continue to erode the quality of elections and governance.

While the system-wide effects are uniformly negative, the actual vote-buying transaction could be a positive experience for voters. Vote buying is retail politicking, and campaigns are generally in the business of being friendly rather than alienating. Most brokers engaged in vote buying are local, have long-standing relationships with the individual voters, and use political connections to assist people in their neighborhoods (Auyero 2000; Szwarcberg 2012). This leads brokers to be trusted by many people. Moreover, brokers are savvy and preferentially direct vote-buying largess to individuals whom they like or trust to vote as instructed. The repeated nature of vote buying (i.e., each election and often in between) and the trusted broker can normalize these illegal interactions. A campaign consultant's ultimate goal is to make a large number of voters think of the act of casting a ballot as an opportunity to repay a generous friend or benefactor. Power imbalances and coercion color the nature of the transaction, but all things being equal, campaigns would prefer

to make clientelistic exchanges a positive experience for voters above and beyond the material reward.

This duality in vote buying leads to conflicting norms to guide behavior. Thinking at the system level, most people value democratic competition and rule of law and oppose corruption. At the individual transaction level, people also value friendship, reciprocity, and keeping one's word, in addition to the material benefit. Given these two dimensions, it is reasonable to expect variance in the degree to which individuals approve or disapprove of vote buying. People who focus on the individual transaction will be much more approving than people who focus on the system-level consequences.

Based on this view of vote buying, we identify three mechanisms that lead some people not to place great weight on the negative system-wide implications, be unable to factor in the negative externalities of the practice, or rationalize it as being justified in a particular instance. These mechanisms can explain variance in the degree to which individuals disapprove of vote buying and allow us to derive a series of testable hypotheses.

Socialization and exposure are the first cause of decreased stigma on vote buying. Like other norms related to political practices that ultimately influence political behavior, value orientations vis-à-vis vote buying are not volatile states of mind but instead respond to concrete, often long-standing life experiences. We argue that voters' direct exposure to vote buying as beneficiaries of gift dispensation, or their indirect experience with it as members of the gift-giving party's subculture or as its supporters, activates political socialization dynamics that nurture permissive attitudes toward the practice.

Parties immerse voters in vote-buying networks and select their targets strategically with the intention of establishing enduring links between clients and the machine. Prior research suggests that people receiving gifts in exchange for votes tend to be poor and less educated and exhibit high levels of reciprocity (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Finan and Schechter 2012; Stokes 2005). Our claim is that exposure to vote-buying transactions in and of itself causes a person to stigmatize the behavior less for three primary reasons.

First, direct exposure to the practice reveals to participants the most benign aspects of these exchanges not only because they are an opportunity for poor voters to satisfy urgent material needs but also because their recurrence makes them a reliable source of income or in-kind assistance. Even if potential clients are able to recognize the long-term societal benefits of refusing to engage in vote-buying transactions, a collective action problem remains. Although a society would potentially be better off if no vote buying occurred, when faced with the decision

⁵We interchangeably refer to negative evaluations of vote buying using terms such as *disapproval*, *stigma*, and *unacceptable*.

of whether to engage in a vote-buying transaction or eschew it, a potential client is always better off defecting and accepting the goods in exchange for his vote, absent strong reputational or enforcement costs. At the individual level, engaging in vote buying has a negligible effect on whether the negative societal externalities occur or not, while refusing clientelistic goods results in a direct and measureable decrease in the client's utility. Thus, there is a clear disjuncture between how costs and benefits are understood in terms of a specific, individual transaction and how such individual-level transactions relate to societal outcomes. As a result, the negligible societal cost of each individual transaction may minimize moral qualms about the practice among those who participate in vote-buying exchanges.

Second, to the extent that clients perceive vote buying as coercive in nature, which may over time engender negative feelings vis-à-vis the practice, clients will still be less inclined to condemn fellow citizens involved in these transactions because they have a better awareness of the conditions that may lead someone to comply with brokers' demands. That is, those with vote-buying experience are also more likely to appreciate the concrete costs associated with refusing such exchanges.

Third, direct and recurrent exposure to this variety of electioneering accustoms voters to it and thus reduces the salience of abstract normative concerns with regard to its illegality or deleteriousness for democracy. Familiarity with corrupt practices engenders permissive normative understandings of those practices, which end up playing an important role in their maintenance, reproduction, and rationalization by participants. Furthermore, people do not like to think of themselves as bad people, so they rationalize behavior to avoid cognitive dissonance (Ariely 2012). Thus, we expect, all things being equal, the stigma against selling votes to be less among people with direct experience with the practice.

H1 (Experience): People directly experiencing vote-buying transactions attach less stigma to selling votes.

In addition to normalizing gift giving by the repeated exposure of voters to the practice, political parties can construct discursive lenses through which their members indirectly evaluate clientelism. The institutionalization of vote-buying exchanges may come to define the relationship between party sympathizers and their leaders, thus transforming a partisan subculture. In this sense, political socialization can play an important role in making the electoral and material benefits of clientelism apparent to citizens. In addition to the concrete electoral and material benefits supporters derive from accepting their party's vote-winning strategies, voters also reflexively defend the

behavior of their own party and are often exposed to alternative narratives that clientelistic strategies are a sign of a party's concern with the welfare of the poor and not as a perverse form of "welfarism."

Conversely, a party's emphasis in distancing itself from what it perceives as corrupt, degrading transactions may offer its supporters a discursive window into the more abstract connections between clientelistic exchanges and social equality or democracy, crucial when articulating the stigmatization of vote buying.⁶ In addition, refusing to participate in vote-buying transactions is harder to justify when the voter perceives the political opponents to be equally corrupt. So parties running on anticorruption platforms can serve to educate the populace about the externalities of vote buying and provide an electoral escape valve.

We predict that supporters of parties that campaign against vote buying will stigmatize the practice more than supporters of other parties. Conversely, parties that routinely engage in vote buying may officially denounce the practice but unofficially encourage supporters to think vote buying is a completely normal practice or to exhibit greater understanding of their party's electoral strategies.⁷ We derive the following testable hypothesis from the exposure or partisan priming mechanism:

H2 (Partisan Identification): Supporters of parties engaged in vote buying come to think vote buying is acceptable. Conversely, supporters of "anti-vote-buying" parties will stigmatize the practice more.

Countervailing ethical considerations provide the second mechanism by which norms against vote buying are weakened. The democratic norm of fair elections and clean government is relatively universal, but so are norms about gratitude and solidarity. Clientelistic parties rely on a large web of local brokers to distribute gifts and favors because these agents are known to voters and viewed as part of the community. Voters are loyal to their community and may feel indebted to agents who can serve as catalysts in problem-solving networks. This organic connection and gratitude toward clientelistic relations may

⁶Parties that lack the resources to distribute goods and favors or that target wealthier constituencies often chastise vote buying and highlight the societal costs of the use of the tactic by their rivals.

⁷Another possible interpretation is one of self-selection. Instead of the party socializing sympathizers into holding certain views of vote buying, sympathizers could self-select into the party to receive the particularistic benefits associated with membership. Nevertheless, partisan socialization is still likely to reinforce this initial clientelistic-based choice. For the purposes of our theoretical framework, the direction of causality is not important. Both interpretations point toward greater sympathy toward vote buying among those who identify with clientelistic parties.

trump the stigma stemming from system-wide problems with vote buying. From their perspective, for example, it would be dishonest and somewhat ungrateful to accept gifts from political brokers and then vote for the opposing party.⁸

Feelings of reciprocity have been found to be an important aspect of the success of vote-buying strategies because they compel targeted voters to uphold their expressed commitment to vote for their patrons (Finan and Schechter 2012; Gouldner 1960; Lawson and Greene 2011; Powell 1970). The transaction itself generates a sense of moral obligation or gratitude that makes the promise of compliance binding (Graziano 1976). According to Auyero (2000), the repeated nature of the transactions leads to the emergence of shared cultural representations related to vote buying. This symbolic infrastructure helps obscure the inequalities inherent in such exchanges, thus reinforcing recipients' tacit acceptance of the culture of vote buying by returning gifts and favors with votes.

Thus, people who exhibit high levels of reciprocity come to understand vote-buying transactions as involving two conflicting sets of norms. While they might recognize the downsides of vote buying and may not approve of the practice, adherence to a norm of reciprocity generates understanding about the role of the voter in the transaction and lessens the stigma surrounding it. The normative mechanism is compatible with the following hypothesis:

H3 (Reciprocity): Respondents exhibiting higher degrees of reciprocity will stigmatize vote buying less.

The implications of vote buying can be complex, nuanced, and even opaque.⁹ The cognitive skills needed to understand the system-level consequences provide the final mechanism by which the stigma against vote buying can be eroded. The factors that structurally shape an individual's cognitive abilities to focus on the immediate and/or the societal implications of vote buying also shape their evaluation of the practice. Political scientists may view the negative consequences of vote buying as self-evident, but the problems with the practice may not be self-evident to relatively less educated or sophisticated voters. The causal chain of events leading to poverty traps and bad policy (Magaloni 2006) involves numerous steps, many of which are obscured from public view. Voters with

higher levels of education are better equipped to see the system-level problems and have access to more sources of political information discussing the societal costs of vote buying. We therefore expect them to stigmatize vote buying more than less educated voters.¹⁰

H4 (Education): All else equal, well-educated individuals will be better able to understand the system-wide problems with vote buying and stigmatize the practice more.

The capacity to recognize the more abstract negative consequences of vote buying has further implications for citizens' evaluations of the practice. Factoring in the context in which political practices take place is important in order to establish their net impact on the welfare of society. Some beneficiaries will be viewed as more deserving and less worthy of condemnation than others. In particular, the large marginal utility of payments from campaigns to poor individuals will cause most observers to stigmatize transactions involving voters enduring economic hardship less than those involving people without financial struggles. Contributing to a societal problem is more understandable when violating the norm may be important to supporting the client's family.

H5 (Conditional on Income Security): Vote buying is stigmatized less when the recipient of the gift is struggling financially.

Another contextual feature of clientelistic transactions conditions citizens' evaluations of vote buying. One of the major downsides of the practice is its potential to distort electoral outcomes. If the receipt of gifts causes people to vote contrary to their preferences, then the electoral connection is effectively severed. However, when supporters of a party receive a gift or favor in exchange for voting as they already intended, this electoral distortion does not take place. Vote buying among supporters may be an inefficient use of campaign resources and creates an incentive for governing parties to be corrupt, but the election result itself is not manipulated. Thus, vote selling by supporters of the vote-buying party may be less stigmatized than vote selling by recipients who oppose the party.

H6 (Less Stigma for Supporters): Accepting gifts from parties is more acceptable when the recipient is a supporter of the party.

⁸An alternate argument suggested by one of our reviewers is that high levels of generalized reciprocity could actually lead citizens to obey the law if others do the same (see also Lawson and Greene 2011). Although we grant this possibility, ultimately, this is an empirical question.

⁹The sizable and erudite academic literature discussing the consequences of vote buying provides excellent evidence of this assertion.

¹⁰A complementary interpretation is that better educated citizens are also less likely to be familiar with the more positive aspects of individual clientelistic exchanges. However, as we argue below, when presented with additional information about clients, the more sophisticated are also the most likely to condition their disapproval of vote buying based on client characteristics.

The argument about the need for higher levels of political sophistication to recognize the systemic consequences of clientelism implies that client characteristics do not have the same effects on normative evaluations across subgroups with varying levels of education. As mentioned above, different types of clientelistic transactions undermine democratic processes in different ways and to different degrees. A higher regard for systemic values is needed in order to discern such relevant distinctions and moderate or strengthen one's moral approval/disapproval accordingly. We expect individuals with higher levels of education to display greater sensitivity to client characteristics in their normative assessment of these exchanges. Given the higher level of abstraction required in order to distinguish between individual- and societal-level costs and benefits associated with poor versus nonpoor clients, more educated individuals should also be more likely to hold more conditional views of the practice.¹¹ Further, just as more educated voters are better able to understand the system-level problems with vote buying, only these voters will be able to discern that vote buying among supporters mitigates these problems. Inattentive and unsophisticated voters may internalize the norm against vote buying, but without fully understanding the logic of the norm, they are not less likely to soften the prohibition. Thus, we expect only the most politically sophisticated respondents (i.e., educated) to make their disapproval of vote buying conditional on whether or not the recipient is a supporter of the gift-giving party as well.

H7 (Conditional Condemnation): Voters with low levels of education are less likely to condition views of vote buying on the relative wealth or partisan predispositions of the gift recipient.

The next section of the article describes the surveys fielded to test these hypotheses. Whereas Hypotheses 1 to 4 were tested using observational data, Hypotheses 5 to 7 were evaluated employing survey experiments in which the characteristics of the vote seller were randomly varied.

Cases, Data, and Methods

To gain a greater systematic and cross-national understanding of the degree to which different citizens stigmatize vote buying, we included items in omnibus surveys conducted in Uruguay (November 2009), Bolivia (December 2009), Honduras (January 2010), Nicaragua

¹¹There is also no expectation that lower-status individuals make exceptions based on economic need. Poor, less educated individuals who condemn vote-buying exchanges should not exonerate similar individuals who do sell their votes.

(September 2010), and Peru (January 2011) that asked respondents to evaluate the acceptability of hypothetical vote-buying situations.¹² With the exception of the Nicaraguan survey, all of the surveys were conducted within two months after an election, and three of the five surveys (Honduras, Uruguay, and Bolivia) included experimental components to assess the possibility of normative conditionality with regard to the practice. The Nicaraguan and Peruvian surveys were nonexperimental, and all respondents received the same hypothetical situation, which did not provide the respondent with many client characteristics:

Imagine a man who lives with his wife and two children in (*this locality*). During an electoral campaign, a member of a party offered him [\$300 (Nicaraguan) córdoba oros/\$50 (Peruvian) soles] so that he would vote for the party. The man accepted the money and voted how he was instructed. In your opinion, was the behavior of this man totally acceptable, acceptable, understandable but unacceptable, unacceptable, or totally unacceptable?

In the surveys conducted in Uruguay and Honduras, the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client was randomly varied:

Imagine a man who lives with his wife and two children in (*this locality*). He works hard, *but/and* he *frequently/never* has trouble with maintaining his family economically. During the electoral campaign, a member of a party offered him [\$1,000 (Honduran) lempiras/\$1,000 (Uruguayan) pesos] so that he would vote for the party. The man accepted the money and voted how he was instructed. In your opinion, was the behavior of this man totally acceptable, acceptable, understandable but unacceptable, unacceptable, or totally unacceptable?

A larger sample size in the Bolivian survey allowed for a 2×2 experimental design in which both the

¹²Details about the survey methodology for each country are found in Appendix A in the online supplementary materials. Although the countries were chosen due to the electoral calendar and logistical reasons, they offer a broad universe of low/middle-income emerging democracies. Appendix B provides summary measures of economic development, levels of democracy, corruption rankings, and estimated vote-buying rates during recent elections for each country, showing that the sample contains reasonable variation across a number of relevant macrolevel variables. It thus offers some guidance as to the types of countries to which our findings might generalize.

socioeconomic status of the client as well as his political predispositions were varied:

Imagine a man who lives with his wife and two children in (*this locality*). He works hard, *but/and* he *frequently/never* has trouble with maintaining his family economically. During the electoral campaign, a member of a party offered him 100 Bolivianos¹³ so that he would vote for *a party that he had not been planning to vote for/the party that he was already planning on voting for*. The man accepted the money and voted how he was instructed. In your opinion, was the behavior of this man totally acceptable, acceptable, understandable but unacceptable, unacceptable, or totally unacceptable?

The Nicaraguan and Peruvian survey questions enable us to assess the relative level of stigma associated with a general vote-buying situation, and, in conjunction with political and sociodemographic variables, to explain among whom that stigma arises (H1–H4). The survey experiments in the Honduran and Uruguayan surveys help test the degree to which respondents hold nuanced opinions about vote buying under different socioeconomic characteristics of the hypothetical client and the degree to which this conditional-experimental stigma effect varies or not across levels of socioeconomic status (H5, H7). The Bolivian experiment allows us to observe the degree to which whether the hypothetical client supports or does not support the party also has an effect on the level of acceptability of the exchange as well as on the socioeconomic differences (H6, H7).¹⁴

In addition to the experimental and nonexperimental stigma questions mentioned above, we also collected data on a number of other variables to test the proposed hypotheses.¹⁵ To measure experience with vote buying, we asked respondents whether they had (1) or had not (0) received a gift or favor in exchange for their vote during the most recent electoral campaign, with the expectation that greater experience with vote buying should reduce the stigma associated with the practice.¹⁶

¹³The cash amounts are worth approximately US\$15 in Nicaragua, US\$20 in Peru, US\$50 in Honduras and Uruguay, and US\$40 in Bolivia and were selected based on field research and pollster input.

¹⁴Eliciting truthful survey responses about vote buying can be difficult (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). Since evaluating vignettes asks for an indirect opinion about vote buying, our methodology may also minimize social desirability in survey responses.

¹⁵Question wording and descriptive statistics are available in the online supplementary materials in Appendices C and F.

¹⁶Since the Nicaraguan survey was not conducted directly after an election, no direct data are available on vote buying.

To capture partisan affiliations, in each of our surveys we asked respondents to reveal their party identification, and we coded two dummy variables to indicate whether each respondent belonged to a traditionally clientelistic party and/or one that has been more publicly critical of the practice in recent elections. The coding of these variables relied on field research, secondary source research, and consultations with country experts.¹⁷

Education is measured on a scale that ranges from less than primary complete (0) to postsecondary complete (4). In order to assess the relationship between an individual's reciprocity values and the stigmatization of vote buying, we included a question in the Honduran and Peruvian surveys asking respondents to express their level of agreement with the following statement: "when I receive a favor, I feel obliged to return it."

Results

The presentation of the results from the five surveys proceeds as follows. First, we describe the acceptability of vote buying across the five cases. Second, we examine the predictors of disapproval associated with a general vote-buying exchange in Nicaragua and Peru (the non-experimental cases). We test the primary effects of the independent variables associated with the education and normative mechanisms (H1–3) and one of the independent variables associated with the cognitive mechanism (H4). In the third section, we expand the statistical analysis to the experimental cases to test the conditionality of vote-buying acceptance (H5–7), with specific attention given to the interactions between education and the treatment conditions. Most results are reported graphically for ease of presentation.

Disapproval of Vote Buying

Leaving aside for the moment the experimental manipulations in the Uruguayan, Honduran, and Bolivian surveys, Table 1 presents the distribution of answers in each country. Across all five surveys, average levels of disapproval are quite high, with the five-country average reaching 3.9 on a 5-point scale, suggesting that most respondents deem the practice unacceptable. In no case does the percentage of respondents indicating that the exchange is "totally acceptable" or "acceptable" exceed 10%, while the percentage believing that the exchange

¹⁷A detailed discussion of our party coding is available in Appendix D.

TABLE 1 Stigma Associated with Hypothetical Exchange Across Countries

	Nicaragua	Peru	Honduras	Uruguay	Bolivia
Totally Acceptable	1.85% (0.43)	0.74% (0.08)	1.62% (0.4)	1.27% (0.37)	0.74% (0.21)
Acceptable	6.47% (0.79)	5.26% (0.5)	6.87% (0.8)	5.28% (0.78)	8.03% (0.73)
Understandable But Not Acceptable	12.13% (1.05)	23.88% (1.15)	14.95% (1.13)	24.14% (1.44)	21.98% (1.24)
Unacceptable	41.73% (1.58)	47.16% (1.42)	52.12% (1.59)	33.52% (1.61)	50.60% (1.5)
Totally Unacceptable	37.82% (1.56)	22.96% (1.22)	24.44% (1.37)	35.79% (1.61)	18.65% (1.13)
Country Average (1–5)	4.07 (0.03)	3.86 (0.02)	3.91 (0.03)	3.97 (0.03)	3.78 (0.02)
N	973	9706	990	969	2035

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

was “unacceptable” or “totally unacceptable” surpasses 60% in all five countries.

Although the overall trend toward “unacceptable” answers is apparent, significant variation in the mean scores on the acceptability scale point to intercountry variability in normative evaluations of vote buying. Nicaragua displayed the highest average levels of stigma associated with vote buying (4.1), with nearly 80% indicating that the general hypothetical exchange was “unacceptable” or “totally unacceptable,” followed by Uruguay (4.0, 69%), Honduras (3.9, 76%), Peru (3.9, 70%), and Bolivia (3.8, 69%).¹⁸ In terms of the percentage of respondents in the “totally unacceptable” category, Nicaragua (38%) and Uruguay (36%) are statistically indistinguishable, with over a third of respondents in this category, while in Honduras (24%), Peru (23%), and Bolivia (19%), less than a quarter of respondents find the exchange “totally unacceptable.”

Individual-Level Predictors of Stigma

Ordered logistic regressions are used to determine the demographic, attitudinal, and partisan predictors of stigma attached to vote-buying exchanges (H1–H4) using the data from Nicaragua and Peru.¹⁹ Figure 1

¹⁸All averages are statistically different from each other ($p < .05$) except for the difference between the Peruvian and Bolivian averages.

¹⁹Ordered logistic regressions are appropriate in this situation because (1) the dependent variable is measured on a categorical rather than ratio scale, and (2) the data are skewed, which can make ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates inconsistent.


graphs the partial changes in Y^* along with 95% confidence intervals and demonstrates fairly consistent support for our first four hypotheses.²⁰ Education (H4) is positively associated with stigma, although the smaller sample size in Nicaragua means that only the Peruvian coefficient reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. Holding other variables at their median values, the predicted probability of finding the hypothetical exchange “unacceptable” or “totally unacceptable” increases by 8 and 10 percentage points, respectively, when going from minimum to maximum levels of education.

Identifying with a traditionally clientelistic party (H2) leads to more accommodating normative evaluations in both countries (no parties in either country are coded as publicly anticlientelistic).²¹ Although lack of

²⁰Instead of presenting logistic coefficients, we graph partial changes in Y^* , which can be interpreted as representing increases or decreases in the underlying (and unobserved) latent stigma in terms of standard deviations associated with a unit increase of each explanatory variable (Long 1997, 128–30). This display enhances the comparability of coefficients, since the number of variables is not constant across countries and unstandardized logistic regression coefficients are highly sensitive to the number of right-hand-side variables, whereas standardized coefficients are much more stable. For reference, a conventional table including ordered logistic coefficients is available in Appendix E. As a robustness check, Appendix F contains logistic models in which the dependent variable was dichotomized, as well as ordered logistic and generalized ordered logistic models with different specifications. The general conclusions remain the same with these alternate specifications.

²¹The effects captured by the clientelistic party variable could be due to party identification rather than any effects attributable to identifying with a clientelistic party. Statistically, it is impossible to distinguish the two possible effects in the Nicaraguan case, since both main political party coalitions actively engage in vote buying (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2012). However, this is not the case in

FIGURE 1 Predictors of Stigma in Nicaragua and Peru



data on experience with vote buying and levels of reciprocity in the Nicaraguan survey precludes testing H1 and H3 in that country, the coefficients in the Peruvian model are substantively large, highly statistically significant, and in the expected direction.²² Going from minimum to maximum levels of reciprocity on the 4-point reciprocity scale leads to a 23 percentage point drop in the predicted probability of finding the exchange unacceptable or totally unacceptable, while a similar change in the vote-buying experience variable is associated with a 15 percentage point decrease. Together, the results demonstrate that those most likely to appreciate the abstract societal costs of vote buying are the most likely to stigmatize the practice, while those most exposed to the beneficial aspects of vote buying (through personal experience and partisan identification) or who hold competing values (higher levels of reciprocity) are more likely to express more accommodating evaluations.

Experimental Evidence

The experimental data from the remaining three cases test our theoretical expectation that client characteristics af-


Peru, where only two parties are traditionally clientelistic. Adding party identification to the analysis does not change this finding (available on request).

²²We also included the reciprocity item in the Honduras survey. Although the experimental manipulations make the two analyses not strictly comparable, we found that the reciprocity variable is not associated with disapproval for the higher SES client but is negatively related for the lower SES client ($p = 0.11$).

fect respondents’ evaluations of vote buying (H5, H6) and that such evaluations interact with respondent characteristics (H7). Figure 2 graphs the average level of stigma across each experimental group. The figure demonstrates that attitudes toward vote buying are strongly conditional, with respondents much less critical of the hypothetical exchange when the client is described as poor than when he is described as having a higher income. In both Honduras and Uruguay, the difference between the poor and higher-income client averages on the 5-point stigma scale exceeds half of a point. A similar difference is apparent in Bolivia, which also displays the expected effect associated with the partisan predispositions of the client. Taking the Bolivian results together, the difference between the stigma associated with a higher-income client selling his vote and a poor client merely selling his turnout approaches the experimental effect found in the former cases.

These results indicate that in the eyes of citizens, not all vote-buying exchanges are created equal. Consistent with our theory, respondents clearly identify the differentiated societal costs of vote buying. Poor citizens are partially exonerated because when transactions involve individuals undergoing economic deprivation, the negative systemic effects of vote buying are compensated by the alleviation of the immediate needs of the poor. Cast in terms of public policy, there will be less demand to eradicate vote buying from retail politicking because of sympathy for the likely clients. Similarly, the results of the Bolivia survey indicate that individuals place a premium

FIGURE 2 Average Levels of Stigma Associated with Vote Buying by Country and Experimental Condition



on citizens who vote their preferences and condemn those practices that can potentially trump the popular will by undermining sincere electoral behavior.

Our explanatory framework suggests that the effect of varying client characteristics is moderated by respondent characteristics, so these aggregate results may obscure even more conditional evaluations of vote buying among theoretically relevant subgroups. Such interactions should occur with the education of the respondent, with the expectation that better-educated individuals should hold the most conditional views of the hypothetical exchanges and especially so with regard to the party-support exchange tested in Bolivia (H7). The ordered logistic regressions modeling stigma levels presented in Table 2 report the interaction between the treatment conditions and education.

Figures 3 and 4 plot the predicted probabilities of an “unacceptable” or “totally unacceptable” response for the Honduran, Uruguayan, and Bolivian data, respectively, across levels of education.²³ The figures demonstrate that Hypothesis 7 is strongly supported in two cases (Uruguay and Bolivia) and unsupported in the other (Honduras). Figure 3, Panel A, shows that respondents’ level of education matters very little for how Hondurans evaluate the two different situations, with only a marginal, nonsignificant positive association between ed-

TABLE 2 Interactions Among Experimental Assignment and Standard Errors, Ordered Logistic Regressions (Figures 3–4)


	Honduras	Uruguay	Bolivia
Education	-0.102	0.241**	0.142
	0.109	0.101	0.117
Poor Client	-1.524***	-0.192	-0.586**
	0.259	0.297	0.274
Poor Client*	0.126	-0.532***	-0.046
Education	0.155	0.144	0.128
Client Supporter			0.24
			0.274
Client Supporter*			-0.317**
Education			0.127
Cut 1	-5.129***	-4.655***	-5.237***
	0.312	0.357	0.376
Cut 2	-3.375***	-2.958***	-2.666***
	0.215	0.267	0.264
Cut 3	-2.107***	-1.020***	-1.098***
	0.193	0.214	0.269
Cut 4	0.453**	0.512**	1.277***
	0.176	0.212	0.268
N	990	969	2035
R ²	0.047	0.039	0.019

Note: Estimates are from ordered logistic regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

²³To demonstrate the statistical significance of the results across levels of education, Appendix F reports the 95% confidence intervals associated with the predicted probabilities shown in these figures.

FIGURE 3 Predicted Probabilities of “Unacceptable” or “Totally Unacceptable” Response by SES and Experimental Conditions




education and disapproval across experimental conditions. In contrast, Hypothesis 7 is clearly supported in the case of Uruguay (Panel B). While the predicted probabilities for low-education individuals are essentially equal for both experimental conditions, education is positively associated with disapproval in the higher-income exchange, whereas it is negatively related to disapproval for those who responded to the poor exchange. As a result, among respondents with the highest levels of education, the difference in the predicted probability of finding the two

hypothetical exchanges “unacceptable” or “totally unacceptable” is 45 percentage points. This difference is highly significant and indicates that better-educated individuals are more likely to appreciate the distinction between concrete individual-level benefits and abstract societal costs.

Similar trends are apparent in the Bolivian data. Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities of an “unacceptable” or “totally unacceptable” response for the four treatment conditions across levels of education. Although the predicted scores for each experimental condition are for

FIGURE 4 Predicted Probability of “Unacceptable” or “Totally Unacceptable” Response, Bolivia



the most part not statistically distinct for individuals with low levels of education, the differences in predicted scores become especially apparent with increasing education. While the relatively better educated are marginally more likely than their less educated counterparts to stigmatize the “Higher Income/Don’t Support” and the “Poor/Don’t Support” situations, they are marginally less critical when asked about a “Higher Income/Support” situation, and much less critical for the “Poor/Support” situation. What is most important for the well educated in Bolivia is the partisan predisposition of the client. If the client already supports the party (that is, turnout buying), then they are much less likely to disapprove of the exchange. In contrast, what appears to matter for the least educated individuals is the income security of the client, although the differences are not nearly as large as for highly educated respondents.

The difference is particularly staggering when comparing the “Higher Income/Don’t Support” and “Poor/Support” exchanges among the most educated. For these respondents, the difference in the predicted probability of an “unacceptable” or “totally unacceptable” response between the “Poor/Support” exchange and the “Higher Income/Don’t Support” exchange is 30 percentage points. While the similar interaction effect found in Uruguay for the poor condition is not significant in Bolivia, it is in the expected direction. The positive association between education and disapproval for the “Don’t Support” conditions is slightly attenuated with increasing education, and the negative association between education and disapproval in the “Support” conditions accelerates with increasing education.

Discussion

The development of a normative stigma against corrupt electoral practices is a necessary step in efforts to reduce their incidence. Our evidence regarding the disapproval associated with vote buying in five Latin American countries suggests that the anti-vote-buying discourse has taken root. Although the countries included in the study vary in their level of development, depth of democracy, and prevalence of vote buying, vast majorities of respondents in all five countries find the practice unacceptable when provided with a hypothetical example. As anticipated by our theoretical framework, however, the survey results also indicate that citizens are more accepting of vote buying under some circumstances.

We began this article with the premise that while the net benefits of engaging in vote-buying transactions to individual clients are fairly clear, the abstract societal costs of such exchanges are often distant from the everyday world in which clientelistic relationships are formed. We then identified three mechanisms that explain the relative salience of societal versus individual-level considerations in citizens’ evaluations of vote buying. With regard to the partisan priming mechanism, one of the strongest findings is that direct or indirect experience with vote buying significantly reduces the disapproval respondents attach to hypothetical vote-buying exchanges. Such exposure highlights the direct beneficial aspects of these exchanges, which in turn reduces the disapproval associated with the practice. A second strong finding is that partisan identification is important. Supporters of parties with strong clientelistic traditions are more

accepting of vote buying than members of other parties or independents.

The negative relationship between reciprocity and disapproval of vote buying is supportive of the second mechanisms identified by the theoretical framework, since it indicates the presence of a tension between interpersonal and system-oriented values associated with the practice. Given that political brokers in charge of distributing gifts during electoral campaigns are usually deeply enmeshed in the social fabric of targeted territories (Auyero 2000), the salience of the interpersonal normative dimension may go a long way in explaining the persistence of vote buying as well as the ineffectiveness of civic education campaigns that demonize exchanges initiated by well-known neighbors (Schaffer 2007).

The evidence presented above also supports the logic behind the cognitive mechanism. Higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of stigma against vote buying. It is important to highlight that this relationship holds even after controlling for exposure to the practice. In other words, education is not simply a proxy for nonexposure, suggesting that irrespective of whether or not they have first-hand experience with vote buying, better-educated respondents are able to identify the abstract societal costs of parties' gift-giving strategies. Another implication of the cognitive mechanism is that the greater ability to understand these abstract societal costs among individuals with higher levels of education should lead them to adjust their disapproval depending on the net effect of contextually different exchanges on values such as democratic quality, fairness, transparency, and so on. Although the experimental results suggest that, in general, respondents made an exception to the high stigma associated with vote buying when refusing clientelistic goods would be concretely detrimental to the client's welfare or when accepting such goods proved less harmful to abstract societal values (i.e., turnout buying), the conditionality of vote-buying norms was greater among better-educated individuals.

Some could argue that the relationship between education and vote-buying norms is simply a result of highly educated respondents' stronger adherence to democratic values. While this is a plausible alternative explanation, it is not entirely consistent with the patterns of conditionality found in the results. Stronger adherence to democratic values would suggest blanket disapproval (i.e., an intercept shift) for all scenarios rather than the conditional patterns we observe (i.e., slope shifts). As far as the cognitive mechanism goes, levels of stigma are a result of a complex balancing act, involving concerns about societal costs, understanding of individual-level effects, and the ability to evaluate the relationship between contex-

tually specific transactions and democratic governance. Better-educated individuals can soften or strengthen the prohibition against vote buying because they are more capable of establishing sophisticated connections between specific transactions and their differentiated effects on societal values. In sum, if education were simply a proxy for democratic values, we would expect greater condemnation of vote buying across the board.

This study constitutes an important first step in generating systematic, comparative inferences about the normative evaluations of vote buying by mass publics. However, it is clear that the results require replication and further exploration. Not all of the explanatory variables were available in all three countries, and differences in experimental manipulation mean that comparing mean levels of stigma across countries, rather than just within them, would not be convincing. Moreover, our findings raise a series of substantive issues that scholars should address.

First, our survey items focus exclusively on evaluations of *client* behavior rather than *patron* behavior, but other work suggests that views of patrons may be distinct from voters' perception of clients who seek or enter into such exchanges (e.g., Kramon 2010b; Szwarcberg 2012; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). In this sense, research on citizens' opinion about brokers could further shed light on the normative system surrounding the activities of political machines. It is plausible to hypothesize a much stronger effect of the exposure mechanism on respondents' assessment of party operatives, with clients being more sympathetic, understanding, or favorable toward patrons than nonclients. Similarly, highly educated individuals may be more consistently unforgiving of patrons who ignite and sustain the clientelistic process at the expense of their clients' long-term welfare and of overall levels of democratic quality.

Second, the hypothetical vote-buying exchanges described in our survey items reflect a fairly narrow view of how such exchanges take place in practice, since vote buying is often more a part of long-standing clientelistic relationships rather than a one-off transaction (Stokes 2007). In addition, our experimental vignettes ask voters to think about a very specific form of clientelism, i.e., the dispensation of money for votes during electoral campaigns. More research is needed in order to fully understand the determinants of stigma under different electoral circumstances. Is the stigma lessened when the vote-buying transaction is a repeated interaction and therefore more of an established relationship? Do other forms of targeted distributive politics such as patronage, the provision of club goods, or cash-transfer programs exhibit the same level of disapproval?

These questions offer a great opportunity to further test the mechanisms of variation presented in this article. For example, following our theoretical framework, to the extent that conditional cash transfers are transparent programs managed under strict bureaucratic rules, reciprocity values may not explain variation in the acceptability of such programs. If this type of benefit is not perceived as a gift but as an entitlement, even those who strongly adhere to the reciprocity norm should not interpret a vote against the incumbent who enacts the program as a breach to the moral imperative of returning favors. By contrast, highly educated individuals may be more accepting of these policy initiatives since they reflect a move away from corrupt clientelistic strategies, which are detrimental to abstract values such as good governance and the transparent use of public monies. Finally, and also in line with our theory, respondents in countries with well-established public welfare systems may lessen the degree to which people condition the stigma against vote buying based on clients' income levels because poor families are relatively less reliant on the material support provided by politicians during campaigns.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Appendix A: Survey Design.

Appendix B: Case Summary Statistics.

Appendix C: Spanish Wording.

Appendix D: Clientelistic Party Coding (Peru and Nicaragua).

Appendix E: Regression Table, Nicaragua and Peru.

Appendix F: Guide to Supplementary Statistical Analysis.