

RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by
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Diploma Date May 2015

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ABSTRACT

There has been both praise and vilification of religion's role in shaping democratic citizens. By focusing on individual differences, religious motivations can help explain the complex relationship between religion and good citizenship, especially concerning the important topics of political engagement and prejudice. This dissertation will demonstrate that in order to understand the connection between religion and democratic citizenship, we must consider people's religious motivations. We must go beyond traditional approaches that only consider people's beliefs and behaviors. Religious motivation is a powerful measurement tool providing a richer framework than traditional measures of religiosity when answering a variety of questions regarding democratic citizenship. It is also a unique measure of individual difference with independent effects going beyond measures of personality, open-mindedness, ideology, and religiosity. The goal of this dissertation is twofold. First, it will establish religious motivation as an important measure that can greatly aid our understanding of the relationship between religion and democratic citizenship. Second, this dissertation will demonstrate how religious motivation can clarify religion's relationship with two specific measures of democratic citizenship: prejudice and political engagement. To meet these goals, this dissertation employs nationally representative surveys including a unique survey-experiment to provide evidence of religious motivations' important explanatory power. The findings suggest it is not what religious service you attend, or even how often you attend, but the motivation for being religious that best explains the level of political engagement and prejudice.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible if it were not for the support I received from several individuals. First, I must thank all of those people who have provided invaluable feedback at various stages of this project. I am grateful to my committee of Kevin, Robin and Nyron for their guidance and feedback throughout the process. This is particularly true for Kevin and Robin who have advised me from the beginning and helped me take this project from a few scattered questions and turn it into what is now a complete dissertation. Kevin's willingness to entertain all of my ideas, models, drafts, and chapters with quick and meaningful feedback has minimized the inevitable frustration of this pursuit. I am lucky to have a positive and friendly relationship with my advisor which has made all of those meetings an enjoyable part of this long process. In addition to my committee, Megan Mullin was always willing to meet for coffee and provide me with excellent advice and moral support whenever needed. Kathy Javian has been a great friend who served as a sounding board and editor with her willingness to listen to ideas and read scattered drafts. Secondly, I must thank those who have kindly funded my dissertation research. Kevin has graciously paid for multiple pilot studies and helped fund much of the research found in this dissertation. Joe McLaughlin and the Institute for Public Affairs was generous in providing funding for both my dissertation research and my graduate assistantship. Working for IPA with Joe and Michelle Atherton has not only made my many years of graduate study financially viable, but it has also made showing up to Temple week in and out pleasant and rewarding. Finally, I want to thank Lauren who has been with me throughout all of this. She is my motivation for finishing my work every day so I can get back to enjoying life with her.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Imagine on any given Sunday, in any church in America, observing three people sitting near each other in a pew. These three people see each other nearly every week, hear the same sermon and sing the same hymns. Current theories of religion and politics would lead us to believe that these three individuals should look alike in politics as they do sitting together on that pew. After all, they nod along to the same sermon, identify with the same religious tradition, and attend religious services at the same rate. While these aspects of their religious practice holds clues about their politics, they also paint an incomplete picture. We must also consider what *motivates* them to adopt their religious practices. They may all be sitting in the same row, but they may be there for different reasons. One may come every week to feel connected to the community he finds before, during and after his time sitting in the pew. He meets new people, sees his friends and genuinely enjoys the fellowship his church provides. Another man, while also enjoying the fellowship and community provided by the church, is there for very different reasons. He is a man of deep faith, someone who believes his relationship with God is both critical to his well-being and enhanced by his time in the pew. His time in church better connects him to God and helps keep his life on track, giving him the guidance to live a “faith-centered life”. The third man is there for a yet another reason. He is there on his journey to search for a truth that is as large as it is unknowable. He’s in the pew, not because he thinks he will find definitive answers to his weekly problems, but because he finds the search for existential truth to be rewarding.

Although these three people are only illustrative examples, take these quotes from real parishioners who embody similar reasons for being religious. Quote #1 is from someone expressing an external and social motivation for attending church:

"Though Mother and Daddy didn't go [to Church] except on Easter and sometimes at Christmas, Mother encouraged me to go, and I did, just about every Sunday. I loved getting dressed up and walking down there. From the time I was about eleven until I graduated from high school, my teacher was A.B. "Sonny" Jeffries. His son Bert was in my class and we became close friends. Every Sunday for years, we went to Sunday school and church together, always sitting the back, often in our own world."

In this quote the parishioner discusses reasons for attending that are purely external. He loves the act of getting dressed up and walking down there. He makes friends there and relishes the social interaction church provides. This is in contrast to the next quote which illustrates primarily internal reasons for being religious. Quote #2 is from someone telling us about when religion became about an internal connection with God.

"I had always been a religious person, had regularly attended church, even taught Sunday school and served as an altar boy. But that weekend my faith took on a new meaning. It was the beginning of a new walk where I would recommit my heart to Jesus Christ. I was humbled to learn that God sent his Son to die for a sinner like me."

Here the person being quoted perceives religion as a personal relationship with Jesus. Terms like 'recommit my heart' and 'for a sinner like me' are indicative of an internal motivation for being religious. Religious beliefs and relationships with God are internalized and affect the way the person views himself. Quote #3 is from a man explaining why doubts and questioning are an important part of faith:

"We would like to have an absolutely certain base on which to build our lives -- unquestioned faith in everything that the Bible tells us about God, about Jesus, about

a quality life, about life after death, about God's love for us. Perhaps we are afraid that opening the door to a little questioning might shake the foundation of our faith or anger God. But I came to realize that it is a mistake not to face our doubts courageously. We should be willing to ask questions, always searching for a closer relationship with God, a more profound faith in Christ.”

Here we also see a close relationship with God, but it is important to highlight the acceptance of doubt and how it is almost crucial to the religious experience. This person is searching for truth and a way to become closer to God but at the same time is uncomfortable with absolute certainty, especially when it pertains to religion.

The religious differences between these three individuals are differences in religious motivation. They may exhibit similar religious behavior patterns, belong to the same church, and adhere to a similar belief system, but there are important variation in what motivates them to be religious. These three men, as you will see, have a lot in common. They all attend churches within the Evangelical Protestant religious tradition. They each spent most of their lives in the South. They are all white men. And they were all President of the United States. The three quotes are from Bill Clinton¹, George W. Bush² and Jimmy Carter³, respectively. Despite the fact they all frequently attend the same type of church, we know these men are very different and we think of them as having a varied relationship with religion and using religion differently in their public life. The quotes give us a clue, albeit limited, to their motivation for being religious, and this motivation may help explain some of their differences. By determining where the drive to be religious lies, religious motivation creates an alternate gauge of religiosity, one that is disentangled from the particular religious

¹ Bill Clinton (2004) in *My Life: The Early Years* page 38.

² As quoted in Stephen Mansfield's (2003) *The Faith of George W. Bush* page 68-69.

³ Jimmy Carter (1996) in *Living Faith* page 26.

tradition, behavior, or beliefs of the individual, and instead indicates the role religion plays in one's life.

This dissertation will demonstrate that in order to understand the connection between religion and democratic citizenship, we must consider people's religious motivations. We must go beyond traditional approaches that only consider people's beliefs and behaviors. Religious motivation is a powerful measurement tool that goes above and beyond traditional measures of religiosity when answering a variety of questions regarding democratic citizenship. It is also a unique measure of individual difference with independent effects going beyond measures of personality, open-mindedness, ideology, and religiosity. Religious motivation allows for a more personal measurement, one that can indicate the place and import of religion in people's life – even if they sit next to each other on the same pew week after week.

What is Religious Motivation?

The three presidential quotes and the descriptions of the people in the pews highlight three distinct motivations for being religious. These motivations are connected to a long history of research within field of the psychology of religion, but have made minimal inroads into our understanding of religion and politics. In this stream of research the three types of religious motivation have come to be known as “extrinsic,” “intrinsic” and “quest” religious motivation. The extrinsic motivation is exemplified by the Bill Clinton quote and the person who attends church because of social or community reasons. The quote from George W. Bush and the person who attends religious services to deepen his relationship with God are examples of intrinsic motivation. The quest motivation is exemplified by the

Jimmy Carter quote and the parishioner who attends church to continue his search for existential truth.

Religious motivation was first measured by psychologist Gordon Allport (1954) and distinguished between only two types of motivations – intrinsic and extrinsic. Building on Allport's work, Batson and Gray (1981) added the quest motivation. This additional type was created in response to a critique that the extrinsic/intrinsic typology did not adequately represent the various dimensions of religiosity. Although religious motivation can be shaped by major life events, it should not be altered by changing pastors or churches, and as a psychological measure of motivation, it should be fairly stable throughout an adult's life.

Religious motivation is measured by listing a battery of statements and having the respondents agree or disagree with each statement. Each statement is connected to one of the motivation types and the more a respondent agrees with a statement the higher level of that particular motivation she has. For instance, a statement connected with the extrinsic motivation reads "The church is most important to me as a place to share fellowship with other Christians." The more the respondent agrees with this statement the more she is described as having extrinsic religious motivation. For each motivation type there are multiple questions and each response is added together to create a scale for each motivation type. Much like personality types generated from tests such as Myers-Briggs (Myers 1985) or the Five-Factor Model (Costa and McCrae 1992), each subject can be high or low on each of the religious motivation dimensions. Because of this we often discuss the characteristics of each motivation in terms of those who score high (or low) in a particular religious motivation even though the types are not mutually exclusive and each individual will have varying levels of each of the three dimensions of religious motivation.

Traditional Measures of Religiosity

Religious motivation is a different measure of religiosity than what is currently used in political science. The measures traditionally used have been grouped into three categories: religious behavior, religious belonging, and religious belief. These have become to be known as the “Three B’s”, although they will be referred to here as the traditional measures of religiosity. These measures have taken the field of religion and politics a long way, and have explained a great deal of political differences. They have been shown to be useful predictor of political variables such as turnout (Legee and Kellstedt 1993; Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt 1994), vote choice (Green, Kellstedt, Smidt and Guth 2007), and partisanship (Kellstedt 1989, Layman 2001).

Religious tradition is typically measured by allowing the respondent to self-identify their religious preference and then asking follow-up questions regarding denomination or affiliation. For analysis, the denominations and affiliations are often grouped into various religious traditions. Specific beliefs are measured in a variety of ways, but it is most common when dealing with a largely Judeo-Christian population to ask about the infallibility of the Bible. Other questions about beliefs are centered on the after-life, creation stories, and evolution. The purpose is typically to get an idea of how orthodox or fundamental the respondent is in terms of religious beliefs. Although there are a great variety of questions that are used pertaining to religious behavior, the most common is the frequency of religious service attendance. Another common religious behavior question asks respondents about frequency of prayer. As religious tradition, belief, and behavior vary, it is thought that their political preferences will vary too. Having a particular set of religious beliefs and behaviors are thought to systematically affect the political beliefs and behaviors of individuals. These

measures do have their limitations, however, and the three parishioners sitting in the same pew highlight those limitations. Like the three presidents, these men have plenty in common and traditional measures of religiosity would treat them as nearly identical. However, we can imagine those attending the same church just as frequently having vastly different reasons for attending.

Religious Motivation and Democratic Citizens

Variance in religious motivations can lead to differences in how religion affects other aspects of life. Previous research has linked religion to both positive and negatives for democratic citizenship⁴. To relate this to religious motivation, let us revisit our three parishioners with three different motivations for being at church. During the service it is possible they are encouraged to attend a political meeting by their pastor. There are important differences in how each parishioner might respond to the call to be politically active, and those differences are connected to religious motivation. The “extrinsic” parishioner who is motivated by the fellowship found in religion may consider the social aspect of the particular event when deciding to attend or not. The nature of the cause may be less important and it would be less likely that he would spend time researching the particular cause since that was less important to his decision to attend. The intrinsically religious man who is attending to deepen his relationship with God may have considerations related to the nature of the cause and if it coincides with his personal religious views. If he did not already know enough about the specific cause he would be more likely to research and ponder how it fit with his beliefs. The parishioner with the quest motivation may decide

⁴ See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of religion’s connection with democratic citizenship.

to take part in the political event based on the nature of the activity. He may be uncomfortable with the event if it required truth professing instead of truth seeking.

The differences highlighted in this hypothetical example are ones not taken in account by traditional measures of religiosity and are best explained by religious motivation. Religion has a complicated relationship with democracy. There are debates as to whether religion is a positive or negative force in creating better citizens. Even two of the founding fathers of modern liberal democracy disagreed on the role of religion. John Locke, although distrustful of religious enthusiasts and extremists believed that some type of religious belief was key to social contracts saying “Promises, covenants and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an Atheist” (Locke 1689, 51). In opposition to Locke, John Stuart Mill believed religion to be a corrupting force in the rational capabilities of humans and the deliberation necessary in democracy. He believes “that there is a very real evil consequent on ascribing a supernatural origin to the received maxims of morality. That origin consecrates the whole of them, and protects them from being discussed or criticized” (Mill 1874, 99). Although the views on how it affects the political system are varied, there is a general consensus that religion has the ability to alter the way democracy functions. From a distance it appears that religion offers a mixed bag for democracy. It can provide moral structure, civic engagement and interpersonal trust, but can also foster intolerance, intergroup conflict and dogmatic beliefs. Religion in democracy presents a paradox: democracy is both aided and hindered by religion. Past research using traditional measures of religiosity, as will be shown in the next chapter, have left the relationship between religion and good citizenship largely unexplained. The main argument of this dissertation is that the concept and measurement of religious motivation can take us much further in our understanding of the complex relationship between religion and democratic citizenship.

Previous research have suggested various mechanisms connecting religion to democratic citizenship. Some claim religion creates better citizens and others suggest a negative relationship with good citizenship. When evaluating religious motivation's ability to clarify the relationship between religion and democratic citizenship, it is important to do so within the context of previous research and the causal relationship they propose. Table 1.1 provides a summary of four potential mechanisms that will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two and will be evaluated throughout this dissertation.

Table 1.1

Potential Mechanisms Connecting Religion and Democratic Citizenship
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Religion creates moral structure that aids in the creation of a civic culture conducive to democracy. - Religion creates social connections through an active, civically minded social organization. - Religion creates a well-defined in-group bias in society that is counterproductive for democracy. - Religious followers tend to have personalities, dispositions, and ideologies that are dangerous for democracy.

While there can be some debate on the exact characteristics of a good citizen, there are some traits largely agreed upon to be important components of a good citizen. This dissertation will highlight two broad attributes and dissect their relationship with religion. The first is how citizens view other citizens who may be different than themselves. Democracy may not need a homogeneous society, but it is aided when citizens can respect and value out-groups. Tolerance is an essential component of a functioning democratic system according to conceptions of both liberal and deliberative democracy. Those who devalue these out-groups are likely to show higher levels of prejudice, something that will be measured in different ways in this dissertation. The relationship between religion and prejudice is a complicated one. There appears to be a paradox where most religions teach

tolerance, kindness and love, whereas those who are religious tend to be less tolerant and exhibit higher levels of prejudice. This dissertation contends that the key to understanding this paradox is found in religious motivations. Traditional measures of religiosity have left the relationship between prejudice and religion largely unexplained. Religious motivation, however, can explain why we see some religious citizens exhibiting prejudice attitudes while other are more tolerant.

The second attribute of good citizenship to be examined in this dissertation is the level of interaction the citizen has with the political system. A “good” citizen within a democracy should be engaged with the political world so that she can make informed and reasoned political decisions. The better decisions made by citizens, the better a democracy can function. To determine the engagement of citizens, this dissertation will measure their levels of interest, knowledge and participation in politics. While most research connecting religion and political engagement has found a positive relationship, there is no consensus (or, there is disagreement on) on what types of religious citizens are most engaged. Religion alters engagement in a variety of patterns, but this dissertation shows that a citizen’s religious motivation effectively explains these patterns of political engagement.

Plan of the Dissertation

The goal of this dissertation is twofold. First, it will establish religious motivation as an important measure that can greatly aid our understanding of the relationship between religion and democratic citizenship. Second, this dissertation will demonstrate how religious motivation can clarify religion’s relationship with two specific measures of democratic citizenship: prejudice and political engagement. Before presenting the research conducted to meet these goals, it is important to first turn to previous research on religion and democratic

citizenship. In chapter two, the various findings of the relevant research are presented, and from them, a series of hypotheses are developed concerning religious motivation's role in explaining the behavior of citizens. These hypotheses are tested in the proceeding chapters. In chapter three, the concept and measurement of religious motivation is developed. Past research in political science has shown that other measures of individual difference are important correlates with many behaviors and attitudes associated with good citizenship. The chapter begins with a discussion of how religious motivation is related to, but distinct from political ideology, authoritarianism, dogmatism, the Five-Factor Personality traits, and traditional measures of religiosity. For each measure the relationship with religious motivation found in past research will be highlighted. Next, results from a national survey will be presented to illustrate the relationship between religious motivation and relevant measures of individual difference. This gives the reader a firm understanding of religious motivation and how it relates to more frequently used measures in political science. It also establishes religious motivation as a distinct and compelling measure of individual difference that is relevant to the study of religion and politics.

Chapter four examines the paradox between religion and prejudice by using measures of religious motivation in three studies including a nationally-representative survey-experiment where religion is primed through political campaign rhetoric. This chapter examines this paradox by asking four research questions. First, how do the differences between the religious relate to prejudice? Are some differences more important in explaining the relationship between religion and prejudice? Is the relationship between religion and prejudice altered when considering sexual prejudice instead of racial prejudice? And finally, is it possible to isolate religion's direct effect on racial and sexual prejudice to see its varied effect on religious citizens? This chapter demonstrates that individual differences in

motivation alter the relationship between religiosity and prejudice with aid of a nationally representative randomized survey-experiment. Analysis of the survey data confirms the persistence of the prejudice paradox in modern-day political campaigns. However, the existence of the paradox is not uniform across believers. Individuals possess different motivations for being religious, with some correlated with increased prejudice and others correlated with decreased prejudice. Importantly, these measures of religious motivation are more potent correlates of prejudice than typical measures of religiosity. Analysis of the results confirms that religious motivations play a key role in moderating the effect of religious campaign rhetoric on prejudice. Consequently, the relationship between religion and prejudice is more complex than previous scholarship has suggested and is contingent on individual differences in the motivation to be religious.

Chapter five tackles the relationship between religion and political engagement. Using data from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, this chapter tests the relationships religious motivation and traditional measures of religiosity have with political interest, political knowledge and non-voting political participation. Political engagement is fundamental to a well-functioning democracy, and political science has spent much of its history attempting to figure out why some people are engaged while others are not. Much of the research connecting religion to political engagement has focused on how religion aids in the ability or opportunity to be engaged. Putnam (1993) and Putnam and Campbell (2010) focus on the social experience of going to church and how it can build skills, interests, and social connections that increase a citizen's ability to be engaged. Other research has focused on how churches provide information, perhaps from the pulpit or from fellow parishioners, that increase engagement opportunities (Califino and Djupe 2009; Guth et al 2006; Djupe and Olson 2013). Whether it is learning more about certain issues or being told of an

upcoming political meeting or election, these studies state that religion engages citizens by increasing opportunity for action. The research presented in this chapter, however, will focus largely on religion's role in increasing engagement through motivation. Religious motivation is an indication of religion's place in a citizen's life. It tells us how religion is being used by the individual and how likely it is to affect all sorts of attitudes and decisions. In this way, the motivation to be politically engaged can be altered by religion. The findings described in this chapter show a variance in political engagement that can be explained by religious motivation and has previously gone unnoticed.

The dissertation will be wrapped up in chapter six with a summary of all the findings and their implications for the field of religion and politics. Finally, a few remaining questions will be asked leading to ideas for future research. By employing multiple data sources and collecting data on religious motivation never before used in political science, this dissertation will add to our understanding of religion's role in shaping the behavior and attitudes of citizens within a democracy. The findings suggest that previous research has over-simplified the relationship between religion and democracy by not accounting for the importance of religious motivation. Extrinsic, intrinsic and quest religious motivation are important measures of religiosity that expand our knowledge of how religion interacts with racial and sexual orientation prejudice and political engagement. The following chapter will begin by discussing the relevant previous research connecting religion with prejudice and political engagement.

CHAPTER 2:
**THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN OPEN-MINDEDNESS, CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT AND RELIGION**

Religious motivation is an important measure that adds a dimension to the measurement of religiosity missing in previous research connecting religion to democratic citizenship. It is a unique measure of individual difference with independent effects going beyond measures of personality, ideology, and religiosity that allows for a more personal measurement, one that can indicate the place and importance of religion in someone's life. In particular, religious motivation can help us understand the complicated relationship between religion and democratic citizenship. Previous research has both blamed and praised religion for its role in shaping democratic citizenship. It can provide moral structure, civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Locke 1689; Putnam 2000), but may also create intolerance, intergroup conflict and dogmatic beliefs (Mill 1874; Rawls 1993). Empirical researchers have studied the characteristics of a "good" democratic citizen for over half a century. Early works by Allport (1954), Stouffer (1955), Rokeach (1960) and Almond and Verba (1963) make various connections between religion and both positive and negative citizen attributes. Since these seminal contributions, much of the research on the relationship between religion and democratic citizenship focus on two main areas of study: open-mindedness and civic engagement. It is these areas, as demonstrated by the proceeding chapters, that religious motivation is capable of providing clarity. Before discussing the research conducted for this dissertation, it is important to first turn to the previous research

on religion and democratic citizenship in order to develop expected relationships. This will be the task of this chapter.

This dissertation draws on research from a wide array of disciplines. The independent variable of interest, religious motivation, has developed from the fields of social psychology and the psychology of religion. Democratic citizenship, the dependent variable, is being operationalized in two different sets of measures: prejudice and political engagement. Prejudice, and closely related concepts such as tolerance, dogmatism, and authoritarianism, have been connected to religion in the fields of sociology, psychology, and political science. Previous research on political engagement has largely fallen within the field of political science, but the closely related topic of civic engagement has been connected to religion within the fields of social psychology, sociology, and the psychology of religion.

While Chapters Four and Five will deal with the specific concepts of prejudice and political engagement respectively, this dissertation is drawing from measures and concepts used to relate religion to broader topics associated with these concepts. Open-mindedness is the term this dissertation will use to discuss the broader research associated with prejudice. Open-mindedness describes the ability to deal with differences and it links measures such as authoritarianism or intolerance to prejudice. This ability to deal with differences is important to the conception of both liberal and deliberative democracy. After discussing open-mindedness, this chapter will then turn to previous research on civic engagement which will allow for a review of research connecting religion to forms of engagement not inherently political. Increased engagement, like open-mindedness, is also considered a benefit for democracy. Much of modern political science assumes increased civic and political

engagement are normatively good for democracy, and this dissertation will follow suit.⁵

These broader conceptions of prejudice and political engagement will also allow for the discussion of additional research containing the religious motivation measure, and therefore aid in the development of mechanisms for and expected relationships between religious motivation and the two dependent variables. This chapter will begin by discussing the previous research on open-mindedness and civic engagement before laying out the mechanisms connecting religion to democratic citizenship.

Open-mindedness

A liberal democracy requires citizens to accept a society that is open to a diversity of people and ideas. Democracy is primarily a system of majority rule, but it also requires involvement and acceptance of political minorities. In the concept of deliberative democracy, each citizen must honor every other citizen's ability to express their preferences. Biases cannot invalidate the voice of minorities within a well-functioning democracy. These minorities may be racial or ethnic groups, or they may be groups representing ideas that are outside of mainstream thought. It is not necessary, and probably not beneficial, for all citizens to share the same beliefs, but democracy does function best when citizens recognize the validity of beliefs that are different than their own. In the concept of liberal democracy it is necessary to provide each citizen with a high level of individual rights. These rights become in danger when members of the majority are unable to tolerate differences of minority or marginal members. Open-mindedness, or the ability to value or respect differences of ideas, behaviors, or people – is something that has been studied in a variety of

⁵ However, some argue that engagement is not necessarily a good for democracy (Green 2004).

ways within political science. The measurement and operationalization of open-mindedness has taken a variety of forms and research within the social sciences have largely focused on four concepts: prejudice, intolerance, authoritarianism, and dogmatism. Dogmatism, like authoritarianism, is a cognitive style characterized by conformity and moral absolutism, but also focuses on the ability to insulate a belief systems from new or contradictory information. These four measures of open-mindedness will be discussed below within a discussion of relevant past research.

Prejudice and intolerance

Prejudice and intolerance are forms of open-mindedness primarily studied as uneasiness with diversity. In an attempt to clarify differences in the motivation for intolerance, Hurwitz and Mondak (2002) differentiate between generic and discriminatory intolerance. Generic intolerance, as they define it, is a dislike of a particular action, as opposed to discriminatory intolerance which is dislike of a particular group. Noting, as Hurwitz and Mondak do, that many measures of intolerance or prejudice conflate the two concepts, for the purposes of this chapter prejudice will reference discriminatory intolerance while intolerance will reference discrimination against a particular action. So that studies focusing on prejudice will focus on discrimination toward an identity trait such as race, ethnicity or sexual orientation. While studies of intolerance focus on the inability to bear a range of beliefs or actions such as white supremacy or communism.

Empirical studies of prejudice within political science have largely focused on attitudes toward policies and candidates. In the decades following *Brown vs Board of Education* much of the research focused on education policy such as bussing and school

integration. Gatlin, Giles, and Cataldo (1978), Sears, Hensler and Speer (1979), and McConahey (1982) all find opposition to desegregation to be more directly related to racial prejudice than to a utilitarian stand against the policy of bussing. Later, attitudes toward affirmative action policies have been connected to racial prejudice. Kukinski, Cobb and Gilens (1996) find attitudes toward affirmative action are related to racial prejudice, but that it does not appear to be the only factor explaining white opposition to the policy. Stoker (1998), however, finds stronger evidence in an experimental setting for a variety of racially prejudiced attitudes affecting opposition to affirmative action.

Other studies show that the acceptance of policies less overtly related to race, such as welfare and crime prevention may still be influenced by racial prejudice. Gilens (1995) finds that attitudes toward welfare programs are affected by racial prejudice and more specifically by a prevalent stereotype casting blacks as lazy and undeserving of government assistance. Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman (1997) find that prejudiced whites judge black welfare recipients negatively compared to white recipients under the same economic conditions. Virtanen and Huddy (1997) find that there is a difference in the policy attitudes of those who are “old-fashioned” racists and those who support negative racial stereotypes. The “old-fashioned” racists do not support any type of aid to African-Americans whereas those espousing stereotypes are in favor of individualistic assistance that aids African-Americans who are deemed deserving. Rabinowitz et al (2009) find evidence of symbolic racism in white’s attitudes toward policies that benefit blacks, but not towards programs that were more racially ambiguous or that benefit women.

In a series of articles Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz investigate the relationship between prejudice and attitudes toward crime policy. Their research suggests white attitudes

towards blacks affect the likelihood of seeing blacks as guilty (1997), favoring more punitive crime policies for blacks (2002), including the increased use of the death penalty (2007), and a softer stance on police brutality (2005).

Some earlier studies show little or no evidence of racial prejudice independently effecting actual electoral outcomes (e.g. Citron, Green and Sears 1990; Sigelman et al 1995), however, more recent studies using experimental and more survey research have shown the effect of racial prejudice on candidate preferences. Mendelberg (1997) finds evidence that the George H.W. Bush's famous Willie Horton campaign ad had an effect on the 1988 presidential campaign by mobilizing white's racial prejudice rather than just invoking their concerns about crime. In an experiment featuring fictitious candidates, Terkildsen (1993) finds that not only does the race of the candidate influence candidate evaluation, but that light skinned blacks were evaluated higher than those with dark skin. Piston (2010), through an analysis of the ANES, finds evidence that racial stereotypes negatively affected Obama's campaign in 2008. Using data collected through their Project Implicit website, Greenwald et al (2009) find that implicit racial attitudes predicted candidate preference in the 2008 presidential race even when controlling for explicit prejudice and political conservatism. Using polling and election data from over 180 electoral races from 1989-2006 Hopkins (2009) investigates the Bradley Effect, a supposed phenomenon where black candidates have electoral outcomes worse than what their final pre-election polls predict. It is proposed that the Bradley Effect is due to covert prejudice of voters who hide their racism during surveys but not in the anonymity of the voting booth. Hopkins finds evidence for the Bradley Effect throughout the 1990's, but does not find evidence for the effect for more recent elections including the 2008 presidential election. Tesler and Sears (2010), however, find racial attitudes more important in 2008 than any recent previous presidential election. Lewis-Beck

and Tien (2008) find no evidence of the Bradley Effect in the 2008 Democratic Primary where Obama's poll numbers and final vote percentage were not significantly different. However, Lewis-Beck and Tien acknowledge the findings of studies such as Heerwig and McCabe (2009) and assume that there is some percentage of voters who will not support a black candidate both in a poll and the voting booth. Redlawsk et al (2014) finds that symbolic racism affects voters' evaluation of Obama just prior to both the 2008 and 2012 elections. And building off of the work by Banks and Valentino (2012), Redlawsk et al (2014) find that emotional racism expressed as feelings of fear and anxiety can compound the effect of racism, while positive emotions such as hope and pride can reduce the impact of symbolic racism.

The sociologist Samuel Stouffer's (1955) monumental study of intolerance titled *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* is the foundation for much of the research in the social sciences on tolerance. The debate on tolerance has often centered on how to measure the concept and whether or not tolerance is increasing in the United States. Sullivan et al (1979) reinvent the measurement of intolerance by introducing the 'least-liked' method of measuring tolerance. Following Stouffer's method, previous research had asked respondents about specific groups that were frequently the target of intolerance. Sullivan and his colleagues argue that by limiting these groups to the discretion of the researcher the intolerance of the individual is not being truly measured. Instead, they argue that the better method is to allow the respondent to name their most disliked groups and ask about their tolerance of those groups.

James Gibson has researched the social conditions under which intolerance is likely to be fostered. Gibson (1992) discovers the evidence of the contagious social effects of

political tolerance by finding clusters of conformity. Those who are the most intolerant also feel the least free to express themselves and are surrounded by those in their family and community who are also intolerant. Gibson (2006) in an analysis of an extensive survey of South Africa finds that group identity, as would be predicted by Social Identity Theory, does not predict intolerance. Instead, it is perceived group threat and lack of contact with other groups that predict intolerance.

The connection between religion and intolerance and prejudice began in the wake of Stouffer's (1955) important study. One of the many findings to come from this research was that intolerance was found more frequently among the religious. This finding has been tested again and again with various alterations to the research design. Smidt and Penning (1982) distinguish between political tolerance and prejudice and find that the highly religious may be politically intolerant but still lack prejudice. They attribute this finding to the “hate the sin, not the sinner” teaching in many churches causing people be intolerant toward certain actions but still not express prejudice towards groups of people. Beatty and Walter (1984) find significant differences in tolerance levels between both religious denomination and service attendance frequency, with Baptists and those who attend services most frequently being the most intolerant. Jelen and Wilcox (1990) in a study to look at intolerance levels between religious traditions and denominations and find that once education levels are controlled for, there is very little difference between the tolerance levels of Jews, Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and Evangelical Protestants. This finding confirmed an earlier finding by Sullivan et al. (1981) who found that religion decreases political tolerance although they did not find that religious tradition (Catholic, Jewish or Protestant) mattered, with the exception of Baptists who are the most intolerant. Using an experimental approach, Djupe and Calfano (2012) find evidence to suggest certain inclusive religious messages can actually

decrease intolerance, but those who consider themselves to be “born again” are more intolerant. Eisenstein (2006) finds only indirect affects between religious tradition, religious commitment and intolerance. Instead, by employing a structural equation model, she finds doctrinal orthodoxy creates intolerance by increasing threat perception and by diminishing a ‘secure personality’ as defined by low levels of dogmatism and high levels of self-esteem.

The concept of religious motivation used in this dissertation was first used by Gordon Allport to measure different levels of prejudice among the religious. Allport was addressing a perceived paradox within the study of religion and prejudice: religions that teach love and acceptance tend to produce followers who are more prejudiced than the non-religious (Allport and Ross 1967; Hunsberger 1995; Rokeach 1965). Since Allport’s conceptual work (1954) that attempted to clarify the paradox and Allport and Ross’s (1967) seminal work which created the first measure of religious motivation⁶ there have been dozens of studies within psychology investigating religion and tolerance.

In the 1960’s this work looked primarily at racial prejudice, mostly prejudice against African-Americans, but there were also some studies including anti-Semitism. Beginning in the late 1980’s research began including the study of homophobic behavior in their research of intolerance (e.g. McFarland 1989). The findings from the early studies were clear: those with high intrinsic religiosity were not likely to be prejudiced, but those high in extrinsic religiosity were. This fit with Allport’s theory of religious motivation. The paradox of the intolerant religious was created by the non-true believers, the members who used religion only as a means to an external end. This type of religious person was more interested in using religion to maintain or create social status and norms. The true believers, the

⁶ Allport and Ross (1967) measure of religious motivation was called the Religious Orientation Scale.

intrinsically religious, have internalized the teaching of their religion and are therefore much more tolerant. McFarland (1989) produced more results that backed up the findings of Allport and Ross (1967) showing extrinsics to be more racially prejudiced. In addition, however, McFarland found that those with high intrinsic religiosity were just as intolerant as those with high extrinsic religiosity when it came to homosexuality. Only the quest types showed tolerance towards homosexuals. This finding was replicated in Duck and Hunsberger (1999) who also found intolerance toward homosexuals among the intrinsics (but interestingly not in extrinsics). In both of these works the theory as to why those high in intrinsic religiosity would be tolerant racially but intolerant toward homosexuality is related to religious teachings. Duck and Hunsberger (1999) asked participants about the teachings of their religion on both homosexuals and African-Americans. Intrinsics show prejudice when their religion taught intolerance (homosexuality) and did not show prejudice when their religion taught tolerance (racial). Two studies looked specifically at the relationship between intrinsic religiosity scores and intolerance toward homosexuals. Tsang and Rowatt (2007) found homophobic behavior correlated with intrinsic religiosity scores both using an explicit measure and using implicit attitude tests. Veenvliet (2008) found that intrinsics who are members of religions that teach the “hate the sin, not the sinner” distinction displayed less homophobic behavior than those where that distinction was not taught. The tolerance of those high in intrinsic religiosity appear to be related to the teachings of their religion, while those high in extrinsic religiosity appear to have a tendency toward intolerance regardless of religious instruction. As McFarland concluded: “quest does not predict any particular discrimination but rather a general anti-discrimination attitude. ‘Don't discriminate!’ appears to be the overriding attitude associated with quest, rather than favorable attitudes toward any specific out-group” (1989).

Dogmatism

The modern study of dogmatism in the field of psychology began with the publication of Milton Rokeach's seminal work *The Open and Closed Mind* (1960). As dogmatism is a word used frequently, often with a variety of intended definitions it will be helpful to define it as it is used in the field of social psychology:

A personality syndrome marked by a cognitive style in which different belief systems are well insulated from one another so that mutually contradictory opinions can be tolerated. Such belief systems are resistant to change in the light of new information and are often characterized by the use of appeals to authority to justify their correctness. A final characteristic of a dogmatic personality is intolerance, whether towards those who hold different beliefs or those that are seen as different or deviant in some way (Spears 1999).

As both religious motivation and dogmatism are related to belief systems and how one uses these systems in life, it is not surprising that there are a number of studies connecting the two concepts. Hoge and Carroll (1973), Thompson (1974), and Kahoe (1974) all found there to be a positive relationship between extrinsic religiosity scores and dogmatism. Only Hoge and Carroll found there to be a relationship between intrinsic religiosity scores and dogmatism, and this relationship was smaller than the relationship with extrinsic scores. The other studies found no relationship between intrinsic religiosity and dogmatism. In a more recent study, one that also included the quest type measure, Jankowski et al. (2011) found a negative relationship between quest scores and dogmatism. No significant relationship between extrinsic or intrinsic scores and dogmatism were found. These studies leave some confusion as to the relationship between religious motivation and dogmatism. It appears that extrinsics may be more dogmatic than intrinsics, and that quest types are less dogmatic than the average person. The studies referenced above utilize a fairly

small sample and one explanation for the lack of clarity in this research is due to non-robust relationships that drift in and out of significance depending on the particular sample. A larger and more representative sample is necessary to clarify the relationship.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism has been measured in a variety of ways, but generally is conceived as a cognitive style that values obedience to authority, has a need to conform to social norms, and believes in moral absolutism. Altemeyer (1981) updated and altered the authoritarian literature that grew out the post-holocaust era, particularly Adorno's (1950) famous work *The Authoritarian Personality*. Altemeyer's RWA scale trimmed down Adorno's original authoritarian F-scale, keeping only three of the original nine sub-scales. The three traits measured by the RWA scale are: Authoritarian submission, Authoritarian aggression, and Conventionalism. Conceptually, RWA and Rokeach's dogmatism are closely related but yet distinct. Dogmatism is a way of thinking that would underlie each of the three traits of RWA. The difference, at least in theory, would be that dogmatism is a personality trait that lets people hold on to the feeling that what they believe is correct despite evident contradictions. RWA is supported by the dogmatic personality, but necessitates a connection to an authoritarian figure or entity. Dogmatism can exist without authoritarianism, but authoritarianism cannot exist without some level of dogmatism. In empirical reality, however, the scales used to measure RWA and dogmatism are highly correlated (Altemeyer 1996).

The research done by Altemeyer and Hunsbereger (1992) tested the relationship between quest scores, religious fundamentalism, and RWA. The finding of this research

suggest a strong negative relationship between quest scores and RWA while showing a strong positive relationship between religious fundamentalisms. Leak and Randall (1995) found similar results that showed a negative relationship between RWA and quest scores. Wilkenson (2004) added in measures for extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, and found that both scores were positively correlated with RWA with intrinsic scores having a higher correlation. Wilkenson also found quest scores to be negatively correlated with RWA. The relationship between quest types and dogmatism and RWA has been fairly well-proven. This is not surprising considering doubt, the antithesis to dogmatism, is a prominent feature of the quest type motivation. The relationship between the extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity and dogmatism and RWA is much less clear. Early studies found extrinsics to be more dogmatic than intrinsics, but after updates to the scales and the addition of the quest sub-scale research has found mixed results for both extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity.

As the original focus of authoritarian studies was related to explaining the actions of the Nazi party in Germany and the Holocaust, it is no wonder that this attribute has been viewed as a normatively negative one. In addition to the proclivity to take part in horrible acts such as genocide, dogmatism and authoritarianism has the potential to affect the democratic citizen in more everyday situations. The concept of deliberative democracy requires citizens to come to the public sphere with some level of open-mindedness. Personality types and religious beliefs that preclude open-mindedness are a detriment to deliberative democracy. In addition, authoritarians and the dogmatic, by definition are more prejudiced and more likely to have negative feelings toward out-groups. This kind of intolerance cannot be productive for a well-functioning democracy. I have included a summary of the relationships between religious motivation and the various measures of open-mindedness in Table 2.1. A plus sign indicates the corresponding study found a

positive relationship between the religious motivation type and the particular measure of open-mindedness. A minus sign indicates a negative relationship. The ‘N/S’ indicates a non-significant relationship. In the next chapter, I will revisit these relationships by testing their empirical relationship through a large representative sample.

Table 2.1

Previous Relationships between Religious Motivation and Open-mindedness

	Extrinsic	Intrinsic	Quest
Prejudice	+ Allport and Ross (1967); Herek (1987); Hunsberger and Jackson (2005); Hall, Matz and Wood (2010)	- Allport and Ross (1967); Herek* (1987); Hunsberger and Jackson* (2005); Hall, Matz and Wood (2010)	- McFarland (1989); Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992); Duck and Hunsberger (1999); Hunsberger and Jackson (2005); Hall, Matz and
Dogmatism	+ Hoge and Carroll (1973); Thompson (1974); Kahoe (1974); Jankowski et al.	+ Hoge and Carroll (1973)	- Jankowski et al. (2011)
	N/S Jankowski et al. (2011)	N/S Thompson (1974), and Kahoe (1974) Jankowski et al. (2011)	
Authoritarianism	+ Wilkenson (2004)	+ Wilkenson (2004)	- Altemeyer and Hunsbereger (1992) Leak and Randall (1995) Wilkenson (2004)

Civic Engagement

Civic engagement is a citizen’s interest and involvement in issues affecting the public or community. It is fundamental to a well-functioning democracy, and political science has spent much of its history attempting to figure out why some people are engaged while others are not. Early on, religion has been considered an important factor when considering

citizen's engagement levels. Starting with Tocqueville, observers have noted the influence of religion on the success of democracy in the U.S. Tocqueville outlines his logic by saying "it is natural that they should hasten to invoke the assistance of religion, for they must know that liberty cannot be established without morality, nor morality without faith." (18, 2004) For Tocqueville, religion creates an essential moral foundation necessary for democracy to flourish. The morality of the religious inspire positive civic behavior. Other observers such as Robert Putnam (2000) have highlighted the role religious congregations play as breeding grounds for social connectedness and civic engagement:

Churches provide an important incubator for civic skills, civic norms, community interest, and civic recruitment. Religiously active men and women learn to give speeches, run meetings, manage disagreements, and bear administrative responsibility. They also befriend others who are in turn likely to recruit them into other forms of community activity. (66, 2000).

As can be seen from Putnam and Tocqueville, civic engagement has been connected to religion through a variety of mechanisms. Previous research has frequently chosen to focus on one specific form of civic engagement, among the many that exist, to make this connection. This chapter will group the research focused on the connection between religion and civic engagement into five categories: political efficacy, political knowledge, political participation, voluntary associations and helping behavior.

Political Efficacy

The concept of political efficacy has been studied for decades in political science (e.g. Lane 1959, Coleman and Davis 1976, Craig and Maggiotto 1982). Political efficacy is a citizen's feelings that her government is responsive to her needs and the needs of citizens like her. It also relates to the confidence a citizen has in affecting the political system. The

topic has traditionally been split into two separate ideas: internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy is a person's feelings about their own ability to affect the political system. External efficacy is confidence in the political system to solve problems and to respond to and do what is right for those it governs. Both concepts are directly related to participation in politics. Having low internal efficacy leads a citizen to feel inadequate and unable to affect politics and therefore suppress participation. This inadequacy may stem from a lack of understanding of the political system or a feeling of being 'just one person'. In either case, the incentive to participate in politics is depressed by the belief of being ineffectual. Low levels of external efficacy can also suppress participation, but in this case the feelings of inadequacy are not placed on the self, but on the political system. Participation in a political system that is believed to be unresponsive can logically be viewed as futile.

Abramson and Aldrich (1982) find that external efficacy accounts for a significant portion of the decline in turnout from 1952 to 1980. Finkle (1985) finds that there is a reciprocal effect between voting and external efficacy, so that as someone votes they gain external efficacy and are therefore more likely to vote again. Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenedyk (2009) find that internal political efficacy alters the response to policy threat. Those with high internal efficacy respond to threat by enlisting an affective emotion, anger, and using it to increase participation. Their findings also suggest that those with lower efficacy are more likely to experience fear and are less likely to participate. There have also been studies investigating factors that add or detract from political efficacy. Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) find, through a natural experiment, find that making a district size larger decreases internal political efficacy. Bowler and Donovan (2002) and Smith and Tolbert (2004) found that direct democracy in the form of ballot measures have a positive effect on political efficacy, even though Dyck and Lascher (2009) find no such effect. Using an

experimental method, Morell (2005) find that face-to-face deliberation can increase internal political efficacy under certain circumstances.

Political efficacy is a slightly different trait than the self-efficacy discussed in social psychology. Self-efficacy is an individual's belief in his or her own ability to complete a task, solve a problem, or over-come an obstacle. The study of political efficacy grew out of the self-efficacy literature and can be considered a specific application of the self-efficacy trait. Since no studies have connected political efficacy to religious motivation, the connection to self-efficacy will have to suffice. Fischer et al. (2006) found that intrinsics scored higher on Schwarzer and Jerusalem's (1995) self-efficacy scale than did non-intrinsics when being faced with an existential threat (terrorist attack). Using the same scale, Watson, Morris and Hood (1988), in a study about mental health and religion, found those high in intrinsic religiosity also had a positive relationship with self-efficacy, and that extrinsics had a small but negative relationship. Fife et al (2011), in a study concerned with the academic progress of African-Americans, found that intrinsic religiosity scores had a positive relationship with the Academic Outcome Expectation scale (Lent et al. 2001). These findings suggest that there is a relationship between intrinsic religiosity scores and having a greater sense of self-efficacy.

Political Knowledge

The assumption has always been that greater political knowledge would be beneficial for democracy. Much of the empirical scholarship has therefore focused on the causal mechanisms that connect increased citizen knowledge with a better democracy. Political efficacy, although itself a characteristic of civic engagement, has also been found to be a product of political knowledge. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1999) find that those with higher

levels of political knowledge have issue stances that are more consistent with their self-interest, at least as dictated by their demographic characteristics.

Political knowledge has also been shown to increase trust in the political system. Cook, Jacobs, and Kim (2010) find that increasing the information on the Social Security System also increases general trust in the political system. Increased knowledge can also allow citizens to make sense of new information. Taber, Cann, and Kucsova (2009) find that those with low levels of political knowledge are unable to coherently process new information or to create counter-arguments. High knowledge participants were able to process new information and create counter-arguments, albeit with a consistent bias toward their prior beliefs. Popkin and Dimock (1999) add, "In cognitive terms, the prior knowledge a citizen has provides the context in which new information will be interpreted and incorporated into candidate evaluations" (Pg. 118). Political knowledge also changes how citizens view political debates or fights. To those with low levels of information political fights are "hard to follow and become indistinguishable from a food fight or mudslinging." Popkin and Dimock (1999, 134).

Increasing political knowledge gives citizens the ability to express attitudes that are more consistent and aligned with their stated values. Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith (2009) find that those with low-levels of political knowledge have inconsistent world-views, as it pertains to egalitarianism and individualism, while those with high levels of political knowledge have very consistent views that also map well with political ideology. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) use factor analysis to investigate political knowledge's effect on attitude consistency across a variety of political issues. In doing so, they find that those within the lowest quartile of knowledge have no coherent attitude structure, whereas those in the

higher groups, particularly in the top quartile, show consistent attitudes. More knowledge can also change attitudes toward complex or multifaceted policies and stances. Popkin and Dimock (2000) find that people with more understanding of political institutions are less fearful of immigration.

There are also findings to suggest that increasing political knowledge alone can increase political participation. Even when controlling for age, education, income, political interest and news consumption, Popkin and Dimock (1999) find political knowledge significantly increases participation. Other research (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Larcinese 2007; Lassen 2005) also finds independent effects of political knowledge on voter turnout. Research conducted by Sanders (2001) suggests that citizens who expressed uncertainty about the characteristics of candidates were less likely to vote. Wattenburg et al (2000) find that those who vote, but do not make a choice on lower ballot races, are doing so because they lack the knowledge to make a decision. The connection between religion and political knowledge has not been empirically studied, at least directly. Political knowledge is related to higher participation (Popkin and Dimock 1999; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Larcinese 2007; Lassen 2005) and as we will see in the section below, religion has frequently been connected to increased participation.

Political Participation

The political action most associated with democratic systems is voting, and therefore it is not surprising that there exists a thick literature regarding voter turnout. In American politics this research is particularly rich beginning with Berelson et al (1954), Downs (1957), Campbell et al (1960), Riker and Ordershook (1968), and Verba and Nie (1972). The debates

in this literature have largely focused on who votes and why. Much of the discussion surrounding the rationality of voting began with Anthony Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) where he inferred that the calculus of voting rarely adds up. The act of voting has costs. It requires at the least filling out voting registration and then actually traveling to the polls to pull the lever and cast your votes. Downs stated that the benefit of voting was both related to the differences between the candidates and to the probability that a single vote will change the outcome of the election. Since the probability that a single vote will change the election is infinitesimal then the cost of voting is almost always larger than the benefit.

Riker and Ordeshook (1968) added to this calculus by inserting the value in voting as an end, not just a means to a desired outcome. A sense of civic duty or patriotism creates value in the act of voting regardless of the probability that a single vote will change the outcome of the election. Riker and Ordeshook's work stipulates that if the value of voting is large enough for an individual, then it is no longer irrational to vote. Findings, such as Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2010), suggest that social pressure may also provide added benefits to voting as an end. Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) alter this model by insisting that most individuals are uncertain about the potential outcome of elections. This uncertainty alters the voters conception of the probability that their vote will decide the election and therefore must consider the potential outcomes if the vote or abstain from voting.

John Aldrich (1993) reconsiders both of these theories and concludes that they both over-estimate the potential benefits and costs to voting. He views voting as a low-cost and low-benefit event, which explains why turnout is influenced by the closeness of the race, weather, or bake-sales at polling stations (Pomper and Sernekos 1991). Another factor in this

low-cost low-benefit event of voting can be something as non-descript as habit. There has been considerable evidence that, even when controlling for other factors, previous voting is a strong predictor for future voting (Campbell et al 1960; Green and Shachar 2000, 2003; Plutzer 2002; Denny and Doyle 2009; and Aldrich, Montgomery, and Wood 2011).

As with much of modern voting research, much of the foundational work relating to who turns out to vote was laid by the Michigan scholars (Campbell et al 1960) and the Columbia scholars (Berelson et al 1954). While both studies found that interest or attention to campaigns is a very good predictor of turnout, Berelson et al highlight the importance of party contact and organizational membership in turnout, while Campbell et al found that strength of partisan preferences and political efficacy were important factors for voter turnout. From these studies there have been many important works that have added to the knowledge of who votes in the United States.

Voting has been found to be affected by the resources voters possess. These resources can be those thought of as typical resources like SES (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), or more intellectual resources like life experience (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; and Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), external political efficacy (Campbell et al 1960; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Finkle 1985; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), or internal political efficacy (Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenedyk 2009). Each of these resources has been shown to have a positive relationship with voter turnout.

Previous research has found engagement, both social and political, to increase the likelihood of voting. Activity with volunteer associations has been shown to increase the likelihood of voting (Verba and Nie 1972; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990; Rosenstone and

Hansen 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Putnam 1993, 2000). The theories as to why associating with non-political organizations would increase political participation are varied. It may be that certain resources or personalities lead someone to both participate in social or community organizations and in politics. The act of being involved in voluntary organizations may increase your political interests, efficacy, or knowledge – all of which have been shown to increase turnout. Or, it could be that being a member of an organization makes it easier for political groups to find and mobilize a citizen. Engagement in politics, not surprisingly, has been found to increase turnout. Those who know more about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Popkin and Dimock 2000), are more interested in politics (Berelson 1954; Campbell 1960; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995), and have participated in politics previously (Campbell et al 1960; Green and Shachar 2000; Plutzer 2002; Denny and Doyle 2009; and Aldrich, Montgomery, and Wood 2011), are all more likely to vote. In addition, those who are stronger party preference (Campbell et al 1960) and who have had contact with a party or politician (Berelson et al 1954; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) are more likely to vote.

Voting is not the only way to participate in elections. Giving your time or money to help the electoral chances of your preferred candidate are also ways of influencing elections. Much of the research related to campaign contributions have focused on the effect it has on campaigns (e.g. Abramowitz 1988; Ferguson 1995; Coleman and Manna 2000; Jacobson 2003, Campante 2011). There has also been research on who contributes to campaigns and what drives donors to give money to campaigns. Mutz (1995) finds the electoral “horse-race” to be an important factor as to when donors choose to give money. When the preferred candidate is viewed as losing ground (and a challenger is making it a close race)

donors are more likely to give. She also finds that when the preferred candidate closes the gap between the frontrunner donors are also likely to contribute.

Gimpel et al (2006) study the geographic and social network patterns of those who contribute money to Republican and Democratic campaigns. They find a pattern that is drastically different than the red/blue map we see on election nights. Areas where Democrats typically do well in fundraising are also likely to contribute similar amounts to Republican candidates. Regardless of partisan leanings, and even income levels to some extent, there are certain zip codes that are more likely to donate to campaigns than others. Their findings suggest there is an important effect that social networks can have on the norm of participation in and contributing to political campaigns. Brown et al (1980) finds, not surprisingly that those who gave \$100 or more to a political campaign are older, higher income, and more partisan than those do not contribute. Their findings also show that those who give have higher levels of efficacy, and are as likely to give for public policy reasons as they are for personal materialistic reasons. Ensley (2009) focuses on the effect candidate positions have on individual campaign contributions. His findings indicate that when candidates take more extreme positions and ideologically distance themselves from their opponents they receive more campaign contributions from individuals.

Rosenstone and Hanson's (1993, Chap. 5) work gives us a glimpse at who does work for political campaigns. Not surprisingly, those who volunteer to work for campaigns are more partisan and have higher evaluations of their candidate than does the average citizen. They have slightly higher sense of efficacy, and are older and better educated than the average citizen. They are also more likely to be religious. Being contacted by a party official increases the chance of volunteering, particularly in mid-term elections. Verba and Nie

(1972) also find that those who work on campaigns are more likely to be psychologically involved in politics, but less community oriented than the average citizen.

Although Almond and Verba (1963) and Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1993) correlate religion with political participation, it is not until 1995 that a resource model of political participation is created by Brady, Verba and Scholzman. In this model church attendance, like any other organization, creates opportunities for members to build civic skills. It is then those civic skills that lead to various forms of political participation. However, in an attempt to look at specific factors within American churches that affect the participation of Christians (Djupe and Grant 2001) find no evidence for church-gained civic skills increasing political participation. Instead, they find political participation of Christians to be related to the political activity of the church itself and whether or not a member was recruited into political activity by a fellow church member. (Driskell, Embry, and Lyon 2008) add to this literature by looking at specific beliefs of individual church members. They find that, in addition to church attendance and activity in the church's organization, the beliefs of members affect their political participation. In particular, those who believe God is directly involved in world affairs are less likely to participate while those who believe in the importance of social and economic justice are more likely to participate. Wald, Kellstedt and Ledge (1993) found that church involvement significantly increase turnout in the 1988 presidential election. Shields (2009) shows evidence of mobilization and political participation gains directly connected with the rise of the Christian Right. Drawing conclusions from this literature is difficult. It can be said that the religious tend to participate more, but there still appears to be open question about exactly why this happens.

Volunteer Associations

Previous research provides evidence that membership in non-political organizations can influence the political behavior of citizens (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990; Putnam 1993, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). The manner in which participating in these groups affects political behavior varies across studies, but the end result has been fairly consistent: the more active citizens are in non-political organizations the more likely they are to participate in politics. A large portion of this research has been found within the social capital literature. Robert Putnam has made the case that even associations like bowling leagues and bird watching groups have the ability to increase political participation through increased social capital (1993). Kwak, Shah, and Holbert (2004) find that involvement in non-political organizations increase participation in public affairs, and do so by increasing interpersonal trust.

Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995) view non-political organization as a way for citizens to gain skills such as leadership, group decision-making, and public speaking that will then aid in future political participation. Ayala (2000) find similar results as Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, but he makes an important distinction in his findings. Ayala finds the effects of participating in non-political organizations are only found if the participation in the organization was voluntary. Work-place participation does not affect political engagement in the same manner than voluntary association involvement does. Ayala presumes the same causal mechanism, learned civic skills, but interprets his findings to suggest that the lessons learned during voluntary participation are greater than those learned in coerced participation. Keele (2007), in a macro-level study, finds that involvement in voluntary associations have a positive effect on trust in government.

Democracy works best when citizens are deeply connected to one another and develop trust with each other and the institutions that govern society (Putnum 1993, 2000). Membership in and identity with religious organization may provide citizens with the interpersonal connections necessary for a well-functioning democracy. If being involved in a religious organization builds social capital and increases civic involvement, it would then be expected that those individuals who attended church frequently would be more involved in their communities, have more trust in others, and give the opinions of others more value. Campbell and Yonish (2003) find that religious service attendance increases a variety of types of volunteering. In fact, increased church attendance has a greater effect on volunteering than education. Smidt (1999) finds social trust to be positively related to church attendance, but the relationship is best characterized as curvilinear with those who attend periodically having more trust than both those who rarely attend and those who frequently attend. Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland (2007) find trust of acquaintances to be slightly related to religious variables but only when key demographic and social network variables are not controlled for. They also find trust in strangers has little relationship with religion, and what connection it does have is negative (among Catholics and 'other' religious). Although there is evidence for religion's effect on some of the measures of social capital such as volunteering, there is contradicting evidence on its effect on trust. This difference may be related to Putnum's terms of bridging and bonding (Putnam 2000, pg 22). Bridging is the act of building social capital between different social groups whereas bonding is creating social capital within a social group. The evidence in the research discussed above suggests that religion tends to create more bonding social capital than it does bridging social capital.

Helping Behavior

In social psychology research, the connections frequently made between religion and civic engagement are through measures of helping behavior. This stream of literature, as with the open-mindedness research, frequently used religious motivation as the measure of religiosity. Helping behavior can be defined in many ways, and previous research varies greatly from Darley and Batson's (1973) famous "good Samaritan" study which had participants pass a person who appeared to be in need to McCrohan and Bernt's (2004) study of activity in community service groups. The findings in a large majority of these studies was that quest types and intrinsics tend to engage in more civic minded activity than do the extrinsics. Many of these studies altered the circumstances around the particular form of engagement. These wrinkles complicate the findings, but also provide some rich context in how religious motivation relates to democratic citizenship. In Darley and Batson's Samaritan study, there were stark differences between intrinsic religiosity and quest religiosity in regards to persistent helping. In the experiment once the participant stopped to help the person who appeared to be in need, the study altered whether or not the person told them she was fine and did not need help. Those high in intrinsic religiosity were much more likely to insist on helping than the quest types. The authors of the study theorized this was because intrinsics are helping because of an internal desire to help and that was not altered by the person telling them they did not need their help. Quest types, however, did not insist on helping after being told they were not needed because their desire to help was primarily to look after the collapsed person's well-being. If these findings can be generalized to other forms of civic engagement then citizen who are high in intrinsic religiosity will be engaged if they have the internal inclination to participate. This participation could be voting, volunteering, or attending school board meeting, but that participation may have little to do

with solicitations to be engaged. Quest types on the other-hand are more likely to respond to perceived and expressed needs.

A later study by Batson et al. (1989, Study 2) provided another twist on the helping behavior of the religious. In this experiment students were asked to help, under different levels of social pressure, a fictitious fellow student after her parents had died and she was responsible for the care of her younger siblings. When there was low social pressure, helping was negatively correlated with extrinsic religiosity scores, but positively correlated with quest scores. The type of social pressure placed during this experiment sheds further light on to the differences. In the high social pressure condition participants were led to believe that “everyone was helping” while in the low pressure condition it appeared that most people were passing on the chance to help. While this did not affect the intrinsics, the low pressure situation let the extrinsics feel as if they did not need to help in order to meet a social norm. The quest types, however, are believed to have helped at a higher rate because the low pressure situation exhibited a need that was not being met. In terms of the implications of a more general form of civic engagement, it can be theorized based on these results that extrinsics will be more engaged in the types of behaviors that are more public and where social expectations are set. Quest types, however, may not be as engaged in the most prevalent civic behavior and will opt for areas of participation where their actions will be of more need. Although the intrinsic scores did not correlate with either helping or not helping in either of the pressure groups, Batson et al (1989 study 1) performed another experiment that has implications for the civic engagement of intrinsics. In this experiment participants were told they had an opportunity to help, but that only a certain number of volunteers would be chosen to help. Those high in intrinsic religiosity were more likely to volunteer in the group where they were told the chances were relatively low that they would be able to

help than in the group where they were told the chances were relatively high. “Apparently, for those scoring high on intrinsic religion, the thought of helping counted more than the deed.” (Batson et al 1989).

Mechanisms Connecting Religion to Civic Engagement and Open-mindedness

There are many factors that could explain what type of democratic citizen someone may be. From Berelson et al (1954), Campbell et al (Campbell, P. Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960) and Zaller (1992), we know that education, income and other socio-economic factors greatly affect both the abilities and interest an individual may have in becoming a good democratic citizen. Religion too, has been discussed as an important factor in creating good (or bad) democratic citizens (Good: Neuhaus 1986, Shields 2009 and McGraw 2010; Bad: Rawls 1971, Habermas 2006, and Rorty 2003). Further, based on the research discussed above, I present four mechanisms connecting religion to positive and negative outcomes for democracy, with a particular focus on the expected outcomes for civic engagement and open-mindedness. 1) Religion creates moral structure that aids in the creation of a civic culture conducive to democracy. 2) Religion creates social connections through an active, civically minded social organization. 3) Religion creates a well-defined in-group bias in society that is counterproductive for democracy. 4) Religious followers tend to have personalities, dispositions, and ideologies that are dangerous for democracy. These four mechanisms will be discussed below, and will be integrated into specific hypotheses for the ensuing chapters.

Religion creates moral structure that aids in the creation of a civic culture conducive to democracy

In order for democracy to work effectively, a large number of the individuals in a society need to act with a sense of civic responsibility. Participation in politics, whether voting, donating to campaigns or attending community meetings, is rarely based on a rational calculus. The sense of civic responsibility necessary for democracy to function properly must come from some type of normative structure. A moralistic sense of what is right and wrong needs to be established in the society and political participation must be included as a part of the culture. Tocqueville believed that in the United States, this sense of civic responsibility was established primarily through a religious framework in communities that make up the nation. Religion alters the bounds of rationality by establishing the power of a higher being and an after-life. Behaviors, that without religion, may not be rational becomes rational once one believes that a higher power exists or that there is life after death. The definition of right or wrong within each religion can differ considerably, but most focus on behaviors that strengthen and provide stable structure to communities.

Most religions promote active civic engagement. By either implicitly or explicitly connecting civic responsibility to religious benefits (or punishments), organized religion creates a rational and stable motivation for individuals to be engaged actively in politics. This is made obvious by highly visible forms of civic engagement such as the war protests of pacifist religions (Buddhist, Anabaptists, Quakers), the evangelical Moral Majority rallies led by Jerry Falwell in the late 1970's and early 1980's, and by the role black protestant churches had in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's. Less public, yet more frequent, are the reminders to vote and who to vote for sent out by religious leaders, the value placed on

public and political service by many religions, and sermons labeling certain behavior as sinful.

The promotion of civic engagement as a moral responsibility should be particularly potent for certain types of religious motivations. Those with high intrinsic motivations will buy into the teachings promoting civic engagement as a religious responsibility. They will also be motivated to defend or attack policies or politicians that either promote or run counter to their religious beliefs. Therefore intrinsics may only be fully triggered to engage by certain political issues or by particular candidates. Those who are high in the quest motivation should also have increased engagement due in part to the moral structure provided by religion. Coming to religion with the perspective that doubting and ambiguity are acceptable allow quest types to meld their religious beliefs with their social and political values. Therefore, religion has a similar positive effect on quests just as it does on the intrinsics by increasing the motivation to be engaged, but the boundaries of what is and is not a religious cause are lifted.

Religion creates social connections through an active, civically minded social organization.

Democracy works best when citizens are deeply connected to one another (Putnam 1993, 2000). By being connected to each other, citizens develop trust with each other, with those who run their government and with the institutions that govern society. By spending time with each other, getting to know each other, fostering common interests and goals, citizens become more closely connected to each other when they join social groups or organizations. Being connected socially to others gives citizens more opportunity and motivation to become civically engaged. Membership in and identity with religious

organization may provide citizens with the interpersonal connections necessary for a well-functioning democracy. These connections, it should be noted, are expected to be of the bonding variety made among those who are likely to be most similar to the religious citizen. Bridging connections made among those of diverse backgrounds are possible through religion, but not as likely. The social connections made through religion are expected to affect all religious motivation types relatively equally, as the frequency of attendance is a more powerful moderator for this particular mechanism. Extrinsic motivation, however, may have an extra incentive to build social connections. Extrinsic motivation is interested in using religion as a means to another end, and making connections and being civically active may help toward that goal. Whether the end is to sell more cars, find a mate or get elected to the school board, those who are extrinsically motivated have the incentive to build connections.

Religion creates a well-defined in-group bias in society that is counterproductive for democracy.

Religious identity throughout history has created conflict based on out-group discrimination. From the Christian Crusades, to the Protestant-Catholic conflicts in Northern Ireland, to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, religious differences have been the cause of many long lasting and deadly conflicts. Democracy scholars have found that societies that are deeply divided by group conflict do not adapt to democracy easily (Horowitz 1993). In these countries with deep cleavages based on ethnicity, religion or class, there is typically a struggle to maintain a well-functioning democracy. Social psychologists have found that group bias is not only easily fostered, but can also create substantial conflict between individuals and groups within a society (Brewer 1979, Tajfel and Turner 1979). So, even though religious identity in the United States has not historically created conflicts as horrendous as it has in other parts of the world, the in-group bias it fosters can be linked to

conflict that is detrimental to a well-functioning democracy. Democracy has not endured in the U.S. because of religious identity, but instead has endured in spite of the intergroup conflict created by religious identity.

The propensity toward out-group bias generated by religion should affect religious motivation types differently. Those high in quest motivation should be relatively immune to this effect, as their open-minded disposition is more likely to reject discrimination and intolerance. On the other hand, extrinsic motivation types should be particularly susceptible to out-group bias. They are more likely to feel threat from out-groups and are less likely to have open-minded views toward non-traditional groups or behavior than the quest types. Intrinsic, too, are less likely to have open-minded views towards groups or behavior they view as contradicting their religious beliefs, and are expected to be somewhat influenced by out-group bias.

Religious followers tend to have personalities, dispositions, and ideologies that are dangerous for democracy

Much of democratic theory emphasizes the role of deliberation and open-mindedness as important characteristics of a good citizen. Having citizens that are not ideologues and are willing to listen to opposing opinions and decide on policy positions based on merit is important to democracy, whether at a school board meeting, or in a voting booth. Religion, either through its teachings or through the individuals it attracts, tend to have personalities that are more close-minded, more dogmatic, and more authoritarian. In particular, dispositions such as need-for-closure (Saroglou 2002a) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Rowatt and Franklin 2004) are over-represented among the religious, particularly within the most active and fervent followers,

and these dispositions are positively correlated with prejudice (Altemeyer 1981; Shah et al 1998). People with high levels of need-for-closure have an intolerance for ambiguity and prefer clear-cut rules and structure. People with high levels of right-wing authoritarianism share a similar need for structure, but they also have a tendency to submit to authority and put high value in societal norms. These traits allow for discrimination of those who are viewed as outsiders or different. This will lead to the religious exhibiting intolerant attitudes and behavior that are considered dangerous for democracy.

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the previous research on open-mindedness and civic engagement, and shows how these two traits are associated with good citizenship are connected to religion. The mechanisms described above and derived from the previous research set up a framework for the remainder of this dissertation and the evidence it will present. Though there have been some studies linking religion to democratic citizenship, there is a lack of research connecting religious motivation to forms of democratic citizenship, particularly within the field of political science. In order to clarify the concept of religious motivation, its measurement, and its importance to political science, it is necessary to build connections between more familiar and accessible political traits. The next chapter will dive deeper into the measure of religious motivation by exploring how it relates to other more widely used measures of ideology, dispositions and personality.

CHAPTER 3:

RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND MEASURES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE AND RELIGIOSITY

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the goal of this dissertation is twofold. First, it will establish religious motivation as an important measure and second it will demonstrate how religious motivation can clarify religion's relationship with two specific measures of democratic citizenship: prejudice and political engagement. This chapter is addressing the first goal and will demonstrate that religious motivation is distinct from previously accepted measures and able to add to our understanding of political differences. Past research in political science has shown that other measures of individual difference are important correlates with many behaviors and attitudes associated with good citizenship. In particular, measures of ideology (Lane 1962; Miller and Shanks 1996), authoritarianism (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005), dogmatism (Rokeach 1960), and personality (Carney et al 2008; Gerber et al 2011b) have been used to explain a great variety of behaviors and attitudes. The individual differences being highlighted in this dissertation are three types of motivation for being religious, and the argument made throughout is simple: religious motivation adds to the understanding of political behavior and attitudes. The plan of the chapter is then to examine relevant measures of individual difference and religiosity by showing how they have been used in previous research, and then to demonstrate the value of religious motivation as an added measure of individual difference. This chapter begins with a discussion of how religious motivation is related to, but distinct from political

ideology, authoritarianism, dogmatism, the Five-Factor Personality traits, and traditional measures of religiosity. For each measure the relationship with religious motivation found in past research will be highlighted. Next, results from a national survey will be presented to illustrate the relationship between religious motivation and relevant measures of individual difference. The findings presented provide the first building block in the thesis of this dissertation: religious motivation is not merely a facsimile for previously used measures, instead it is a unique scale important to the understanding of the relationship between religion and politics. This is particularly true for extrinsic and quest type motivations, which are found to be particularly distinct from previously established measures of individual difference and religiosity. Traditional measures of religiosity appear to only partially capture the importance of intrinsic religious motivation, leaving the other two types of motivations largely unexplained.

The Previous Connections between Religious Motivation and Measures of Individual Differences and Religiosity

Political Ideology

For the purposes of this research, political ideology can be understood as a measure of how conservative or liberal respondents view themselves. In modern political science, the dialogue of political ideology began with the qualitative work of Lane (1962) and the more survey-based work of Converse (1964). The goal of both of these works was to gain an understanding of American political belief systems. The consensus between these studies was that most Americans lack a consistent political ideology, at least one that is both stable over time and fits into a broad liberal-conservative spectrum. Even though works such as

Zaller (1992) have backed, and even strengthened the claims of Converse, political ideology is widely thought to be an important explanatory and dependent variable. Work such as Levitan and Miller (1979) and Miller and Shanks (1996) show political ideologies to be consistent predictors of voting behavior even when encountered with cross-cutting party identifications. Kinder and Winter (2001) found a similar pattern when connecting social welfare attitudes to vote choice in the 1992 presidential election. Those expressing a clear ideological preference for a policy voted for the candidate who matched their policy position. A fruitful stream of literature, both in political science and social psychology, has shown correlation between political conservatism with psychological traits⁷. In most cases, scholars have associated conservatism with attributes generally considered negative, so much so that Tetlock (1994) has criticized political psychologists for having confirmation bias within their research (although see Sears 1994 for a strong rebuttal).

Much of the research connecting religion and ideology has focused on two partially related topics: the rise of the “religious right” and religious attitudes on social issues such as abortion or gay marriage. Groups who consider themselves members of the religious right typically define themselves by their socially conservative political stances. Research on the religious right has focused on its mobilization abilities (Shield 2009), its association with the Republican Party (Green and Guth 1988; Layman 2001), and its effect on elections (Green 2006; Guth, Kellstadt, and Smidt 2006). The consensus of this research, at least as it concerns the purpose of this chapter, is that the religious right organized around a specific ideology, helped mobilize voters, particularly when elections became about a specific set of

⁷ Jost and Thompson (2000) find a connection between conservatism and neuroticism; Altemeyer (1998) finds a connection between conservatism and self-esteem; Rokeach (1960) finds a connection between conservatism and dogmatism; Golec (2002) finds a connection between conservatism and need for closure; and Kinder and Sears (1981) finds a connection between conservatism and racism. For more examples and a review see Jost et al (2003).

issues, and helped the Republican Party more than the Democratic Party at the polls.

Research has also focused the set of issues that defined the religious right movement and the attitudes of the religious on these issues. Those who are religious have been shown to be more pro-life (Baker, Epstein, and Forth 1983; Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1993), less inclined to support gay rights (Kellstadt et al 1996; Wood and Bartkowski 2004) and in particular gay marriage (Olson, Cadge and Harrison 2006; Campbell and Monson 2008; Sherkat, De Vries, and Creek 2010). While there have been studies connecting sexual orientation prejudice or homophobia to religious motivation (Herek 1987; Kirkpatrick 1993), none have connected attitudes toward gay marriage or abortion policy.

The overarching argument of this dissertation is that religious motivation is an important measure that allows researchers to tap into an aspect of religiosity that is valuable when explaining certain behaviors and attitudes. It is also valuable to discuss the similar and distinct attributes of religious motivation in relation to other key measure of individual difference. As it pertains to political ideology, it is possible to see religious motivation as poorly replicated version of the liberal-conservative-liberal dichotomy mapped onto religion. In this framework, intrinsic religious motivation would be the conservative pole as this measures an internalized religious beliefs that are frequently hierarchical and traditional – feeding into the need for structure and stability associated with conservatives. The Quest motivation would be the liberal ideology since open-mindedness and low levels of need for structure as both associated with the Quest-types and liberals. Those high in extrinsic motivation then become the moderates in this framework. If this framework holds, this will be an interesting result. The questions within the religious motivation sub-scales are decidedly a-political. Furthermore, the questions do not even discuss a specific theology or religious tradition. The questions ask about the respondent's relationship with religion, what

drives them to be religious, and how sure they are about their religion. The potential cause of such a finding is that religious motivation measures an approach to religion partially overlaps with an approach to life and predispositions that correlates with the left-right political ideology. If someone is motivated to religion in a certain way, they are probably motivated in similar ways throughout different aspects of their life including how they approach politics. The hypothesis of this chapter, however, is that while there will be some correlation between political ideology and the religious motivation types the results will show that political ideology explains very little of the variance within religious motivation.

Authoritarianism and Dogmatism

Two canonical works define the early study of dogmatism and authoritarianism: Adorno's (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*, and Rokeach's (1960) *The Open and Closed Mind*. Altemeyer's Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) (1981) updated and altered Adorno's work which had grown out of the post-Holocaust era. Altemeyer's RWA scale trimmed down Adorno's original authoritarian F-scale, keeping only three of the original nine sub-scales: Authoritarian submission, Authoritarian aggression, and Conventionalism. Conceptually, RWA and Rokeach's dogmatism are closely related but yet distinct. The difference, at least in theory, is that dogmatism is a cognitive style that allows people to hold on to the feeling that what they believe is correct despite evident contradictions. RWA is aided by the dogmatic personality, but necessitates a connection to an authoritarian figure or entity. In reality, however, the scales used to measure RWA and dogmatism are highly correlated (Altemeyer 1996). Work by Feldman (2003) and Stenner (2005) have returned to an ideology independent conception of authoritarianism. Unlike RWA, this measure of authoritarianism

does not conflate conservatism, at least in the political ideological sense with authoritarianism. Their measurement focuses on different aspects of a central dichotomy: group authority versus individual autonomy. Those high in authoritarianism will have strong preferences for group authority and will tend to discount freedom of individuality.

The research connecting authoritarianism and dogmatism to religious motivation has produced modestly consistent empirical findings. Both concepts are negatively connected to the Quest type, which is not surprising considering doubt, the antithesis to dogmatism, is a prominent feature of the Quest type orientation (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Leak and Randall 1995; Wilkenson 2004; Jankowski et al. 2011). Research connecting RWA and dogmatism to the extrinsic and intrinsic types has been less clear cut. Some studies fail to uncover evidence of a relationship between RWA and extrinsic/intrinsic as well as no relationship between dogmatism and extrinsic/intrinsic, while some studies do. When significant results have been found, they are consistent: RWA is positively correlated with intrinsic religiosity (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Wilkinson 2004⁸); while dogmatism has been found to be correlated with intrinsic religiosity and tentatively with extrinsic religiosity⁹ (Hoge and Carroll 1973).

There is a good deal of similarity between religious motivation and both dogmatism and authoritarianism. Those with quest motivation clearly have a negative relationship with both dogmatism and authoritarianism. Intrinsic religiosity does appear to have a strong

⁸ Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) use the religious fundamentalism scale instead of intrinsic religiosity, however these two scales are conceptually similar. Rowatt and Franklin (2004) find positive correlation between RWA and extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, but the relationship is stronger with intrinsic religiosity.

⁹ Hodge and Carroll (1973) also find a positive relationship between dogmatism and intrinsic religiosity, but the correlation coefficient was larger with extrinsic religiosity. It should also be noted that this study did not include Quest scale, and that the authors were dissatisfied with the extrinsic scale employed stating: "The Feagin Extrinsic Subscale is strongly associated with prejudice, but it lacks a clear definition of what is being measured; we know only that it is not tapping extrinsic religious motivation."

positive relationship RWA and dogmatism, while the relationship with extrinsic religiosity is less clear and could be described as a moderately positive relationship, especially with RWA. As the Quest sub-scale has multiple questions about allowing for doubts within their religious beliefs there is no wonder Quest would be related to dogmatism. Because of the strong connection, both conceptually and empirically between dogmatism and authoritarianism it is not surprising that strong links have been found between quest motivation and RWA. Similarly, as intrinsics are the 'true believers' it is easy to see the connection with dogmatism and therefore a link with authoritarianism is not surprising. Extrinsic religious motivation does not have a clear relationship conceptually with dogmatism or authoritarianism. The questions in the sub-scale do ask respondents about their social reasons for being religiously active. This indicates their willingness to use religion as a means to a social end. It is logical that those who treat religion as an instrument may prefer the rules of the game to be dependable and unchanging. This leads to a tenuous prediction that extrinsic religious motivation would have positive relationships with dogmatism and authoritarianism as both measure a desire for stability and traditionalism. Again, the hypothesis of this chapter expects some correlation between authoritarianism and dogmatism and religious motivation, particularly with the intrinsic and quest sub-scales, but these two measures will not be able to explain large amounts of variance within religious motivation.

Five-factor Personality Traits (The Big Five)

The five-factor personality traits are the product of over a century of research attempting to classify the broad dimensions that people use when thinking about

personalities. At some level we are all aware of how we differ from others and how our personalities contrast with those of friends, family, and co-workers. Among lay-persons these traits are thought of in a great variety of ways, and for psychologists, this has been a long-standing problem. Going back to 1936 Allport and Odbert were attempting to classify the ways people talked about personality. Cattell's research (1944; 1957) identified a set of sixteen primary factors associated with the thousands of terms Allport and Odbert had found. Both Fiske (1949) and Tupes and Christal (1961) critique Cattell's working finding little evidence for the complex sixteen-factor system, but rather finding that only five factors explain the various dimensions adequately. The development of this research agenda was stalled for years until it was reintroduced and branded the 'Big Five' by Goldberg in 1981 and was soon examined by numerous scholars (e.g. Costa and McCrae 1985; Noller et al 1987; Watson 1989). The five factors, as they have come to be known are: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience. To measure these traits, various batteries have been created. This chapter will use the Ten-item Personality Inventory (TIPI) created by Gosling et al (2003) which is a shorter battery as compared with the dozens of questions within the Big Five Inventory (John et al 1991) or NEO-Five-Factor (Costa and McCrae 1992). Table 3.1 below lists both the questions used in the TIPI battery, as well as description of each factor (John et al 2008; Gerber et al 2011).

Table 3.1 – The Five-Factor Personality Traits

Five Factors	TIPI Battery Question (Negative traits reverse coded)		Description of Trait
	Positively Associated	Negatively Associated	
Extraversion	Extraverted, enthusiastic	Reserved, quiet	Energetic approach toward the social and material world
Agreeableness	Sympathetic, warm	Critical, quarrelsome	Contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation toward others with antagonism
Conscientiousness	Dependable, self-disciplined	Disorganized, careless	Socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior
Emotional Stability	Calm, emotionally stable	Anxious, easily upset	Contrasts even-tempereness with negative emotionality
Openness to Experience	Open to new experiences, complex	Conventional, uncreative	The breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individuals' mental and experiential life.

In summarizing the explanatory power of the Big Five across various fields of research ranging from economics (Ben-Ner et al 2008) to health (Goodwin and Friedman 2006), Gerber et al (2011a) states “these traits have predictive power in an impressive variety of domains but are not universal predictors of all outcomes” (pg 268). Within political science research using the Big Five have been associated with various political outcomes. Political interest is positively associated with extraversion and openness and negatively with neuroticism (Gerber et al 2011a). Frequency of political discussions is positively correlated with extraversion and openness and negatively associated with emotional stability (Mondak and Halperin 2008). Political knowledge has a positive relationship with openness and a negative correlation with conscientiousness and emotional stability (Mondak and Halperin 2008). Those who are high in conscientiousness are also more likely to join quasi-political organizations and become a member of a voluntary organization (Bekkers 2005), while those high in extraversion and openness are more likely to participate in political campaigns and

those high in agreeableness are less likely to participate (Gerber et al 2011b). In terms of political ideology, those high in openness are more liberal while those high in agreeableness and conscientiousness are more conservative (Carney et al 2008).

Several studies have connected the relationship between religion and the five factor personality traits. Many of these studies have used some form of the ROS as a measure of religiosity. The relationship is clearest between intrinsic motivation and the five factors. Multiple studies show a statistically significant positive relationship between intrinsic and agreeableness (Taylor and McDonald 1999; Kosek 1999; Saroglou (2002b); Henningsgaard and Arnau 2009), conscientious (Taylor and McDonald 1999; Kosek 1999; Henningsgaard et al 2009), and emotional stability (Saroglou 2002b; Henningsgaard and Arnau (2009). Rowatt and Schmitt (2003) also found a statistically significant positive relationship between extraversion and intrinsic motivation, while Saroglou (2002b) found a negative relationship between openness and intrinsic motivation. The strong relationships that have been found between intrinsic religious motivations and agreeableness and conscientious does fit with the profile of the motivation type. Accepting religious teachings as self-defining truths takes a certain level of willingness to suspend disbelief and ability to put faith in others – something that is associated with agreeableness. Piety, something associated with intrinsic religiosity is similar to the conscientious measure. Those high in conscientiousness view socially defined rules and norms as important and to be followed. Intrinsic relate similarly to religious teachings and traditions, and therefore it is not surprising that research has found a positive connection between the two measures. The theoretical explanation for the positive relationship between emotional stability and intrinsic religious motivation is less clear. From one perspective, religion could be viewed as a grounding force that centers and calms

individuals, but it could also be that those who are more grounded and calm are more able to devote themselves to religion.

Extrinsic religious motivation was found to be negatively related to emotional stability in two different studies (Taylor and McDonald 1999; Saroglou 2002b). Kosek (1999) does find a positive relationship with extraversion and Taylor and McDonald (1999) find a negative relationship with openness. No statistically significant relationship is found among the research reviewed for this chapter between extrinsic religious motivation and agreeableness or conscientiousness. The relationship between quest religious motivation and the five factor personality is the most complicated, mostly due to variation in how the previous research was conducted. It should first be noted that Saroglou's (2002b) research is a meta-analytic study that combines measures of "open-mature religiosity and spirituality" which includes quest, but also other somewhat related scales including spirituality measures. Therefore conclusions from Saroglou (2002b) should be viewed differently than the other studies connecting quest to the five factors. Secondly, Taylor and McDonald (1999) did not include a quest measure unlike the other four studies cited here. The quest relationship is also the only motivation type with contradictory findings. Research for both conscientiousness and emotional stability show both positive and negative relationships with quest motivation (conscientiousness: Kosek (1999); Saroglou (2002b) Rowatt and Schmitt (2003) and Henningsgaard et al (2009); emotional stability: Saroglou (2002b) and Henningsgaard et al (2009). Table 3.2 summarizes the relationships found in five previous studies. While some connections between the religious motivation sub-scales are expected, it is not hypothesized that the Five-Factors will explain much of the variance within religious motivation.

Table 3.2

Relationship between the Five-Factor Personality Traits and Religious Motivation in Previous Research

	Extrinsic	Intrinsic	Quest
Extraversion	+ Kosek (1999)	+ Rowatt and Schmitt (2003)	+ Saroglou (2002b)
Agreeable	No relationship found	+ Taylor and MacDonald (1999); Kosek (1999); Saroglou (2002b); Henningsgaard et al (2009)	+ Kosek (1999); Saroglou (2002)
Conscientious	No relationship found	+ Taylor and MacDonald (1999); Kosek (1999); Henningsgaard et al (2009)	+/- + Kosek (1999); Saroglou (2002) - Rowatt and Schmitt (2003); Henningsgaard et al (2009)
Emotional Stability	- Saroglou (2002b); Taylor and MacDonald (1999)	+ Saroglou (2002b); Henningsgaard et al (2008)	+/- + Saroglou (2002) - Henningsgaard et al (2009)
Openness	- Taylor and MacDonald (1999)	- Saroglou (2002b)	+ Saroglou (2002b)

Religious Motivation and Traditional Measures of Religiosity

The relationship between religious motivation and traditional measures of religiosity has remained fairly unknown despite the many studies including either of these measures. Psychology, social psychology, and the psychology of religion have used measures of religious motivations for decades, but infrequently include measures of religious tradition or denomination. Even when such measures are included, the studies are of convenience

samples such as undergraduates or church members. Previous research has not provided evidence to allow for any conclusions about the breakdown of religious motivation types and religious tradition. Nor has it asserted the percent of any large general population that may be high on any particular type of religious motivation. There is evidence regarding the behavior of different motivation types (frequency of attendance and prayer) and about their belief in Biblical literalism, but generalizing these findings from cohorts of 18-22 year olds or a few specific religious affiliations are problematic. In political science and sociology, there are many surveys of general populations on the religious tradition, behavior, and belief of the religious, but no surveys that include a measure of religious motivation.

There is scant empirical research connecting religious motivation to traditional measures of religiosity. From what is known about the religious traditions, some relationships can be hypothesized. Evangelicals are more likely than other Protestants to be fundamentalists, and since intrinsic religiosity has been positively linked with fundamentalism it would be expected that there would be a positive relationship between being an evangelical and scoring high on intrinsic religiosity. Previous research has shown that Mainline Protestants are more trusting of others than both Catholics and Evangelicals (Smidt 1999; Welsh et al 2007). Increased trust is also associated with more dense social networks and increased activity in secular organization (Welsh et al 2007). This evidence suggests, although indirectly, that extrinsic religiosity would be associated more highly with Mainline Protestants. As quest religiosity is associated with openness to doubts and uncertainty of faith – something disassociated with fundamentalism, the relationship between high quest scores and being an Evangelical is expected to be negative. As for the relationship between the religious motivation types and religious behavior and belief, intrinsics should have positive relationships with frequency of prayer, frequency of

attendance, and believing in the infallibility of the Bible. Extrinsic should have a positive relationship with frequency of attendance as it is a social and external religious behavior variable, but not necessarily with frequency of prayer. Quest should be less sure about the infallibility of the Bible and therefore those with high quest scores should have a negative relationship with the belief measure. It is not hypothesized that the traditional measures of religiosity will explain large amounts of the variance within religious motivation. This will be particularly true for the extrinsic and quest sub-scales where the connections between the measures are more indirect.

Testing Relationships with Religious Motivation

Data and Measures

The sections above have described the relevant measures of individual difference and religiosity, and how previous research has connected them to religious motivation. I now turn to original data to evaluate these arguments and to test relationships found in and omitted by previous studies. The data for this study were collected through an online survey conducted the second week of March 2014. Qualtrics recruited 800 respondents through a Survey Sampling International (SSI) panel. All respondents were adult U.S. residents, and measures are taken by SSI to make sure their panels are representative of the U.S. population on a variety of demographic variables. Although SSI draws from a large general population panel, this survey over-sampled Christians by setting quotas for different religious preferences. Table 3 presents the religious preference of the respondents for this study and the percent each religious group comprises of the total sample. In order to compare this over-sample with a standard sample of similar size, Table 3 also presents the percentage of

religious preferences from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES).

The CCES, also employing an online survey, recruited a sample of 1000 respondents aiming to be representative of the adult U.S. population. Table 3.3 shows the desired over-sample of Christians with over 10% more Protestants and Catholics in this study.

Table 3.3

Religious Preference of Respondents

Religious Preference	Current Study		CCES
	Number	% of total	% of total
Protestant	437	54.6%	42.9%
Catholic	257	32.1%	20.9%
Jewish	13	1.6%	3.3%
Spiritual but not religious	42	5.3%	N/A ¹⁰
No Religion	30	3.8%	18.6%
Other	21	2.6%	13.8%

The religious motivation measure consists of three sub-scales each with six items. Respondents are presented with a statement and asked to agree or disagree with it in a five-point Likert scale format. There was also a sixth option, they could respond that the question was not applicable, and those responses have been treated as missing data. Table 3.4 lists the entire religious motivation battery which is taken from Francis (2007).

¹⁰ The CCES does not have an option for ‘Spiritual but not religious’. Presumably some of the respondents from the ‘No Religion’ category and the ‘Other’ category would have chosen the Spiritual option had it been available.

Table 3.4


Religious Motivation Questions

<p>Prompt: "For each of the following statements please mark whether you strongly disagree, disagree, have no opinion, agree or strongly agree." 5-point Likert Scale.</p>
<p>Extrinsic</p>
<p>While I am a religious person, I do not let religion influence my daily life. Occasionally, I compromise my religious beliefs to protect my social and economic well-being. One reason for me going to church is that it helps to establish me in the community. I go to church because it helps me to feel at home in my neighborhood. One reason for me praying is that it helps me to gain relief and protection. I pray chiefly because it makes me feel better.</p>
<p>Intrinsic</p>
<p>My religious beliefs really shape my whole approach to life. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life. I allow almost nothing to prevent me from going to church on Sundays. The church is most important to me as a place to share fellowship with other Christians. I pray at home because it helps me to be aware of God's presence. I pray chiefly because it deepens my relationship with God.</p>
<p>Quest</p>
<p>I was driven to ask religious questions by a growing awareness of the tensions in my world. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious beliefs. I value my religious doubts and uncertainties. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious. As I grow and change, I expect my religion to grow and change as well . I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.</p>
<p><small>Francis's (2007) adaptation of the scale originally used by Allport and Ross (1967) and Batson (1981).</small></p>

Figure 3.1 presents the frequency distribution and lists the mean, standard deviation, and Cronbach's Alpha for each of the sub-scales from the March 2014 SSI Panel Survey.

Intrinsic religious motivation has the largest mean at 21.5 out of a potential 30 (and a minimum of 6), but also has the largest standard deviation at 5.4. Extrinsic religious motivation has the smallest mean at 17.6, with quest religious motivation less than a point higher at 18.4. The figure shows that the extrinsic and quest sub-scales have a pattern not very different from the normal distribution centering near the center of the graph. The intrinsic sub-scale, however, peaks at a higher score of 22-24 and still has relatively high frequencies at the right tail.

Figure 3.1



Frequency Distribution of Religious Motivation Sub-scales

In addition to the religious motivation items, respondents were asked other questions about their religious belonging, belief, and behavior. For religious belonging, respondents were asked about the tradition of their religious preference. For religious belief, respondents were asked about their thoughts on the Bible, specifically about whether the Bible is the literal word of God, inspired by God, or a book of fables. Religious behavior is measured by two variables. The first is frequency of prayer, and the second is the frequency of religious service attendance. Eight measures of individual differences are also measured. These measures are political ideology, dogmatism, authoritarianism and the five-factor personality traits: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientious, emotional stability, and openness. Appendix A lists the various measures used for each of the eight measures of individual differences.

Results

The first step in testing the relationship between religious motivation, traditional measures of religiosity and measures of individual differences is to analyze the pairwise correlations between each of the measures. This has two primary benefits. First, it adds to the description of the religious motivation measures. The correlations will provide evidence of the raw relationships between a variety of measures through the sampling of a nationally representative panel – something that has not been done previously in published studies of religious motivation. Second, it also describes the other measures of individual difference by showing how they relate to the measures of ideology, dogmatism, authoritarianism, and personality. For instance, the correlations between political ideology and the five-factor personality traits help to explain the politics of the five-factors. For the purpose of presentation, the correlations are broken into two tables with one table containing the

religious motivation sub-scales and the traditional measures of religiosity and another table containing the religious motivation sub-scales and the remaining eight measures of individual difference¹¹. The first set of correlations can be found in Table 3.5 which shows the pairwise correlations between each of the three religious motivation sub-scales, dummy variables for evangelical protestant, mainline protestant, and catholic religious traditions and the two measures of religious behavior. Extrinsic religiosity is positively associated with being Catholic and a slight increase in religious service attendance and belief in biblical literalism. Extrinsic religiosity has a negative relationship with being evangelical. Unsurprisingly, intrinsic religiosity is positively associated with being an evangelical protestant, increased attendance and prayer, and biblical literalism. Quest religiosity has a small but negative relationship with being evangelical, biblical literalism, frequency of prayer and attendance, and a small positive relationship with being Catholic. While there are some patterns that emerge among the religious traditions, with intrinsic religiosity associated with being evangelical and extrinsic and quest religiosity negatively associated (and the opposite being true for mainline Protestants and Catholics), the patterns for the behavior and belief measures are different. Extrinsic are more closely matched with intrinsic religiosity for biblical literalism and religious service attendance, with quest types having a negative relationship. Figure 3.2 graphically presents the pairwise correlations found in Table 3.5. The purpose of this exercise is both to describe the measures of religious motivation by comparing them to traditional measures of religiosity and to demonstrate that while there are some relationships between the two measures they stand rather distinct from each other. Only intrinsic religious motivation has correlations higher than .5 with any of the traditional measures of religiosity.

¹¹ Appendix B contains the pairwise correlations of all variables used in this chapter.


Table 3.5

Correlation of Religious Motivation and Traditional Measures of Religiosity

	Extrinsic	Intrinsic	Quest	Evangelical	Mainline	Catholic	Bible	Prayer
Intrinsic	0.245							
P> t	0.000							
Quest	0.449	-0.033						
P> t	0.000	0.405						
Evangelical	-0.165	0.367	-0.131					
P> t	0.000	0.000	0.000					
Mainline	0.033	-0.160	0.014	-0.375				
P> t	0.393	0.000	0.714	0.000				
Catholic	0.178	-0.055	0.116	-0.448	-0.396			
P> t	0.000	0.157	0.002	0.000	0.000			
Bible	0.082	0.582	-0.189	0.440	-0.113	-0.134		
P> t	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000		
Prayer	-0.034	0.572	-0.126	0.353	-0.119	-0.115	0.420	
P> t	0.382	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	
Attend	0.093	0.642	-0.079	0.317	-0.177	0.035	0.379	0.448
P> t	0.016	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.000	0.329	0.000	0.000

Pairwise correlations. Bold indicates $p < .05$

Figure 3.2



Pairwise Correlation Religious Motivation and Traditional Measures of Religiosity

Next, the results of the pairwise correlations between the religious motivation sub-scales and eight different measures of individual differences are presented in Table 3.6. The results show intrinsic having a positive relationship with conservatism while both extrinsic and quest religiosity have a negative relationship. Both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity is positively correlated with increased dogmatism, and only intrinsic religiosity is positively correlated with authoritarianism while quest religiosity has a negative relationship. Turning to the five-factor personality traits, neither extraversion nor openness to experience have any statistically significant correlations with any of the religious motivation sub-scales. Agreeableness follows the pattern of conservatism with intrinsic religiosity having a positive relationship and both extrinsic and quest religiosity having negative relationships. This pattern holds for emotional stability as well, and nearly so for conscientious, save for a non-significant relationship with intrinsic religiosity. Political conservatism has a positive relationship with both dogmatism and authoritarianism and a negative correction with

openness to experience. The purpose of this exercise is both to describe the measures of religious motivation by comparing them to frequently used measures of individual difference and to demonstrate that while there are some relationships between the two measures they stand rather distinct from each other. None of the religious motivation types have a correlations higher than .3 with any of the other measures of individual difference. Table 3.7 highlights the correlation between religious motivation and the five-factor personality traits by comparing the findings of past research and this study.

Table 3.6

Pairwise Correlation Religious Motivation and Individual Differences

	Extrinsic	Intrinsic	Quest	Ideology	Dogma- tism	Author- itarianism	Extra- version	Agree- ableness	Conscien- tious	Emotional Stability
Intrinsic	0.245									
p> t	0.000									
Quest	0.449	-0.033								
p> t	0.000	0.405								
Ideology	-0.161	0.220	-0.249							
p> t	0.000	0.000	0.000							
Dogmatism	0.089	0.214	-0.031	0.187						
p> t	0.021	0.000	0.411	0.000						
Authoritarianism	0.012	0.238	-0.205	0.308	0.293					
p> t	0.759	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000					
Extraversion	0.070	0.031	-0.033	-0.062	-0.059	-0.051				
p> t	0.068	0.421	0.370	0.094	0.093	0.147				
Agreeableness	-0.228	0.091	-0.228	0.023	-0.115	0.011	0.049			
p> t	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.527	0.001	0.760	0.169			
Conscientious	-0.196	0.058	-0.255	0.048	-0.067	0.052	0.211	0.402		
p> t	0.000	0.132	0.000	0.193	0.059	0.139	0.000	0.000		
Emotional Stability	-0.131	0.076	-0.234	0.045	-0.066	0.003	0.258	0.377	0.482	
p> t	0.001	0.050	0.000	0.228	0.062	0.935	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Openness	0.047	0.058	0.047	-0.177	-0.090	-0.193	0.392	0.205	0.269	0.281
p> t	0.216	0.135	0.204	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Pairwise correlations. Bold indicates $p < .05$

Table 3.7

Five-factor Personality and Religious Motivation: Previous Research and Pairwise Correlations

	Extrinsic		Intrinsic		Quest	
	Previous Research	This Study	Previous Research	This Study	Previous Research	This Study
Extraversion	+ Kosek (1999)	NS+	+ Rowatt and Schmitt (2003)	NS+	+ Saroglou (2002)	NS-
Agreeable	No relationship found	-0.23	+ Taylor and MacDonald (1999); Kosek (1999); Saroglou (2002); Henningsgaard et al (2009)	0.09	+ Kosek (1999); Saroglou (2002)	-0.23
Conscientious	No relationship found	-0.20	+ Taylor and MacDonald (1999); Kosek (1999); Henningsgaard et al (2009)	NS+	+/- - Kosek (1999); Saroglou (2002); Rowatt & Schmitt (2003); Henningsgaard et al (2008)	-0.25
Emotional Stability	- Saroglou (2002); Taylor and MacDonald (1999)	-0.13	+ Saroglou (2002); Henningsgaard et al (2008)	0.08	+/- - Saroglou (2002); Henningsgaard et al (2008)	-0.23
Openness	- Taylor and MacDonald (1999)	NS+	- Saroglou (2002)	NS+	+ Saroglou (2002)	NS+

For extrinsic religiosity there is only one relationship found in more than one study, and that was a negative relationship with emotional stability. The findings of this study confirm this relationship with a small but statistically significant negative relationship. Kosek’s (1999) finding of a positive relationship is also found in this study, but the finding is not significant. No other study referenced in this chapter found relationships with extrinsic religiosity and agreeableness or conscientiousness, but this study found a significant negative relationship with both. And while Taylor and MacDonald (1999) find a negative relationship between extrinsic religiosity and openness to experience, the results of this study point to a positive but non-significant relationship. As for intrinsic religiosity, previous research had found a consistently positive relationship with agreeableness, conscientiousness, and

emotional stability. The findings of this study confirm those findings, although the positive relationship is only statistically significant for agreeableness and emotional stability. Rowatt and Schmitt (2003) find a positive relationship between intrinsic religiosity and extraversion, and while this study also finds a positive relationship the coefficient is not statistically significant. The previous research on the relationship between quest religiosity and the five-factor personality traits only had one repeated finding, that of Kosek (1999) and Saroglou (2002b)¹² where a positive relationship was found between quest and agreeableness. The results of this study contradict previous findings with a comparatively large and statistically significant negative relationship between quest and agreeableness. This study also contradicts Kosek's (1999) and Saroglou's (2002b) findings of a positive relationship between quest and conscientiousness, but confirms Rowatt and Schmitt's (2003) and Henningsgaard et al's (2008) finding of a negative relationship. Previous research also had contradictory findings on the relationship between quest religiosity and emotional stability. Saroglou (2002) found a positive relationship while Henningsgaard et al (2008) results show a negative relationship – a finding confirmed by the results of this study.

Pairwise correlations are useful in that they tell us the raw relationship between two variables in a dataset, but the key benefit of employing these measures in a representative sample is the ability to control for other important variables and isolate relationships to their independent effects. For instance, it is reasonable to have concern that age may be influencing religious motivation, so that those at different stages of life may have different motivations for being religious. By including age in the model, not only will the results show the relationship between religious motivation and age, but the effects of other variables in the model will be shown independent of age. In most analyses, religious motivation is an

¹² Kosek's (1999) findings are also within Saroglou's (2002b) meta-analysis.

independent variable because the research is attempting to prove its effect on some other variable of interest such as prejudice, mental health, or helping behavior. By setting the measures of religious motivation as the dependent variable the model then provides evidence of religious motivation's independent relationship with all of the other variables in the model. This allows for two important types of information to be made clear: 1) the coefficients and standard errors will provide evidence of the independent (at least independent from the other included variables) relationship between the measure of religious motivation and the variables of interest; and 2) the adjusted R-squared will show the total amount of variance within the measure of religious motivation that is explained by the independent variables in the model. The closer this number is to one the more variance is explained by the measures included in the model. If a few variables that are commonly found in previous research can explain a large amount of the variance in the religious motivation variables then religious motivation has little to no independent effects and it can be concluded that this measure is not necessary or important to account for in future research. If however these variables do not explain this measure then it can be concluded that the measures of religious motivation are not redundant to the other variables in the model and are in fact distinct.¹³

In Table 3.8 the results of three models for each of the three religious motivation sub-scales are presented. In the first model the eight measures of individual differences referenced above are included in the model in addition to the demographic variables of educational attainment, household income level, gender, and age of respondent. The second model includes the traditional measures of religiosity and the demographic variables. The

¹³ Note this does not alone necessitate that these measures should be included in future research, only that the religious motivation measures are distinct from these previously included variables. The following two chapters of this dissertation will provide evidence that religious motivation is an important measure to include in certain types of research.

third model includes the measures of individual difference, the traditional measures of religiosity, and the demographic variables. This design will allow a comparison of explained variance between the models and provide evidence about which group of measures have the strongest relationship with religious motivation.

Table 3.8

Regression Models for the Religious Motivation Scales

		Extrinsic						Intrinsic						Quest					
		Model I		Model II		Model III		Model I		Model II		Model III		Model I		Model II		Model III	
		N=632		N=681		N=632		N=624		N=671		N=624		N=668		N=723		N= 668	
		Coef	P> t																
Measures of Individual Difference	Political Ideology	-0.603	0.00	--	--	-0.628	0.00	0.801	0.00	--	--	0.007	0.96	-0.813	0.00	--	--	-0.720	0.00
	Dogmatism	0.239	0.02	--	--	0.237	0.01	0.473	0.00	--	--	0.220	0.01	0.148	0.17	--	--	0.200	0.06
	Authoritarianism	0.207	0.11	--	--	0.152	0.23	0.654	0.00	--	--	0.122	0.27	-0.371	0.01	--	--	-0.289	0.04
	Extraversion	0.135	0.02	--	--	0.097	0.09	0.026	0.73	--	--	-0.044	0.39	-0.030	0.64	--	--	-0.042	0.51
	Agreeableness	-0.270	0.00	--	--	-0.307	0.00	0.165	0.14	--	--	-0.100	0.18	-0.267	0.01	--	--	-0.250	0.01
	Conscientiousness	-0.301	0.00	--	--	-0.322	0.00	-0.057	0.63	--	--	0.037	0.63	-0.364	0.00	--	--	-0.378	0.00
	Emotional Stability	-0.056	0.44	--	--	-0.072	0.30	0.073	0.42	--	--	-0.075	0.21	-0.286	0.00	--	--	-0.278	0.00
	Openness	0.146	0.06	--	--	0.156	0.04	0.218	0.03	--	--	0.172	0.01	0.242	0.00	--	--	0.251	0.00
Traditional Measures of Religiosity	Freq. of Prayer	--	--	-0.113	0.31	-0.138	0.21	--	--	0.801	0.00	0.813	0.00	--	--	-0.142	0.25	-0.131	0.27
	Freq. of Attendance	--	--	0.204	0.02	0.304	0.00	--	--	1.120	0.00	1.144	0.00	--	--	-0.081	0.42	0.071	0.48
	Biblical Literalism	--	--	0.801	0.01	0.777	0.01	--	--	2.421	0.00	2.209	0.00	--	--	-1.335	0.00	-1.184	0.00
	Evangelical	--	--	-1.595	0.02	-1.219	0.07	--	--	0.391	0.48	0.449	0.43	--	--	-0.091	0.90	0.265	0.70
	Mainline	--	--	0.343	0.60	0.631	0.33	--	--	0.243	0.65	0.339	0.54	--	--	-0.019	0.98	0.143	0.83
	Catholic	--	--	0.955	0.13	1.168	0.07	--	--	0.360	0.50	0.597	0.27	--	--	0.633	0.35	0.869	0.19
	Non-religious	--	--	-4.711	0.00	-4.794	0.00	--	--	-3.020	0.00	-2.936	0.01	--	--	-4.079	0.00	-3.699	0.01
Demographics	Education	-0.007	0.74	-0.014	0.91	-0.041	0.74	0.071	0.65	-0.240	0.02	-0.237	0.02	0.281	0.03	0.350	0.01	0.226	0.09
	Income	0.119	0.39	-0.090	0.49	0.114	0.39	-0.253	0.15	-0.062	0.57	0.002	0.98	0.236	0.11	-0.156	0.30	0.143	0.34
	Gender	-0.446	0.24	-0.411	0.21	-0.384	0.24	0.324	0.46	-0.124	0.65	-0.118	0.69	-0.474	0.20	-0.379	0.31	-0.471	0.20
	Age	-0.050	0.00	-0.080	0.00	-0.046	0.00	-0.005	0.79	0.011	0.29	0.019	0.09	0.007	0.62	-0.044	0.00	0.002	0.87
Constant		24.932	0.00	20.775	0.00	23.591	0.00	10.237	0.00	9.549	0.00	7.441	0.00	27.643	0.00	24.200	0.00	29.944	0.00
Adj Rsquared		0.137		0.142		0.226		0.108		0.607		0.616		0.181		0.071		0.207	

OLS Regression. Bold indicates $p < .05$

Model I for extrinsic religiosity shows a strong negative relationship with political conservatism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and age. Extrinsic religiosity is shown to have a positive relationship with dogmatism, extraversion, and openness to experience


(marginally significant) in Model I. In Model II extrinsic religiosity has a positive relationship with frequency of attendance and biblical literalism, while having a negative relationship with being an evangelical, being non-religious, and age. In Model III the results from the first two models hold with some slight changes to the standard errors. The adjusted R-square from each of the three extrinsic models shows that the two types of measure have similar explanatory power with Model I having a .137 and Model II having a .142 adjusted R-square. In the combined model, the adjusted R-square jumps to .226. This result provides evidence that the extrinsic religiosity measure is distinct from the measures of individual differences and the traditional measures of religiosity. While adding these predictors explains some of the variance, there is a great deal of variance left unexplained by the addition of these predictors.

Turning to the intrinsic religiosity models, Model I shows a positive relationship with political conservatism, dogmatism, authoritarianism, and openness to experience, all with strong and statistically significant coefficients. Model II presents evidence of strong positive relationships between intrinsic religiosity and frequency of prayer, frequency of religious service attendance and biblical literalism. Model II also shows a strong negative relationship between intrinsic religiosity and being non-religious and educational attainment. The results from Model III, which combine Model I and II, provide evidence that the traditional measures of religiosity are more closely associated with intrinsic religiosity than the measures of individual difference. First, two of the four positive relationships from Model I become insignificant (and are not even marginally significant) in Model III. Only dogmatism and openness to experience remain significantly related to intrinsic religiosity. Secondly, the adjusted R-square for Model II is nearly six times higher than for Model I, and the difference in adjusted R-square between Model II and Model III is very small. This indicates that the

traditional measures of religiosity are doing a fairly good job of explaining the variance and therefore suggest that intrinsic religiosity may be only a moderately distinct measure of religiosity. This is also what we see in the pairwise correlations.

For quest religiosity Model I shows strong negative relationships with political conservatism, authoritarianism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability. Quest religiosity has a strong positive relationship with openness, a finding slightly different than the simple pairwise correlation which showed a non-significant relationship. In Model II the results suggest a negative relationship between question religiosity and biblical literalism and being non-religious. This highlights an important note. Although the traditional measures of religiosity do not do a very good job of explaining the variance within quest religiosity (adjusted R-squared of 0.071) that does not mean that those high on quest religiosity are not religious. As can be seen by the strong negative relationship with being non-religious, quest religiosity is a form of being religious, but it is just non-traditional. The findings from Model I and II are similar in Model III, with all significant relationships holding in the combined model. While the traditional measures of religiosity do a poor job of explaining the variance in the quest scale, the measures of individual difference do only slightly better with an adjusted R-squared of .181. The combined model does slightly better at .207, but the evidence suggests that the quest religiosity measure is rather distinct from measures of individual difference and especially traditional measures of religiosity. Figure 3.3 below compares the total variance explained by each of the nine models by graphing the adjusted R-squared.

Figure 3.3



Comparison of Total Variance Explained

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that religious motivation is distinct from previously accepted measures of religiosity and individual difference and able to add to our understanding of political differences. The first part of this chapter discussed each of these measures and how they related to the three subscales of religious motivation. The second section of this chapter presented results providing evidence that religious motivation is both connected to and distinct from previous measures of religiosity and individual difference. This is particularly true for extrinsic and quest religious motivation. While they show some relationship with other measures, quest and extrinsic religiosity remain largely distinct from most of the measures with very little variance being explained even in the full model. Intrinsic religiosity, however, is less distinct from traditional religiosity measures. The moderate level of intrinsic religiosity's variance explained by the traditional religiosity model provides evidence that previous measures of religiosity have partially captured one of three religious motivations, but mostly failed to account for the quest and extrinsic motivations.

To reiterate a point stressed above, this does not necessarily indicate that these other religious motivation types are indicating a lack of religiosity. Respondents high on extrinsic and quest religiosity are just as likely to express some sort of religious preferences, if not more so than those high on intrinsic religiosity.

The eight measures of individual difference used in Model I were most effective in explaining the variance of quest motivation and less effective in explaining extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Even in the case of quest motivation, however, the model could not explain eighty percent of the variance. Although there are some connections between religious motivation and the measures of individual difference, religious motivation is distinct from ideology and personality and provides an additional insight into the dimensions of individual differences.

Knowing the relationship religious motivation has with other measures of individual difference is important, but only part of the process of proving its value in explaining political differences. The next step is to show how religious motivation is an important factor in explaining critical aspects of democratic citizenship. If, as this chapter shows, the measures traditionally used in political science are missing a crucial dimension of religiosity – religious motivation, then does this added measure aid in our understanding of democratic citizens? In the following two chapters, religious motivation will be shown to be an important factor in two areas commonly thought of as critical for democracy: prejudice and civic engagement.

CHAPTER 4:
THE PREJUDICE PARADOX - HOW RELIGIOUS MOTIVATIONS
EXPLAIN THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RELIGION AND PREJUDICE

The previous chapter spoke to the first goal of the dissertation which was to establish religious motivation as an important measure that can greatly aid our understanding of the relationship between religion and democratic citizenship. This chapter will be the first of two to demonstrate how religious motivation can clarify religion's relationship with democratic citizenship. There is a long standing paradox within the study of religion and prejudice: religions that teach love and acceptance tend to produce followers who are more prejudiced and intolerant than the non-religious (Allport and Ross 1967; Hunsberger 1995; Rokeach 1965). Numerous studies have at least partially confirmed this sweeping conclusion (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Hunsberger 1995). However, there are differences between religious traditions, between religious fervor, and between the motivations that lead people to become religious. How then do these differences relate to prejudice? Are some of these differences more important in understanding the relationship between religion and prejudice? And finally, is it possible to isolate religion's direct effect on racial and sexual orientation prejudice to help understand religion's role in shaping political attitude formation? This chapter answers these questions by employing a unique approach consisting of a nationally representative survey experiment. The experiment employs a measure of religious motivation, and the results demonstrate that there is not a simple, positive correlation between religiosity and prejudice. Depending on an individual's motivation to be religious, religion is positively correlated with increased prejudices for some

and greater acceptance for others. This chapter contains three studies, including a nationally representative survey-experiment where religion is randomly primed in the political campaign context. The results of the studies demonstrate that religious motivation plays a crucial role moderating the causal effect of religion on expression of prejudice.

In the sections to follow, the mechanism connecting religion and prejudice is discussed, as well as previous relevant research on the subject. The expected relationships are laid out, along with the details of the study design to test the subsequent hypotheses. The presentation of the results, an effect-size comparison of the different religious variables found in the studies, and a discussion of implications of the findings will conclude the chapter.

The Mechanism: Why Should Religion be related to Prejudice?

To some the paradox of religion and prejudice is quite perplexing. Prejudice and intolerance are largely proscribed by religions (Batson et al 1993; Duck and Hunsberger 1999). The major religious traditions in the United States teach love of neighbors, tolerance, and mutual respect, so it appears prejudice persists among the religious not because of religious teachings, but in spite of it. There are several mechanisms that may explain why religions harbor followers who are more prejudiced than the average citizen. The first is rooted in the social psychology literature, and relates to intergroup dynamics and minimal group effects. Studies in social psychology show that it takes very little for individuals to exhibit out-group bias (Brewer 1979, Tajfel et al 1971). Even in a lab setting where the groups are assigned randomly and arbitrarily, people tend to favor their assigned group and discriminate against the out-group. Religion is definitely not an arbitrary group assignment. It marks clear differences between belief systems, ethnicity, worship styles, and communities.

Therefore, it is not surprising for some level of out-group bias to occur among those who believe, worship or look differently.

There may also be a more purely psychological mechanism for religion's relationship with prejudice. Previous research provides evidence that religion attracts more than its fair share of certain types of psychological predispositions – ones with a higher tendency for prejudice and intolerance. In particular, dispositions such as need-for-closure (Saroglou 2002b) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Rowatt and Franklin 2004) are over-represented among the religious, particularly within the most active and fervent followers and these dispositions are positively related to prejudice (Altemeyer 1981; Shah et al 1998). People with high levels of need-for-closure have an intolerance for ambiguity and prefer clear-cut rules and structure. People with high levels of right-wing authoritarianism share a similar need for structure, but they also have a tendency to submit to authority and put high value in societal norms. These traits allow for discrimination of those who are viewed as outsiders or different. For many, religion provides structure, hierarchy, and fulfills what their predisposition craves. Religion can provide answers to many of life's toughest questions and gives authority to those who can guide them to those answers. Therefore, religion attracts citizens with the psychological traits associated with prejudice and intolerance, and the practice of religion may also enhance such traits within individuals who are already predisposed to them.

Another mechanism is the effect of religious teachings, which can incite higher or lower levels of prejudice. Through sermons, songs, scripture study, and social interactions a norm of attitudes toward out-groups can be created by religious groups. Previous work has found that racial prejudice is more likely to be proscribed (discouraged) while sexual orientation prejudice may be encouraged or at least non-proscribed (Batson et al 1993; Duck

and Hunsberger 1999). Therefore, the mechanism between religious beliefs and sexual orientation prejudice is found to be stronger than is the mechanism connecting religious beliefs and racial prejudice.

Finally, religious motivations have been ascribed an independent effect on prejudice. Religious motivations, in this dissertation operationalized by the ROS, measures an individual's drive to be religious through three sub-scales: extrinsic religiosity, intrinsic religiosity, and quest-type religiosity. An individual's motivation to be religious may be an important predictor as to how he feels about various out-groups. It may also take into consideration some personality traits and religious beliefs that would lead to prejudice. What religious motivation tells us, independently of these other mechanisms, is how religion is used in that person's everyday life. The motivation to be religious does not simply just indicate how much religion is a consideration in everyday decisions, but it is also an indication of how religion is integrated into personal decisions and attitudes and thus translating into political behavior as well. Therefore, religious motivation should have the ability to tell us how messages, whether religious or political, can influence perspectives on African-Americans and homosexuals.

Connecting Religion and Prejudice

The concepts of prejudice and tolerance have been the subject of political research for decades. Democracy is primarily a system of majority rule, but it also requires involvement and acceptance of political minorities. Previous research connects prejudice, and its cousins, such as open-mindedness, tolerance, authoritarianism, right-wing authoritarianism, and dogmatism with various measures of religiosity. This area of research began in the wake of World War II and on the tails of several seminal studies in the fields of

psychology and sociology (Allport 1954; Aldorno et al 1950; Stouffer 1955). This research found intolerance and prejudice more frequently among the religious. Subsequently scholars have confirmed these findings repeatedly with various alterations to the research design. Smidt and Penning (1982) distinguish between political tolerance and prejudice and find that those who attend religious services most frequently are likely to be politically intolerant but still lack prejudice. They attribute this finding to the “hate the sin, not the sinner” teaching in many churches. Beatty and Walter (1984) find significant differences in tolerance levels between both religious denomination and service attendance frequency, with Baptists and those who attend services most frequently being the most intolerant. After controlling for education levels, Jelen and Wilcox (1990) find there is very little difference between the tolerance levels of Jewish, Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Evangelical believers. This confirmed an earlier finding by Sullivan et al. (1981) who found that religion decreases political tolerance although they did not find that religious tradition (Catholic, Jewish or Protestant) mattered, with the exception of Baptists who tended to be the most intolerant. Using an experimental approach, Djupe and Calfano (2012) found evidence to suggest certain inclusive religious messages can actually decrease intolerance, but those who consider themselves to be “born again” are more intolerant. In one of the few attempts at a comprehensive model, Eisenstein (2006) finds only indirect effects from religious tradition and commitment on intolerance. Instead, by employing a structural equation model, she finds doctrinal orthodoxy creates intolerance by increasing threat perception and by diminishing a “secure personality” as defined by low levels of dogmatism and high levels of self-esteem. The conflicting findings of past research using traditional measures of religiosity present no clear relationship between religion and prejudice making further research necessary.

Much of the research in the field of psychology connecting religion and prejudice began with the work of Gordon Allport and his idea of intrinsic and extrinsic religious motivations. Allport's conceptual work (1954), which attempted to clarify the paradox, and Allport and Ross's (1967) seminal work, which created the ROS started a large research agenda linking religious motivation not only to prejudice but also to a variety of individual traits. In the 1960's, this work looked primarily at racial prejudice, mostly prejudice against African-Americans, but also included studies involving anti-Semitism. Beginning in the late 1980's research began including homophobic behavior in the research of intolerance (e.g. McFarland 1989).

Allport's theory of religious motivation attempted to explain the paradox of religious intolerance. Allport's findings suggest that it was the extrinsically religious, those who use religion as a means to a selfish end, who create the paradox. This type of religious person was more interested in using religion to maintain or create social status and norms. The true believers, the intrinsic religiosity types, have internalized the teaching of their religion and are, therefore, much more tolerant. Herek (1987) produced results that backed up the conclusions of Allport and Ross (1967) by also finding that the extrinsically religious are more racially prejudiced than intrinsic religiosity types. However, Herek also found that the intrinsically religious were more intolerant than the extrinsically religious when it came to homosexuality. More recent research has had similar findings (Kirkpatrick 1993; Wilkinson 2004). Previous research has consistently found those with high levels of quest religiosity to show low levels of prejudice towards African-Americans and homosexuals (McFarland 1989; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Duck and Hunsberger 1999). As McFarland concluded: "Quest does not predict any particular discrimination but rather a general anti-discrimination

attitude. ‘Don't discriminate!’ appears to be the overriding attitude associated with quest, rather than favorable attitudes toward any specific out-group” (1989, 333).

There are a variety of minority or marginal groups that face significant prejudice. In the United States, African-American are unique in the level and length of discrimination they have faced. When studying a U.S. sample, the distant and recent history of racial prejudice both in politics and as the subject of scholarship is so rich it is necessary to engage it. As such, this chapter will focus on racial prejudice. In addition, the topic of gay marriage and gay rights has been the frequent focus of recent political attention with attitudes on these topics changing drastically in the past decade.¹⁴ Therefore, it is timely to ask Americans about their attitudes on homosexuals and this chapter will also focus on sexual orientation prejudice.

Expected Relationships

The existence of four potential mechanisms that may cause those who are religious to be more or less prejudiced highlights the complexity of the religious-prejudice paradox. The aim of this chapter is to provide some clarity to the subject, but before that can be done it will be important to lay out the expected relationships between the independent variables of interest (religious motivation types) and the dependent variables (racial and sexual orientation prejudice). From the previous research cited above, there is only one clear and consistent finding: Quest types are less prejudiced than both the extrinsically and intrinsically religious. In terms of racial prejudice, those who are extrinsically religious appear to be more prejudiced than the intrinsically religious Allport and Ross (1967) found extrinsic religiosity

¹⁴ See Gallop (2015) for recent trends: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx> Accessed March 19th, 2015.

to have a stronger relationship with prejudice than intrinsic religiosity and this has been confirmed by more recent studies (see meta-analyses by Hunsberger and Jackson (2005) and Hall, Matz and Wood (2010)). Therefore, it is expected that extrinsic religiosity has a strong positive relationship with racial prejudice, while intrinsic religiosity has a weak but negative relationship with racial prejudice. Quest types are expected to have a strong negative relationship with racial prejudice.

The expected relationship for intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity changes when considering sexual orientation prejudice. While racial prejudice is proscribed in most modern western religions, sexual orientation prejudice may be encouraged by some through highlighting beliefs in the sinful nature of homosexuality. Findings from Herek (1987), McFarland (1989), Kirkpatrick (1993) and Wilkinson (2004) all point toward those with high intrinsic religiosity exhibiting more sexual orientation prejudice than extrinsic types. Therefore extrinsic religiosity is expected to have no relationship with sexual orientation prejudice while intrinsic types are expected to have a positive relationship. Again, the Quest types are expected to have a strong negative relationship with sexual orientation prejudice.

This chapter will present three studies connecting religious motivation and prejudice. The first study uses a nationally representative survey to test the relationship between the measures of religious motivation and racial prejudice. This is important because all of the literature cited above involving religious motivation was conducted on convenience samples, most on university or religious community populations. Study 1 will use racial prejudice as the dependent variable and will compare the effects religious motivation, traditional measures of religiosity, ideology, and demographics have on levels of prejudice.

Study 1

The data for Study 1 is from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), and consists of questions from the common content and questions the author was able to add to the group content.¹⁵ The survey asked some questions as part of a pre-election panel in September and October of 2012, while other questions were asked of the same respondents in a post-election survey in November 2012. The sample was a nationally representative sample consisting of 1,000 respondents, although only 822 also responded to the post-election survey. Both surveys were administered online by YouGov (formerly Polimetrix).

The ROS questions used in this study are a truncated version of Francis (2007) adaptation of the scale originally used by Allport and Ross (1967) and Batson (1981). Instead of using six questions for each of the orientation type, this shortened form of the scale only used two questions for each of the three orientation types. These questions were chosen based on factor analysis of the full scale conducted by Jennings (2013). These six questions can be found in Appendix C.

Traditional measures of religiosity can be grouped into three sets of measures: a measure of the specific religious beliefs of an individual, which religious tradition the individual belongs to, and the religious behavior of the individual. In political science research these three sets of measures are frequently used together to create an index of religiosity (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009). This index, commonly referred to as the “three b’s” (belonging, behavior and belief) is a useful predictor of political variables such as turnout (Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt 1994), vote choice (Green, Kellstedt, Smidt and Guth 2007), and partisanship (Kellstedt 1989, Layman 2001).

¹⁵ The questions were included in the Yale University group content. Thank you to Yale University, and to Temple University’s Kevin Arceneaux for making it happen.

This study includes questions regarding religious tradition and frequency of religious service attendance. In order to fully gauge religious tradition, the survey asked respondents about the religious preference down to the denomination level, and then these responses were aggregated by the author following the approach of Steensland et al (2000). Unfortunately, the CCES did not contain any questions pertaining to specific religious beliefs such as biblical literalism, creation, or the after-life. Therefore this study only contains a measure of belonging and behavior, and not a belief measure (see Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009 for the use of the “three b’s” when measuring religiosity).

The prejudice measure in this study is an index of two Likert scale questions regarding racial resentment. Both questions ask the respondent to agree or disagree to statements regarding ability of African-Americans to overcome discrimination. Kinder and Sanders (1996) used these questions as part of a racial resentment scale, and Henry and Sears (2002) use these questions as part of a symbolic racism scale. In both cases the questions are designed not to measure overt or “old-fashioned” racism, but rather an underlying resentment of African-Americans stemming from a more subtle racism.

Previous research has shown political ideology to be an important predictor of prejudice (Feldman and Huddy 2005), and therefore the models control for ideology, along with other important demographic variables. This approach allows for both a broad test of how differences in religiosity relate to prejudice and the inclusion of important control variables ensure any found relationships are not spurious.

Results

The results presented in Table 4.1 are the product of an OLS regression model including the three religious motivation types, each with a range from 2 to 10, and four

religious tradition dummy variables. In addition, religious service attendance is also included and ranges from 0 (never attends) to 6 (attends more than once a week). Six control variables are also included in the model: a dummy variable for being African-American, a five-point political ideology measure, household income, education attainment level, gender of the respondent, and age of the respondent. The dependent variable is an index of two racial resentment questions that have a combined range of 2 to 10.


Table 4.1

Study 1	Racial Prejudice	
	Coef.	P-Value
Extrinsic	0.05	0.268
Intrinsic	0.087 *	0.054
Quest	-0.101 ***	0.020
Evangelical	0.105	0.659
Mainline	-0.159	0.529
Catholic	0.332	0.175
Non-Religious	0.031	0.900
Attendance	-0.16 ***	0.010
African-American	-1.51 ***	0.000
Ideology	1.108 ***	0.000
Income	0.015	0.568
Education	-0.232 ***	0.000
Gender	-0.149	0.359
Age	0.009 **	0.093
Constant	4.553 ***	0.000
N=	629	
Adjusted R2	0.371	

*** P-Value < .001 | ** < .05 | * < .10 | One-tailed test

The model shows a positive and significant relationship between scoring high on the intrinsic religiosity scale and answering the racial resentment questions in a prejudiced manner. There is a strong negative relationship between Quest scores and the prejudice measure, meaning individuals with a high Quest score are less likely to be prejudiced than those with low Quest scores. The same is true for religious service attendance, which also has a strong negative relationship with the prejudice measure. As one might expect, being African-American and having a higher educational attainment are negatively correlated with prejudice. A conservative political ideology is positively associated with prejudice. This highlights one of the critiques of the racial resentment and symbolic racism measures. There have been claims that the questions, at least in part, are measuring an ideology of individualism and not just prejudice (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al 2000; Feldman and Huddy 2005; but see Rabinowitz et al 2009). As the primary relationships of interest are between the religious variables and prejudice, including the ideology measure in the model allows this paper to sidestep the debate regarding the racial resentment measures. Ideology may contaminate the prejudice measures; therefore, controlling for ideology should bolster confidence in the correlations found with prejudice in this paper outside of ideology. The row of graphs in Figure 4.1 depicts the relationships the religious orientation types have with prejudice.

Figure 4.1



Study 2

The findings from Study 1 provide evidence that a relationship between religious motivation and racial prejudice exist. Of course, demonstrating that there is a correlation between religious motivation and racial prejudice does not definitively establish cause and effect. One way to convincingly isolate the effect of religion on racial prejudice is to prime the salience of religion outside of the subject’s conscious awareness. Previous research has shown that presenting stimuli regarding a specific topic to a subject can automatically raise the salience of that topic in the mind of the subject (Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Bargh and Chartrand 1999). A researcher may want to give the following prompt before asking her research questions: “If you only considered how religion affects your attitudes on this topic, how would you respond to the following questions?” The researcher, however, knows that it is nearly impossible for subjects to honestly and consistently answer this type of question. Priming allows the researcher to indirectly get at the heart of the matter. By randomly assigning some subjects a

prime on a specific topic, such as religion, and then asking all of the subjects questions regarding their attitudes on another subject, such as African-Americans, the researcher can assume that the difference in attitudes toward African-Americans in the treatment group and in the control group represent the effect of the religious priming treatment.

If religion induces racial prejudice, then those who are unconsciously primed to think about religion should also express higher levels of prejudice. Moreover, if religious motivation alters the relationship between religiosity and prejudice, the effect of the unconscious religious prime on racial prejudice should operate differently depending on the subject's religious motivations. A chief result of priming is that it causes the subject to consider a construct more than they would have under normal circumstances. In this case of religious priming, the object is to create a circumstance where religion is an exalted consideration when later answering questions regarding racial prejudice. Extrinsically religious people are focused on the external rewards religion can bring them, and because of this religion may not always be primary in their focus. Intrinsically religious people are more focused on religion itself and are more likely to use religious beliefs to alter their daily choices. Those with the Quest motivation are likely to use religion in their life decisions, but their view of religion is more malleable and may at times be shaped by other strongly held beliefs (such as equal rights). This is important to re-emphasize when discussing the expectations of a religious priming treatment, as these motivations should shape how the different types respond to the prime. The extrinsically religious have the highest potential for being affected by the religious prime, as religion is not something that is always on the front of their mind. In some sense, the prime should push extrinsically religious to appear more similar to intrinsically religious, as one of the key differences between the two is how primarily they are focused on religion during their everyday lives.

Study 2 takes the form of an on-line survey experiment with a religious priming treatment. Respondents to the survey were recruited through *Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk*. *Mechanical Turk* is a marketplace of workers who receive compensation for completing tasks. For this project, workers were compensated \$0.50 for finishing the survey, which took between 8 to 10 minutes to complete. Demographically, *Mechanical Turk* has been shown by Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) to be more representative of the U.S. population than other commonly used convenience samples such as college student and local adult samples. Furthermore, they show the difference between *Mechanical Turk* samples and nationally representative internet and face-to-face samples to be relatively small in the areas of education, sex, and region. The survey experiment was placed on the *Mechanical Turk* website in late July 2013, and within two days 403 respondents completed the survey. The religious prime took the form of a series of simple lexical decision tasks. These tasks prompted the respondents to create a four word sentence out of a group of five scrambled words. For example the respondent would be given these five words: beards fast are short scratchy. It is expected that the respondent would respond: Short beards are scratchy. In the control groups, all of the words and sentences were neutral, but in the treatment group half of the ten word groups contained a religious word that was designed to be used in the most obvious sentence creation.¹⁶ This was done in order to nonconsciously prime the respondents before the next section of the survey. This procedure has been used previously to prime religion (Inzlicht and Tullett 2010; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007) and is based on the procedure originally used by Srull and Wyer (1979). Below are two examples of the lexical decision task. Example 1 represents a task that did not include a religious word, whereas Example 2 represents a task where a religious word was included.

¹⁶ Please see the Appendix E for a full list of word groups for the treatment group.

Example 1



Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **are beards short scratchy fast**

Example 2



Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **sacred sober ritual the is**

Following the lexical decision task section respondents were asked four questions from the racial resentment scale (Henry and Sears 2002). Henry and Sears (2002) compare several questions of symbolic racism. In their analysis they have four categories of questions: Work ethic and responsibility for outcomes, Excessive demands, Denial of continuing discrimination, and Underserved advantage. The four questions chosen for this study contain one question from each of Henry and Sears' (2002) four categories. Following this, the respondents were asked some basic demographic, political, and religious questions before taking the 18-question ROS battery.¹⁷ The results in Table 3 are from an OLS

¹⁷ Please see the Appendix F for a full list of questions used for the Racial Prejudice Scale and Table 3.4 in Chapter Three for the questions used to measure religious motivation.

regression model that contains a dummy variable for the treatment effect, and interaction terms between the three ROS sub-scales and the treatment dummy variable.

Results

The results presented in Table 4.2 are the product of the regression models that include the three religious motivation types, the treatment dummy variable, and the interaction between the treatment and the religious motivation measures. In addition, a measure of religious service attendance and four religious tradition dummy variables are included. Three control variables are also included in the model: a dummy variable for being African-American, a five-point measure of ideology, and education attainment level. The dependent variable is an index of four racial resentment questions that have a combined range of 4 to 20.

Table 4.2


Results from Study 2

Study 2	Racial Prejudice	
	Coef.	P-Value
Extrinsic	0.173 ***	0.006
Intrinsic	-0.058	0.247
Quest	-0.155 ***	0.003
Evangelical	0.966	0.152
Mainline	0.352	0.602
Catholic	1.189 *	0.053
Non-Religious	-1.546 ***	0.001
Treatment	-0.194	0.854
Treatment x ER	-0.154 *	0.063
Treatment x IR	0.044	0.524
Treatment x Quest	0.100	0.149
African-American	-3.639 ***	0.000
Education	-0.504 ***	0.001
Ideology	1.163 ***	0.000
Constant	12.380 ***	0.000
N=	382	
Adjusted R2	0.296	
*** P-value < .001 ** < .05 * < .10 Two-tailed test		

The results from the model show a strong positive relationship between prejudice and the extrinsic scale. Because of the interaction between Extrinsic Scale and the Treatment, the Extrinsic variable represents the effect of the being extrinsic religious without having been primed. In addition, the interaction effect between extrinsic religiosity and the treatment effect is negative. This means that, although those who score high on the extrinsic scale are more prejudiced than most in this sample, the effect of the religious prime was to decrease or mute their prejudice. These findings match the expectations described by the

hypotheses, but the primary relationship between extrinsic religiosity and prejudice is much stronger in Study 2 than what was found in Study 1. The model shows a small, negative and not statistically significant relationship between intrinsic religiosity and prejudice. The interaction term shows that the religious priming treatment had little to no effect on the relationship. The primary relationship does not match the hypothesized expectations or the results from Study 1. The first study showed a fairly strong positive relationship between prejudice and the intrinsic scores. The interaction effects, however, were as expected. The expectation was a null result, and this is the clear finding. This was expected because the prime was redundant, as religion is commonly an elevated concern of those with high intrinsic scores. The model shows a strong negative relationship between Quest scores and prejudice. This matches both the hypothesis and the results from Study 2. Although the effect of the treatment interaction is not statistically significant, it suggests that there is a small but negative effect. For Quest types, religious beliefs are important but are frequently being balanced with other strongly held beliefs. It is suspected that for some Quest types religion is not the source of their open racial attitudes, but rather they have adjusted their religious beliefs to match with some other ethos. Hence, when religion is primed it temporarily tips the scale toward their religious beliefs and making them act slightly more like an intrinsically religious person, at least as it relates to racial prejudice. The effects of the religious prime on prejudice for each of the three religious motivation sub-scales can be found in Figure 4.2. Another interesting result is the positive relationship between Catholics and racial prejudice. This closely matches the coefficient in Study 1, although that finding was not statistically significant. Also, those who are non-religious have a strong negative relationship with racial prejudice, a finding not found in Study 1.

Figure 4.2



Study 3

The goal of this chapter is to discover religion’s effect on prejudice specifically within the political context. Candidates campaigning for political office are constantly trying to connect with the people they are speaking to. One way to do this is to signal to the audience that you are all in the same group – that you have a shared identity. If the candidate creates a shared religious identity by using religious rhetoric, how does this change the audience’s attitudes about out-groups? From studies such as Brewer (1979) and Tajfel et al (1971) evidence has accumulated suggesting in and out-groups are easily established. With a few slight cues, people can be manipulated into a sense of solidarity or a sense of difference amongst their peers. As discussed above, one mechanism connecting religion to prejudice is the inherent in-group/out-group dynamic it creates. A way to isolate religion’s out-group affect is to prime religion by using both exclusive and nonexclusive language through the strategic use of first person plural pronouns. Research into political discourse has shown that the use of ‘we’ and ‘us’ is effectively used by politicians to evoke a sense of solidarity in the

face of out-group competition (Maitland and Wilson 1987; Íñigo-Mora 2004; Proctor and I-Wen Su 2011). Study 3 randomly assigns respondents to exclusive language prompts; this study provides evidence to the effect of such language. In addition, when pairing this random assignment with the religious prime in a two-by-two design, this study is able to isolate the effect of exclusive language from the effect of religion. This takes an important step in detangling the complicated relationship between religion and prejudice. Religion can be a promoter of prejudice by acting like any other identity group – it creates a sense of in-group and out-groups. However, religion may have additional effects on prejudice that are more closely related to its belief system and its adherent’s motivation for joining. This design allows for a separation of the two effects.

The effect of the religious prime in Study 3 is similar to the expected outcome from Study 2. Those who are extrinsically religious will be most affected by the prime, and they should become less prejudiced when subjected to the religious treatment. Quest types will have a slight positive response to the religious prime, while the intrinsically religious are expected to have little response to the religious treatment. In addition, expected effect of the exclusive prime is similar to the religious prime, in terms of direction for each of the religious motivation variables for both racial and sexual orientation prejudice. The size of the effect, however, is expected to be smaller and noticeably less significant than the religious prime. In the two-by-two design, it is expected that the religious-exclusive treatment and the religious-nonexclusive treatment will be larger than the nonreligious-exclusive treatment. Table 4.3 includes a summary of the expected relationship between prejudice and religious motivation for each of the three studies.

Table 4.3

Summary of Hypotheses

Racial Prejudice	Study 1, 2 & 3	Study 2	Study 3		
	Control/Baseline (Nonreligious- nonexclusive)	Non-Conscience Prime	Religious- Nonexclusive	Religious- Exclusive	Nonreligious - Exclusive
Extrinsic	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative-large	Negative-small
Intrinsic	Negative	Nearly Zero	Nearly Zero	Positive-small	Nearly Zero
Quest	Negative	Positive - Small	Nearly Zero	Positive-small	Nearly Zero

Sexual Orientation Prejudice	Study 3	Study 3		
	Control/Baseline (Nonreligious- nonexclusive)	Religious- Nonexclusive	Religious- Exclusive	Nonreligious - Exclusive
Extrinsic	Negative	Positive - small	Positive - small	Nearly Zero
Intrinsic	Positive	Nearly Zero	Nearly Zero	Nearly Zero
Quest	Negative	Positive- small	Positive - small	Nearly Zero

The data for this study was collected through an online survey conducted the second week of March 2014. Qualtrics recruited 800 respondents through a Survey Sampling International (SSI) panel. All respondents were adult U.S. residents, and measures are taken by SSI to make sure their panels are representative of the U.S. population on a variety of demographic variables. Although SSI draws from a large general population panel, this survey over-sampled Christians by setting quotas for different religious preferences. Table 4.4 presents the religious preference of the respondents for this study and the percent of the total each religious group represents of the total sample. In order to compare this over-sample with a standard sample of similar size, Table 4.4 also presents the percentage of

religious preferences from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES).

The CCES, also employing an online survey, recruited a sample of 1000 respondents aiming to be representative of the adult U.S. population. Table 4.4 shows the desired over-sample of Christians with over 10% more Protestants and Catholics in this study.

Table 4.4

Religious Preference of Respondents

Religious Preference	Current Study		CCES
	Number	% of total	% of total
Protestant	437	54.6%	42.9%
Catholic	257	32.1%	20.9%
Jewish	13	1.6%	3.3%
Spiritual but not religious	42	5.3%	N/A ¹⁸
No Religion	30	3.8%	18.6%
Other	21	2.6%	13.8%

The over-sample was done for two reasons. First, as this study is primarily interested in the attitudes and behaviors of religious citizens it was cost-effective to limit the number of non-religious respondents in this survey. As can be seen from the CCES data, a national sample may include upwards of 20% non-religious. Secondly, Christians were chosen to be over-sampled because it simplified the experiment portion of the study to prime religion to a narrower subset of religious preferences, and there is also some research to suggest that the measure of religious motivation used in this study is most effective on Christians (Flere and Lavric 2008; Brewczynski and MacDonald 2006).

¹⁸ The CCES does not have an option for ‘Spiritual but not religious’. Presumably some of the respondents from the No Religion category and the Other category would have chosen the Spiritual option had it been available.

In order administer the over-sampling the survey began with the religious preference question. This was followed by several personality questions and a distractor task. The distractor task was necessary to include before the religious priming experiment because of concern the religious preference question would negate the treatment effect by priming religion even in the groups assigned no religious prime. The distractor task consisted of a question that listed 20 produce items and asked the respondents to decide if each of the items was a vegetable or a fruit. If this task was unsuccessful the results presented below will not be exaggerated but rather the effect of the religious prime will be diminished – making this a conservative research design.

The respondents were then randomly assigned into four different treatment groups. The groups were created through a two-by-two design where the prime included religious language or no religious language and exclusive language or non-exclusive language. The prime was inserted into a short article the respondents were asked to read carefully for a comprehension test to be administered afterwards. The article was newspaper coverage of two fictional mayoral candidates in Akron, Ohio. The article was only two paragraphs, and the first paragraph ends by quoting a candidate on a new city program promoting healthy living. This quote was the experimental treatment and was different for each of the four groups. In order to create a shared identity for the non-religious exclusive group, respondent within different broad age ranges received treatments indicating the candidate was in their age range. Table 4.5 below lists the quotes for each of the treatment groups, and each of the articles, as they appeared in the survey, can be found in Appendix D.

Table 4.5

Randomized Treatments

Treatment	Candidate Quote
Nonreligious-Nonexclusive	"Taking care of ourselves, doing all the things necessary to stay healthy is something everyone should strive to make a top priority. That is what is being encouraged here, and I think programs like this deserve the City's support."
Nonreligious-Exclusive	Received by those over 60: "Those of us who've been around the block a few times know that taking care of ourselves, doing all the things necessary to stay healthy, should be a top priority. That is what is being encouraged here, and I think programs like this deserve the City's support so that we can continue to enjoy our golden years."
	Received by those under 25: "I know what it's like to be young, to think you are invincible and how easy it is to neglect your health. This program is valuable because it reminds us that taking care of your body is important, maybe more important, when you are young and still healthy."
	Received by those between 25-60: "We work so hard, providing for our family and giving our job all that we have. Sometimes we forget to take care of ourselves. Sometimes our health is the thing that gets neglected. This program is important because it encourages healthy living by fitting into our schedules; by bringing the fitness to where we work."
Religious-Nonexclusive	"The Scripture teaches that the body is a temple and that it is important for everyone to be a good steward of all that God has given. That is what is being encouraged here, and I think programs like this deserve the City's support."
Religious-Exclusive	"Those of us who are religious know that the Scripture tells us that our bodies are a temple, and that we must be good stewards of all that God has given us. I think programs like this deserve the City's support, so that we as a community can do our best to live up to those standards."

The treatments with the religious primes mention both “The Scripture” and “God” evoking reflection on religion. The treatments with exclusive language primes use pronouns such as “us” and “we” indicating that the candidate is a part of a shared group with his audience and also indicating that those who are not a part of this shared group are different. After the treatments, the respondents were asked their attitudes on a variety of subjects and included in this group of questions were measures of racial and sexual orientation prejudice.

This measure of racial prejudice is identical to the one used in Study 2. Sexual orientation prejudice is measured through an index of three Likert scale questions regarding the morality of homosexuality (LaMar and Kite 1998). At the end of the survey the respondents were asked a battery of questions to determine their religious motivation using the eighteen-item ROS (Francis 2007). This version includes adapted question wording from Allport and Ross's (1967) extrinsic and intrinsic scales, with six questions each. It also includes a variation on Batson and Gray's (1981) Quest scale which also has six questions.

Respondents were also subjected to a battery of personality questions including the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), a measure of authoritarianism, and a dogmatism scale. The items were included into the model as a test of competing hypotheses. These items have frequently been associated with prejudice in various ways, and by including these measures the model will be better suited to highlight the independent effect of religious motivation. This will allow for more confidence in rejecting the hypothesis that religious motivation is simply taping into personality traits with previously established connections to prejudice. This is not to say there is no connection between these personality measures and religious motivation. The previous chapter has established the patterns of correlation between personality traits and religious motivation.

This chapter has introduced four potential mechanisms that can connect religion and prejudice. It is the goal of this chapter to isolate the independent effects of these mechanisms, and in particular to highlight the role religious motivation has in influencing racial and sexual orientation prejudice. Table 4.6 below summarizes the tools to be used in this study to isolate each mechanism.

Table 4.6**Means of Isolating Mechanism**

Mechanism	Means of Isolating effect
In-group/Out-group Dynamic	Randomly assigned exclusive treatments
Personality Correlates	Big 5 personality variables, authoritarian variable, dogmatism variable
Religious belonging, beliefs, behavior	Religious tradition variable, Biblical literalism variable, Service attendance variable
Religious motivations	Intrinsic, extrinsic and quest variables and interactions with randomly assigned religious treatments

Results

In Table 4.7 below, the results of OLS regression models are displayed for two dependent variables: racial prejudice and sexual orientation prejudice. For each model there are the following groups of variables: religious motivation measures, treatment effects, traditional measures of religiosity, demographic variables, personality trait measures, interactions between religious motivation sub-scales and treatment effects. The only differences between the two models are their dependent variables and for sexual orientation prejudice gender is controlled for instead of the dummy variable for African-American.

Table 4.7

Results from Model

	Racial Prejudice				Sexual Orientation Prejudice			
		Coef.		Pvalue		Coef.		Pvalue
Religious Motivation	Extrinsic	0.047		0.426	Extrinsic	-0.134	**	0.036
	Intrinsic	-0.126	***	0.006	Intrinsic	0.112	**	0.023
	Quest	-0.145	***	0.005	Quest	-0.106	*	0.058
Treatments	(TR1) Religious Non-Exclusive	-3.043		0.112	(TR1) Religious Non-Exclusive	-1.896		0.366
	(TR2) Religious Exclusive	-3.651	*	0.058	(TR2) Religious Exclusive	-4.355	**	0.038
	(TR3) Nonreligious Exclusive	-1.634		0.317	(TR3) Nonreligious Exclusive	-1.935		0.277
Traditional Measures of Religiosity	Evangelical	0.724		0.111	Evangelical	1.074	**	0.031
	Mainline	0.470		0.284	Mainline	-0.098		0.837
	Catholic	0.747	*	0.090	Catholic	-0.274		0.565
	Non-Religious	-0.291		0.747	Non-Religious	-1.282		0.190
	Religious Service Attendance	-0.063		0.394	Religious Service Attendance	0.152	*	0.057
Demographics Controls	Biblical Literalism	-1.099	***	0.000	Biblical Literalism	0.476	*	0.051
	African-American	-3.120	***	0.000	Gender	-1.031	***	0.000
	Political Ideology	0.707	***	0.000	Political Ideology	0.644	***	0.000
Personality Traits	Education	-0.215	***	0.008	Education	-0.079		0.366
	Authoritarian	0.207	**	0.020	Authoritarian	0.518	***	0.000
	Dogmatism	0.090		0.178	Dogmatism	0.340	***	0.000
	Openness to experience	0.034		0.392	Openness to experience	-0.038		0.385
	Conscientiousness	-0.069		0.248	Conscientiousness	-0.030		0.642
	Extraversion	0.045		0.469	Extraversion	-0.079		0.246
	Agreeableness	0.057		0.230	Agreeableness	0.016		0.767
Interaction Terms	Emotional Stability	-0.031		0.550	Emotional Stability	-0.025		0.667
	ER x TR1	-0.077		0.333	ER x TR1	0.160	*	0.062
	ER x TR2	-0.111		0.178	ER x TR2	0.079		0.380
	ER x TR3	-0.066		0.426	ER x TR3	0.128		0.159
	IR x TR1	0.139	**	0.024	IR x TR1	-0.015		0.823
	IR x TR2	0.118	*	0.053	IR x TR2	0.024		0.721
	IR x TR3	0.055		0.333	IR x TR3	-0.036		0.566
	Quest x TR1	0.069		0.342	Quest x TR1	-0.033		0.681
	Quest x TR2	0.172	**	0.017	Quest x TR2	0.137	*	0.082
Quest x TR3	0.089		0.199	Quest x TR3	0.014		0.852	
Constant	15.929		0.000	Constant	7.583		0.000	
***p< .001;	N	569		N	568			
**p<.05;	Adjusted R ²	0.297		Adjusted R ²	0.459			
*p<.10								

The religious motivation variables are in the expected direction for both racial and sexual orientation prejudice, however the positive relationship between extrinsic religiosity and racial prejudice is not statistically significant. These relationships are also in line with most research pertaining to prejudice. Extrinsic religiosity is more racially prejudiced mirroring findings by Hunsberger and Jackson (2003) and Hall, Matz and Wood (2010) while intrinsic religiosity exhibits more sexual orientation prejudice as found by (Herek (1987), McFarland (1989), Kirkpatrick (1993) and Wilkinson (2004). The lack of significance for the relationship between extrinsic religiosity and racial prejudice is interesting in light of the finding from Hall, Matz and Wood (2010). In their meta-analysis they find the relationship between racism and extrinsic religiosity has been diminishing over the years.

The three treatment effects all had negative effects on both measures of prejudice. When controlling for the interactive effects with the religious motivation measures, the randomly assigned treatments decreased the overall scores of prejudice as compared to the control condition (nonreligious-nonexclusive). The Religious-exclusive treatment, as expected, had the largest impact on both racial and sexual orientation prejudice. For racial prejudice, the Religious-nonexclusive treatment had a larger effect than did the Nonreligious-exclusive treatment, although neither effect was statistically significant. For sexual orientation prejudice the difference between the Religious-nonexclusive and Nonreligious-exclusive treatment were nearly zero. The traditional measures of religiosity provide a mixed-bag of results between the two measures of prejudice. For racial prejudice, being Catholic was correlated with increased prejudice, whereas believing the Bible was the literal word of God was correlated with decreased prejudice. For sexual orientation prejudice being an Evangelical Protestant, higher levels of service attendance, and Biblical literalism were all correlated with increased sexual orientation prejudice. These results, with the

exception of the Catholic finding, are all suggestive that the proscriptive nature of prejudice matters. Racial prejudice is rarely proscribed by religions, so it is not surprising that those who attend more frequently and believe in the literal word of God are more likely to exhibit sexual orientation prejudice than racial prejudiced.




The demographic variables are all in the expected directions. Being African-American is a very large factor in not being prejudiced against African-Americans. Being female is also strongly associated with lower levels of prejudice against homosexuals. Having a liberal political ideology has strong negative relationship with both measures of prejudice. Educational attainment is a strong indicator of lower levels of racial prejudice, but surprisingly education is not a significant correlate with lower levels of sexual orientation prejudice.

None of the Big-Five personality traits were associated with prejudice, but as expected authoritarianism is positively correlated with both measures of prejudice. Dogmatism is positively correlated with prejudice, but is only significantly so for sexual orientation prejudice. Both dogmatism and authoritarianism have large coefficients with extremely small standard errors in the sexual orientation prejudice model indicating that they are both strong correlates.

The graphs below in Figure 4.3 and 4.4 highlight the effects of the different treatments on each of the three religious motivation measures for both racial and sexual orientation prejudice.

Figure 4.3

Racial Prejudice by Religious Motivation and Treatment Effect




For extrinsic religiosity, the prime had a strong affect both changing baseline and the slope for the relationship with racial prejudice. In the control group (Nonreligious-Nonexclusive) there is a positive relationship between extrinsic religiosity and racial prejudice. In both the religious non-exclusive and the non-religious exclusive treatments this relationship is gone and even has a small negative relationship. For the religious exclusive treatment, the relationship is even stronger in the negative direction although not quite significant. Although the initial relationship between extrinsic religiosity and racial prejudice was positive, once an exclusive religious message is assigned, the relationship is negative.

For the intrinsic religiosity, there is some difference in the treatment effect for those with lower intrinsic religiosity, but as the intrinsic scores go up the effect of the various treatments are nullified. In the control group, there is a negative relationship between intrinsic religiosity and racial prejudice. This relationship dissipates, however, with the religious primes, and to a lesser extent with the exclusive primes. Essentially, priming religion makes those with low intrinsic scores look more like those with higher scores, at least in terms of racial prejudice. This is a very different effect than what was seen for the extrinsic scale. For extrinsics the effect of the prime was accentuated as the extrinsic scores rose. For intrinsics, the effect of the prime was attenuated as scores went up.

For quest types, there is strong negative relationship between quest religiosity and racial prejudice within the control group. This relationship is altered by the various treatments, but only slightly. Both of the exclusive primes raise the levels of prejudice for those who score high on the quest scale. Interestingly, the religious non-exclusive message lowers racial prejudice across the board.

Figure 4.4

Sexual Orientation Prejudice by Religious Motivation and Treatment Effect



Across the board, the treatments had less of an effect on sexual orientation prejudice than it did for racial prejudice. The baseline effects for the three religious motivation types are strong, and levels of sexual orientation prejudice vary less across the different treatment groups. For extrinsic religiosity there is a negative relationship with sexual orientation prejudice among the control group (Nonreligious-nonexclusive). The treatments appear to negate this relationship, as each of the treatment groups has no significant relationship with sexual orientation prejudice.

For intrinsic religiosity there is a strong positive relationship with sexual orientation prejudice. Each of the treatments slightly lowers the intercept, but the positive relationship between sexual orientation prejudice and intrinsic religiosity persists. Quest types have a negative relationship on the whole, and this exists within the control group as well. Again, each of the treatments lowers the intercept, but the negative relationship persists with the exception of the religious exclusive prime. For this treatment, there is a slightly positive relationship between quest scores and sexual orientation prejudice.

Table 4.8 shows the expected effects of the various treatments on racial and sexual orientation prejudice as seen in Table 3, but now each cell is highlighted to show how the results of this study provided evidence to support each hypothesis. A green cell denotes that the evidence provide strong support for the hypotheses. A yellow cell indicates that the results from this study provide some evidence of the hypotheses, but that the evidence was not strong enough to reject the null hypothesis. A red cell indicates that the results of this study provide evidence contrary to the expected outcome.

Table 4.8

Evidence to support hypotheses

Racial Prejudice	<u>Study 1, 2 & 3</u>	<u>Study 2</u>	<u>Study 3</u>		
	Control/Baseline (Nonreligious- nonexclusive)	Non-conscience Prime	Religious- Nonexclusive	Religious- Exclusive	Nonreligious – Exclusive
Extrinsic	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative-large	Negative-small
Intrinsic	Negative	Nearly Zero	Nearly Zero	Positive-small	Nearly Zero
Quest	Negative	Positive - Small	Nearly Zero	Positive-small	Nearly Zero

Sexual Orientation Prejudice	<u>Study 3</u>	<u>Study 3</u>		
	Control/Baseline (Nonreligious- nonexclusive)	Religious- Nonexclusive	Religious- Exclusive	Nonreligious - Exclusive
Extrinsic	Negative	Positive - small	Positive - small	Nearly Zero
Intrinsic	Positive	Nearly Zero	Nearly Zero	Nearly Zero
Quest	Negative	Positive- small	Positive - small	Nearly Zero

Green = strong evidence to support hypothesis; Yellow = some evidence; Red = No or contrary evidence

Discussion and Conclusion

When looking at the independent effects associated with the four different mechanisms discussed earlier in this chapter, the relationship between religion and prejudice does become less confounding. With the exception of Biblical literalism, there appears to be little evidence that traditional measures of religiosity such as religious preference or frequency of attendance are important correlates with prejudice, especially racial prejudice. Although authoritarianism is a strong predictor of both racial and sexual orientation prejudice, none of the Big-Five Personality traits appear to have any independent effects on racial or sexual orientation prejudice. The results from the exclusive priming treatments do

suggest that the in-group/out-group mechanism do connect religion and prejudice. The nonreligious-exclusive treatment showed no statistically significant results proving it influenced levels of prejudice; however the religious-exclusive treatment had significant effects that were larger than those of the religious-nonexclusive treatments. The exclusive language used in Study 3 did not appear to have an effect on levels of prejudice alone, but when paired with religious rhetoric there were significant effects on racial and sexual orientation prejudice.

Religious motivations do appear to explain, in part, the complex relationship between religion and prejudice. Even after controlling for variables such as religious service attendance, religious preference, personality traits, education and ideology, there are strong differences between the various religious motivation types. Furthermore, these differences are not consistent across both measures of prejudice. Intrinsic religiosity is clearly disassociated with racial prejudice, but clearly associated with sexual orientation prejudice. Extrinsic religiosity has nearly no relationship with racial prejudice, but has a strong negative relationship with sexual orientation prejudice. Quest types, however, consistently have low levels of prejudice.

The religious motivation types also appear to respond to religious and exclusive rhetoric in different ways, particularly when it comes to racial prejudice. Those with higher extrinsic scores were greatly affected by the religious and exclusive rhetoric – showing significantly lower levels of racial prejudice, especially when exclusive and religious rhetoric was used together. Those with high levels of intrinsic religiosity, however, show very little signs of being affected by the exclusive or religious primes.

These findings have some interesting democratic implications for the use of religious and exclusive political rhetoric. Even when speaking to a religious crowd, the use of exclusive religious rhetoric may have a varied effect on those who hear it. For those with an extrinsic religious motivation it will have the effect of significantly reducing levels of prejudice, particularly racial prejudice. For those with intrinsic and quest type religious motivations, it may slightly moderate an already strongly held predisposition or have no effect at all. Although there are some strong findings suggesting that certain religious types are more prejudiced than the average person, these findings suggest that all things considered the use of exclusive religious rhetoric has a largely positive effect on democracy in that it has a net negative effect on racial prejudice.

In the previous two chapters this dissertation has traced the relationship religious motivation has with various dispositions and attitudes. As important as these findings are, connecting religious motivation to political behavior will allow us to see a more direct relationship between religion and democratic citizenship. To this end, the following chapter will connect religious motivation with political engagement.

CHAPTER 5:

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION

The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the connections between religion and democratic citizenship through the investigation of religious motivations. To this end, this chapter will focus on how various religious motivations relate to political engagement. The evidence presented below will suggest that religious motivation is a more useful indicator of a citizen's political engagement than traditional measures of religiosity. Political engagement is fundamental to a well-functioning democracy, and political science has spent much of its history attempting to figure out why some people are engaged while others are not. Much of the literature connecting religion to political engagement has focused on how religion aids in the ability or opportunity to be engaged. Putnam (1993) and Putnam and Campbell (2010) focus on the social experience of going to church and how it can build skills, interests, and social connections that increase a citizen's ability to be engaged. Other research has focused on how churches provide information, perhaps from the pulpit or from fellow parishioners, that increase engagement opportunities (Calfano and Djupe 2009; Guth et al 2006; Djupe and Olson 2013). Whether it is learning more about certain issues or being told of an upcoming political meeting or election, these studies state that religion engages citizens by increasing opportunity for action. The research presented in this chapter, however, will focus largely on religion's role in increasing engagement through motivation.

There are two ways to think about religious motivation's role in engaging citizen politically. First, religion and politics share some common attributes. The both relate to a

general view point on how the world works, and they both frequently involve hierarchical leadership and camaraderie among those who share a similar background and world-view. Because of these similarities, individual personality differences can affect how a citizen would interact with both politics and religion. In this way, the relationship is decidedly not causal, as there is an underlying personal trait causing both the religious motivation and the political engagement. The second way in which religious motivation relates to political engagement, however, has a potential causal relationship. Religious motivation is an indication of religion's place in a citizen's life. It tells us how religion is being used by the individual and how likely it is to affect all sorts of attitudes and decisions. In this way, the motivation to be politically engaged can be altered by religion.

Let us revisit those three parishioners sitting near each other in their church pews. During the service suppose the parishioners are encouraged to attend a political meeting regarding an issue the leaders of the church find to be important. The reasons the three citizens are religiously active may alter their response to the opportunity to be politically engaged. If one came for extrinsically motivated reasons, his response may be to consider the social aspect of the particular event when deciding to attend or not. The nature of the cause may be less important and it would be less likely that he would spend time researching the particular cause since that was less important to his decision to attend. If the other citizen was intrinsically motivated to be religious, his consideration will be related to the nature of the cause and if it coincides with her personal religious views. If he did not already know enough about the specific cause she would be more likely to research and ponder how it fit in with her beliefs. The parishioner with the quest motivation may decide to take part in the political event based on the nature of the activity. He may be uncomfortable with the event if it required truth professing instead of truth seeking.

This hypothetical situation serves to drive home the purpose of this chapter. Three citizens may have the same religious tradition and the same ability and opportunity to be engaged, but their personal religious motivation can alter their ultimate level of political engagement. In the section below political engagement will be operationalized through three different concepts: political knowledge, political interest, and political participation. Chapter Two contains a more extensive review of the relevant literature on political engagement, but this chapter will briefly highlight the potential advantages to democracy found in each measure of engagement as well as how political engagement is connected to religion. This will be followed by expectations for how the different religious motivation types will relate to the different measures of political engagement, and a presentation of three models aimed at testing these expectations.

Political Knowledge and Interest

Political knowledge and political interest have long been thought of as key components to a citizen's democratic capacity. The definition of democratic capacity is rather nebulous. The concept is meant to capture the ordinary citizen's ability to sustain her share of a well-functioning democracy. Elements of democratic capacity are meant to be foundational and are not behavioral in nature (although it may be measured through behavior), and allow citizens the facility to act in a way that is beneficial for democracy. Although there may be many ways to operationalize this concept, this paper will limit the discussion of democratic capacity to the concepts of political knowledge and political interest. The assumption has always been that increasing both political knowledge and interest would be beneficial for democracy. Much of the empirical scholarship has therefore

focused on the causal mechanisms that connect increased citizen knowledge and interest in politics with a better democracy.

Political efficacy, although itself a characteristic of democratic capacity, has also been found to be a product of political knowledge. Efficacy is a citizen's feelings that her government is responsive to her needs and the needs of citizens like her. It also relates to the confidence a citizen has in affecting the political system. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1999) find that those with higher levels of political knowledge have issue stances that are more consistent with their self-interest, at least as dictated by their demographic characteristics. Political knowledge has also been shown to increase trust in the political system. Taber, Cann, and Kucsova (2009) find that those with low levels of political knowledge are unable to coherently process new information or to create counter-arguments. High knowledge participants were able to process new information and create counter-arguments, albeit with a consistent bias toward their prior beliefs.

Increasing political knowledge gives citizens the ability to express attitudes that are more consistent and aligned with their stated values. Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith (2009) find that those with low-levels of political knowledge have inconsistent world-views while those with high levels of political knowledge have very consistent views that also map well with political ideology. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) those within the lowest quartile of knowledge have no coherent attitude structure, whereas those in the higher groups, particularly in the top quartile, show a consistent attitude structure. More knowledge can also change attitudes toward complex or multifaceted policies and stances (Popkin and Dimock 2000). A citizen's level of political interest and political knowledge also effect political participation. Findings suggest that increasing political knowledge and interest alone can

increase political participation (Popkin and Dimock 1999; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Larcinese 2007; Lassen 2005).

As can be seen, there is ample research connecting political interest and political knowledge to various citizen attitudes and behaviors believed to be advantageous for democracy. However, there is no previous works connecting political knowledge or political interest to religious motivation, and in fact there is very little research that allows us to connect the concepts of political interest or knowledge and religion. Research has shown that the religiously active are also politically active (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1993; Wald, Kellstedt and Ledge 1993; Brady, Verba and Scholzman 1995), and this would lead us to believe that the religiously active would also be interested and knowledgeable about politics. This does not, however, give guidance as to which of the various traditions or orientations will be more or less politically interested or knowledgeable.

Political Participation

One of democracy's primary requirements is that citizens must be civically engaged. Much of the participation research has focused on voter turnout, but this paper will look at various forms of campaign participation other than voting. Giving your time or money to help the electoral chances of your preferred candidate are also ways of influencing elections. Much of the research related to campaign contributions have focused on the effect it has on campaigns (e.g. Abramowitz 1988; Ferguson 1995; Coleman and Manna 2000; Jacobson 2003, Campante 2011). There has also been research on who contributes to campaigns and what drives donors to give money to campaigns.

Rosenstone and Hanson's (1993, Chap. 5) work gives us a glimpse at who does work for political campaigns. Not surprisingly, those who volunteer to work for campaigns are

more partisan and have a higher consideration of their candidate than does the average citizen. They have slightly higher sense of efficacy, and are older and better educated than the average citizen. Citizens who volunteer to work for campaigns are also more likely to be religious. Citizens that are contacted by a party official have a significantly higher chance of volunteering, particularly in mid-term elections. Verba and Nie (1972) also find that those who work on campaigns are more likely to be psychologically involved in politics but less community oriented than the average citizen.

Almond and Verba (1963) and Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1993) correlate religion with political participation, and Brady, Verba and Scholzman (1995) create a resource model of political participation that includes religion. In this model church attendance, like any other organization, creates opportunities for members to build civic skills. It is then those civic skills that lead to various forms of political participation. However, in an attempt to look at specific factors within American churches that affect the participation of Christians Djupe and Grant (2001) find no evidence for church-gained civic skills increasing political participation. Instead, they find political participation of Christians to be related to the political activity of the church itself, and whether or not a member was recruited into political activity by a fellow church member. Driskell, Embry, and Lyon (2008) add to this literature by looking at specific beliefs of individual church members. They find that, in addition to church attendance and activity in the church's organization, the beliefs of members affect their political participation. In particular, those who believe God is directly involved in world affairs are less likely to participate while those who believe in the importance of social and economic justice are more likely to participate. Shields (2009) shows evidence of mobilization and political participation gains directly connected with the rise of the Christian Right.

Drawing conclusions from this literature is difficult. It can be said that religious citizens tend to participate more, but the connections as to what kind of religious person participates more are strained. However, there are some connections that can be made between two of the three religious motivation types. The finding from Driskell, Embry, and Lyon (2008) suggest that the Quest type, those who are motivated by the spiritual journey associated with religion, may be more likely to participate than the other orientation types. Shields' discussion of the mobilization of the Christian right suggests that the intrinsically motivated, those who have internalized their religious beliefs, may also be likely participants.

Theory and Hypotheses

Previous chapters have introduced the different characteristics of the three religious motivation types. There are some key traits for each of the types that should inform our expectations for political engagement. Extrinsically religiously motivated individuals are using religion as a means to a self-rewarding end. It may be social or it may be financial, but their religious experience is largely selfish. It should be expected that this should affect their political engagement in two ways. First, political engagement rarely provides immediate rewards for the average citizen. Most citizens, if they are looking for personal gains, are better off spending their time, money or energy on their personal or business life than trying to affect change in politics. By viewing religion from a selfish perspective, it is expected that extrinsics would also view politics from a similar perspective and be less likely to be engaged. Secondly, any motivation religion can provide for being more politically engaged will be muted by the extrinsically religious motivation. Religion has the ability to encourage followers to take up specific political and social issues, whether it is poverty, abortion or pacifism. Religion's role in instigating interest and participation in these issues is that it can

provide the ability, opportunity and motivation to be involved through the activities and teachings of the religion. Those who are extrinsically motivated will consider their engagement in these issues from a similar perspective: if they came to church because it helps them meet new people or because it enhances their place in the community, then they will decide if the particular cause also benefits them in a similar way. Often, the immediate reward is not there, and therefore it should be expected that the extrinsically religious should have lower levels of political interest, political knowledge, and political participation.

Those with an intrinsic religious motivation are religious because they have internalized the teachings and beliefs of their particular religion. Their engagement in politics, therefore, will be based on how connected the particular form of engagement is to their religious beliefs. This means that on some issues, ones that intersect with their religion, they will be very politically active, but on issues they view to be unrelated they will be less inclined to participate. As discussed above, religion provides the ability, opportunity and motivation for political engagement, and the intrinsically religious are affected by all three of those factors. However, their engagement has boundaries and will only be activated for certain issues or certain types of candidates. Therefore, it is expected that intrinsically religious types will have a moderately-sized positive relationship with political engagement.

It is known from previous studies that the Quest type religious motivation exhibit increased levels of pro-social behavior such as helping (Darley and Batson 1973; Batson et al 1989) and service group participation (McCrohan and Bernt's 2004). Quest types are known to be more open-minded than the other religious motivation types, scoring lower on both dogmatism (Jankowski et al. 2011) and right-wing authoritarianism (Leak and Randall 1995). This suggests that Quest types should be more politically engaged because they tend to exhibit pro-social behavior (like volunteering for a campaign or attending a political

meeting), and that they have more capacity and interest in obtaining new information. In addition, coming to religion with the perspective that doubting and ambiguity are acceptable allow Quest types to meld their religious views with their social and political values. Therefore, religion has a similar positive affect as the intrinsic types by increasing the ability, opportunity and motivation to be engaged, but the boundaries of what is and is not a religious cause are lifted. Table 5.1 summarizes the expected relationships for this chapter.

Table 5.1

Summary of Hypotheses Relationship with Political Engagement		
Extrinsic	Negative	Both religious and political engagement is for external self-serving gratification. Political engagement rarely ‘pays off’.
Intrinsic	Moderately Positive	Political engagement is dependent on the relevance to their religion.
Quest	Strong Positive	Quest types are open-minded helpers who look to both religion and politics as ways to improve the world.

Data and Measures

The data for this paper is from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), and consists of questions from the common content and questions the author was able to add to the group content. Some questions were asked as part of a pre-election survey in September and October of 2012, while others were asked of the same panel in a post-election survey in November 2012. The sample was a nationally representative sample consisting of 1,000 respondents, although only 822 also responded to the post-election survey. Both surveys were administered online by YouGov (formerly Polimetrix).

Religious Orientation Scale Questions

The ROS questions used in this study are a truncated version of Francis (2007) adaptation of the scale originally used by Allport and Ross (1967) and Batson (1981). Instead of using six questions for each of the three orientation types, this shortened form of the scale only used two questions for each of the three orientation types. These questions were chosen based on factor analysis of the full scale conducted by Jennings (2013). These six questions can be found in Appendix C.

Traditional Measures of Religiosity

This study includes questions regarding religious tradition and frequency of religious service attendance. The respondents were asked about the religious preference down to the denomination level, and then these responses were aggregated by the author following the approach of Steensland et al (2000). Unfortunately, the CCES did not contain any questions pertaining to specific religious beliefs such as biblical literalism, creation, or the after-life. Therefore this study only contains a measure of belonging and behavior, and not a belief measure (see Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009 for the use of the “three b’s” when measuring religiosity).

Political Participation Questions

The participation measure used in this study is an index of four questions regarding the respondent’s participation in the 2012 election campaign. The four questions pertain to the following activities: donating money to a political campaign; volunteering for a political campaign; attending a local political meeting; or putting up a political sign. For each of the

forms of participation the respondent reported they received one point for a possible total of four. The mean total of participation activities was 0.79 with a standard deviation of 1.08.

Political Knowledge Questions

The political knowledge measure in this study is an index of six questions regarding the respondent's knowledge of politics. Each of the questions the respondents were asked pertained to political parties. They were asked which party controlled the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. They were also asked the party of their governor, their U.S. senators, and their U.S. congressman. In each of these last four cases the name of the public official was named and their title was given before asking about their political party. For each question answered correctly the respondent was given one point with a possible total of six points. The mean number of correct responses for each respondent was 4.14 with a standard deviation of 2.11.

Political Interest Questions

The measure for political interest is a response to a single question. The wording of the question is as follows: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...?" The possible responses to this question are: 1) "hardly at all" 2) "only now and then" 3) "some of the time" and 4) "most of the time." The mean response was 2.3 (between "only now and then" and "some of the time"), with a standard deviation of .89.


Results

The results of the analysis will be presented in two different ways. First, in order to get a sense of the relationship between the different measures of political engagement and religion, the breakdown of the survey results will be displayed. The purpose is to present a “lay of the land” before going on with the second part of the analysis – the presentation of the three regression models.

In all three of the graphs below different types of religious traits have been grouped together. For the three religious motivation types (extrinsic, intrinsic, and quest) the groups are non-exclusive, in that an individual could be found in all three of these types and also in one of the religious tradition groups¹⁹. The religious groups are exclusive, and a respondent can only be classified in one of the four listed categories (Mainline, Evangelical, Catholic, Non-Religious). Figure 5.1 lists the levels of political knowledge among the different religious groups. In each of the groups the high political knowledge group is the largest and the low political knowledge group the smallest. The Quest types have the largest percentage in the high category, while the non-religious have the lowest.


¹⁹ Each religious motivation type was determined by two 5-point Likert scale questions. Those with scores of 7 or above, out of 10, were categorized in this group.

Figure 5.1




Below in Figure 5.2, levels of political interests are broken down by the religious groups. Quest types and Mainline Protestants have the highest levels of political interest. Those who stated that they had no religious preference have the lowest levels of political interest. Of those with a religious preference, Catholics have the largest percentage with low levels of political interests, and the extrinsic types have similarly low levels of interests.

Figure 5.2



In Figure 5.3 below there is a different general pattern of the data. In the previous two graphs higher levels of political knowledge and interest were the norm. For non-voting participation lower levels are more common. In the most extreme example, nearly 60% of Evangelical Protestants have indicated no instances of non-voting political participation. For Mainline Protestants, on the other hand, have only 46% with no reported participation. Quest types have the highest levels of participation with 28% of this type reporting at least two types of non-voting participation.

Figure 5.3



Although these breakdowns present an opportunity to see the basic relationship between these measures of civic engagement and religion, previous research has shown that it is likely that other variables may be driving some of the differences seen between the religious groups. The table below presents four variables often connected with civic engagement: income, education, age, and partisanship. As can be seen, there is a good deal of variance between the different religious groups with each of the four variables. Average income ranges from low of just under \$58,000 for Evangelical Protestants to a high of over \$75,000 for the Quest types. Educational attainment, a five point scale ranging from no high school to a post graduate degree ranges from 3.42 for Evangelicals to 3.99 for the Quest types. The average age of each of the religious group varies greatly as well, with the average age of the non-religious being nearly 15 years younger than Mainline Protestants. Partisanship measures the percent of respondents who said they were either a strong

Republican or a strong Democrat. Nearly half of all Mainline Protestants are strong partisans whereas only 34.5% of the non-religious consider themselves to be a partisan. The variance exhibited in Table 5.2 is evidence that when looking at the relationship between religion and civic engagement certain variables need to be controlled for in the models below.

Table 5.2

Religious Group	Median Income	Education Attainment 1-5	Average Age	Percent Partisan
Extrinsic	\$ 67,624	3.6	51.7	43.4
Intrinsic	\$ 62,909	3.53	53.6	48.7
Quest	\$ 75,476	3.99	52.4	43.3
Mainline	\$ 73,093	3.72	60.2	49.7
Evangelicals	\$ 57,900	3.42	52.6	46.9
Catholic	\$ 71,215	3.49	54.3	41.3
Non-Religious	\$ 69,930	3.59	46.6	34.5

In order to test the hypotheses, an OLS model was generated for each of the three measures of political engagement. The independent variables are the religious measures listed above and some relevant control variable. The control variables are race (whether you are African-American or not), partisanship (party identification as strong Republican or strong Democrat), self-reported household income, highest level of educational attainment, gender, and age. Table 3 below presents the results of the three models.

Table 5.3

Model results for the three measures of political engagement

	Political Interest		Knowledge		Participation	
	Coef.	P-Value	Coef.	P-Value	Coef.	P-Value
Extrinsic	-0.028 *	0.091	-0.123 ***	0.001	-0.016	0.486
Intrinsic	0.039 **	0.013	0.051	0.130	0.019	0.364
Quest	0.048 ***	0.002	0.127 ***	0.000	0.046 **	0.028
Evangelical	0.049	0.559	0.144	0.426	-0.081	0.483
Mainline	0.115	0.214	0.077	0.701	0.151	0.230
Catholic	-0.004	0.967	0.124	0.515	-0.030	0.806
Non-Religious	0.242 ***	0.007	0.175	0.360	0.212 *	0.080
Attendance	0.009	0.683	0.022	0.641	0.010	0.747
African-American	-0.130	0.166	-0.27	0.176	-0.279 *	0.064
Partisanship	0.195 ***	0.001	0.574 ***	0.000	0.347 ***	0.000
Income	0.021 **	0.023	0.072 ***	0.000	0.032 **	0.013
Education	0.129 ***	0.000	0.371 ***	0.000	0.138 ***	0.000
Gender	-0.248 ***	0.000	-0.457 ***	0.000	-0.074	0.344
Age	-0.019 ***	0.000	-0.047 ***	0.000	-0.010 ***	0.000
Constant	-0.140	0.587	-1.926 ***	0.001	-1.242 ***	0.000
N=	789		815		682	
Adjusted R2	0.253		0.335		0.14	

*** Confidence >.99 | ** Confidence > .95 | Confidence > .90

The broad pattern from the three models support the hypotheses listed in table 5.1, but there are some differences between the three models that are worth highlighting. Extrinsic types have a negative relationship with all three measures of political engagement. The relationship is the strongest with political knowledge and weakest with participation where the coefficient is not statistically significant. This matches the prior expectation, as having political knowledge takes an investment in time and energy that is likely to never pay the tangible benefits that interest those with extrinsic religious motivation. Non-voting

participation such as donating money or attending a political meeting, however, are more likely to be done for some sort of direct benefit, and this is why a near zero relationship is observed.

The intrinsic motivation measure has a positive relationship with all three measures of political engagement, however only the political interest coefficient is statistically significant. Although the sign points in the expected direction for each measure, the lack of statistical significance is counter to the stated hypotheses. The coefficient for political knowledge is close to being statistically significant and is the expected size, but similarly to the extrinsic motivation measure, intrinsic motivation appears to have a near-zero relationship with non-voting participation. This may reflect a problem with the distribution of the dependent variable. The index variable of participation described above has a high number of respondents who had no participation; in fact over half of all respondents did not participate in any of the ways included in the index (452 of 822). With such a seemingly high threshold for participation, this measure may not be able to pick up on the effect intrinsic or extrinsic motivation has on non-voting participation.²⁰


The relationship between Quest motivation scale and all three measures of political engagement is positive and statistically significant, matching the expectations listed in Table 5.1. The effect size outpaces the other motivation scales in all three models. These results confirm the hypotheses that the Quest religious motivation is strongly associated with political engagement.

The graphical representation for the relationship between the three measures of political engagement and the three religious motivation types are presented in Figure 5.4. In

²⁰ Although the distribution exhibited some of the characteristics of over-dispersion, when Poisson and negative binomial models were tested, the model fit was worse than with OLS.

each of the graphs, the fitted value lines for the model above are shown with the shaded 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5.4



In regards to the other religious measures, it should be noted that none of the dummy variables for the three major religious traditions or the frequency of attendance measure had statistically significant relationships with any of the political engagement measures. This gives further credence to the parable from the beginning of this chapter – those attending the same religious service with the same frequency can have drastically

different motivation for being there, and that difference is related to their level of political engagement. One religious measure that did have significant relationships for two of the three measures was the non-religious dummy variable. Those claiming to have no religious preference are more engaged than those who have some preference. It is interesting to contrast this with the intrinsic motivation scale results. The intrinsic motivation types are essentially the polar opposite of the non-religious; they are typically thought of as the true-believer, yet their pattern of political engagement are near matches. Both have strong positive relationships with political interest and have positive if not statistically significant relationships with the other political engagement measures. This highlights religion's particularly complex relationship with political engagement. The control variables in the three models all have consistent and non-surprising results. Age, education level, and partisanship, in particular, explain large portions of the variance in the models.

Conclusion

This chapter began by discussing how three parishioners can have the same religious tradition and the same ability and opportunity to be engaged, but their personal religious motivation alters their ultimate level of political engagement. Religious motivation, as a measurement of religion's place in the life of individuals, is a mechanism that explains why some religious citizens are more politically engaged than others. This chapter used a nationally representative survey to test religious motivation's exact relationship with engagement. As predicted by the hypotheses, the broad pattern found within the models are that those with extrinsic religious motivation are less politically engaged, those with intrinsic religious motivation are slightly more engaged, and those with the quest-type religious motivation are considerably more engaged than the average citizen. These patterns are

strongest for political knowledge and political interest, with the models providing the strongest support of the stated hypotheses. In addition, this chapter has provided evidence suggesting religious tradition and frequency of religious service attendance are not important predictors for political engagement when compared to religious motivation. Religious motivation has an active relationship with political engagement. Religion alters engagement in a variety of patterns, but from the findings in this chapter it can be seen that a citizen's religious motivation effectively explains these patterns of political engagement. The findings of this chapter supplement the conclusions from the previous two chapters, and it is clear that religious motivation is an important measurement for the understanding of religion's relationship with democratic citizenship. The following chapter will summarize the findings of this dissertation and discuss its larger implications.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The introduction to this dissertation described three fictional parishioners who sat near each other in the pews of a church with different motivations for being religious. In many other ways, these church-goers were similar. Traditional measures of religiosity would have counted them as being nearly identical. It has become clear that a variation in religious motivation can lead to dramatic differences in areas considered important to democracy. Furthermore, the previous chapters have demonstrated that relying solely on traditional measures of religiosity that only account for religious tradition, religious belief or religious behavior lead to a misunderstanding of the levels of prejudice and political engagement among religious citizens. This chapter will begin by summarizing the results of these chapters and emphasizing three overarching findings from this dissertation. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the implications this dissertation has on the understanding of democratic citizenship and suggestions for further research.

Summary of Findings

The goal of this dissertation was twofold: first, to establish religious motivation as an important measure that can greatly aid our understanding of the relationship between religion and democratic citizenship; and second to demonstrate how religious motivation can clarify religion's relationship with two specific measures of democratic citizenship. Chapter

Three tackled the first goal by demonstrating that religious motivation is both connected to and distinct from previous measures of religiosity and measures of individual difference frequently used in political science. This is particularly true for extrinsic and quest religious motivation. Quest and extrinsic religiosity remain largely distinct from most of the measures with very little variance being explained. Intrinsic religiosity is less distinct from traditional religiosity measures and there is a relatively high level of variance explained by the traditional religiosity model. These findings suggest that previous measures of religiosity have only partially captured one of three religious motivations, but mostly failed to account for the quest and extrinsic motivations. While the extrinsic and quest motivation does not correlate with traditional measures of religiosity, this does not signify that extrinsic and quest motivation types have a lack of religiosity. Respondents high on extrinsic and quest religiosity are just as likely to express some sort of religious preferences as those high on intrinsic religiosity. Although there are some connections between religious motivation and the measures of individual difference, the results of this study do not support the argument that religious motivation is already being accounted for through other measures of individual difference commonly used in political science. Religious motivation is distinct from ideology and personality and provides an additional insight into the dimensions of individual differences.

The purpose of Chapters Four and Five were to address the second goal of the dissertation by demonstrating how religious motivation can clarify religion's relationship with two specific measures of democratic citizenship: prejudice and political engagement. In Chapter Four religious motivations explains the complex relationship between religion and prejudice. Even after controlling for variables such as religious service attendance, religious preference, personality traits, education and ideology, there are strong differences between

the various religious motivation types. We can see important differences both between the motivation types and also between types of prejudice. Intrinsic religiosity is clearly disassociated with racial prejudice, but clearly associated with sexual prejudice. While extrinsic religiosity has a small positive relationship with racial prejudice, it has strong negative relationship with sexual orientation prejudice. Quest types, however, consistently have low levels of both racial and sexual orientation prejudice.

Chapter Four also included a priming exercise where religious and exclusive rhetoric was randomly assigned within an article discussing a fictional mayoral race. Those with higher extrinsic scores were greatly affected by the religious and exclusive rhetoric – showing significantly lower levels of racial prejudice, especially when exclusive and religious rhetoric was used together. Those with high levels of intrinsic religiosity, however, show very little signs of being affected by the exclusive or religious primes. The explanation for these findings connects well with our understanding of the differences between the extrinsically and intrinsically motivated. Those who are high on extrinsic religious motivation are less likely to have religion at the top of their mind on a daily basis, whereas those high on intrinsic religious motivation are more likely to have religion as a top of mind consideration. By priming religion, we have made the extrinsics consider religion much as a non-primed intrinsic motivation type might – and we can see the effect on racial prejudice with primed extrinsics having lower levels of prejudice than intrinsics.

The findings in Chapter Four have an interesting implication for the use of religious rhetoric in political communications and their effect on prejudice. When speaking to a religious crowd, the use of exclusive religious rhetoric may have a varied effect on those who hear it. For those with an extrinsic religious motivation it will have the effect of significantly

reducing levels of prejudice, particularly racial prejudice. For those with intrinsic and quest type religious motivations, it may slightly moderate an already strongly held predisposition or have no effect at all. Although there are some strong findings suggesting that certain religious types are more prejudiced than the average person, these findings suggest that all things considered the use of exclusive religious rhetoric has a largely positive effect on democracy in that it has a net negative effect on prejudice.

Chapter Five studied the relationship between religious motivation and political interest, political knowledge, and non-voting participation. Without controlling for potentially important co-variants, those with quest type motivation have the highest levels of political interest while the non-religious have the lowest levels of political interest. Those with quest type motivation and mainline Protestants have higher levels of political knowledge. Those with extrinsic motivation, evangelical Protestants, and the non-religious have the lowest levels of political knowledge. Quests and Mainline Protestants had the highest levels of non-voting participation, while Evangelicals had the lowest levels of non-voting participation.

Once all demographic, political and religious variables are included in a model, extrinsic types have a negative relationship with all three measures of political engagement. The relationship is the strongest with political knowledge and weakest with participation where the coefficient is not statistically significant. The intrinsic motivation measure has a positive relationship with all three measures of political engagement, however only the political interest coefficient is statistically significant. The relationship between Quest motivation scale and all three measures of political engagement is positive and statistically significant, matching the expectations. These findings present a clear relationship between

religious motivation and civic engagement. Extrinsic religious motivation has a negative relationship, intrinsic religious motivation has a moderately positive relationship, and quest religious motivation has a strong positive relationship with civic engagement.

Table 6.1 contains a summary of the findings from this dissertation. Included are seven measures of good citizenship and their relationship with the three measures of religious motivation. Each of the measures of good citizenship are oriented so that “Positive” (in green) indicates both a positive statistical relationship and a positive normative relationship, and “Negative” (in red) indicates the opposite. As can be seen from the table, quest type religious motivation has a mostly positive relationship with good citizenship, as it has been operationalized here, save one non-significant negative relationship with low levels of dogmatism. The relationship between extrinsic religious motivation and good citizenship is largely negative with the exception of sexual prejudice, which has a significant positive relationship. The relationship between good citizenship and intrinsic religious motivation is mixed with some positive and some negative relationships.

Table 6.1

	Measures of Good Citizenship						
	Low Levels of Dogmatism	Low Levels of Authoritarianism	Low Levels of Racial Prejudice	Low Levels of Sexual Prejudice	Political Interest	Political Knowledge	Participation
Extrinsic	Negative	Negative N/S	Negative N/S	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative N/S
Intrinsic	Negative	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Positive N/S	Positive N/S
Quest	Negative N/S	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive

From all that we have learned about how religious motivation relates to good citizenship there are three over-arching points that should be emphasized. First, religious motivation is a powerful measurement tool that goes above and beyond traditional measures of religiosity when answering a variety of questions regarding democratic citizenship. Religious motivation adds a dimension to the measurement of religiosity that is not accounted for when asking questions about preferences for religious tradition, frequency of attendance or theological beliefs. Religious motivation allows for a more personal measurement, one that can indicate the place and import of religion in three people's life – even if they sit next to each other on the same pew week after week.

The second point that needs to be emphasized is that religious motivation is a unique measure of individual difference. Even after including multiple measures of personality, open-mindedness, ideology, religiosity, and demographics the three sub-scales of religious motivation held their independence. This is particularly true with the extrinsic and quest motivation types. A potential challenge that Chapter Three met head on, is that religious motivation is simply a substitute for more common measures of individual difference. While measurement items such as the five-factor personality model, the dogmatism scale, the authoritarianism scale, or a seven-point political ideology measure have a small level of correlation with religious motivation there is no evidence that it is duplicating their measurement. And, as can be seen from Chapters Four and Five and Table 6.1, religious motivation can help explain important attributes of democratic citizenship.

The final point to emphasize is the implication religious motivation has for our understanding of the relationship between religion and democracy. If religion is becoming more “privatized” as Putnam (2000) suggests it becomes easier to over-look religion's effect

on democracy using traditional measures of religiosity. A privatized religion is disconnected to particular religious traditions and may be less likely to attend conventional religious services. Their belief system may not be captured by the standard questions long included in surveys like the General Social Survey. In this regard, measuring religious motivation, which is inherently personalized, may become increasingly important when accounting for religion's effect on democracy. Religion's denominations and formal organizations may fade with increased focus on privatizing religion, but that does not mean religion is not still affecting the ways citizens interact with government and with each other. Finding measurements that are less dependent on organized and large-group based religions will insulate social science from a trend toward privatized religion and, as the findings of this dissertation show, continue to help us understand the complex relationship between religion and democratic citizenship.

Implications for democratic citizenship

The research within this dissertation has further explained the relationship between religion and good citizenship. First, it has shown that motivation alters the effects of the religious experience, even when controlling for religious tradition, religious belief, and religious behavior. Those with extrinsic motivations represent a large proportion of what is considered the negative effect religion has on democracy. Those with the quest motivation represent most of the positive attributes linked with religion in a democracy, while those with an intrinsic motivation offer a mix of positive, negative and null effects. This nuance, although important, does not really help us answer an underlying question associated with this dissertation: does religion aid democracy? This is a complex question, especially when it

is difficult to separate out the true effect of religion from those with particular predispositions being attracted to religion. Would the negative (or positive) observable attributes associated with those who are religious be present with or without religion? Does religion temper such effects, further obscuring us from its true effect? The experiment portion of Chapter Four does begin to speak to this complex question. By randomly priming religion through the use of religious rhetoric in campaign coverage, this study can give us the effect religion has when discussed in a fictional public square. Randomization and the controls present in the study shed potential confounding effects such as psychological predispositions, and the results represent religious rhetoric's effect on prejudice. The findings suggest that religion, when used in the public square can reduce levels of prejudice. Is it possible that religion, while attracting those most likely to have negative or fearful feelings toward outgroups, can actually make followers become more tolerant? The findings in this dissertation only provide limited proof that this is true, but the findings do support the claims of then U.S. Senator Barack Obama in his speech on faith and politics:

“...what I am suggesting is this - secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the door before entering into the public square. Frederick Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, Williams Jennings Bryant, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King - indeed, the majority of great reformers in American history - were not only motivated by faith, but repeatedly used religious language to argue for their cause. So to say that men and women should not inject their ‘personal morality’ into public policy debates is a practical absurdity.”(June, 2006)

If the use of a few religious words in a randomized experiment can decrease levels of prejudice, is it surprising to believe that religious rhetoric can be used as an effective tool in fighting social tensions and injustice? And yet, we know religious rhetoric can be used to advance fears and out-group biases. Further research needs to be done into the impact of

religious rhetoric in the political arena, and this dissertation has two natural avenues for future research to address this issue. The first relates to religious rhetoric's effect on candidate evaluations, particularly among the religious. The results from Chapter Four provided evidence that levels of prejudice were affected by the religious rhetoric prime. Would such an effect also be present when looking at candidate evaluations? Would different levels of religious motivation correspond with the evaluations? In Chapter Four the religious rhetoric treatment priming experiment was embedded in a news article. Expanding this experiment into a more visual treatment and testing its effects on a wider array of outcomes would provide more external validity. This would be interesting because we could see how religious rhetoric and symbolism affects the religious and how those with different types of religious motivation respond to candidates using religion in the public square.

The second avenue of additional research is testing religious motivation's role in the development of attitudes towards a range of political issues. Too often religion's role in shaping attitudes is assumed to be limited to social issues, and specifically moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage. The preliminary data found in surveys conducted for this dissertation suggests religion's reach extends much further into such areas as attitudes toward social welfare and egalitarianism. The distribution of wealth and the social safety net are not commonly thought of as religious issues. However, if religious motivation is affecting levels of prejudice toward out-groups, it may also affect attitudes on how the government should respond to both the wealthy and the poor.

This dissertation has dealt with religious motivation's effect on democratic citizenship, but there are, of course, other issues affecting good citizenship. Citizen education and how political knowledge is obtained and digested is a topic only tangentially

covered in this dissertation, but an important one that is constantly changing. One area that has yet to be fully explored is when and how people learn about politics and the role new media plays for young voters in the accumulation of political knowledge and the formation of political attitudes. One avenue worth exploring is the relationship between political Twitter activity and ensuing Google searches on that political topic. For instance, does Twitter activity lead or lag political information search patterns on the Internet? A secondary question, but one that is equally as interesting, is whether Google's search algorithm personalizes searches so that political search results confirm existing predispositions.

Differences in levels of political knowledge are closely related to levels of political interest, but are some citizens predisposed to be interested in politics? We know that some citizens seek out news, while others seek out entertainment (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013), but we do not know a lot about why that is the case. Do emotions play a role in motivating some people to learn about politics, while also keeping some people from wanting to be informed? If so, it would be important to know more about these motivations and what part they play in political interest. As this dissertation has shown, there is a great deal left to understand about democratic citizenship.

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APPENDIX A - MEASURES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE

Chapter Three uses eight different measures of individual difference. Below are the questions the scales for each of the eight measures beginning with the Ten-Item Personality Inventory Scale which measures the ‘Big Five’ personality traits.

Ten-Item Personality Inventory Scale

Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.

I see myself as...

	Disagree strongly	Disagree moderately	Disagree a little	Neither agree or disagree	Agree a little	Agree moderately	Agree strongly
Extroverted, enthusiastic	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Critical, quarrelsome	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dependable, self-disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Anxious, easily upset	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Open to new experiences, complex	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Reserved, quiet	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sympathetic, warm	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Disorganized, careless	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Calm, emotionally stable	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Conventional, uncreative	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Six-item Authoritarianism Scale

Please choose the statement closest to your opinion.

	Choose one
It is most important to give people all the freedom they need to express themselves.	<input type="radio"/>
Our society will break down if we allow people to do or say anything they want.	<input type="radio"/>

Please choose the statement closest to your opinion.

	Choose one
Rules are there for people to follow, not to change.	<input type="radio"/>
Society's basic rules were created by people and so can always be changed by people.	<input type="radio"/>

Please choose the statement closest to your opinion.

	Choose one
Rules are there for people to follow, not to change.	<input type="radio"/>
Society's basic rules were created by people and so can always be changed by people.	<input type="radio"/>

Please choose the statement closest to your opinion.

	Choose one
People should be given the opportunity to hear all sides of a question, regardless of how controversial it is.	<input type="radio"/>
If we cannot achieve agreement on our values we will never be able to keep this society together.	<input type="radio"/>

Please choose the statement closest to your opinion.

	Choose one
Students must be encouraged to question established authorities and criticize the customs and traditions of society.	<input type="radio"/>
One of the major aims of education should be to give students a few simple rules of behavior to make them better citizens.	<input type="radio"/>

Please choose the statement closest to your opinion.

	Choose one
It may well be that children who talk back to their parents respect them more in the long run.	<input type="radio"/>
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	<input type="radio"/>

Two-Item Dogmatism Scale

For each of the following statements please mark whether you strongly disagree, disagree, have no opinion, agree or strongly agree.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Political Ideology

Do you consider yourself very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, very conservative or haven't you thought much about this?

- Very liberal
- Somewhat liberal
- Moderate
- Somewhat conservative
- Very conservative
- Haven't thought much about this

APPENDIX B - FULL PAIRWISE CORRELATION FROM CHAPTER THREE

	Extrinsic	Intrinsic	Quest	Evangelical	Mainline	Catholic	Bible	Prayer	Attend	Ideology	Dogmatism	Authoritarianism	Extra-version	Agree-ability	Conscientious	Emotional Stability
Intrinsic	0.245															
p> t	0.000															
Quest	0.449	-0.033														
p> t	0.000	0.405														
Evangelical	-0.165	0.367	-0.131													
p> t	0.000	0.000	0.000													
Mainline	0.033	-0.160	0.014	-0.375												
p> t	0.393	0.000	0.714	0.000												
Catholic	0.178	-0.055	0.116	-0.448	-0.396											
p> t	0.000	0.157	0.002	0.000	0.000											
Bible	0.082	0.582	-0.189	0.440	-0.113	-0.134										
p> t	0.033	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000										
Prayer	-0.034	0.572	-0.126	0.353	-0.119	-0.115	0.420									
p> t	0.382	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000									
Attend	0.093	0.642	-0.079	0.317	-0.177	0.035	0.379	0.448								
p> t	0.016	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.000	0.329	0.000	0.000								
Ideology	-0.161	0.220	-0.249	0.232	-0.078	-0.071	0.252	0.182	0.211							
p> t	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.034	0.056	0.000	0.000	0.000							
Dogmatism	0.089	0.214	-0.031	0.137	-0.041	-0.086	0.201	0.076	0.101	0.187						
p> t	0.021	0.000	0.411	0.000	0.247	0.015	0.000	0.031	0.004	0.000						
Authoritarianism	0.012	0.238	-0.205	0.167	-0.029	-0.086	0.281	0.170	0.138	0.308	0.293					
p> t	0.759	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.410	0.016	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000					
Extra-version	0.070	0.031	-0.033	-0.047	-0.048	0.104	-0.007	0.020	0.036	-0.062	-0.059	-0.051				
p> t	0.068	0.421	0.370	0.185	0.178	0.003	0.847	0.564	0.307	0.094	0.093	0.147				
Agree-ability	-0.228	0.091	-0.228	0.056	-0.004	0.005	0.067	0.165	0.116	0.023	-0.115	0.011	0.049			
p> t	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.111	0.901	0.888	0.057	0.000	0.001	0.527	0.001	0.760	0.169			
Conscientious	-0.196	0.058	-0.255	-0.004	-0.008	0.062	0.052	0.056	0.069	0.048	-0.067	0.052	0.211	0.402		
p> t	0.000	0.132	0.000	0.915	0.815	0.080	0.143	0.113	0.052	0.193	0.059	0.139	0.000	0.000		
Emotional Stability	-0.131	0.076	-0.234	0.033	0.024	-0.015	0.040	0.066	0.165	0.045	-0.066	0.003	0.258	0.377	0.482	
p> t	0.001	0.050	0.000	0.357	0.497	0.665	0.255	0.061	0.000	0.228	0.062	0.935	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Openness	0.047	0.058	0.047	-0.040	-0.042	0.024	-0.033	0.024	0.038	-0.177	-0.090	-0.193	0.392	0.205	0.269	0.281
p> t	0.216	0.135	0.204	0.263	0.238	0.492	0.353	0.497	0.289	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

APPENDIX C – RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION QUESTIONS

A truncated religious motivation battery was a part of the CCES and used in the analysis for Study 1 in Chapter Four and in Chapter Five. The six question used are listed below. The full battery was used for other studies and appears in Table 3.4 in Chapter Three.

Religious Motivation Questions
Prompt: "For each of the following statements please mark whether you strongly disagree, disagree, have no opinion, agree or strongly agree." 5-point Likert Scale.
Extrinsic
While I am a religious person, I do not let religion influence my daily life. Occasionally, I compromise my religious beliefs to protect my social and economic well-being.
Intrinsic
My religious beliefs really shape my whole approach to life. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
Quest
I was driven to ask religious questions by a growing awareness of the tensions in my world. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious beliefs.

APPENDIX D – SURVEY-EXPERIMENT TREATMENT ARTICLES

Study 3 in Chapter Four included a randomized treatment. All respondents were asked to read an article about a mayoral race. Below is how the article appeared to them. The article below includes the Religious-Exclusive treatment found in Table 4.5 of Chapter Four.

Mayoral Candidates Hit the Trail

Akron, Ohio – The race for Mayor is in full swing, and the two leading contenders to become Akron's chief executive have been hitting the campaign trail. Both candidates made several public appearances yesterday, taking time to meet citizens and talk to community leaders.

Front-runner in the latest poll and current City Council President Robert Dover stopped at the Downtown YMCA meeting with organizers and participants of a new program to improve health and encourage exercise. "Those of us who are religious know that the Scripture tells us that our bodies are a temple, and that we must be good stewards of all that God has given us." Dover said, "I think programs like this deserve the City's support, so that we as a community can do our best to live up to those standards."

Local business leader and former Ohio State Legislator Allen Maddux spent the day visiting local elementary schools talking to students, parents, and teachers. Maddux is trailing Dover in the latest poll by only 4 points, re-energizing a campaign that had been trailing by double digits immediately following the primary. The candidates only have two weeks to make their case to local citizens before the election on November 5th. Information on all local elections and polling locations can be found at the Akron Journal's website: www.akronjournal.com.

APPENDIX E - LEXICAL DECISION TASK FULL WORDS

Study 2 in Chapter Four included a randomized lexical decision task treatment. The ten exercises listed below were given to the treatment group. Of the ten exercises, five include religious words. The control group was given ten exercises which include zero religious words.

In this section you will be asked to take a group of FIVE words and create a FOUR word sentence, leaving out one word. For instance, when given this prompt:

*Make a four word sentence out of the following words: **fast deer very break run**.*

You should create this sentence:

Deer run very fast.

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **again the won rust team**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **felt she eradicated spirit the**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **fly water over lost birds**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **comb rubber cars wheels need**

Make a four word sentence out of the following words: **connect a home prophet traveled**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **dessert divine was fork the**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **are beards short scratchy fast**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **sacred sober ritual the is**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **provide salad hair dressings flavor**

Make a FOUR word sentence out of the following words: **to sky look some God**

APPENDIX F – RACIAL AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION PREJUDICE SCALES

Below are measures of racial and sexual orientation prejudice used in Chapter Four. In study 1 only the first two racial prejudice questions were used. In Study 2 all four racial prejudice questions were used, but none of the sexual orientation prejudice questions.

Racial Prejudice Questions

The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Blacks are demanding too much from the rest of society.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Sexual Orientation Questions

Homosexuality is not sinful.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Homosexuality is a perversion.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

I find the thought of homosexual acts disgusting.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>