

PLATO ON TRUTH-VALUE AND TRUTH-APTNESS

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ABSTRACT: "Plato on Truth-Value and Truth-Aptness" examines Plato's conception of truth-value and truth-aptness. The examination focuses on *Philebus* 36c3-50e4 where Socrates argues that pleasures can be true and false and more precisely that there are various kinds of true and false pleasures. The *Philebus* passage is the only one in Plato's corpus where various kinds of truth, falsity, and truth-aptness are examined in close proximity and in relation to one another. Hence it is an especially valuable and, with respect to the topics treated in this paper, neglected site. Socrates distinguishes four kinds of true and false pleasure, which I examine sequentially. In doing so, I argue that Plato distinguishes two kinds of representational truth-value and truth-aptness, propositional and non-propositional respectively, and two kinds of ontic truth-value and truth-aptness, absolute and gradable respectively. On the basis of a key passage at *Philebus* 42c5-7 the discussion concludes, suggestively but aporetically, with a consideration of how these various kinds of truth-value and truth-aptness are related to one another.

1. "TRUTH-VALUE" AND "TRUTH-APTNESS" IN AN EXTENDED SENSE

Frege introduced the concept of truth-value (*Wahrheitswert*).¹ He conceived of truth-value as including the two possible referents of sentences and propositions: the True (*das Wahre*) and the False (*das Falsche*). In the *Principles of Mathematics*, Russell rendered the German *Wahrheitswert* as "truth-value". Since then, the English phrase has been widely used in philosophy to refer the genus, of which truth and falsity are the exhaustive or at least salient species. Today, truth-values are standardly taken to be properties of propositions or propositional entities.

In this paper, for exegetical and heuristic reasons that will become clear as we proceed, I employ the phrase "truth-value" in an *extended* sense. I use the phrase to refer to the truth or falsity of *anything* to which truth or falsity is at-

¹ First in "Function und Begriff. Vortrag, gehalten in der Sitzung vom 9. Januar 1891 der Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft" (reprinted in FREGE (1986)); most significantly in FREGE 1892. "We are therefore driven into accepting the *truth-value* of a sentence as constituting its *Bedeutung*. By the truth-value of a sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or false. There are no further truth-values. For brevity I call the one the True, the other the False" (transl. in BEANEY (1997). 157-58. Cf. "Function and Concept": *ivi*, 137.)

tributed. Likewise, I use the phrase "truth-apt" in an extended sense to refer to *anything* that may possess truth-value in the extended sense.

An example will serve to concretize my interest in extending the uses of these familiar philosophical terms. Consider the phrases "true friend" and "false friend." Here "true" and "false" are predicated of sub-sentential expressions that designate non-propositional entities. In other words, the properties or putative properties of truth and falsity are here attributed to non-propositional entities. Of course, it may be questioned in such cases whether the operative concepts of truth and falsity are the same concepts as those employed with respect to propositions. I grant this point whole-heartedly.

Nonetheless, as I hope to show, in examining Plato's conceptions of truth and falsity, we need – as I say, for exegetical and heuristic reasons – terms that refer to properties or putative properties of both propositional and non-propositional entities. Thus, "truth-value" and "truth-aptness" in my extended senses are exegetical tools.

2. A NEW WAY IN

Given the terminology of "truth-value" and "truth-aptness" in an extended sense, my aim in this paper is to broach in a *novel* way the topic of Plato's conception of truth-aptness. Since the topic is large and we ought not to preclude incompatibilities and developments among Plato's works, it is questionable where our inquiry should begin. I propose to begin with a text that former students of the subject have neglected: Socrates' division of false pleasures in *Philebus*.² Whatever else I have to say about this text, I want to emphasize that my distinction of it as a site for the examination of Plato's conception of truth-aptness is itself a novel interpretive move.

I should also emphasize that I have designed this paper so that those less familiar with Plato's *Philebus* should be able to follow the discussion. When I say that Socrates divides false pleasures in *Philebus*, I mean simply this. At some stage in the dialogue, Socrates suggests that pleasure can be false. He then proceeds to argue for various ways that pleasure can be false. That's all the textual background you need.

Now, some philosophers regard pleasure as some sort of non-cognitive state. Hence, the very idea of truth-apt pleasures will strike them as confused.³ More

² *Phlb.* 36c3-50e4. The *Philebus* passage is not discussed in DENYER (1991); SZAIF (1996), (2006), 1-32; or CRIVELLI (2011).

³ Socrates' interlocutor Protarchus is initially resistant to the idea that pleasure can be false. But Protarchus' initial position differs from that of most contemporary philosophers in that he maintains that pleasures have truth-value, but that they only have one truth-value: truth. In other words, Protarchus denies only that pleasure can be false. Some relatively contemporary discussion of pleasure's truth-aptness can be found in: THALBERG (1962), 65-74; PENELHUM (1964), 81-91; PERRY (1967), 112-33. Cf. also LOVIBOND (1989-90) 213-30

puzzling, Socrates argues that there are *four* different ways that pleasure can be false.⁴ These four ways may exhaust the range of Plato's *basic* conceptions of truth-aptness among the dialogues. But *only Philebus* examines all four in close proximity and in relation to one another. This makes the text a valuable point of entry into Plato's conception of truth-aptness. I will call the four false pleasures " α , β , γ , and δ "; likewise, with respect to correlative true pleasures and to the genera to which the false and true species belong. I will discuss the truth-aptness of pleasures α - δ in Greek alphabetic order. And I will conclude with a consideration about the interrelation among the various truth-aptness conceptions.

3. FALSE PLEASURE A

Socrates argues for false pleasure α in conjunction and by analogy with belief. He distinguishes two components of belief: the psychological attitude of believing and the object of this attitude, that which is believed.⁵ The doxastic object is truth-apt. For example, a man may believe that he is going to win the lottery, but in fact he isn't.⁶ Hence *what* he believes is false.⁷ Additionally—I want to draw special attention to this point—Socrates maintains that the belief itself, that is, the complex consisting of the conjunction of doxastic attitude and doxastic object, possesses truth-value.⁸ Precisely, the belief *derives* its truth-value from the truth-value of its component doxastic object. Socrates suggests that a certain kind of pleasure, namely, pleasure α , has a form analogous to belief. That is, pleasure α has two components: the psychological attitude of taking-pleasure and the object of this attitude, that in which pleasure is taken.⁹ In short, pleasure α is a complex of a hedonic attitude and a hedonic object.

Now, it seems that we *do* indeed take pleasure *in* things. For example, a man may take pleasure in winning the lottery or in the thought of winning the lottery. But at this stage in the argument, Socrates' interlocutor Protarchus objects.

⁴ Cf. the use of "τρόπος" at *Phlb.* 41a7. Note: most of Socrates' discussion focuses on ways that pleasure can be false. However, I believe and will assume here that all of these are ways that pleasure can also be true. Second, Socrates only distinguishes two ways of pleasure being truth-apt using the term "τρόπος." However, following his distinction of these two ways, he says at 42c6 that he will consider pleasures that are "more false" ($\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$) than the preceding ones. I assume, then, that the following false pleasures are false in a different way (τρόπος) than the preceding ones. Indeed, it is clear from the exegeses of these pleasures that they bear truth-value in a different way.

⁵ *Phlb.* 37a2-8.

⁶ Cp. *Phlb.* 39a3-7.

⁷ Strictly speaking, there may be cases where this claim itself is false, cases of vagueness and undecidability, Liar-like paradoxes, arguably also future contingents. It is unclear whether Plato was alive to any such cases. For simplicity's sake I ignore them.

⁸ For example, *Phlb.* 37b10-c1.

⁹ *Phlb.* 37a5-10

Protarchus grants that pleasure may occur *in conjunction with* false belief. Yet he insists that the pleasure itself is not thereby falsified.¹⁰ Protarchus' position seems to be that the belief *merely causes* pleasure. In response, Socrates grants that the belief does cause pleasure. However, he insists that the caused pleasure still has two components: the attitude of taking pleasure and the object in which pleasure is taken. Socrates' view seems to be this. Taking pleasure is an *intentional* state, in the philosophical sense of "intentional." That is to say, when one takes pleasure in something, one's pleasure is *directed toward* that thing; it is *about* that thing.¹¹ Moreover – although it would be psychologically possible to take pleasure in *believing* something – the object of taking pleasure is rarely the attitude of believing. One is rarely pleased at exercising a psychological capacity to believe certain things. So, someone who is pleased because he believes he will win the lottery does not take pleasure *in believing* he will win the lottery.

Granted this, is the hedonic attitude directed toward the doxastic *object* instead of the doxastic attitude? In other words, does the man in the example take pleasure in *what* he believes? Indeed, one can take pleasure in *what* one believes. But Socrates develops his position in a slightly different way. He suggests that the object in which pleasure is taken is not identical to the object of belief. Instead, a man who falsely believes he is going to win the lottery may then *envision* himself winning the lottery; and he may take pleasure in this vision. In the case of pleasure α , then, Socrates holds that, the object of taking pleasure is a vision.¹²

At this point, it may be wondered why Socrates develops his position in this way, that is, why he takes the vision, rather than the doxastic object, to be the hedonic object. I confess I do not feel certain of the answer. However, I suspect at least the following. Socrates hereby draws a *strong* distinction between belief and pleasure. Pleasure *can* be taken in a vision whose content one does not believe. Thus, by showing that pleasure can have its own object, distinct from that of belief, Socrates encourages the rejection of Protarchus' view that belief *merely* causes an object-less pleasure.

Now, Socrates maintains that the content of the hedonic object, that is, the content of the vision, *derives* from the content of the doxastic object, from what is believed.¹³ Some appreciation of this point may be gained from considering Tim Crane's remarks on what he calls different *vehicles* of mental representation:

Consider a road sign with a schematic picture in a red triangle of two children holding hands. The message this sign conveys is: 'Beware! Children crossing!' Compare this with a linguistic sign that says in English:

¹⁰ *Phlb.* 37a10-38a2. Cp. PENNER (1970), 166-78.

¹¹ An early discussion of this is WILLIAMS (1959), 57-72.

¹² *Phlb.* 39b3-b8.

¹³ *Phlb.* 39b9-c2.

'Beware! Children crossing!' These two signs express the same message, but in very different ways. I'll call this sort of difference in the way a message can be stored a difference in the *vehicle* of representation. ... The most obvious distinction between vehicles of representation is that which can be made between sentences and pictures.¹⁴

Indeed, in his argument in *Philebus* Socrates characterizes doxastic objects as akin to psychological inscriptions. A scribe, as it were, etches λόγοι in the soul, and these are believed.¹⁵ Likewise, a painter, as it were, depicts images in the soul, and pleasure is taken in these.¹⁶ Hence, Socrates, like Crane, maintains that both linguistic and pictorial or imagistic representations can possess the same content, but by means of different kinds of vehicle.¹⁷ More precisely, Socrates maintains that imagistic representations *can* be fashioned so that they convey the same content as linguistic representations. Thus, truth-value should transmit from the linguistic to the imagistic representation.¹⁸

In short, then, the hedonic object possesses truth-value. The truth-value of the hedonic object derives from the truth-value of the doxastic object. Finally, pleasure, that is, the complex of the hedonic attitude and the hedonic object, *derives* truth-value from the truth-value of its component hedonic object. Thus, Socrates concludes that pleasure α exhibits one way that pleasure may be false.^{19,20}

¹⁴ CRANE (2003), 136. Vehicular distinctions should be distinguished from another set of distinctions, which Crane calls *media* of representation: "I shall call different ways of storing different tokens of the same type of sentence the different *media* in which they are realized. Written English words are one medium, spoken English words are another ... The same sentence can be realized in many different *media*". This distinction between *media* features is implicit in another passage in the present context of *Philebus*. Immediately following his statement that the deliberator may silently answer himself, Socrates notes that if he happens to be in the company of another person: "<the deliberator> might speak aloud to his companion thereby stretching into sound (ἐνταίνας εἰς φωνήν) what he had told himself, and so what we earlier called 'belief' would become an assertion" (*Phlb.* 38e1-4). In this case, the doxastic and spoken representations are distinguished by the substances in which they are realized, psychological and somatic substance (precisely, air) respectively, including distinct causal properties of these substances.

¹⁵ *Phlb.* 38e12-39a7.

¹⁶ *Phlb.* 39b3-c2.

¹⁷ In contrast, DRETSKE (1981), who distinguishes between linguistic entities carrying information in *digital* form and pictures carrying information in *analogue* form, emphasizes that "most pictures have a wealth of detail, and a degree of specificity, that makes it all but impossible to provide even an approximate *linguistic* rendition of the information the picture carries in digital form".

¹⁸ *Phlb.* 39c4-6.

¹⁹ This is obviously a highly compressed and selective account of Socrates' argument. But it serves the present purposes.

²⁰ There is an intriguing lacuna in the argument. Pleasure α is a complex of an attitude and its object. Given that the object may be false, on what basis can we infer that the complex is false? To appreciate the force of this question, consider that there is no sound principle according to which complexes must inherit the properties of their components. In other words, there is no sound principle

4. FALSE PLEASURE B

Socrates holds some general views about pleasure that I have not yet introduced because they are not pertinent to the truth-aptness of pleasure α . They are pertinent to pleasures β , γ , and δ . So here they are. There is a distinction between

according to which properties are *transitive* from component to complex. The following argument proves this:

- If a and b are not identical, then a has a property that b lacks and b has a property that a lacks. (A version of Leibniz's Law)
- But a component is not identical to the complex.
- So the component has a property that the complex lacks.
- For example, the component is a component of the complex, but the complex is *not* a component of the complex.
- So the complex cannot inherit all of the properties of the component.

Consequently, if a complex *does* inherit truth-value from its component, some additional argument is needed. I believe that some such argument *is* available. For example, it is natural to attribute paleness to Socrates, although strictly it is the surface of Socrates' skin, a component of Socrates, that is pale. Still, identifying the argument in virtue of which truth-value is transitive from component to complex is no simple matter. I cannot entirely resolve the problem here. But I will offer a preliminary suggestion. Consider a 2-inch line segment AB and a 1-inch sub-segment of AB, which I'll call AC. While AC is a component of AB, AB does not inherit AC's property of being 1-inch. The reason for this is that the part AC and the remainder of the whole AB both possess quantitative properties of length. Moreover, the length of AC contributes to and thus affects the length of AB. In other words—and speaking somewhat loosely now—the length property of AC is not *insulated* from any such properties of AB. Thus, in order for a complex to inherit the property of a component, the property of the component must, in some sense, be an *insulated* property. The truth-value of the hedonic object looks to be an insulated property relative to pleasure as a whole. This is because pleasure, taken independently of its object, simply does not possess truth-value. Hence, the component's possession of truth-value does not *affect* or *influence* any other such property of the complex. (In fact, Socrates considers the problem of property-transmission from part to whole in the context of another discussion of pleasure. In *Hippias Major* Socrates and Hippias agree that not all pleasure is καλόν. Rather, only pleasure-through-sight and pleasure-through-hearing are. Socrates now asks what καλόν-making property pleasure-through-sight and pleasure-through-hearing possess. In posing this question, Socrates cautions Hippias to consider what καλόν-making property the two pleasures *conjointly* possess in virtue of their *individual* possession of the καλόν-making property. Hippias finds Socrates' cautious remark idiotic, since he can't imagine a property that the two pleasures would *conjointly*, but not *individually* possess: "And how could that be, Socrates? That when neither has a property individually, this property could belong to both conjointly?" (300b6-8). Indeed, Socrates grants Hippias that many properties transmit from individuals to conjunctions of individuals, for example, if individuals are made of gold, silver, are healthy or wise, then the conjunction of individuals is made of gold, silver, is healthy or wise. But Socrates subsequently explains that quantitative properties do not conform to the principle: "... each of us is *one*, but we are not conjointly one ... because we're conjointly two" (301d6-9). In short, Plato clearly took an interest in the metaphysical problem of property transmission from part to whole that we have flagged in our consideration of the truth-aptness of pleasure α .) Assuming some such argument, then, at least with respect to the problem of the lacuna, Socrates has a cogent argument for the truth-aptness and specifically falsity of pleasure α .

what pleasure *is* (τὸ ὄν) and the way that pleasure *appears* (τὸ φαινόμενον). To those who hold the Berkeleyan idea that pleasure's *esse* is *percipi*, for example, that pleasure is *merely* a feeling, *quale*, subjective state, or φαινόμενον, this is a startling view.²¹ More precisely, Socrates holds that pleasure is a kind of restoration or coming-to-be (γένεσις). For example, in the case of bodily pleasure, say, pleasure derived from drinking when thirsty, rehydration, a physiological restoration, occurs. This restoration, if robust enough, registers psychologically. This psychological registering is the way the restoration appears. I will refer to this as the *phenomenal component* of pleasure. I will refer to the restoration itself as the *ontic component*. Socrates holds that pleasure entails *both* phenomenal and ontic components. For instance, if a restoration is too gradual or slight to register psychologically, then no pleasure occurs.²²

In light of the preceding claims, I will begin by outlining a case of *true* pleasure β . Here, restoration occurs, and the phenomenal component indicates the occurrence of restoration. It does so by having a phenomenally pleasant, as opposed to, say, painful character. More precisely, the phenomenal component indicates various properties of restoration.²³ For example, restoration may occur more or less rapidly; it may occur over a wider or narrower scope of the body or soul. So in *veridical* cases, the phenomenal component registers a swifter restoration as, say, with a particularly acute or intense character. In short, in veridical cases, the character of the phenomenal component correlates with the ontic com-

²¹ Cp. BUTLER (1999), 285-98.

²² How the phenomenal and ontic components of pleasure figure in pleasure α is a question for a different paper.

²³ Evidence for this claim derives from the following passage where Socrates asks, in the context of discussing mixed affective conditions: "<What device is there for correctly judging (κρίσεως) pleasures and pains> if we have a desire to judge them in some such circumstances (τοιούτοις τισι;) and want to know then which is greater (μειζων) or lesser (ἐλάττων) in relation to the other or which is more (μᾶλλον) or more intense (σφοδρότερα) ...?" (*Phlb.* 41e2-5). In this question, Socrates appears to indicate three respects in which pleasure and pain admit degrees. These three respects correspond to Socrates' expressions "greater and lesser," "more," and "more intense." At 45c3-6, in the context of discussing mixed somato-somatic pleasures, Socrates also appears to distinguish three respects in which pleasures admit degrees: "Now, mind you, my question was not whether the very sick have more (πλείων) pleasures than healthy people, but rather with the size (μέγεθος) and intensity (τὸ σφόδρα) of the condition when it occurs." The first and third members of each set appear to correlate. The first members refer to numbers of pleasures; the third members refer to intensities of pleasure. The second members are more difficult to interpret, and it is unclear whether they correlate with one another. Again, in the first set, Socrates speaks vaguely of "more" (μᾶλλον); in the second set he speaks somewhat less vaguely of "magnitude" (μέγεθος) of pleasure. One possibility is that Socrates has in mind pleasures of varying durations, in other words, long- and short-lasting pleasures. In the analogy with vision that he draws in his account of misapparent pleasure, Socrates speaks of the magnitudes (τὰ μεγέθη) of objects whose visual appearance changes when they are beheld at different distances. Accordingly, Socrates is analogizing the magnitudes of spatial extension of visual appearances with the magnitudes of temporal extension of affective appearances.

ponent and certain of its properties. More generally, in the case of pleasure β , the phenomenal component of pleasure possesses content, and the truth-value of this content is a function of its relation to the ontic component.

Broadly speaking, in non-veridical cases, the character of the phenomenal component deviates in some way from the veridical case.²⁴ Simplifying considerably, the deviation is akin to an *illusion*.²⁵ In this case, restoration, which is in fact a property, functions analogously to an object of perception. So restoration occurs and registers psychologically, but it *mis*-appears. There are many ways we might imagine such misappearance occurring, but Socrates suggests that the misappearance results from the *compresence* of the pleasure with some other affective condition. For example, a pleasure occurs in conjunction with another pleasure or with a pain. The compresence of the two affective conditions distorts one or both of their individual appearances.²⁶ Compare the way juxtaposition of colors or shapes may distort the appearances of individual colors or shapes. Indeed, Socrates explains false pleasure β by analogy with visual illusion.²⁷

If the preceding account of pleasure β sounds strange as a conception of pleasure, it is worth comparing with contemporary representational conceptions of sensation. Michael Tye is a prominent expositor.²⁸ In the following passage, he analogizes the representation involved in bodily pain with that involved in basic visual sensation:

Pains are sensory representations of bodily damage or disorder. More fully, they are ... responses to the relevant bodily changes in the same way that the basic visual sensations are ... responses to proximate visual stimuli. In the case of pain, the receptors (known as nociceptors) are dis-

²⁴ Socrates' treatment occurs at *Phlb.* 41a7-42c3.

²⁵ Here again, I am simplifying considerably. In particular, Socrates conceives of the case as a conflict with anticipatory or imagined affective conditions or the conjunction of one anticipatory or imagined affective condition and a bodily pain or pleasure.

²⁶ An example may help. This is my example. A woman who likes, but is allergic to shellfish derives pleasure from eating a meal of prawns, while simultaneously fearing the consequences. The phenomenal component of the anticipatory displeasure affects and distorts the phenomenal component of the pleasure derived from eating.

²⁷ Granted this, the question may arise why we should not take a hedonic appearance engendered, say, by a bodily restoration *in conjunction with a painful anticipation* to represent that complex of affective conditions just as it occurs. The reason, I propose, is that a hedonic appearance *qua hedonic* differs in its phenomenal character from an algesic appearance. Moreover, a hedonic appearance *qua hedonic* is an appearance of a hedonic condition, a restoration. Thus, a hedonic appearance, if engendered in the context of a complex affective state such as a pleasure in conjunction with a pain is, insofar as it is a *hedonic* appearance, *not* an appearance of that complex affective state. Rather, it is an appearance of one aspect or component of that complex affective state. Moreover, according to Socrates' account, the compresence of the pain causes the restoration to appear in a way that it would not were the restoration unaccompanied by pain.

²⁸ TYE (1995). 111-16.

tributed throughout the body. These receptors function analogously to the receptors in the retina. They are transducers. They are sensitive only to certain changes in the tissue to which they are directly connected (typically, damage), and they convert this input immediately into symbols. Representations are then built up ... of internal bodily changes, just as representations are built up of external surfaces in the case of vision. These representations, to repeat, are sensory. They involve no concepts. One does not need to be able to conceptualize a given bodily disturbance in order to feel pain."²⁹

Tye's position rests on the theory of indicator or informational semantics.³⁰ The basic idea is that one state, in this case a mental state, represents, indicates, or carries information about another insofar as they causally covary under optimal conditions. Here is how Tye puts it:

for each state S ... S represents ... $P =_{df}$ if optimal conditions obtain, S is tokened ... iff P and because P . <Hence,> when optimal conditions do not obtain, there is *misrepresentation*.³¹

In pleasure β , optimal conditions require a psychological context free from other affective conditions. Once again, it is the compresence of multiple affective conditions that distorts the way the restoration registers psychologically, thus yielding misrepresentation.^{32,33}

Consider now some significant points of contrast between pleasures α and β . The primary truth-value bearer of pleasure α is its object, that in which pleasure

²⁹ *Ivi*, 113-14. Cf. EVANS (2007), 71-94.

³⁰ Cf. STAMPE (1977), 42-63; DRETSKE (1981); FODOR (1990), (1999). These approaches to explaining representation and content have been much criticized. Two recent criticisms include: BRIDGES (2006), 522-47; and BURGE (2010), 292-308.

³¹ TYE 1995, 101. I am slightly simplifying here.

³² Cf. *ivi*, 224, n.26. SCHROEDER (2001), 507-30, focuses on developing a representational account of pleasure. But it is questionable to what extent bodily pleasure and pain can be explained analogously. AYDEDE (2000), 537-70, is an excellent account of the disanalogies among these affective conditions.

³³ It is also worth noting here why the truth-value conferring relation of causal covariation under optimal conditions does not apply to pleasure α . Consider Tye's comments on why indicator semantics cannot explain mental representation *generally*: "The account is not straightforwardly applicable to beliefs across the board. Take, for example, the belief that the Devil is an angel who fell from grace. What are the relevant optimal conditions here? And what about mathematical beliefs, the belief that $2 + 2 = 4$, say? Again, the proposal does not seem applicable. There are no states in human heads that are tokened *because* $2 + 2 = 4$. That abstract mathematical fact has no causal power." (1995, 101-2). Tye's mathematical example is particularly germane to Socrates' discussion of pleasure α . Socrates focuses on false *anticipatory* pleasure: the man believes he *will* win the lottery. The doxastic and hedonic objects represent a future state of affairs. Thus, *what* they represent is causally inert.

is taken. The primary truth-value bearer of pleasure β is the phenomenal component of pleasure. Availing ourselves of a *broad* notion of representation, we may say that the truth-aptness conceptions for the primary truth-value bearers of both pleasures α and β are representational.³⁴ The representations are, however, distinct in several significant ways. In pleasure α , the pictorial representation derives from a doxastic and so linguistic representation. In pleasure β , *in principle* the phenomenal representation does not depend on belief.³⁵ Additionally, the vehicles of the representations differ. Pictorial representation is visual or imagistic. Phenomenal representation occurs, for lack of a better expression, in the *hedonic modality*. Finally, the content of the hedonic representation is limited to the property of restoration and certain of its properties.³⁶

Let this suffice for an account of false pleasure β and of the relation between the truth-aptness conceptions in pleasures α and β .³⁷

³⁴ Tyler Burge refers to use of "representation" of which I am here availing myself as "deflationist." (2010, 293) I am sympathetic to Burge's criticisms of this broad use as well as to the narrow use of perceptual representation he defends. However, my use of "representation" is well motivated by the fact that it seems to capture Plato's broad conception of content-bearing entities and their truth-conditions.

³⁵ *Phlb.* 42a5-9.

³⁶ It is noteworthy that the phenomenal component can *not* represent objects. To clarify this point, consider the correlative case of pain, for example, pain in the knee. According to Socrates, the phenomenal component of pain represents damage or disintegration. Moreover, the representation may have a locative property. That is, one senses, as part of the experience of pain, a bodily location of the pain. However, this algesic representation cannot represent the *knee* itself, that is, the object where it represents the damage as located. In contrast, pictorial or imagistic representation can represent objects.

³⁷ Observe also Tye's claim that sensory representation is *non-conceptual*: "They involve no concepts." This invites the question whether in pleasure β Socrates commits to the view that the phenomenal component represents restoration non-conceptually. I merely want to flag this possibility and suggest one reason to think the answer may be positive. In *Republic* 9, Socrates articulates a similar conception of hedonic misrepresentation, likewise using visual illusion as an analogue. In *Republic*, however, Socrates does not draw any clear distinction between sensation and belief. For example, in the well-known passage in book 10 where he describes the visual illusion of a stick in water, Socrates says that the irrational part of the soul *believes* the stick to be bent, while the rational part believes it to be straight. (*R.* 602d6-603a2. I note in passing that BYRNE 2009 (esp. at 450-451) advances a similar account. In *Theaetetus*, by contrast, Socrates famously works to distinguish sensation and belief. I take *Philebus* to have been composed after *Theaetetus* and to incorporate this distinction between sensation and belief. Recall that a central point in the account of pleasure β , in contrast to pleasure α , is that false pleasure β in principle occurs independently of belief. If it could be shown that the distinction between sensation and belief in *Theaetetus* entails that sensation is non-conceptual, then there would be good reason to think that the phenomenal component of pleasure β represents non-conceptually. (While noting this intriguing possibility, it must also be emphasized that the nature of non-conceptual content is vexed. There is considerable need to clarify just what one is talking about here. let alone whether Plato is committed to it).

5. FALSE PLEASURES Γ AND Δ

Immediately following his account of pleasure β , Socrates says:

Next after these (namely, false pleasures α and β), we will see whether we can come upon pleasures (namely, γ and δ) ... even more false ($\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ἔτι μᾶλλον) ... both as they appear ($\phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\varsigma$) and as they are ($\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha\varsigma$).³⁸

For convenience, I will refer to being false in appearance as being "*phenomenally false*," and I will refer to being false in being as being "*ontically false*." I emphasize, then, that false pleasures γ and δ are *both* phenomenally and ontically false.

Let's begin with their phenomenal falsity. Relative to false pleasure β , false pleasure γ can be understood as akin to hallucination.³⁹ The phenomenal component of pleasure occurs, but there is *no* ontic component; that is, no restoration occurs.⁴⁰ I will not discuss the mechanisms by which Socrates thinks such hedonic hallucination may occur.

I turn to the phenomenal falsity of pleasure δ . As we saw in his account of false pleasure β , Socrates explains that the compresence of two affective conditions, whether both pleasures or a mixture of pleasure and pain, distorts the phenomenal character of each. False pleasure δ likewise entails the compresence of two affective conditions.⁴¹ In this case, Socrates requires that the affective conditions be *opposites*: pleasure and pain. The ontic components of the pain and pleasure may be bodily or psychological. For example, a somatic part may undergo disintegration, while a psychological part undergoes restoration. When they both register psychologically, Socrates emphasizes, the phenomenal components of pleasure and pain *fuse* into a single experience:

³⁸ *Phlb.* 42c5-7.

³⁹ Discussed at *Phlb.* 42c5-44d6. It is also central to and discussed in detail in Socrates' argument at *Republic* 9, 583b1-585a7.

⁴⁰ For example—my example—assume a child is suffering from some short-term fever. He struggles through the night and finally falls into a deep asleep. When he awakens, the fever is gone. The state into which he awakens is one of health. For Socrates, this is an affectively neutral rather than hedonic condition. Moreover, the child does not experience as pleasant the restorative process that occurred during the night since it occurred while he was unconscious. Crucially, it is the contrast between the child's present conscious state and the antecedent pain that makes this present state appear pleasant. That is, the antecedent pain causes the present neutral condition to *misappear* as pleasant. (One might reasonably wonder here why this isn't conceived as a misapparent neutral state instead. Presumably, the reason is this. The character of the phenomenal component is the primary epistemological means, i.e., the primary evidence, by which a subject cognizes his or her affective condition. Hence in case the ontic component does not correlate with the phenomenal component, the deviant affective condition is named after the character of the phenomenal component.)

⁴¹ Discussed at *Phlb.* 44d7-50e4.

Now when there is pain over and against pleasure or pleasure against pain, both are finally joined in a *single blend* (μίαν κρᾶσιν). We have talked about them earlier ... <and> when we discussed this, we did not make any special mention, as we do now, of the fact that in all cases where <the ontic components> are not in agreement the final result is a *single mixture* (μειξίς μία) of both pleasure and pain.^{42,43}

Like false pleasure β , false pleasure δ is false in that the phenomenal component is akin to illusion. Restoration occurs, but it disappears. Likewise, the illusion or distortion is a function of the compresence of two affective conditions.⁴⁴ Indeed, false pleasures β , γ , and δ are all *phenomenally* false.

What is really distinctive and noteworthy about false pleasures γ and δ is their ontic falsity. The source of ontic falsity is the condition of the entity's ontic component. False pleasure γ is ontically false because it wholly lacks an ontic component. No restoration occurs. False pleasure δ is ontically false because it is conjoined with an algesic component, damage or disintegration.

Ontic truth-value generally and ontic falsity specifically are *not* matters of representation or misrepresentation.⁴⁵ They concern what something *is*. Consider the phrases "true friend" and "false friend." Here, "true" is akin to "real" or "genuine," while "false" is akin to "fake" or "pseudo-." Compare the following pairs:

⁴² *Phlb.* 47c4-d3. Although Socrates makes his comment about psycho-somatic mixed pleasure, I assume his point that mixed pleasure involves fusion of phenomenal components holds for all somato-somatic mixed pleasure and psycho-psychological mixed pleasure as well. The reason Socrates makes the remark precisely in the context of his discussion of psycho-somatic pleasure is just that he has already discussed such pleasure, in the context of his discussion pleasures α and β . The difference here, as he says, is that previously he did not "make any special mention" of the fact that "the final result is a single mixture of pleasure and pain."

⁴³ I note, but will not further discuss, the worry that the present account undermines the account of false pleasure β , since the latter requires that at least one of the phenomenal components be distorted.

⁴⁴ Note that in the case of misapparent pleasure, the false form of pleasure β , Socrates does not limit compresence of multiple affective conditions to pleasure and pain; mis-appearance may derive from two compresent pleasures.

⁴⁵ Presently, I have focused on false pleasures γ and δ , not on the true forms of pleasures γ and δ . True pleasure γ is a restoration that registers psychically, in case this restoration is not preceded by pain. Because the restoration is not preceded by pain, the hedonic appearance is not distorted. In other words, a true or veridical appearance occurs. Since disintegration must precede restoration, this condition is only possible if the disintegration is gradual or slight and thus does not register psychically. In discussions of pleasure in *Republic* 9 and *Timaeus* as well as *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and Socrates admit this possibility. (*R.* 584b1-8; *Ti.* 65a1-b3) A signal example is olfactory pleasure, which—strangely but consistently with his theory—Plato conceives as a restoration of the olfactory faculty. The restoration is sudden, forceful, and hence pleasant, but the correlative depletion or disintegration is subtle, gradual, and hence unperceived. (I note in passing that true pleasure γ is identical to true pleasure β —although the sense of "true pleasure γ " differs from that of "true pleasure β .")

"a genuine or true Degas" versus "a fake Degas"; "real money" versus "fake or counterfeit money"; "true or real happiness" versus "false happiness"; "true modesty" versus "false modesty."

Linguists refer to "false," "fake" and their kin in these contexts as "privative" adjectives. Their semantic character is explicable by contrast with so-called "intersective" adjectives. For example, "red" and other color terms are often characterized as intersective adjectives.⁴⁶ The extension of the phrase "red house" is the *intersection* of the extensions of "red" and "house," that is, the intersection of the sets of red entities and houses. In contrast, the extension of "fake Degas" *excludes* works by Degas. So the extension of phrases composed of privative adjectives and noun-phrases excludes entities in the extension of the noun-phrase.^{47, 48}

In contrast, the extension of "true Degas" is identical to that of "Degas," just as that of "true gold" is identical to that of "gold." Accordingly, Barbara Partee refers to this class of adjectives as "tautologous."⁴⁹ If the semantic function of these adjectives does not affect the extension of the noun-phrases they modify and, more generally, is truth-functionally idle, then their meaning is not descriptive. Arguably, their semantic function is *validating* and *contrastive*: precisely, to *validate* the ontological status of the referent *in contrast to* some invalid set. For example, in the sentence "That is a true Degas," "true" serves to validate the authenticity of a painting in contrast to a set of fakes.^{50, 51}

False pleasure γ is ontically false in the privative sense. It is like a false friend, no friend (or pleasure) at all. The mere hedonic appearance does not constitute a pleasure since, once again, for Socrates, pleasure's *esse* is not simply *percipi*.

The ontic falsity of false pleasure δ is a more difficult case. I suggest that "false" is not exactly used here in the privative sense—although its use is related. Consider the following sentence: The paint we used in the bedroom is not

⁴⁶ In fact, this is a controversial claim. For example, cf. RECANATI (2010), esp. 55-59. But for the purposes of the present discussion, it is innocuous.

⁴⁷ At least, this is a familiar way in which the semantics of privative adjectives has been explained. Recently, however, PARTEE (2007) has argued that so-called privative adjectives are actually subjective. That is, the extension of "false friend" is a subset of the extension of "friend"—at least in the context in which the former phrase occurs. This is because the so-called privative adjective coerces the expansion of the noun-phrase it modifies. For example, in the question "Is this gun fake or real?" the extension of "gun" includes fake as well as genuine instances." (cp. PARTEE, 2010).

⁴⁸ There seem to be counter-examples. Are false teeth and false eye-lashes *not* teeth or eye-lashes?

⁴⁹ PARTEE (2007), 157. Partee herself maintains that so-called tautologous adjectives are also subjective. "True friend" coerces the extension of "friend" to include untrue instances.

⁵⁰ Cp. LANGACKER (2008), 320, who speaks of the adjective pair "real" and "fake" as concerned with assessing the validity of the nominal type specification.

⁵¹ Insofar as they have discussed the foregoing uses of "false" and "true," philosophers have referred to them as "ontological," "metaphysical," or "transcendental." See KÜNNE (2003), 104. For Plato scholars, see SZAIF (1996), 75-132; HESTIR (2004), 109-50.

true white; it has some admixture of rose. Here, the color's not being *true* white does not exclude it from the extension of "white." Rather, "not true white" as well as "true white" designate members of the set of white entities.⁵² Likewise, according to the present usage, some whites may be truer than others. Indeed, the example of off-white paint is aptly chosen since Socrates' account of false pleasure δ entails that this pleasure is mixed with pain, and mixtures may be of various proportions. Accordingly, a pleasure conjoined with a slight pain will be ontically truer in this sense than a pleasure conjoined with a greater pain.

The privative and tautologous uses of "false" and "true" as in pleasure γ are, we might say, *absolute* rather than *gradable* ones. Once again, the set of absolutely true F s is identical to the set of F s; whereas absolutely false F s are excluded from this set. In contrast, the uses of "false" or "not true" and "true" as in pleasure δ are gradable. More and less true or false F s belong to the set of F s. For convenience, hereafter I'll simply refer to these kinds of ontic truth-value as "absolute and gradable truth-value."⁵³

The gradable truth-value to which Socrates commits in his account of pleasure δ entails a distinction between pure and impure property possession, where pure and impure property possession in turn requires possession of properties to various degrees.⁵⁴ This, finally, entails limiting minimal and maximal degrees of property possession. Maximal property possession is pure property possession. For example, an object that is maximally green will, with respect to its color, not possess any other color. Note, however, that minimal property possession will not be the degree next to zero. For consider the condition of mixed *pleasure*, that is, pleasure mixed with pain: if a mixture involved a preponderance of pain over pleasure, that mixture would not be a mixed *pleasure*; it would be a mixed pain. Hence minimal property possession here must be significantly greater than zero.

In short, gradable truth-value can be understood as follows. The more purely F some x is, the more gradably truly $F x$ is, the limit being where x is purely F . The more impurely F some x is, the more gradably falsely $F x$ is – up to the point where x is not F (which is significantly greater than possessing F -ness to zero degree).⁵⁵

⁵² I note in passing that we do not use the phrase "false white" in this context, at least not in English.

⁵³ My discussion in this section has been informed by Jan Szaif's discussion of Plato's use of "ἀληθές" and equivalent expressions such as "ἀληθινόν," "(ὡς) ἀληθῶς," and "τῆ ἀληθείᾳ," in SZAIF (1996), 49-56; he distinguishes two logically attributive uses of "ἀληθές" and its cognates, which he calls "statuierende" (52) and "signierende" (54). The former conforms to my absolute, the latter to my gradable ontic truth-value conceptions.

⁵⁴ These must be properties whose genera have multiple species. In other words, the properties themselves must have coordinate kinds.

⁵⁵ But again, the point at which x is absolutely not F is not the point at which x is F to zero degree. In fact, the extent will have to be considerable, presumably more than half. For example, it would be absurd to say of a glass of water into which a microscopic amount of alcohol was introduced that the solution was of impure alcohol.

Based on the preceding, there are numerous, significant consequences for the metaphysics of absolute and gradable truth-value. But, for the sake of brevity, I will skip that discussion.^{56,57}

6. ON THE INTERRELATION OF SOCRATES' TRUTH-APTNESS CONCEPTIONS

There are many things to say about the interrelations of Socrates' truth-aptness conceptions in pleasures α , β , γ , and δ .⁵⁸ In this final section I confine myself to considering just one point. Recall Socrates' claim, cited above:

Next after these (namely, false pleasures α and β), we will see whether we can come upon pleasures (namely, γ and δ) ... even more false ($\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ἔτι μᾶλλον) ... both as they appear and as they are.

⁵⁶ First, are there in fact properties of absolute truth-values? Insofar as the phrase "true F " is "tautologous" and non-descriptive, the answer is clear: there is no property of being absolutely true. Just being F is necessary and sufficient for being an absolutely true F . Let's turn to absolute falsity. Tables and houseplants, for instance, are *not* pleasures. Does this mean they possess the property of *not being a pleasure*? It is questionable whether there are such negative properties. (For Plato's view of negative properties, for example, not being beautiful, see *Sophist* 257b ff. For a recent discussion of the metaphysics of negative properties, see ZANGWILL (2011), 528-56. Interestingly, Zangwill resurrects the Platonic notion of degrees of reality and argues that negative properties are in fact real, but *less* real than positive properties.) But whether or not there are negative properties, not being an F is not sufficient for being an absolutely false F . Tables and houseplants, for instance, are not false pleasures. In addition to not being an F , a false F must *appear* to be an F . (Or, perhaps, it must at least have the disposition to appear to be an F .) Tentatively, I conclude that the property of absolute falsity is the property of *merely* appearing to be something. Is this a genuine property? I'm not sure. It looks like it would have to be a conjunctive property of appearing to be an F , *but* not being an F .

⁵⁷ With respect to the metaphysics of gradable truth-values, we said that the more purely F an x is, the more gradably true it is; and the less purely F an x is, short of not being an F , the more gradably false it is. Being F to some degree looks like a property, assuming "some" is given a definite quantity (or range of quantities). Plato, however, would balk at this suggestion; for this seems to entail that there are properties P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n for each degree of possession of a property P . But even assuming that there are properties of being F to different degrees, being more and less ontically true or false are relational. For example, relative to a purely F entity and a barely F entity, one and the same entity may be less truly (hence more falsely) F and more truly (hence less falsely) F . In other words, assuming there are properties of being F to a particular degree, having gradable truth-value characterizes those properties in relation to one another. (Another difficulty: it looks like there is a difference between *being F* to some degree and *possessing the property F-ness* to some degree. The latter evidently does not entail the former. For example, a liquid possessing a microscopic amount of alcohol is not alcohol to some degree.) I have barely scratched the surface of ontic truth-value in pleasures γ and δ , but I must stop here.

⁵⁸ For example—with respect to how the true and false forms of pleasures α , β , γ , and δ are correlated—the true forms of pleasures β , γ , and δ are in fact identical. Once again, this is consistent with the *senses* of "being a true pleasure β , γ , and δ " differing.

From this, I inferred that false pleasures γ and δ are both phenomenally and ontically false. But Socrates' claim clearly conveys more than this. It conveys that:

BRIDGE False pleasures γ and δ are *more false* than false pleasures α and β .

My question is how we should interpret the comparative claim in Bridge. I interpret the comparative claim in Bridge to mean that:

BRIDGE2 False pleasures γ and δ are more false *in their phenomenal and ontic falsity* than false pleasures α and β are false, in whatever way false pleasures α and β are false.

Now, we have concluded that false pleasures α and β are *representationally* false. And we know that phenomenal falsity is representational falsity. So we can interpret Bridge2 as:

BRIDGE3 False pleasures γ and δ are more false in their *representational* and ontic falsity than false pleasures α and β are false *in their representational falsity*.

Minimally, I interpret Bridge3 to entail the following two claims:

BRIDGE4A False pleasure γ is more representationally false than false pleasure β .

BRIDGE4B Ontically false pleasures γ and δ are more false than false pleasures α and β .

I'll take Bridge4a first. I have suggested that false pleasures β and γ are the hedonic analogues of visual illusion and hallucination. Illusion gets its object right, but some property of the object wrong. Hallucination does not get the object right. A fortiori, it errs in misrepresenting properties of the object. In false pleasure β , the phenomenal component veridically indicates the occurrence of restoration. However, it misrepresents the way the restoration occurs. In false pleasure γ , the phenomenal component misrepresents the occurrence of restoration. A fortiori, it misrepresents the way restoration is occurring. In this way, we might conclude that hallucination misrepresents to a greater extent than illusion. Turning now to Bridge4b, I see two interpretive paths: one easy, one hard.

EASY BRIDGE False pleasures γ and δ are more *ontically false* than false pleasures α and β because false pleasures α and β are *not* ontically false at all.

False pleasures α and β are not ontically false at all because in both cases restoration occurs. The problem with false pleasures α and β are phenomenal not ontic. So, if Easy Bridge is correct, then we've crossed the river. But, following the Greek motto $\chiαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ$ (beautiful things are difficult), I'd like to try Hard Bridge.

HARD BRIDGE The ontic falsity of false pleasures γ and δ is more false than the representational falsity of pleasures α and β .

In Hard Bridge, the items being compared constitute a *heterogeneous* set of kinds of falsity. The question then is on what basis Socrates could take ontic falsity to be more false than representational falsity.⁵⁹ To start, consider the following idea: The ontic component of pleasure has *ontological priority* relative to the phenomenal component. By "ontological priority" I mean this:

An entity e has ontological priority relative to an entity f if the existence of e does not depend upon the existence of f , whereas the existence of f depends upon the existence of e .⁶⁰

Barring idealism, an appearance of some object o ontologically depends on o , whereas o is not ontologically dependent on the appearance of o . Accordingly, the ontic component of pleasure has ontological priority relative to the phenomenal component.⁶¹ Accordingly, Socrates may be implicitly committed to the view that ontic truth-value has ontological priority relative to representational truth-value. The justification for this view would be that ontic truth-value can exist independently of representational truth-value, whereas representational truth-value cannot exist independently of ontic truth-value.^{62,63} Ontic falsity is, then, a

⁵⁹ KÜNNE (2003), 105 – who devotes just a few pages to the discussion of what I am calling ontic truth-value – concludes that this and the notion of representational truth-value "are vastly different."

⁶⁰ Conversely, an entity f has ontological posteriority in relation to an entity e if the existence of f depends upon the existence of e , while the existence of e does not depend on the existence of f . (For much more and much more penetrating discussion of ontological dependence, see (FINE) 1995, 269–90.)

⁶¹ Note that this is so even in the case of hedonic hallucination, that is, in the case of false pleasure γ . This is because the phenomenal aspect represents restoration, even though no restoration occurs, because there is a natural correlation between restoration and hedonic appearance.

⁶² Note that this claim must not be construed too narrowly. It is possible to represent a given object that does not and has not existed. Hence, the representation of such an object does not depend on its existence. However, it is logically possible for objects to exist, without the existence of

more ontologically fundamental way of being false than representational falsity. If this is correct, then we now need an explanation of the inference from:

x's falsity is more ontologically fundamental than *y*'s falsity

to:

x's falsity is more false than *y*'s falsity.

Finally, if this inference can be justified, then it remains to clarify what conception of comparative falsity is operative in the final claim.

This is as far across Hard Bridge and, more generally, into this *prolegomenon* to Plato on truth-value and truth-aptness as I can go here. I leave you to ponder whether to forge ahead, turn back, or jump.

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representations, whereas it is logically impossible for representations to exist without the existence of objects.

⁶³ This is in fact questionable, at least in the following way. While ontically true *F*s can in principle exist if no other entities exist, ontic falsity requires entities that *appear* to be *F*. This makes me wonder whether ontic falsity is actually an epistemological category.

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