

On the Unity of the *Dissoi Logoi*

David Conan Wolfsdorf

1. Orientation to the Text

It is generally agreed that the text T that we call the *Dissoi Logoi* was originally composed within the first decade or so after the Peloponnesian War. The single most compelling piece of evidence in support of this dating is the text's description of the Spartans' victory over the Athenians as "the most recent" (τὰ νεώτατα) of the battles under discussion.¹ In a 1985 paper, Thomas Conley proposes that T was composed in the late Byzantine period.² His grounds for this thesis are very weak. A few remarks will serve to show why and to corroborate the standard dating.

T includes two poetic fragments that occur only here: one perhaps from Euripides, the other expressly from the poetess Cleobuline.³ T also includes a fragment from Aeschylus that occurs only once elsewhere in antiquity.⁴ T refers to the Anaxagoreans (οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι) and the Pythagoreans as exemplars of teachers of wisdom (σοφία) and excellence (ἀρετά).⁵ The phrase "οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι" occurs only once elsewhere in classical antiquity,⁶ and I am aware of only one other ancient passage in which it is implied that that Anaxagoreans taught wisdom and excellence.⁷ Finally the dialect of T is largely West Doric, with some rather peculiar and in some cases unique forms.⁸ On the basis of these facts, it is implausible that a late Byzantine scholar created T. On the contrary, T is a rare and precious vestige of late fifth- and early fourth-century non-Socratic ethical philosophy.

The text of T is incomplete. It ends abruptly. Most manuscripts conclude with an ellipsis and a scholiast's remark: "Σῆ ὅτι τὸ ἐπίλοιπον οὐχ εὐρέθη" (Indication that the remainder has not been found).⁹ It is difficult to ascertain with confidence how much of the original is lacking. Some interior sections are also lacunose or seem abbreviated.¹⁰ One reason that has been proposed for at least some of lacunae and seeming abbreviation is that the original composition consisted of lecture notes¹¹ rather than a relatively polished treatise. But it is

¹ 1.8. ² "Dating the So-called *Dissoi Logoi*: A Cautionary Note," *Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1985), 59–65.

³ 2.19; 3.11. ⁴ 3.12; Stob. 3.3.13. ⁵ 6.8.

⁶ Pl. *Cra.* 409b. Cp. Syncellus, *Chron.* 140C.I p. 282, 19 Dind. = DK 61 A6.

⁷ In his biography of Anaxagoras, Diogenes Laertius writes: "Favorinus says in his *Miscellaneous History* that [Anaxagoras] was the first to show that the poetry of Homer is about ἀρετή and justice, and that his acquaintance Metrodorus of Lampsacus defended this account more extensively and was the first to study the poet's physical doctrine." (2.11 = DK 61 A2) On this topic, cp. David J. Califf, "Metrodorus of Lampsacus and the Problem of Allegory: An Extreme Case?" *Arethusa* 36 (2003), 21–36; Mokolaj Domaradzki, "Allegoresis in the Fifth Century BC," *Eos* 97 (2010), 233–48.

⁸ Cp. T.M. Robinson's view that the text was composed for a Doric audience, but by someone whose native dialect was Ionian (*Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the Dissoi Logoi [Contrasting]* (New York, 1979), 51).

⁹ See Appendix 2.C. Cp. Parisinus 1963: "Σῆ: ἐλλιπὲς οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀντίγραφον, ὡς ὀρᾶτε."

¹⁰ E.g., 4.9, 5.1, 8.1, 8.6, 8.9. I discuss some of these below.

¹¹ This could mean notes for delivering a lecture or notes taken from hearing a lecture.

peculiar that the opening sections seem relatively complete, while the concluding sections seem relatively incomplete. Whatever the reason for this—I suggest one momentarily—a distinction must be recognized between T and a more complete text from which T is derived.

Henri Estienne (c.1530–98), aka Stephanus, published the first modern edition of T in 1570. In doing so, he added the text as an appendix to his edition of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives*. But the manuscripts that are our sources for T, including those that Stephanus used,¹² consist of Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Professors*, either alone or in conjunction with the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.¹³ So, at some point between Sextus' composition of these works, the late second to early third century CE,¹⁴ and the mid-fifteenth century, our earliest extant manuscripts containing T, T was added as an appendix to Sextus' works.¹⁵ The reason for the addition is presumably that the editor, whether or not he himself was a skeptic, viewed the antilogical contents of T as an important early exemplar of skeptical argumentation. As I will discuss later, the antilogical contents are limited to the first two thirds or so of T, and this may also explain why the concluding portions are more lacunose and seem abbreviated.

Most manuscripts provide headers for four contiguous sections of T, starting from its beginning:¹⁶

1. On the good and the bad
2. On the seemly and the unseemly¹⁷
3. On the just and the unjust
4. On the true and the false.¹⁸

¹² Stephanus "offers no indication of what ms. or mss. he" uses. (Robinson, *Contrasting*, 1)

¹³ See Appendix 1.

¹⁴ I follow E. Floridi, *Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism [Sextus]* (Oxford, 2002), 5, in taking Sextus' life to have spanned c.140–60 to c.220–30.

¹⁵ The earliest datable manuscript to include T appears to be Marcianus gr. 262 (coll. 408), which was composed some time prior to 1468 and which contains *Adv. Math.* as well as T. Earlier manuscripts containing one or both of Sextus' works or excerpts from these include: Parisinus suppl. 1156 + Vaticanus gr. 738 + Vindobonensis Theol. gr. 179, which are three fragments of the same ms. (9th–10th century); Coisilianus 371 (10th century); Vaticanus gr. 435 (12th–14th century); and Heidelberg Univ. Bib. Pal. gr. 129 (14th century); Laurentianus 9.32 (14th century); Monacensis gr. 493 (14th century); and perhaps Ac. Leningrad, Biblioteka Akademij Nauk 0 128 (1448). See Floridi (2002) 91–2. The fact that several manuscripts contain only *Against the Professors* and T—in approximate chronological order these include: Marcianus gr. 262 (coll. 408), Regimontanus S. 35 (16.b.12), Cizensis gr. fol. 70, Oxoniensis Bodliensis Savilianus gr. 1 (6548), Parisinus gr. 2081, Escorialensis gr. 136 (T.1.16), and Oxoniensis Mertonensis gr. 304; on which see Floridi, *Sextus*, 91–2—but no manuscript contains only the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and T may encourage the thought that T was added as an appendix specifically to *Against the Professors*. But the reason that we find several manuscripts containing only *Against the Professors* and T, but none containing only the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and T can instead be explained by the fact that in certain branches of the manuscript tradition the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Professors* were separated, and in such cases we tend to find *Against the Professors* with T because T was originally appended to the set consisting of both of Sextus' works. Cp. Appendix 1.

¹⁶ To be clear, not all manuscripts that contain T provide these headers or in exactly the words given here.

¹⁷ The Greek here is "τὸ καλόν" and "τὸ αἰσχρόν," which are notoriously difficult terms to translate. An alternative rendition is "the fine" and "the base." The problem is that in T, especially in section 2, the terms seem to be used to mean "that which is socially appropriate/ inappropriate."

¹⁸ In the oldest manuscript, Marcianus gr. 262, the headers are written in red ink, in contrast to the black ink of the rest of the manuscript. And while the first three headers are inscribed in the main text, the fourth division in the right margin. Moreover, the main text does not introduce a break at this point to indicate a section division. See Appendix 2.A, B.

Since Stephanus, editors have supplemented the manuscripts' section divisions. Stephanus divides section 4 in two, retains header 4 for the first resulting part, and adds the following fifth header to the second resulting part:

5. On whether wisdom and excellence are teachable.

From the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, editors and translators followed Stephanus' five-fold division. Since then, several editors have made further partitions. In his 1884 edition, Gustav Teichmüller divides T into eight sections.¹⁹ In the first edition of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (1903), Diels divides T into nine sections. He divides section 4 in two and section 5 in four. Although Diels does not, several more recent editors and translators add headers to the new sections.

Hereafter I assume an enneadic division of T with the following headers:

1. On the good and the bad
2. On the seemly and the unseemly
3. On the just and the unjust
4. On the true and the false
5. On the sound-minded and the mad, the wise and the ignorant
6. On whether wisdom²⁰ and excellence are teachable
7. On the assignment of public offices by lot
8. On omniscience and linguistic skill
9. On the value of memory.²¹

No manuscript provides a title, let alone an author for T. Stephanus himself refers to the work as "Discourses (*Dialexeis*) by an unnamed author" (*ἀνωνύμου τινὸς διαλέξεις*).²² Prior to the late nineteenth century, editors and scholars followed Stephanus in using the title "*Dialexeis*."²³

The title *Dissoi Logoi* derives from the incipit of T:

Dual accounts (*δισσοὶ λόγοι*) concerning the good and the bad are proposed in Greece by those who engage in philosophy. (1.1)²⁴

¹⁹ G. Teichmüller, *Litterarische Fehden im vierten Jahrhundert vor Chr.*, vol. 2 (Breslau, 1884), 544–52. Likewise, E. Weber, "Δισσοὶ Λόγοι: Eine Ausgabe der sogenannten Διαλέξεις," in *Philologisch-historische Beiträge zum 60. Geburtstag C. Wachsmuth überr.* (Leipzig, 1897), 33–51.

²⁰ Note that by "wisdom" (*σοφία*) here I understand: skill that enables one to flourish, whether in private life or in public life. (Cp. Pl. *Prt.* 318e–319a. And cp. D. Wolfsdorf, "'Sophia' and 'Epistēmē' in the Archaic and Classical Periods" ["*Sophia*"], in N. D. Smith, ed., *Philosophy of Knowledge: A History*, vol. 1 (London, 2018), 11–29).

²¹ Cp. A. Becker and P. Scholz, *Dissoi Logoi Zweierlei Ansichten [Ansichten]* (Berlin, 2004), 75–91. A. Laks and G. Most, *Early Greek Philosophy*, vol. IX, *Sophists part 1 [Early]* (Cambridge, 2016), 164–207, also divide the text in nine sections, although without adding headers for sections 5–9.

²² In the context of this discussion, I too will treat the author of T as anonymous.

²³ The fact that "*Dialexeis*" is a plural noun might suggest that T is a set of discourses rather than a single one. Compare Friederich Mullach's prefacing the headers "*Dialexis A*," "*Dialexis B*," and so on, to sequential sections of the text in his 1875 edition (F.W. Mullach, *Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1875), 544–52). I discuss this point further later.

²⁴ On the phrase "δισσοὶ λόγοι" cp. Eur. *Antiope*, fr. 189 Nauck²: "ἐκ παντὸς ἂν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός."

Ernst Weber first proposed this title in his 1897 edition.²⁵ But it is especially through the influence of the fifth and six editions of Diels and Kranz's *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (1934, 1951) that "Dissoi Logoi" has come to replace "Dialexeis" as the standard title for T.

The first English translation of T, by Rosamond Sprague in 1968, renders "Δισσοὶ Λόγοι" as "Two-Fold Arguments."²⁶ Compare Adolfo Levi's rendition in a 1940 article: "Twofold Statements."²⁷ The distinction between Sprague's "arguments" and Levi's "statements" is not inconsequential. Following the opening sentence of T, the author expresses the first of several pairs of dual λόγοι as follows:

Some say that the good is one thing and that the bad is another. Others say that they are the same. (1.1)

These are statements rather than arguments. In this respect, Levi's rendition is more faithful. On the other hand, the statements, here and in later sections, are in most cases supported by arguments. Additionally, at various points in T "λόγος" is used to denote an argument or set of arguments.²⁸ Consequently, a translator may reasonably seek a term that can be used for both statements and arguments. The English words "position" and "account" are plausible candidates. I suggest that "dual accounts" is an apt rendition of the Greek.

That "δισσοὶ λόγοι" is the incipit of T does not imply that "δισσοὶ λόγοι" was the incipit of the original composition. For example, the original might have begun with a now lost proemium.²⁹ So, the claim that "δισσοὶ λόγοι" is in fact the incipit of the original, which T preserves, requires an argument regarding the nature of the original. Even granting that "δισσοὶ λόγοι" is the incipit of the original, it does not follow that *Dissoi Logoi* is the most appropriate title for T. Once again, some argument, if merely an appeal to the weight of currently accepted usage, is required.

2. The Question of the Unity of T

The question I want to examine in this chapter is whether and if so how T or the original from which T is derived is a unity. By "unity" here I mean a single discourse. Contrast this with the possibility that T is a set of several, indeed up to nine independent discourses corresponding to each section division. I acknowledge that a collection of discourses, like a collection of poems or essays, may constitute a unity of a kind. But I will assume it to be

²⁵ "Δισσοὶ Λόγοι: Eine Ausgabe der sogenannten Διαλέξεις," in *Philologische-Historische Beiträge Curt Wachsmuth zum sechzigsten Geburtstag überreicht* (Leipzig, 1897), 33–51. (Strangely, Weber does not justify this renaming.)

²⁶ "Dissoi Logoi or Dialexeis," *Mind* 72 (1968), 155–67. Cp. M. Untersteiner's "ragionamenti duplici" (*Sofisti*, vol. 3 (Florence, 1954)); J.-P. Dumont's "double-dits" and "doubles arguments" (*Les Sophistes* (Paris, 1969)); Becker and Scholz's "zweierlei Ansichten" (*Ansichten*, 2004).

²⁷ A. Levi, "On 'Twofold Statements,'" *American Journal of Philology* 61 (1940), 292–306.

²⁸ E.g., at 1.17, 5.5, 6.13, 8.12.

²⁹ This is the view of A. E. Taylor, "The δισσοὶ λόγοι," in *Varia Socratica* (St. Andrews, 1911), 91–128. I note the idea, but my own interpretation will favor—albeit not require—the view that "δισσοὶ λόγοι" was the incipit of the original composition.

intuitively clear what is meant here by the idea of T as a unity in the sense of being a single discourse.

In the following discussion, I will advance several considerations in favor of the view that T is a unity in the sense of a being a single discourse. These considerations are of different kinds and pertain to different aspects of T. The first set, consisting of two considerations, pertains to the unity of T as a whole. The first of these two considerations indicates a weak, but nonetheless important form of unity based on the distribution of connecting particles in the opening lines of each section. The second suggests a stronger form of unity that concerns the function of T and especially the functional relation between sections 1–6 and sections 8–9. The second set of considerations pertains to proper parts of T rather than to T as a whole. Observe here that the very fact that this second set of considerations is being advanced indicates that the foregoing set of considerations regarding the unity of T as a whole is insufficient to explain the unity of numerous substructures of the text. This second set again consists of two considerations. The first pertains to the topical or thematic unity of sections 1–3. The second pertains to the topical unity between and to the forms of argumentation that feature in sections 1–3 and sections 4–5.

3.1. Opening Sentences and Connecting Particles

One reason to think that T cannot be a set of nine wholly independent discourses is that the opening sentences of at least sections 2–4 include particles and other contents that connect them to the sections that precede them. Recall that section 1 begins with the following sentence:

Dual accounts concerning the good and the bad are proposed in Greece by those who engage in philosophy. (1.1)

Observe the absence of particles in the Greek original of this sentence:

δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ.

Contrast this with the opening sentences of sections 2, 3, and 4:

And also (*δὲ καὶ*) concerning the seemly and the unseemly dual accounts are proposed. (2.1)

And (*δὲ*) dual accounts are also (*καὶ*) proposed concerning the just and the unjust. (3.1)

And also (*δὲ καὶ*) concerning the false and the true dual accounts are proposed. (4.1)

This provides some evidence that at least sections 1–4 were intended to be read or heard sequentially, and precisely in the sequence in which they are presented in T.

In contrast, the sentence that begins section 5 lacks connecting particles. It is also peculiar in that it is in direct discourse:

The mad and the sound-minded and the wise and the ignorant say and do the same things. (5.1)

ταῦτά τοι μαινόμενοι καὶ τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι.

This is the only opening sentence in a section of T, aside from the opening sentence of section 1, that lacks connecting particles. But note that the last sentence of section 4 appears incomplete.³⁰ Diels, among others, proposes a lacuna. Assuming so, perhaps the lacuna extended into the beginning of section 5 in the original composition. And in that case, the opening sentence of section 5 as we have it in T might have been added by a later editor to clarify the transition from the content of section 4 to the content of section 5. On this interpretation, section 5 would have originally begun as sections 2–4 do, with a sentence such as:

And dual accounts are also proposed concerning the mad and the sound-minded and the wise and the ignorant.³¹

A further consideration that strongly supports this hypothesis is that the ensuing contents of section 5 are structured, as the contents of sections 1–4 are structured, as a sequence of arguments for each member of a pair of dual accounts.³² As such, and for further reasons that I discuss below, I presume that sections 1–5 constitute a unified sequence.

Each of the opening sentences of sections 6, 7, and 9 includes the post-positive particle “δέ.” Section 8 does not. But the absence of the particle here is easily explained. Section 8 begins in mid-sentence.³³ Some editors have suggested a lacuna of several letters at the end of section 7. As in the case of the ending of section 4 and beginning of section 5, that lacuna could have extended into section 8. In any event, most editors have accepted the addition to the opening sentence of section 8 of an expression that includes the particle “δέ.”³⁴

These considerations provide some reason to think that sections 1–9 were originally intended to be read or heard as a sequence, as they are in fact presented in T. This is a significant conclusion. But it entails only a weak unity for T. It does not constitute an argument for the topical unity of T; and it does not provide an explanation of the functional unity of T.

3.2. The Antilogical and Monological Portions of T

I turn to a second consideration in favor of the unity of T. This second consideration suggests a more contentful and functional unity for the text. In order to advance this consideration, it is necessary to clarify the antilogical and monological portions of T.

³⁰ “τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον διαφέρει.”

³¹ Alternatively, the opening sentence of section 5 might have been: “And dual accounts are also proposed concerning the mad and the sound-minded and the wise and the ignorant.” However, for reasons discussed later, I favor the proposal in the main text above.

³² I discuss this point more fully later. ³³ See the following note.

³⁴ “<τῶ δ' αὐτῶ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι . . .”

The first four sections of T are structured in the following antilogical way. Each section opens with the claim that dual accounts are proposed regarding $\tau\acute{o}$ *a* and $\tau\acute{o}$ **a*. Here *a* stands for an adjective and **a* for its opposite, for example, *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν* in section 1. One member of the pair of dual accounts is an identity thesis. It claims that $\tau\acute{o}$ *a* and $\tau\acute{o}$ **a* are the same ($\tau\acute{o}$ *αὐτό*). The other member of the pair is, as I will call it, a differentiating thesis. It claims that $\tau\acute{o}$ *a* is one thing and $\tau\acute{o}$ **a* is another (*ἄλλο . . . ἄλλο*)—in other words that $\tau\acute{o}$ *a* and $\tau\acute{o}$ **a* are different from one another. For example, recall the quotation from section 1 above where the identity thesis is that the good and the bad are the same and the differentiating thesis is that the good is one thing and the bad is another. Following the opening statement that there are these dual accounts, a set of arguments is advanced for the identity thesis, and then a set of arguments is advanced for the differentiating thesis.

As we have seen, section 5 does not open with a statement of dual accounts. However, we have also suggested that in the original composition section 5 likely did open with a statement of dual accounts.³⁵ This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that, following its opening sentence, section 5 proceeds to present arguments supporting the identity thesis and then arguments supporting the differentiating thesis.

Section 6 differs from sections 1–4 (and, according to my reconstruction, section 5) in that it does not open with a statement that there are dual accounts regarding the topic that it discusses. Rather section 6 begins with the following statement:

And there is a certain account advanced that is neither true nor new that wisdom and excellence can neither be taught nor learned. (6.1)

Observe also that the theses against and for the teachability and learnability of wisdom and excellence are not identity and differentiating theses. Granted this, the ensuing structure of section 6 is antilogical. The author first presents a set of arguments for the view that wisdom and excellence cannot be taught and learned; he then follows with a set of arguments for the positive thesis.

Like section 6, section 7 does not open with a statement that there are dual accounts regarding the topic that it discusses. As also in section 6, section 7 opens with a criticism of a position that others advance:

And ($\delta\epsilon$) some of the public speakers claim that public offices ought to be assigned by lot. But their thought is not the best.

Observe that, again like section 6, the theses against and for the assignation of public offices by lot are not identity and differentiating theses. In contrast to section 6, however, no arguments are subsequently presented for the public speakers' position. Instead the author proceeds to argue for the thesis that public offices should not be assigned by lot. At one point in his argument for this negative thesis (7.5), the author states a reason in favor of the thesis that public offices should be assigned by lot, namely that this is a democratic and good procedure. The author states this reason in order to argue against it. But it is the only

³⁵ Note that these dual accounts contain more complex expressions than those in sections 1–4, namely “the *a*/**a* say and do” the same/different things; that is, the actions and statements of the sound-minded/mad and wise/ignorant are the same/different.

reason cited in support of the thesis that public offices should be assigned by lot. In short, section 7 reads simply as a criticism of a view endorsed by certain democratically minded public speakers that public offices should be assigned by lot. Consequently, section 7 is antilogical only insofar as it begins by introducing a thesis that it subsequently criticizes.

Sections 8 and 9 are strictly monological. Section 8 opens with the thesis that it is characteristic of the same man and the same skill to have various linguistic, epistemic, and pedagogical abilities,³⁶ and it proceeds to explicate and defend this thesis. Section 9 opens with the thesis that memory (*μνάμα*), by which the author appears to mean mnemonic ability, is the greatest and seemliest human discovery. The author then proceeds to explain how to cultivate this ability. Neither section 8 nor section 9 so much as mentions antitheses.³⁷

In sum, the antilogical structure and content of T is limited to sections 1–6. Section 7 is almost wholly monological. And sections 8 and 9 are wholly monological.

3.3. The Relation between the Antilogical and Monological Portions of T

My basic proposal for the functional unity of T is that in the antilogical sections of T, namely sections 1–6, the author is deliberately impressing upon his audience a set of aporiae. In the monological sections, especially sections 8 and 9, the author responds to these aporiae by proposing that there is a master skill whose possession will enable one to resolve the aporiae. I will argue that the author takes himself to possess this master skill and to be able to teach it to members of his audience. The central task of my argument for this functional unity of T lies in showing that the master skill is described in ways that indicate how it can resolve the aporiae of the antilogical sections. I begin then with an account of the master skill.

Section 8 advances the thesis that a single skill (*τέχνα*) endows its possessor with omniscience and the ability to speak on all subjects. For convenience, I will refer to this skill as the “master skill.” More precisely, the thesis of section 8 is that the master skill consists of the following six abilities:

- A1. to converse succinctly (*κατὰ βραχὺ . . . διαλέγεσθαι*)
- A2. to know the truth of things (*ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι*)
- A3. to pursue one’s legal case correctly (*δικάσασθαι ὀρθῶς*)
- A4. to be able to speak in public (*δαμαγορεῖν οἶον τ’ ἡμῖν*)
- A5. to know the skills of accounts (*λόγων τέχνας ἐπίστασθαι*)
- A6. to teach (*διδάσκειν*) people about the nature of all things (*περὶ φύσιος*)

³⁶ I discuss these abilities in detail later.

³⁷ T.M. Robinson entertains the following “point of contact” between section 8 and the preceding sections: the thesis that section 8 advances “could be described as another identity thesis.” (“A Sophist on Omniscience, Polymathy, and Omniscience: Δ. Α. 8.1–13,” *Illinois Classical Studies* 2 (1977), 125–35, at 127.) For example, consider the opening sentence of section 8: “I think that it is characteristic of the same man and skill (<τῶ δ’ αὐτῶν ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνας) to converse in brief questions and answers, to know the truth of things, to plead one’s case correctly, to be able to speak in public, to know the skills of *logoi*, and to teach about the nature of all things, how they are and how they came to be.” (8.1) So, on this hypothesis in section 8 the author is engaging with the (unstated) antithesis that each of these abilities depends on a distinct skill. But recall that the opposing theses in sections 6 and 7 are not identity and differentiating theses.

τῶν ἀπάντων), both how they are and how they came to be (ὡς τε ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο).

In fact A1–A6 are not each distinct abilities. Rather some abilities are distinct facets of others. In particular A5, the skills—note the plural “τέχνας”—of accounts, includes A1, A3, and A4. These latter three might be re-described as dialectic, forensic rhetoric, and political rhetoric, respectively.

Regarding the skills of accounts, the author further says:

In addition, he who knows the skills of accounts (τέχνας λόγων) will also know how to speak correctly about all things. For the man who is going to speak correctly must speak on those things of which he has knowledge. And he will have knowledge of all things; for he has knowledge of the skills of all accounts, and all accounts concern all that is. (8.3–5)

Having the skills of all accounts entails having the knowledge of all things because all accounts concern all that is. So A5 entails A2. Further, insofar as knowledge is teachable, the possessor of omniscience will be able to teach people all things, both how they are and how they came to be. So A5 entails A6.

This conclusion precisely strengthens the thesis of section 8 that it belongs to the same man and the same skill to have the six abilities enumerated. In short, the master skill consists of at least three kinds of τέχνας λόγων, and it depends on knowledge of all things, which is equivalent to knowledge of the truth of all things.

After stating his thesis at 8.1, the author first conveys the practical significance of knowing the nature of all things:

First, how will the man who knows the nature of all things not be able to act correctly with regard to all things? (8.2)

I assume that the ability to act correctly with regard to all things entails the ability to do what is good, seemly, and just whenever the opportunity to do so exists. Some confirmation of this inference is derivable from contents in subsections 8.6–9. At 8.6, the author describes the possessor of the master skill as knowing how to:

correctly teach the city-state to do what is good (τὰ ἀγαθὰ) and to refrain from doing what is bad (τὰ κακὰ).

This ability is explicitly said to depend on the possessor’s knowledge of the skills of all accounts (πάντων τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας) and the fact that these accounts concern all that is.³⁸ So here the master skill is applied to benefit the possessor’s city-state. In view of this, one might also assume that the skill is applicable to benefiting the possessor himself. Explicit support for this assumption derives from the statement at subsection 8.9 that:

he who knows how to pursue his legal case must have correct knowledge of what is just (τὸ δίκαιον).

³⁸ “τοὶ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐόντων ἐντι.” (8.5)

Evidently if one knows everything, one will know what is just.

Note that in subsections 8.6–9 the seemly (*τὸ καλόν*) is the only member of the triad of evaluative terms central to sections 1–3 that is not explicitly mentioned. Nor is the seemly (or unseemly) mentioned elsewhere in section 8. However, in subsection 8.6 there is a lacuna of four lines.³⁹ The lacuna precisely follows the incomplete claim that:

the man who is going to speak correctly concerning things must know . . .

And the text resumes with the claim, cited above, that the possessor of the master skill will be able to teach his city-state to do what is good and to refrain from doing what is bad. Perhaps the contents of the lacuna included the explicit claim that since the possessor of the master skill knows everything, he knows what is good and seemly.

Observe further that the author states at several points in section 8 that in knowing something *x*, the possessor of the master skill will also know the opposite of *x* and that which differs from *x*:

And in knowing these things, he will also know the things that differ from these things (*τὰ ἄτερα τούτων*); for he will know everything. (8.7)

And in knowing this, he will also know the opposite of this (*τὸ ὑπεναντίον*). (8.9)

In the second passage, the author is specifically speaking of the just (*τὸ δίκαιον*). So he is claiming that in knowing the just, the possessor of the master skill will also know the unjust. Of course, it follows from the possession of omniscience that the possessor knows the good and the bad, the seemly and the unseemly, the just and the unjust. However, the author is making these particular points explicit and thereby, I suggest, the master skill is expressly being related to the contents of sections 1–3.

Again it follows from his possession of the master skill that the possessor knows the true and the false. But this is also made explicit in the course of section 8. First, as we have seen, at subsection 8.1 the master skill is expressly said to include “knowledge of the truth of things” (*ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων*). Observe that this phrase recurs at 8.12:

At any rate, the argument easily follows that he who knows the truth of things (*ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίσταται*) knows all things.

So here again, I suggest, the content of the master skill is expressly related to the content of an earlier section, in this case section 4.⁴⁰

Apropos of section 5, the master skill entails that the possessor is sound-minded and wise. However, it is not explicitly stated in section 8 that the possessor of the master skill is sound-minded and wise. Granted this, there may be an explicit connection between the description of the master skill in section 8 and the description of sound-mindedness and wisdom in section 5. At subsection 5.9 it is stated that although, in some respect, the sound-minded and wise say (and, I presume, do) the same things as the mad and ignorant, the former say (and do) these things when it is appropriate (*ἐν δέοντι, ἃ οὐ δεῖ*), whereas the

³⁹ See Appendix 2.D.

⁴⁰ I discuss the sense of the phrase “*ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων*” further later.

latter say (and do) these things when it is inappropriate ($\hat{\alpha}$ οὐ δεῖ). The phrase “τὰ δέοντα” occurs at subsection 8.7. Unfortunately, the text is, at that point, garbled. On Diels’ reconstruction the text reads:

... he [i.e., the possessor of the master skill] will, of himself, provide what is appropriate, if it is required.⁴¹

If this reconstruction is correct, or at least if the original text claimed that the possessor of the master skill does what is appropriate (τὰ δέοντα), then the possessor of the master skill will be sound-minded and wise in the explicit terms employed in section 5.

A further point of contact between section 5 and the monological sections of T can be discerned precisely in section 9. The author begins section 9 by claiming that mnemonic ability is the greatest and seemliest discovery, “useful for life, for all things, for φιλοσοφία, and for σοφία.”⁴² Prima facie, it is unclear whether memory is supposed to be useful for the acquisition or instead the employment of φιλοσοφία and σοφία. But based on the author’s ensuing explanation of what mnemonic ability consists in and how to cultivate it, there is good reason to believe that mnemonic ability is understood to be useful for both the acquisition and the employment of φιλοσοφία and σοφία.

In particular, with regard to the acquisition of φιλοσοφία and σοφία, the author claims that:

whenever you hear anything, you ought to practice it (μελετᾶν) [that is, go over the content again and again]. For by frequently hearing and saying the same things many times, one commits them to memory. (8.3)

In addition, the author claims that “by applying one’s mind, one’s thought will perceive more as a whole (σύνολον) what one has learned” (9.2). In other words, memory helps not merely to commit content to mind, but to unify discrete contents.⁴³ Compare the author’s following claim:

whenever you hear something, connect (καταθέσθαι) it to what you know. (9.4)

In short, the author is advancing a means to acquire or at least to assist in the acquisition of φιλοσοφία and σοφία.

I suggest that φιλοσοφία and σοφία are constituents of the master skill. Accordingly, I suggest that sections 8 and 9 are related to one another as follows: after having presented an overview of the master skill in section 8, the author, in section 9, turns to explain a crucial means by which the master skill is to be cultivated.

Granted this, note now that the author takes mnemonic ability to “have been discovered” (εὑρηται), and therefore to exist. As such, the author is not merely hypothesizing that mnemonic ability would be useful for acquiring and employing φιλοσοφία and σοφία.

⁴¹ “... <δ> δὲ ... τὰ δέοντα παρέξεται, αἱ χρή.” (Cp. Most and Laks, *Early*, 203.)

⁴² 9.1. Arguably, the distinction between φιλοσοφία and σοφία is between cosmological knowledge and practical knowledge.

⁴³ Compare Robinson: “One of the many functions of μνάμα (= ‘memorization’), suggests the author, is to help us view *as a whole* things learned only in a discrete series.” (*Contrasting*, 239.)

Moreover, the author's explanation of what mnemonic ability consists in and how to cultivate and employ it encourages the view that the author takes himself to possess this ability. But the author's possession of this ability also encourages the inference that the author takes himself to possess the *φιλοσοφία* and *σοφία* for which it is useful. In short, I will hereafter assume that the author of T takes himself to possess the master skill.

Since the master skill consists of the knowledge of the nature of all things, it endows its possessor with the ability to know what is good and bad, seemly and unseemly, just and unjust, true and false, sound-minded and mad, wise and ignorant. This skill would thereby enable its possessor to resolve the contradictions, whether real or apparent, presented in sections 1–5. Likewise, the possessor of the master skill will be able to resolve the questions whether wisdom and excellence are teachable and whether political offices should be assigned by lot. But the master skill is explicitly said to consist in the ability to teach others about the nature of all things. Therefore, it follows that wisdom and excellence are teachable. And in that case the author must also believe that political offices should be assigned on the basis of knowledge and skill. After all, the possessor of the master skill can correctly advise his city-state.

3.4. Conclusion to the Functional Unity of the Antilogical and Monological Portions of T

Consider a remark that Socrates makes to the young Cleinias in Plato's *Euthydemus*. The remark occurs in the wake of a series of eristic arguments that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have deployed on the young man:

so here these two [Euthydemus and Dionysodorus] are merely dancing around you [Cleinias] and performing their sportive gambols with a view to your subsequent initiation. You must now accordingly suppose that you are listening to the first part of the sophistic mysteries. First of all, as Prodicus says, you have to learn about the correct use of words (*περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος*)—the very point our two visitors are making plain to you... (277d–e)

My suggestion is that the opposing accounts with which the opening sections of T begins function analogously to the first part of a “sophistic mystery.” As Socrates suggests, appealing to Prodicus, clarification of the puzzles that they present requires learning the correct use of words. Likewise, I am proposing, the antilogical sections with which T begins are deliberately so introduced and deployed to undermine their intended audience's confidence in understanding the topics they treat and to engender puzzlement and questions regarding these topics. The author subsequently introduces the master skill, of which skills of *λόγοι* are a central constituent, and the mnemonic ability crucial to its cultivation and employment as the means to resolve the *aporiae*.

In a paper on Heraclitus Mark Johnstone remarks that the use of “*λόγος*” is somewhat conventional in the opening line of a fifth-century prose treatise.⁴⁴ For example, consider the opening lines of the works of Heraclitus, Ion of Chios, and Diogenes of Apollonia:

⁴⁴ Mark A. Johnstone, “On ‘*Logos*’ in Heraclitus” [“Heraclitus”], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 47 (2014), 1–29, at 12–17; cp. R. Dilcher, *Studies in Heraclitus* (Hildesheim, 1995), 31–47.

Of this *logos* which holds always humans prove uncomprehending, both before hearing it and when they have first heard it . . . (Heraclitus B1, part)

The starting point of my *logos*: All is three and nothing more or less than these three. (Ion of Chios, B1)

In every *logos* I think it is fitting to begin by providing an indisputable starting point, expressed in a simple and solemn way. (Diog. Apoll., B1)

Consider also Hecataeus:

Thus speaks Hecataeus of Milteus: I write of these things as they appear to me to be true, for the *logoi* of the Greeks are various and, in my opinion, ridiculous. (*Genealogies*, fr. 1)⁴⁵

Assuming “*δισσοὶ λόγοι*” is in fact the incipit of T, I suggest accordingly that what distinguishes T from the conventional use of “*λόγος*” at the inception of a number of fifth-century prose texts is precisely the author’s juxtaposition of contradictory *λόγοι*. Moreover, the author of T appears intent on compounding the confusion that these contradictory accounts produce by the fact that he is, initially, silent on his purpose in presenting them as such. Engendering this puzzlement is, I am suggesting, a part of the author’s strategy. More precisely, it is a part of the author’s protreptic strategy. The author aims to perplex his audience and then to propose that a certain skill, which centrally includes skills in *λόγοι*, is required to resolve the confusion. Such skill is precisely what the author can provide. Additionally, such a skill is of central value for advancement in personal and political life.

4. The Topical Unity of Sections 1–3

I turn now from considerations in favor of the unity of T as a whole to considerations pertaining to the unity of proper parts of T. My first consideration here pertains to the topical unity of sections 1–3. I propose that the concatenation across sections 1–3 of the three positive attributes corresponding to the adjectives “*ἀγαθόν*,” “*καλόν*,” “*δίκαιον*”—with or without their negative opposites corresponding to “*κακόν*,” “*αἴσχρόν*,” “*ἄδικον*”—is indicative of a commitment, within a tradition of philosophical thought, to the kinship of these attributes. Precisely how the kinship of these attributes was conceived is questionable. I return to this point later. For now, I suggest that within the tradition of philosophical thought in question, they were conceived as constituting a triad of basic practically evaluative attributes. For convenience, I will refer to them simply as the “evaluative triad.”

I derive support for my suggestion that these three attributes were conceived as a triad of basic practically evaluative attributes within a tradition of philosophical thought from the following facts. In the quarter century or so following the composition of T,⁴⁶ we find the concatenation of the three positive adjectives “*ἀγαθόν*,” “*καλόν*,” and “*δίκαιον*,” with or without their opposites, in only two contexts, both philosophical and more precisely Socratic. One context is Plato’s early dialogues, where the triad occurs several times. The

⁴⁵ I owe these references to Johnstone, “Heraclitus,” n.25.

⁴⁶ Again, I am assuming a composition date around the end of the Peloponnesian War.

other is Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, where it occurs once. Here are two examples from Plato followed by the example from Xenophon:

But about what would there be disagreement, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and to be angry with one another? . . . [Is it not about] the just and unjust (τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον), and seemly and unseemly (καλὸν καὶ αἴσχρο), and good and bad (ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν)? . . . (*Euthphr.* 7c10–d2)

For the moment let us consider whether the orator is in the same relation to the just and unjust (τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον) and the seemly and the unseemly (τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἴσχρο) and good and bad (ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν), as to the healthy and to the various objects of all the other arts. Does he not know what is good and what is bad or what is seemly and what is unseemly, or what is just and what is unjust, but instead has devised a means of persuasion to deal with these matters . . . ? (*Grg.* 459c8–d6)⁴⁷

(So:) Are you aware that some people are called “slavish”? (Eu:) Yes. (So:) To what do they owe the name, to skill or ignorance? (Eu:) Clearly to ignorance. (So:) To ignorance of the smith's trade? . . . to carpentry . . . to cobbling . . . ? (Eu:) No, to none of these. On the contrary, those who have knowledge of these things are slavish. (So:) Then is this the name that is given to those who lack knowledge of those things that are seemly and good and just (τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια)? (Eu:) I think so. (*Xen. Mem.* 4.2.22)

Note further that in Plato's middle dialogues, the just, the seemly, and the good are treated as the central evaluative Forms, for example:

Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is something just in itself (δίκαιον αὐτὸ)? . . . And something seemly and good (καλὸν . . . καὶ ἀγαθόν)? (*Phd.* 65d4–7)

Tell me, did you yourself draw this distinction . . . certain forms themselves separate from the things that participate in them? . . . And do you think that that there are forms of the following sorts of things: the just itself by itself and seemly and good (δικαίου . . . εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ) and all such things? (*Prm.* 130b1–9)⁴⁸

In short, Plato and perhaps Xenophon as well as the author of T recognize the good, the seemly, and the just as an evaluative triad.

Prior to its occurrence in T, the concatenation of the three positive adjectives “ἀγαθόν,” “καλόν,” “δίκαιον,” with or without their negative opposites, occurs only once in the surviving record. Once again, this is in a philosophical context, namely in the following fragment of Heraclitus:

For the divine, all things are seemly and good and just (καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια); but human beings take some things to be just, others unjust. (B102)⁴⁹

I underscore that Heraclitus is not here asserting identity theses with respect to antonymous pairs of these evaluative attributes. That is, he does not claim that for the divine all

⁴⁷ Cp. *Cri.* 48a, *Grg.* 461b.

⁴⁸ Cp. *Phd.* 75d, *R.* 451a, 493c. (It is worth noting in passing here that for neither Plato nor Xenophon does the evaluative triad map onto the cardinal virtues: sound-mindedness, justice, courage, piety, and knowledge.)

⁴⁹ “τῶι μὲν θεῶι καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἂ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπελήφασιν ἂ δὲ δίκαια.”

things are both seemly and unseemly, good and bad, just and unjust. Rather Heraclitus' view seems to be that due to their limited perspective human beings view the cosmos as consisting of evaluatively opposite constituents, whereas from the perspective of the divine all cosmic constituents have positive value. Compare Heraclitus' criticism of Hesiod:

Hesiod considered some days to be good (*ἀγαθὰς*), others bad (*φάυλας*), because he did not recognize that the nature of day is one and the same. (B106)

I suggest that it is not coincidental that the evaluative triad occurs in Heraclitus fragment 102, on the one hand, and in T, Plato, and Xenophon, on the other. Rather I suggest that in the course of the fifth century, through Heraclitus' influence, fragment 102 played a role in the establishment of the evaluative triad within a tradition of philosophical discourse.

I suggest that Protagoras played an important role in this development. One passage that encourages this thought is Plato's *Theaetetus* 166d. The passage occurs within the broader discussion of the thesis that sense perception (*αἴσθησις*) is knowledge, which Socrates attributes to Protagoras.⁵⁰ More precisely the passage involves a defense of the view that Protagoras' position is consistent with the existence of *σοφία*.⁵¹ The passage begins with Socrates reasserting on behalf of Protagoras the opening sentence of Protagoras' treatise *On Truth*:

I say that the truth is as I have written it: Each of us is the measure of what is and what is not. (*Tht.* 166d1–3)

Socrates proceeds to explain this position, again on Protagoras' behalf. He does so first with respect to what is good (*ἀγαθόν*) for individuals (166d–167c) and then with respect to what is seemly (*καλόν*) and just (*δίκαιον*) for city-states (167c–d). My stake here in how faithfully Socrates represents Protagoras' position is limited to the following: Protagoras' *On Truth* included the evaluative triad.⁵² It also seems to me likely—although nothing I will say requires it—that insofar as Protagoras' *On Truth* involved the evaluative triad, its discussion proceeded from what is good and bad for individuals to what is seemly and just according to societies or city-states.

If this is correct, then it may be questioned how Protagoras interpreted Heraclitus' own position regarding the evaluative triad. Protagoras' position seems directly critical of Heraclitus' view. First the *ἄνθρωπος-μέτρον* doctrine asserts that what appears or seems to each human being is so. Thereby Protagoras rejects the distinction between humanity's limited perspectival and fallible grasp of values and the divine's holistic and infallible apprehension. In addition, we know that Protagoras is skeptical of humanity's ability to know of the existence of the divine, let alone the values or evaluative views of the divine:

⁵⁰ I think Socrates' attribution is dubious and at least to some extent conveniently serves Plato's epistemological and pedagogical interest in the dialogue. But this suggestion does not affect the main point I am making.

⁵¹ The *sophos* is one who is able to effect a transition from what is bad for a person, thing, city-state to what is good for that person or thing, and from what is unseemly or unjust.

⁵² Cp. e.g., M. Lee, *Epistemology after Protagoras* (Oxford, 2005), 21–9. (I underscore that Protagoras is not here made to distinguish the good, seemly, and just in precisely the way these attributes are distinguished in T.)

Concerning the gods, I am not in a position to know either that they exist or that they do not exist; for there are many obstacles in the way of such knowledge, notably the intrinsic obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life. (D.L. 9.51)

In short, these are some reasons to believe that Protagoras discussed the evaluative triad and that his discussion was expressly critical of Heraclitus' treatment of the triad.

As I suggested above, Heraclitus' position does not commit him to the identity thesis with regard to any pair of attributes of the evaluative triad. In contrast, Protagoras' position entails or at least encourages the identity thesis with respect to all three pairs. If x is a insofar as x appears to s to be a , then if x appears to be a to $s1$ and $*a$ to $s2$, x is both a and $*a$.

Some further independent support for attributing to Protagoras a commitment to the identity theses with respect to the evaluative triad derives from a couple of Platonic passages. One occurs within the *Theaetetus* passage introduced above. The first example that Socrates introduces on behalf of Protagoras to explain the role of the σοφός man in effecting change from worse to better experiences is that of the sick versus healthy person. Socrates has Protagoras say that for a sick person food is bitter, whereas for a healthy person it is sweet. The attributes bitterness and sweetness are appropriately chosen here with respect to the thesis that knowledge is sense perception, which Socrates is—I suggested above dubiously—attributing to Protagoras. On the other hand, bitterness is assumed to be a bad attribute, while sweetness is assumed to be a good one. Consequently, it is through σοφία that a doctor can use drugs to cause the patient's experience to "change from one condition [namely a worse one] to a better one" (ἀπὸ ἐτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον).⁵³ For our purposes, the upshot is that food is both good and bad: good insofar as it is sweet to the healthy person, and bad insofar as it is bitter to the sick person. Observe the similarity of this example to the first example used to support the identity thesis in section 1 of T:

These things [namely food, drink, and sex] are bad for the sick person, but good for the healthy person . . . (1.2)

Compare also the following passage from Plato's *Protagoras* in which Protagoras offers an elaborate response to Socrates' question whether some things are good for humans:

[Yes,] but I know of many things that are harmful to humans: foods, drinks, drugs, and many other things; whereas some are beneficial; but some are neither beneficial nor harmful to humans, but to horses; and some are beneficial or harmful only to cattle; some only to dogs; some are beneficial or harmful to none of these, but are so to trees; some are good for the roots of trees, but bad for its shoots, such as manure, which is good to spread on the roots of any plant but completely destructive if applied to the new stems and branches. Or take olive oil, which is extremely bad for all plants and is the worst enemy of the hair of all animals except humans, for whose hair it is beneficial, as it is for the rest of their bodies. But the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) is so complicated (ποικίλον) and diverse

⁵³ *Tht.* 167a4–5.

(παντοδαπὸν) that in the case of oil it is good for the external parts of the human body but very bad for the internal parts, which is why doctors universally forbid their sick patients to use oil in their diets except for the least bit, just enough to dispel a prepared meal's unappetizing aroma. (334a3–c6)

Protagoras does not here expressly state that the same things—for example, food, drink, and drugs—are both good and bad. But his explicit commitment to the complexity and diversity of the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) encourages this view.

When the author of *T* introduces the opposing identity and differentiating theses in section 1, he says that these theses are asserted by those in Greece who “philosophize” (ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων) (1.2). Contrast this with attribution of the thesis that public offices should be assigned by lot at the beginning of section 7 to “some of the public speakers” (τινες τῶν δαμαγορούντων). So the author attributes distinct theses to distinct types of parties throughout *T*. Although the author does not assign the opposing theses in sections 2–3 to any particular parties, I presume—consistently with my earlier suggestion that sections 1–3 are intended to be heard or read sequentially and my present suggestion that they are topically unified by a philosophical tradition that recognized the evaluative triad—that they too are advanced by philosophers. In the case of the identity theses in sections 1–3, this attribution is also independently the most plausible; after all, who else would think that the same things are good and bad, seemly and unseemly, just and unjust? I suggest then that Protagoreans are among those philosophers who assert the identity theses in section 1 as well as 2 and 3. More broadly, I conclude that the concatenation of the attributes corresponding to the adjectives “ἀγαθόν,” “καλόν,” “δίκαιον”—with or without their negative opposites—reflects a tradition of philosophical thought, of which Heraclitus and subsequently Protagoras were key contributors, in which these attributes were conceived as a triad.

5.1 Introduction to the Topical and Functional Relation between sections 1–3 and Sections 4–5

That the good, the seemly, and the just were conceived as a triad provides some explanation of the topical unity of sections 1–3. However, it does not explain why the author of *T* selected this triad of topics to begin his discourse. One possibility relates to the point, which I have already expressed, that the triad was conceived as consisting of *basic* evaluative entities. Accordingly, insofar as the author wished to begin with evaluative topics at all, it would have been reasonable for him to begin with what he conceived to be the basic evaluative kinds.

Granted this, it may be wondered why the author was concerned to begin with evaluative topics at all. Contrast the possibility of the author beginning the discourse with any number of non-evaluative topics that were the subject of conflicting claims. I hypothesize that the author's decision to begin with evaluative topics owes to the author's view that knowledge of these topics is necessary for wisdom (σοφία) and in turn for excellence (ἀρετή).

Among other things, this hypothesis assumes that in the late fifth or early fourth century, the term “σοφία” could be used in a philosophical context to convey an epistemic

state whose content included evaluative topics. I have defended this view at length elsewhere and here merely refer the reader to that discussion.⁵⁴

“*ἄρετά*” denotes excellence and, when used to refer specifically to human beings, often precisely denotes the excellence of action or a person’s characteristic conduct. Compare two relatively contemporaneous philosophical uses of “*ἀρετή*” that employ the term in this way:

One must strive not for words, but for deeds and actions of excellence (*ἔργα καὶ πράξεις ἀρετῆς*). (Democritus, B55)

The adornment of a city-state is manly courage, of a body beauty, of a soul wisdom (*σοφία*), of an action excellence (*πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή*), and of a speech truth. (Gorgias, B11.1–2)

I assume that in T *ἀρετά* is also conceived as a property of action or conduct. Consequently, I assume that in T the relation between *σοφία* and *ἀρετά* is understood as being between a capacity (*σοφία*) and its exercise (*ἀρετά*). In other words, I am suggesting that *σοφία* is assumed to endow its possessor with a capacity to perform actions that have the property of *ἀρετά*. I underscore that this is an assumption. However, it is an assumption consistent with fifth-century usage of the terms “*σοφία*” and “*ἀρετά*.” Moreover, nothing in T contradicts the assumption. And, more positively, as we will see, the assumption helps to explain the topical and functional organization of sections 1–5.

Granted this, how should we understand the relation between sections 1–3 and sections 4–5? For consider this: if knowledge of the topics of sections 1–3, namely the good and the bad, the seemly and the unseemly, the just and the unjust, wholly constituted wisdom and so endowed their possessor with the capacity for excellence in action, it would seem most appropriate for the topic of section 6, namely whether wisdom and excellence are teachable and learnable, immediately to follow the conclusion of section 3. The location and function of sections 4–5 vis-à-vis sections 1–3 therefore require explanation.

In considering an explanation, let me first underscore a possibility that must be rejected. Apropos of section 4, if the same things are good and bad, seemly and unseemly, just and unjust, then at least some of the same things will be true and false. For example, if it is true that *x* is good, then since *x* is also bad, it is also false that *x* is good. Likewise, apropos of section 5, if the same things are good and bad, seemly and unseemly, just and unjust, then, arguably, the statements and actions of the sound-minded and wise are the same as those of the mad and ignorant. For example, if one does what is just, one also does what is unjust; and if one says what is seemly, one also says what is unseemly.

But, as I say, this account of the relation between sections 1–3 and sections 4–5 must be rejected. The principal reason I propose for rejecting it is simply that no such arguments occur in sections 4–5. In fact, in sections 4–5 there is no mention of any member of the evaluative triad. Considered from this vantage point, the absence of overlapping content between sections 1–3 and sections 4–5 should in fact raise concern about the unity of sections 1–3 and 4–5. At any rate, if sections 1–3 and sections 4–5 are topically and functionally unified, such unity must be understood otherwise.

⁵⁴ Wolfsdorf, “*Sophia*.”

Granted this, I suggest that the relation between sections 1–3 and sections 4–5 should be understood in terms of two distinct considerations. One concerns the topical relations between these sections. The other concerns the argumentative relations between these sections. More precisely, the latter concerns the forms of argument employed on behalf of the differentiating thesis in these sections. In clarifying and defending these points, I'll begin with the topical relation between sections 1–3 and section 4. I will then turn to the topical relation between sections 1–4 and section 5 and the argumentative relations between sections 1–3 and sections 4–5.

5.2 The Topical Relation between Sections 1–3 and Section 4

Regarding the topical relation between sections 1–3 and section 4, I suggest that the author of *T* conceives of knowledge of the evaluative triad, the topic of sections 1–3, as dependent on non-evaluative knowledge. I also suggest that section 4 concerns knowledge of non-evaluative facts. I offer consideration of several passages of *T*, both in and out of section 4, in support of this suggestion.

In section 4, the first example the author employs occurs in the context of the defense of the identity thesis. The example concerns a legal case pertaining to temple-robbery (4.3). The author refers to the attitudes of the accuser and the defendant; continuing his account, he claims that law-courts judge the same statement to be true and false. In defense of the differentiating thesis, the author also refers to jurors' view of the facts (4.7). In short, much of the discussion in section 4 appeals to legal contexts. Central to adjudicating the truth and falsity of statements, the author suggests, is the determination of the relevant facts (*πράγματα*).

Consider now the content of subsection 8.10. We encountered the context of these passages in the discussion of the master skill above. Precisely the author has there suggested that a man who pursues a legal case must have knowledge of what is just (*τὸ δίκαιον*); he adds that in knowing this, he will also know the opposite (*τὸ ὑπεναντίον*), namely what is unjust. Subsection 8.10 now follows:

He must also know all the laws (*τῶς νόμος*). But if he does not know the facts (*πράγματα*), he will not know the laws either.

Here the author distinguishes knowledge of what is just, on the one hand, from knowledge of the laws and of the facts, on the other. I presume that the relation between these three entities is as follows. To determine whether an action is just, one must know whether it conforms with the relevant law; and to know whether it conforms with the relevant law, one must know both the law and the details of the event or action. Likewise, I surmise, in the cases of what is good and what is seemly, that one must know what the entity in question is in order to determine whether it is good for someone, i.e., beneficial, or whether it is seemly, i.e., socially appropriate.

In short, knowledge of what is true and false includes evaluative knowledge (for example, knowing that some *x* is good is knowledge of some truth). But in section 4, the author implicitly distinguishes non-evaluative from evaluative knowledge and focuses on knowledge of non-evaluative truths and falsities, because the author is committed to the

view that evaluative knowledge depends on non-evaluative knowledge. Consequently, knowledge of non-evaluative truth and falsity will also be constitutive of wisdom.

5.3 The Topical and Functional Relation between Sections 1–4 and 5

5.3.1 Introduction

Earlier, I posed the following question: if knowledge of the topics of sections 1–3, namely the evaluative triad, constitutes wisdom, and assuming that the exercise of wisdom produces excellence, then why doesn't the content of section 6, namely whether wisdom and excellence are teachable and learnable, immediately follow the conclusion of section 3? In discussing section 4, the answer I gave was that evaluative knowledge depends on non-evaluative knowledge, and that section 4, in focusing on the true and the false, focuses on non-evaluative facts and thus non-evaluative knowledge. Given that result, we can now pose a similar question with respect to section 5: if knowledge of the topics of sections 1–4 is constitutive of wisdom, and assuming that the exercise of wisdom produces excellence, then why doesn't the content of section 6, namely whether wisdom and excellence are teachable and learnable, immediately follow the conclusion of section 4? In other words, why is section 5 situated where it is? What is the function of section 5 vis-à-vis sections 1–4?

I suggest the following reason for the topic and function of section 5. First, assuming my foregoing interpretation of sections 1–4, the topical constituents of wisdom have all been introduced by the end of section 4. So, it cannot be among the roles of section 5 to introduce further topical constituents of wisdom. Instead, section 5 applies the identity and differentiating theses to wisdom itself. The question on which section 5 focuses is, after all, whether wisdom and its opposite ignorance are the same or different.⁵⁵ Granted this, observe further that the arguments for the identity and differentiating theses in section 5 do not draw on the topics of sections 1–4. That is to say, in section 5 it is not argued that the wise and ignorant are the same or different insofar as they distinguish or conflate the members of the antonymous evaluative pairs or the true and the false.⁵⁶ Instead, I suggest that the principal function of section 5 vis-à-vis sections 1–4 is to advance a new argument for the differentiating thesis. More precisely, section 5 elaborates on a new argument for the differentiating thesis that is first introduced in section 4. In doing so, section 5 provides further and deeper clarification of the identity and differentiating theses that have been discussed to that point.

In order to defend this proposal regarding the function of section 5, it is necessary to clarify the types of arguments employed on behalf of the differentiating thesis in sections 1–3, 4, and 5. In order to do that, it will also be necessary to provide some clarification of

⁵⁵ I note that I am here ignoring the fact that section 5 more precisely focuses on the question whether wisdom and ignorance are the same or different as well as the question whether sound-mindedness and madness are the same or different. In other words, I have said nothing about sound-mindedness or its relation to wisdom. For the sake of simplicity and convenience, I will hereafter ignore the topic of sound-mindedness (and its opposite madness). I assume, however, that sound-mindedness and wisdom both require evaluative and non-evaluative knowledge.

⁵⁶ One can easily imagine an argument of this kind. For instance, if the good and the bad are the same thing, then insofar as the wise person says and does what is good, he says and does what is bad, and therefore the wise person and the fool are the same.

the arguments advanced on behalf of the identity thesis in these sections. I begin with a basic clarification of the identity and differentiating theses themselves.

5.3.2 *Tò* Phrases

The identity and differentiating theses state that two things are the same or different. For convenience, I'll call these two things the "relata" of the identity and differentiating theses. We've seen that in sections 1–4 the relata of the identity and differentiating theses are described using phrases composed of two components: the definite article $\tau\omicron$ and an adjective a or $*a$. I will refer to these phrases as " $\tau\omicron$ phrases." So the author of T uses $\tau\omicron$ phrases in sections 1–4 to describe the relata of the identity and differentiating theses.

To this point I have rendered the $\tau\omicron$ phrases literally as "the $a/*a$," for example, "the good/bad." Some such usage is acceptable in natural English,⁵⁷ but most of the cases I have rendered from T are unnatural in English. It is therefore questionable exactly what these phrases mean. As I have argued elsewhere,⁵⁸ $\tau\omicron$ phrases function as quantifier phrases. They select from a domain of discourse entities that satisfy the description supplied by the adjectival phrase. For example, " $\tau\omicron$ ἀγαθόν" selects entities that are ἀγαθόν. Compare the following English phrases: "the poor," "the uninsured," "the disabled." In all of these English cases, the domain of discourse is restricted to human beings. But in Greek, as the neuter gender of the article $\tau\omicron$ suggests, a much broader domain is permitted.⁵⁹

On this interpretation of $\tau\omicron$ phrases, the identity thesis entails that the set of entities that are a is coextensive with the set of entities that are $*a$. And the differentiating thesis entails that the two sets are disjoint.

5.3.3 Two Interpretations of the Identity and Differentiating Theses

In view of this interpretation of the $\tau\omicron$ phrases that are used to describe the relata of the identity and differentiating theses, prima facie it is the identity theses in sections 1–5 that are counterintuitive and paradoxical, whereas the differentiating theses are commonsensical. I underscore that what makes the identity theses counterintuitive and paradoxical is that a and $*a$ are opposites. So, it would seem natural that the set of things that are a and the set of things that are $*a$ would not be the same. I presume that this is why sections 1–5 begin with arguments on behalf of the identity theses and are followed by counterarguments on behalf of the differentiating theses, and not vice versa.

Granted this, let us consider what might motivate the counterintuitive identity theses. For example, why would one think that things that are good are also bad and vice versa or that things that are true are also false and vice versa? In considering this question, I suggest that we need to consider two ways of construing the identity and differentiating theses. These two ways turn on two different construals of the predicates $a/*a$. According to one construal, the predicates are, as I will call them, "incomplete." According to the other, the predicates are "complete." I will first consider the incomplete predicate interpretation and reject it. I will then introduce the complete predicate interpretation.

Assume the identity theorist takes the predicates a and $*a$ to be incomplete. On this interpretation, the predicates require, in addition to a subject, a relativizing phrase of some

⁵⁷ I note some felicitous examples later.

⁵⁸ David Wolfsdorf, "Euthyphro 10a2–11b1: A Study in Platonic Metaphysics and its Reception since 1960," *Apeiron* 38 (2005) 1–72.

⁵⁹ It is noteworthy that, among our extant evidence, $\tau\omicron$ phrases with evaluative contents first occur here in T.

kind, in order to express a truth-evaluable content. For example, in the cases of “ἀγαθόν” and “κακόν,” in addition to a subject such as “eating, drinking, and sex,” a relativizing phrase is needed to specify the beneficiary or victim. For example, eating, drinking, and sex are good *for those who are healthy*, but bad *for those who are sick*.

A seemingly very strong reason to think that the identity theorist assumes the incomplete predicate interpretation is that every example the author cites in defense of the identity thesis includes a relativizing phrase of some sort. For instance, according to the example just cited, eating, drinking, and sex are claimed to be both good and bad, and arguably so precisely because these activities are good *for those who are healthy* and bad *for those who are sick*.

Compelling as this consideration might initially appear, I suggest that there are good reasons to reject the view that the identity thesis assumes the incomplete predicate interpretation. First, the incomplete predicate interpretation makes the identity thesis, as it is explicitly stated, misleading. The identity thesis that is explicitly stated is that x is both a and $*a$. But on the incomplete predicate interpretation, the intended identity thesis is that x is both $a-r1$ and $*a-r2$ (where $r1$ and $r2$ stand for distinct relativizing phrases). Assume that being good and being bad are opposite and apparently contradictory attributes. In contrast, being good-for-the-healthy and being bad-for-the-sick are not. A consequence of this is that if the identity thesis did assume the incomplete predicate interpretation, the differentiating theorist would not need to object to it. The explicit differentiating thesis is that, for any x , it is not the case that x is both a and $*a$. Contrast this with the thesis that for any x , it is not the case that x is both $a-r1$ and $*a-r2$. It is now the latter thesis that is counterintuitive.

One further problematic consequence of treating the identity thesis as assuming the incomplete predicate interpretation is that the principal argument that the differentiating theorist in fact employs becomes a non-sequitur. The differentiating theorist’s principal argument, at least in sections 1–3, is a *reductio* of the following form:

1. Assume (with the identity theorist) that, for any x , x is both a and $*a$.
2. Consequently, for any x that is taken to be a , the identity theorist must also admit that x is $*a$.
3. But in certain cases, such an admission will be unacceptable.
4. Therefore, the initial assumption is false.

The crucial point is that in the course of deploying *reductio* arguments of this form the differentiating theorist uses relativizing phrases, but precisely he uses the very same relativizing phrase in the $*a$ predication as in the a predication. For example:

1. Assume (with the identity theorist) that, for any x , x is both a and $*a$.
2. Consequently, for any x that is taken to be a , the identity theorist must also admit that x is $*a$.
3. Now assume that s does some good to s ’s relatives.
4. In that case, s does some bad to s ’s relatives.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ The example occurs at 1.13.

5. But this inference is unacceptable.
6. Therefore, the initial assumption is false.

So again, if we assume that the identity thesis assumes the incomplete predicate interpretation, the criticisms subsequently made by the differentiating theorist become non-sequiturs.

For these reasons, I reject the view that the identity thesis assumes the incomplete predicate interpretation and that the differentiating thesis responds to the identity thesis so conceived. Instead, I suggest that both the identity and differentiating thesis assume that *a* and **a* are complete predicates. Consequently what the identity thesis claims is that any *x* that is *a* is also **a* (and vice versa). In other words, there is nothing that is purely *a* (that is, *a* and not **a*), and there is nothing that is purely **a* (that is, **a* and not *a*). As such the differentiating thesis responds by claiming that in fact there are things that are purely *a* and things that are purely **a*.

On the complete predicate interpretation, the identity theorist's use of relativizing phrases throughout his defense of the identity thesis can be understood according to the following—call them *de-relativizing*—inference patterns:

If *x* is *a r1*, then *x* is *a*.

If *x* is **a r2*, then *x* is **a*.

For example, the identity theorist infers from eating, drinking, and sex being good for the healthy that eating, drinking, and sex are good, and from eating, drinking, and sex being bad for the sick that eating, drinking, and sex are bad. To be sure, these *de-relativizing* inferences are problematic in themselves. Nonetheless, I suggest that assuming their employment and the complete predication interpretation with which they are consistent yields a more plausible interpretation of sections 1–3 (and, as I will proceed to clarify, sections 4–5) overall.⁶¹

5.3.4 The Central Argument for the Differentiating Thesis in Section 4

The defense of the differentiating thesis in section 4 includes a *reductio* argument of the kind that pervades the defenses of the differentiating theses in sections 1–3.⁶² However, the principal defense of the differentiating thesis in section 4 depends on a novel argument. This novel argument turns on the nature of the relata of the identity and differentiating theses. In examining this argument, we must first appreciate a distinction between the relata as they are described in the opening statement of section 4 and the relata that are the focus of ensuing discussion in the defenses of the identity and differentiating theses in the section.

In the opening statement of section 4, the relata are described as “the true” (τὸ ἀλαθές) and “the false” (τὸ ψευδές). But immediately thereafter and through most of the remainder of section 4, the discussion focuses on true and false statements (ὁ ἀλαθῆς/ψευδῆς λόγος):

⁶¹ I note in passing that the treatment of the identity thesis in section 1 of T should be compared with Xen. *Mem.* 3.8.1 and 4.6.8–9.

⁶² At 4.6.

And dual accounts are also advanced concerning the false and the true. Of which one account says that the false statement is one thing and the true statement is another, while the other account says that they are the same. (4.1)

And when the author begins the defense of the differentiating thesis, this thesis is stated in terms of true and false statements:

And it is also said that the false statement is one thing and that the true statement is another. (4.6)

In view of this, one might think that the descriptions of the relata in the opening statement of section 4 are merely abbreviated or, at worst, misleading formulations and that although the author speaks of “the true” and “the false,” what he intends is “the true statement” and “the false statement.” But there is reason to resist identifying the true and the false and so the relata of the identity and differentiating theses in section 4 with the true statement and the false statement. The reason derives from the final subsection of section 4. There, the author concludes the defense of the differentiating thesis with a claim that the identity theorist as well as the differentiating theorist accepts:

that with which the false is mixed is false, and that with which the true is mixed is true. (4.9)

ὃ μὲν τὸ ψεύδος ἀναμέμικται, ψεύσταν ἦμεν, ὃ δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθῆ.

To be clear, the differentiating theorist is here claiming that the false statement is false because it is mixed with “the false” and that the true statement is true because it is mixed with “the true.” Consequently, on pain of gross incoherence, the differentiating theorist’s claim requires that true statements and false statements cannot exhaust the extension of “the true” and “the false.”

I am suggesting, then, that while in section 4 true and false statements are included within the extensions of “the true” and “the false,” respectively, the extensions of “the true” and “the false” include other entities as well. Moreover, the fact that the arguments in section 4 for the identity and difference of the true and the false focus on true and false statements should not mislead us to identify the true and the false with the true statement and the false statement. In short, the identity theorist argues for the identity of the true and the false on the basis of his argument for the identity of the true and the false statement; and the differentiating theorist argues for the difference of the true and the false on the basis of his argument for the difference of the true and the false statement. But even so, I repeat, we should not conflate the true and the false with the true and the false statement.

Assuming then that the true statement and the false statement are distinct from the true and the false, the question naturally follows: What then is included in the extension of “the true” and “the false” that is not a true or false statement? I derive the answer to this question from content immediately preceding subsection 4.9 as well as from earlier in section 4. The pertinent content immediately preceding subsection 4.9 is the differentiating theorist’s appeal to one of the identity theorist’s commitments:

And on the basis of their [that is, the identity theorist's] account, they say that a statement is true (*ἀλαθῆ τὸν λόγον*) when the thing (*πράγματος*) has taken place (*γενομένω*), and [that a statement is] false when it has not (*ἀγενήτω*). (4.7)

A very similar claim, indeed the one to which the differentiating theorist is here referring, is made at the beginning of the defense of the identity thesis:

Whenever a statement (*λόγος*) is spoken, if it has taken place (*γεγένηται*) just as the statement states, the statement is true; and if it has not taken place (*μὴ γεγένηται*), the same statement (*ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος*) is false. (4.2)

Accordingly, I suggest that in the case of the true statement, the true is to be identified with the relevant portion of the world. In other words, the true is the *πράγμα*, that is, the thing, state of affairs, event, or fact that the statement states. The false must then be a non-entity, precisely the non-occurring or non-existent *πράγμα* that the false statement states. I acknowledge that such a view of the false is, of course, metaphysically problematic. Nonetheless, I maintain that this is in fact the position to which the author is committed.⁶³

Earlier, I said that in section 4, in the course of defending his thesis, the differentiating theorist employs a novel argument against the identity thesis. Having clarified the distinction between the true/false and the true/false statement, we are now in a position to clarify this novel argument. For his part, the identity theorist attempts to argue that the true and the false are the same on the ground that the true statement and the false statement are the same. For example, “You robbed the temple” is true in one context, but false in another.⁶⁴ The differentiating theorist then argues against this position by claiming that a true statement consists of both the statement, that is, the linguistic utterance, and the relevant *πράγμα*, that is, the thing stated, which is the contextually relevant entity, the event, fact, etc. The differentiating theorist characterizes the relation between the statement and the *πράγμα* or thing stated as one of mixture (*ἀναμίμεικται*). In short, the differentiating theorist defends the view that the true and the false are different by arguing that the identity theorist has mistaken the nature of the relata. The identity theorist had conceived of the relata as merely the linguistic utterances, for example, again: “You robbed the temple.”⁶⁵ Instead, the differentiating theorist maintains that the relata are the mixture of linguistic utterances and *πράγματα*. I suggest that this criticism of the identity theorist is further developed in section 5, to which I now turn.

5.3.5 The Argument for the Differentiating Thesis in Section 5

The defense of the differentiating thesis in section 5 makes no use of the sort of *reductio* arguments that are central to the defense of the differentiating theses in sections 1–3 and that also figure, albeit in a minor role, in section 4. Rather, central to the defense of the differentiating thesis in section 5 is the claim that the wise say what they say “on the

⁶³ It is worth bearing in mind here how the Greeks struggled to explain how false statements and judgments were possible.

⁶⁴ 4.3.

⁶⁵ It is questionable precisely what sort of entities the identity theorist conceives the relata as, e.g., tokens, types, contents, propositions. For an insightful discussion of this point, cp. D.T.J. Bailey, “Excavating *Dissoi Logoi* 4,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 30 (2008), 249–64.

appropriate occasion” (ἐν δέοντι), whereas the ignorant say what they say “when it is not appropriate” (ἄ οὐ δεῖ).⁶⁶ The author then proceeds to discuss the significance of the addition of these expressions, “ἐν δέοντι” and “ἄ οὐ δεῖ,” to the descriptions of what is said. In particular, the author claims that in virtue of the addition of these expressions what is said is not the same thing:

And in saying this it seems to me they have added a small thing, “when it is appropriate” and “when it is not appropriate.” Consequently, it is no longer the same thing (τὸ αὐτὸ).
(5.10)

Given this, the author draws a general distinction between two ways that two things can differ from one another; and he illustrates these two ways using linguistic, among other, examples. One way in which two things can differ is exemplified by a shift in the accent of a given word, for example, from “σάκος” (shield) to “σακός” (enclosure), or by a rearrangement in the order of the letters of given word, for example, from “ὄνος” (ass) to “νόος” (mind).⁶⁷ The other way in which two things can differ is exemplified by appending to an utterance an expression such as “when it is appropriate” or “when it is not appropriate.”

I understand these two ways that two things can differ as follows. The former involves structural change to a given entity; that is, it consists of the alteration of the organization of a fixed set of components that are constitutive of the entity. The author expressly uses the term “alteration” (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι) to characterize this way in which two things can differ.⁶⁸ The latter involves a change in the membership of the components that constitute the entity, for instance by the addition or the subtraction of components. The author does not supply a term for this kind of difference, but for convenience we may call it “difference-in-constituency.” Observe that the author conceives of the two forms of difference as general. Again, the linguistic examples are among other examples he uses to illustrate his point. In addition, specifically with regard to difference-in-constituency, the author cites the subtraction of one from ten, rendering nine.⁶⁹

Given the distinction between alteration and difference-in-constituency, the author suggests that difference-in-constituency is more significant, a greater form of difference, than alteration:

Since therefore [in the cases of shifting accents or letters] there is such a difference (τοσοῦτον διαφέρει) when nothing is taken away, what is the case if one adds something or takes away something? (5.13)

Apropos of the defense of the differentiating thesis in section 5, the author makes these points to suggest that in fact the wise do not say the same things as the ignorant. In other words, the wise say different things; indeed, they say things that are significantly different.

I have suggested that this argument in section 5 develops the novel argument for the differentiating thesis introduced in section 4. Precisely, the argument criticizes the identity

⁶⁶ 5.9. I assume that the author’s point extends to the actions of the wise and ignorant. (Recall also that for the sake of simplicity I ignore discussion of the sound-minded and mad in section 5.)

⁶⁷ 5.11–12. ⁶⁸ Cp. the use of this term as Pl. *Tht.* 181d2.

⁶⁹ 5.14. Cp. the discussion of Epicharmus on the Growing Argument in, e.g., P. Horkey, *Plato and Pythagoreanism* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 127–49.

theorist's conception of the nature of the *relata*. Parts of the *relata* are indeed the same, namely the utterances. However, these are merely proper parts of the *relata*. Once again, the identity theorist ignores contextual features of the utterances, which are also constitutive of the *relata*. In short, as in the case of the criticism of the identification of true and false statements in section 4, the defender of the differentiating thesis here argues that the bearers of the attributes of being $a/*a$ are more complex than the identity theorist has taken them to be.

In short, in section 4 and more elaborately in section 5, the differentiating theorist argues that the identity thesis, the thesis x is both a and $*a$, is faulty on the metaphysical ground that x , as described by the identity theorist, is not the bearer of a and $*a$, but rather a proper part of the bearer. Instead, $x-c1$ is the bearer of a and $x-c2$ is the bearer of $*a$ (where $c1$ and $c2$ stand for distinct contextual features of the utterance).

5.3.6 Conclusion to the Topical and Functional Relation between Sections 1–4 and Section 5

The foregoing account of the arguments presented on behalf of the differentiating thesis in sections 4 and 5 suggest that what is being contested in these sections is the ontological or metaphysical nature of the bearers of the attributes of being a and $*a$. The identity theorist, we may say, takes a narrow view of these bearers, which supports his thesis that the *relata* are the same; while the differentiating theorist takes a broad view, which supports his thesis that the *relata* are different.

This conclusion may encourage us, interpreters, to think that the solution to the debate between the identity and differentiating theorists lies in metaphysical knowledge rather than skill in *λόγοι*. But I suggest that the author of T conceives of such skill as consisting of metaphysical knowledge. After all, recall that the master skill consists, among other stated things, in “knowledge of the truth of things” (*ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι*). Accordingly, we may think of the matter this way. When we speak of things as being good or bad, seemly or unseemly, just or unjust, true or false, precisely what are the sorts of things to which such attributes are properly ascribed? As the foregoing interpretation of sections 1–5 has suggested, the answer to this question requires a certain view of the meaning of the predicates, but also a certain view of the bearers of the attributes corresponding to the predicates.

In sum, the elaboration of the differentiating thesis in section 4 and above all in section 5 deepens and brings into sharper focus the dispute between identity and differentiating theses. It exposes the theses as metaphysical as well as semantic, and, once again, it is this sort of understanding that the master skill is supposed to provide.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, I have offered two sets of considerations on behalf of the thesis that T is a unity in the sense of being a single discourse. The first set of considerations concerns the unity of T as a whole. I first argued for a weak unity on the basis of the distribution of connecting particles in the opening sentences of sections 1–9. I then argued for the functional unity of T on the basis of an account of the relation between the antilogical and monological portions of T. The second set of considerations focuses on the unity of

proper parts of T. I first argued for the topical unity of sections 1–3 on the basis of a philosophical tradition that conceived of the attributes ἀγαθόν, καλόν, and δίκαιον as constituting an evaluative triad. I then argued for the topical unity of sections 1–4 on the grounds that while knowledge of the topics of the evaluative triad constitutes wisdom, such knowledge depends on non-evaluative knowledge. I concluded with an argument for the functional unity of sections 1–5 on the grounds that sections 4 and 5 extend and deepen the arguments for the differentiating theses beyond those presented in sections 1–3.

These various considerations adduced in favor of the unity of T should help to advance a deeper and more thorough understanding of T. But clearly there is more work to do. Among other things, I underscore the following outstanding problems. Generally, more needs to be said about the various arguments for the identity and differentiating theses in sections 1–3. In addition, nothing here has been said that would explain the placement and function of section 7 in T. Finally, there is the question of author's various expressed attitudes toward a number of the theses he discusses. For instance, sometimes the author explicitly commits himself to an identity or differentiating thesis. For instance, he does so with respect to the identity thesis in section 1:

And I also add myself (ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς . . . ποτιτίθεμαι) to the latter group [namely those who maintain the identity thesis]. (1.2)

But in other passages he merely introduces a thesis as one that is held. For instance, this is the case with the differentiating thesis in section 2:

It is also said that when what is unseemly and what is seemly is under discussion that each differs from the other. (2.21)

Moreover, sometimes the author directly contradicts his explicit commitment to an identity or differentiating thesis; but in other passages not. For example, in section 1 the author appears flatly to contradict himself. As we saw above, he endorses the identity thesis; but later, when he begins the account in favor of the differentiating thesis, he endorses that thesis as well:

And I myself also distinguish (ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς . . . διαίρεῶμαι) them [i.e., the good and the bad] in the above-mentioned manner. For it is not even clear what sort of thing would be good and what sort of thing bad if each of the two were the same thing and not each different from the other. (1.11)

This feature of T, again the author's various expressed attitudes toward various identity and differentiating theses, is puzzling and invites reflection.

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APPENDIX 1

The Manuscript Tradition

The following Greek manuscripts, in approximate chronological order, contain: D = the *Dissoi Logoi*, M = *Against the Professors*, PH = *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.⁷⁰

NAME	DATE	CONTENTS	ROBINSON	DK
Marcianus gr. 262 (coll. 408)	ante 1468 ⁷¹	M, D	V2* ⁷²	V
Marcianus gr. IV.26 (coll. 1442)	1494–5 ⁷³	PH, M, D	V1	W
Regimontanus S. 35 (16.b.12)	15th century ⁷⁴	M, D	R*	
Parisinus gr. 1964	15th century	PH, M, D	P1*	
Laurentianus 85.24	15th century ⁷⁵	PH, M, D	F2*	F
Parisinus gr. 1963	1534	PH, M, D	P3*	
Vaticanus Ottobonianus gr. 21	1541	PH, M, D	Q	
Berolinensis Phillipps gr. 1518	1542	PH, M, D	B*	P
Cizensis gr. fol. 70	1556	M, D	C	
Oxoniensis Bodliensis Savilianus gr. 1 (6548)	1589 ⁷⁶	M, D	S ⁷⁷	
Laurentianus 85.19	14th–16th century ⁷⁸	PH, M, D	F1	
Taurinensis Athenaei gr. 81 (B.I.3)	15th–16th century ⁷⁹	PH, M, D	T	
Vesontinus 409 (Besançon Univ. Lib 14)	16th century ⁸⁰	PH, M, D	H	H
Vaticanus gr. 1338	16th century	PH, M, D	Y1	
Vaticanus gr. 217	16th century	PH, M, D	Y2	
Parisinus gr. 1966 and gr. 1967	16th century ⁸¹	PH, M, D	P2*	
Parisinus gr. 2081	16th century	M, D	P4*	
Parisinus gr. 1965	16th century	PH, M, D	P6* ⁸²	
Parisinus Supplementarius gr. 133	16th century ⁸³	PH, M, D	P5 ⁸⁴	
Escorialensis gr. 136 (T.I.16)	16th century	M, D	E	
Monacensis gr. 79	16th century	PH, M, D	Z	
Oxoniensis Mertonensis gr. 304	16th century ⁸⁵	M, D	M	
Leidensis	16th–17th century	L ^{86,87}		

⁷⁰ The information presented in the main text largely derives from Floridi, *Sextus*.

⁷¹ Robinson lists this as 15th century.

⁷² Note that Robinson uses an asterisk to denote “codex inter optimos aestimandus.”

⁷³ Robinson lists this as 15th century. ⁷⁴ Robinson lists this as 14th–15th century.

⁷⁵ Robinson lists this as 15th–16th century. ⁷⁶ Robinson lists this as 16th century.

⁷⁷ Robinson claims that this derives from M, but it cannot since M contains only M and D, and S contains PH, M, and D.

⁷⁸ Robinson lists this as 16th century.

⁷⁹ Robinson lists this as 16th century, which is required by his view that it depends on Z.

⁸⁰ Robinson lists this as Vesont. F. 19. ⁸¹ Robinson lists this solely as Parisinus gr. 1967.

⁸² Robinson hypothesizes that this derives from P4 or V2, but it cannot since P4 and V2 contain only M and D, while P6 contains PH, M, and D.


⁸³ Robinson lists this as 17th century.

⁸⁴ Robinson claims that this derives from R, but it cannot since R contains only M and D and P5 contains PH, M, and

⁸⁵ Robinson lists this as 15th century. ⁸⁶ This manuscript is not listed by Floridi.

⁸⁷ The lost manuscript, Vaticanus Perditus, 15th century (?), which contained a Latin translation of M, D, is not noted by Robinson.


C. Conclusion of section 9 with editorial note in right margin (c. 408r)



τὰ δὲ πράγματα οὕτως· περὶ ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρη καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλῆα· περὶ χαλκείας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, περὶ δειλίας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑπειόν·

Ση̄ ὅτι τὸ ἐπίλοιπον οὐχ εὐρέθη.

D. Lacunae in section 8 (c. 407v)



ἐπισταεῖται· πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας ἐπίσταται· τοὶ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν εὐ δεῑ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὅτων καὶ λέγοι,

καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν πράσσειν· τὰ δὲ