ECHOES OF TSÜLTRIM LODRÖ: AN INDIGENOUS VOICE FROM CONTEMPORARY TIBET ON THE ‘BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE’

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This paper seeks to find a place for the intellectual voices of an indigenous movement of ‘Buddhist modernism’ that recently took shape in eastern Tibet. It presents how a prominent leader of this movement, Tsültrim Lodrö (tshul khrims blo gros, b. 1962), articulates Buddhism in response to modern discourses of rationality and science. In particular, since the ‘dialogue’ between Buddhism and science in recent years has largely been a series of monologues, this paper seeks to open up the conversation in order to shed light on the nature of this dialogue and what is at stake in this conversation. I will discuss Tsültrim Lodrö’s most recent work on philosophy and science with the aim to shed light on the nature of the current Buddhism and science discourses through considering the contributions of this influential contemporary Tibetan.

Introduction

This paper seeks to find a place for the intellectual voices of an indigenous movement of ‘Buddhist modernism’1 that recently took shape in eastern Tibet. Here, I will present how a prominent leader of this movement, Tsültrim Lodrö (tshul khrims blo gros, b. 1962), articulates Buddhism in response to modern discourses of rationality and science. In particular, since the ‘dialogue’ between Buddhism and science in recent years has largely been a series of monologues, this paper seeks to open up the conversation in order to shed light on the nature of this dialogue and what is at stake in this conversation.

Tsültrim Lodrö’s (2008) A Brief Presentation of Ancient and Modern Thought from the Eastern and Western World is a bold attempt at comparative philosophy by a contemporary Tibetan scholar. The author is the head of the monastic college (bshad grwa) of Larung Gar (bla rung sgar) in Serta, eastern Tibet, a monastic encampment that is home to over 10,000 monks and nuns and currently the...
largest monastic college in the world. Larung Gar is also a dynamic centre of literary production—on diverse subjects commensurate with its population—and has been a nexus of indigenous voices of Buddhist modernism in Tibet. Tsültrim Lodrö, the main successor of the late Larung Gar founder, Khenpo Jikmé Püntsok (’jigs med phun tshogs, 1933–2004), has now emerged as the primary architect of this movement. In this paper, I will discuss his most recent work on philosophy and science with the aim to shed light on the nature of the current Buddhism and science discourses through considering the contributions of this influential contemporary Tibetan.

Before going into Tsültrim Lodrö’s treatment of science in his most recent book, I should mention that his first book, A Clear Mirror for Existence: A Presentation of Past and Future Lives (Tsültrim Lodrö [2004] 2006, 1–146), draws from the scientific studies of the late University of Virginia psychologist, Ian Stevenson, among several others, to make a case for reincarnation. In the summer of 2006, when I spent a month at Larung Gar and met daily with Tsültrim Lodrö, he told me that he wrote this book for Tibetan students who attend Chinese colleges and are steeped in materialism as the worldview of science. The book makes a case for how topics such as consciousness and the nature of life and death in the scientific community are open questions. Some of the sources for his book were Chinese translations of the transcripts from the Mind and Life conferences facilitated by the Dalai Lama. The book has become widely popular among Tibetans and has gained Tsültrim Lodrö quite a reputation in Tibet as a pioneering scholar.

Tsültrim Lodrö’s knowledge of science, albeit limited, is impressive. For a Tibetan monk who does not read English and had never been to Continental Europe or the United States, his knowledge of Western philosophy and the history of science is remarkable (not to mention his command of madhyamaka, epistemology (tshad ma), and tantra; as the head of the largest monastic college on the Tibetan plateau, it is needless to mention that he is an authority on all the major topics of their curriculum).

An indigenous Buddhist voice of Buddhist modernity

Tsültrim Lodrö’s (2008) A Brief Presentation of Ancient and Modern Thought is divided into three parts: (western) philosophy (mtshan nyid rig pa), science (tshan rig), and ‘the art of the inner-meaning’ (nang don rig pa), otherwise known as ‘Buddhism’. The first section begins with a short history of philosophy beginning with the pre-Socratics and moves quickly to discuss the likes of Karl Popper, John Searle, and David Chalmers. Tsültrim Lodrö concludes that the history of western philosophy can be subsumed within the views of materialism (dngos gtsos smra ba) and idealism (sems gtsos smra ba) (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 4).

Tsültrim Lodrö turns to René Descartes and presents his mind-body dualism as the beginning of modern philosophy. He positions Descartes in a way that he represents the synthesis of materialism and idealism (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 8–9). He says that the Buddhist view accords with the Cartesian dualism of body and
mind as two independent substances (rang rkyab thub pa’i dngos po gnyis) (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 32). His portrayal of Buddhism as in line with Cartesian substance dualism raises questions as to which Buddhism he is representing in this book. It is certainly not the highest view of Buddhism as it is laid out by Longchenpa, the fourteenth-century Nyingma authority with whom Tsültrim Lodrö shares his name and allegiance. Presumably the Cartesian Buddhism Tsültrim Lodrö has in mind here is the Buddhism of the Abhidharma. Before turning further to his presentation of Buddhism, however, we will first look further at how he represents (western) philosophy and science.

In his sweeping critique of western philosophy, Tsültrim Lodrö begins a discussion of materialism with Thomas Hobbes and characterizes materialism as the view that only matter is real, and that the mind or the mental is nothing other than the physical brain, or an epiphenomenal product of it (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 2–6). Although the view of materialism is his primary target, he quickly moves on to idealism and the position of Bishop Berkeley. He presents Berkeley’s view in a favourable light, that ‘to exist is to be perceived’. However, he questions Berkeley’s appeal to God as a way to justify how things continue to exist when they are not perceived (by humans). He argues that Berkeley’s appeal to God as the basis of his philosophy is an article of unsupported faith, not reason, so he contends that it cannot be used reasonably to support his position because the existence of God is yet to be proven (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 6–8, 31). He similarly argues that those who follow the assertions of quantum physics get stuck in the same position as the idealists, like Berkeley, who rely on God to perceive the world in order to support the world’s existence when it is not perceived. He says that all the scholars of quantum physics have to say about the question of whether the world exists or not when it is not observed, given that existence depends on observation, is that ‘this is a difficult point of quantum physics!’ (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 95–96). He thus sets up the claims of science as the product of an ongoing and unfinished project, and then critiques the reliability of science as a metaphysical worldview by pointing out that science has only ever offered an incomplete picture of the world.

In his lambast of Western traditions, Tsültrim Lodrö also brings up Feuerbach and Marx and their critiques of religion. He turns Western ethnocentrism on its head when he raises the point that their critiques of religion were not addressed to Buddhism, but rather were aimed at ‘Western’ traditions like Christianity and therefore do not apply to Buddhism. He goes on to say that there is too much arrogance among people who consider themselves scholars yet fail to see this distinction (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 36). Reminiscent of Ram Mohan Roy (1774–1833), the ‘father of modern India’, and his role in the creation of a rational Hindu identity in response to colonialism in nineteenth-century India, Tsültrim Lodrö constructs a distinctively modern version of rational Buddhism in conversation with western science and Christian theology. Ram Mohan Roy had based his vision of a reformed Hinduism on the platform of rationality, and thus redefined Hinduism in a language valorized by post-Enlightenment Europe.
Roy, Tsültrim Lodrö shapes his social and philosophical vision of Buddhism in a way that draws from the values of European Enlightenment, yet supplants them. There is an important difference, however, between what we now see in Tibet and what came to be in India. Tsültrim Lodrö’s arguments evoking Marx are unique: they do not evoke him in a subaltern’s cause against colonial influences from the West. Rather, Tsültrim Lodrö argues against the materialism that Marx represents and his targets implicate colonialists from the East not the West. That is, Tsültrim Lodrö’s distinctive engagement with science should be seen in light of Tibet’s unique relationship with the People’s Republic of China. In modern China, Marx’s historical materialism has formed the basis of what is seen as scientific progress. Tibetans getting a higher education in the state-run universities there are taught to see science as completely replacing religion. It is important to keep in mind that Tsültrim Lodrö’s audience is the Tibetans in Tibet; he aims to give them a modern education that provides space for Buddhism.

Monologues of modernity

Tsültrim Lodrö presents science in the second section of his book. He delimits the domain of scientific inquiry to the first skandha, and part of the fourth (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 41), among the five skandhas that constitute what we misinterpret as a singular, independent self. That is, he says that science completely deals with material forms and with part of formations (subjects such as time and motion, but presumably excluding inquiry into mental states [sems byung, Skt. caitta], at least those that are virtuous and afflictive). Given that he also excludes the other three skandhas (feelings, perceptions, consciousnesses), he clearly does not have psychology or cognitive science in mind when he speaks of ‘science’ (tshan rig).

It is unfortunate that he leaves out cognitive science and psychology from science because it is in these fields where Buddhism would seem to have the most promise of collaboration. This conspicuous absence may simply be a result of his ignorance of the recent developments in cognitive science, or could reflect a sceptical attitude toward the possibility that science would have anything worthwhile to offer Buddhism, a tradition presumed to be self-contained and complete. In any case, it is helpful to keep in mind that for a Buddhist, science deals only with a slice of life, and for Tsültrim Lodrö, it only deals with one and a half skandhas.

We get a better idea of what Tsültrim Lodrö means by ‘science’ when he explains the scientific domain of the ‘subtle world’ (phra ba ‘jig rten), which he defines as subtle forms that cannot be seen (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 42). He lays out these fields in three broad sections: (1) early atomic theory (snga rab sreul phran smra ba), (2) contemporary relativity theory (ltos bcas smra ba), and (3) quantum mechanics (tshad rdul nus rig smra ba) (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 52).

After giving a concise history and explanation of these three fields of science, he concludes that they all are contained within the ‘lower’ philosophies of
Buddhism. He says that matter being composed of particles, or atoms, is a position held by the lowest of the Buddhist philosophies, the Vaibhāṣikas, and goes on to say that relativity (with regard to time and length) is part of the view of the Sautrāntikas, the second lowest of the Buddhist philosophies. Despite his notable effort in rendering an account of quantum mechanics and relativity theory in Tibetan terms, a scrupulous reader will be left wondering the extent to which his renderings of scientific theories are lost in translation. This is a particularly glaring problem when his descriptions of science are cast in terms of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism. Indeed, he has been criticized for this misrepresentation of science in a recent Tibetan-language work (see Tsawa Danyuk 2011, 126–137).

Tibetan scholastics organize Buddhist systems of thought broadly within four philosophical schools: the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mind-Only, and Madhyamaka. Two lower schools, which represent conflicting interpretations of Abhidharma, are characterized with the metaphysically dualist claim that the ultimate constituents of the world are (1) material particles and (2) moments of mind. Positioned higher are the Mahāyāna schools, depicted respectively as idealist (in the case of Mind-Only) and anti-realist (in the case of Madhyamaka). Madhyamaka, a school of thought inspired by Nāgārjuna’s negative dialectics, holds the place at the top of this hierarchy of views, and thus it is the philosophy with which most Tibetan Buddhist scholars self-identify.

Tsültrim Lodrö (2008, 93) claims that the view of quantum physics is subsumed within the philosophical system of Mind-Only. He even argues that quantum physics is not as rational as Mind-Only because Mind-Only at least has reasoned arguments to support its philosophy (like what is found in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavarttika), implying that quantum physics does not! In a way, his book reads like a twenty-first-century siddhānta, a text presenting the philosophical tenet systems in a standard scholastic format, refuting others’ positions then presenting one’s own. This is a style familiar to his audience of monastics trained in classical Buddhist literature, but an unusual place to find an exchange of ideas between Buddhism and modern science. As fascinating as this is, Tsültrim Lodrö tries to contend with science without scientific training.

Quantum physics, let alone calculus, is complex mathematics, yet Tibetan Buddhist monks tend to get basic maths skills mainly from studying astrology. Given that the curriculum at a Buddhist monastic college in Tibet rarely includes much more mathematics education than long division, it is not hard to see why Tsültrim Lodrö does not engage in a dialogue with science, but in a Buddhist monologue, or rather, a conversation with his Tibetan community. Conversely, a scientist who understands quantum mechanics (presuming there is one) would likely not have gotten very far with Dharmakīrti’s arguments for self-awareness (svaśaṃvedana) in the Pramāṇavarttika.

When Tsültrim Lodrö presents his own tradition of Buddhism, he claims that the Buddha not only taught about science more than 2000 years ago, but that he did much more. He says that the Buddha promoted peace and harmony, mental and physical health, democracy, environmentalism, vegetarianism, and (last but
certainly not least) he also taught the path to complete liberation. The voice of Buddhism that Tsültrim Lodrö articulates in this book is certainly a voice of Buddhist modernism, but is strikingly different from the more familiar voices of Buddhist modernism from America that eagerly embrace the compatibly of Buddhism and modern science.

For instance, when he makes his case for believing in more than we can see—an important part of his argument to support certain Buddhist claims that there is more to life (e.g., consciousness) than just the material world (the domain of scientific knowledge)—he argues for the existence of spiritual beings, gods and demons (lha ‘dras). Tsültrim Lodrö stumbles upon an unlikely ally for his cause in George W. Bush, and quotes a speech that President Bush gave in 2002 to students at Qinghua University in Beijing: ‘America is a nation guided by faith. Someone once called us ‘a nation with the soul of a church.’ Ninety-five per cent of Americans say they believe in God, and I’m one of them’ (Tsunltrim Lodro 2008, 168). Tsültrim Lodrö finds support for Tibetans’ beliefs by locating like-minded people across the globe; basically, he is saying that many people in the richest, most powerful, and technologically developed nation believe in God, so Tibetans are not alone in believing in spiritual beings (Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 168). God Bless Tibet! (lha rgyal lo).

I don’t feel like I am really being fair to Tsültrim Lodrö here, given that I am extracting this text out of his intended context: that is, a Tibetan text written for (ultra-pious) Tibetans in Tibet not for the deconstructive gaze of (ultra-critical) academics. I do think this example illustrates my point: that we have to understand the discourses of Buddhism and science in the context of a particular audience and agenda; in this case, the audience of Tibetans he is trying to support in the belief in spiritual beings to fend off materialism as the exclusive ontology of rational thought.

Sources for Tsültrim Lodrö’s writing on science include Chinese translations of books that document the Dalai Lama’s conversations with scientists. In his *The Universe in a Single Atom*, the Dalai Lama outlines how seeing the nonexistence of something is different from simply not seeing something (see Dalai Lama 2005, 35). This is an important distinction he makes that is relevant to the way he distinguishes scientism—which is bad science, a metaphysical view—from good science, an empirical method trimmed of excess metaphysical baggage or commitments. In an oft-quoted passage, the Dalai Lama says that if science shows certain Buddhist claims about the world to be false, then Buddhists should reject those views (Dalai Lama 2005, 3). By putting his views at risk, the Dalai Lama represents an ideal participant in a dialogical encounter between Buddhism and science, where the participant’s views in dialogue are open-ended and thus at stake in the encounter. Unfortunately, we do not see the nuance or openness of this kind of engagement with science in Tsültrim Lodrö’s book.

Yet conversely, we do not necessarily find many scientists in dialogue with Buddhism in this way either, in ways that put the methodological assumptions of materialism at stake, given that topics like reincarnation, for instance, tend to be
dismissed a priori as viable areas of scientific inquiry. Constrained by systems of institutional and financial support, scientists are predisposed to approach Buddhism firmly rooted within a set of predetermined parameters (e.g., by researching mindfulness as a means to reduce stress, boost immunity, and so forth). The point I am trying to make here is that we should not confuse the nature of the subject matter of scientific inquiry—Buddhism in this case—with dialogue with Buddhism. Likewise, when the subject matter of science is rocks (as in the case of the earth science of geology), we should not confuse the silent, passive subject matter of rocks with something that is a participant in a ‘rocks-science dialogue’.

**Transformative encounters**

The data-driven neuroscience of Buddhist meditation and ‘mindfulness’ has gained enormous popularity in recent years. Yet the potential for human transformation offered by Buddhism, under the microscope or fMRI—delimited to simply an ‘object’ of science—can be rendered sterile, lifeless, and inert when it is displaced from its performative dimensions, which are constitutive to its meaning. This disjunction poses a real challenge if a dialogue between science and Buddhism, at least on meaningful philosophical grounds, is to proceed.

The disjunction between the discordant orientations of science and Buddhism reflects what Freya Mathews, an environmental philosopher, described as the difference between knowledge and an encounter. An encounter is a ‘bilateral’ relation between subjectivities, in contrast to knowledge as the product of the objective orientation of science: ‘To encounter an other is to approach it as another subject with whom it is possible to have a relationship . . . and from whom it is possible to elicit a response’ (Mathews 2003, 77). Recasting the relation of knower-known from subject-object to subject-subject, Mathews (2003, 78) explains that ‘knowledge seeks to break open the mystery of another’s nature; encounter leaves the mystery intact . . . Knowledge provides closure on the future, hence control and security. Encounter is open-ended, allowing spontaneity and vulnerability’. Another environmental philosopher, Jim Cheney, has pointed out a similar disparity between modern forms of knowledge and personal encounters. He claims that: ‘Modern conceptions of knowledge . . . hold that knowledge emerges from a relationship between an active, knowing subject and a passive, known object’ (Cheney 1999, 142).

In his reflections on the ‘white man’s’ study of Native Americans, Cheney relates this distinction to a difference between an irreducibly performative world and a descriptive belief or object of knowledge. He describes this difference as one between the ‘object of knowledge or belief . . . and . . . a matter of comportment, which in some sense brings into being a world’ (Cheney 1999, 149–150). Cheney’s portrayal of an irreducibly performative dimension that is at odds with a simple descriptive account draws upon the work of Sam Gill, who showed this disjunction with the example of Navajo prayer, for which questions of what prayers mean is consistently met with native informants’ responses that, ‘it is not what messages
prayers carry, but what prayers do’. In a way that parallels the recent engagements of scientists with Buddhist practices, Gill portrays the limitations of theoretical approaches to Native American religious performances remarking that ‘the person of knowledge in the Navajo tradition holds that [‘theology, philosophy, doctrine’] are ordinarily discouraged. Such concerns are commonly understood by Navajos as evidence that one totally misunderstands the nature of Navajo religious traditions’ (Gill, ‘One, Two, Three: The Interpretation of Religious Action’, cited in Cheney 1999, 148). As with the science of Tibetan Buddhist practices, at least in its current state, the place afforded to science reflects the colonization of indigenous knowledge, while the status of Tibetans resembles that of Native Americans, in disturbing ways.

Furthermore, the modern supposition that valueless, dead ideas—static truths—are the only real truths is what Donald Evans (1992) has referred to as the dogma of impersonalism. He characterized impersonalism as ‘the dogmatic rejection of any claim that requires personal transformation to be adequately understood and appraised’ (Evans 1992, 101). He used the example of love to counter this dogma:

Impersonalism is perhaps most deeply undermined when we consider the question, ‘does unconditional love exist?’ It seems clear to me that I cannot recognize unconditional love . . . unless I have experienced it myself, however fleeting, as a recipient or as a channel. (Evans 1992, 107)

Indeed, ‘disinterested’ impersonal facts are never completely separate from personal interests and values. An implication is that there can be no real distinction between facts and values, and this is as true for the orientations of science as it is for Buddhism. That is to say, the discourses of science reflect the socially constituted values of the culture in which those scientific discourses are embedded, as well as the financial and institutional systems that enable scientific practice. Even the claim that the value of science is ‘knowledge for knowledge’s sake’ exemplifies a value embedded with the personal interests of a community. Thus, despite the ideal of impersonal, objective truth, science does not exist in a vacuum.

If it is lab work that permits scientists to confirm and refine theories, or reject models that are off the mark, then the laboratory for a science of Buddhism is arguably vacant. For instance, the truth of suffering, the Buddhist starting point as the first noble truth, calls for a scientist to suffer in order to adequately evaluate it; yet this requirement pre-empts the impersonal and disinterested gaze that enables science’s methodological ideal. The central place of embodied, personal knowledge in Buddhism—as an active, living truth—contrasts sharply with the modern ideal of disinterested knowledge. For Buddhists, a transformative knowledge (or encounter) is the most important kind of knowledge. Yet scientists generally are not interested in Buddhist transformation, but in knowledge. And it is important to keep in mind that scientific inquiries into the neural correlates of cognitive states in Buddhist meditators, for instance, are guided by scientists with the assumptions, methods, and goals of scientists.
With this in mind, we will not lose sight of whose agenda is served in scientific studies of Buddhist practices. In the case of Tsültrim Lodró, too, he certainly has an agenda for engaging science in his books: to educate Tibetan people how to challenge the hegemony of scientism and show them that science does not have all the answers. In the case of a scientist engaging in neurological studies on Buddhist meditators, I would contend that it is the scientists who are in it to gain scientific data from their encounter. A by-product of this encounter—the enthusiasm on the part of a Buddhist community—may be eventual vindication or disappointment, but it is at least evidence of the dominant and domineering role that science plays in our modern culture (and arguably, the materialist underpinnings of a Buddhist community’s presumed ‘spiritual’ impulse). In any case, science has undoubtedly displaced many of the traditional roles that religion has played in modern cultures, by shaping prevailing forms of knowledge. As Buddhism continues to become a part of European and American cultures, science inevitably will continue to play a role in shaping some of the new forms Buddhism is taking, in a way that parallels the roles that indigenous religions played in shaping the ways that Buddhism has assimilated into the cultures it has historically encountered.

**Conclusion**

I present this paper because I feel that it is important to let indigenous Buddhist scholars in the Buddhism and science discourses be heard. Moreover, the so-called ‘dialogue’ between Buddhism and science in recent years has largely been a series of monologues. I feel that the intended audience of these discourses, and whose agenda is being served in the ‘dialogue,’ has not been considered enough.

In his recent book, Tsültrim Lodró (2008) reflects many of the typical signs of Buddhist modernism: he represents Buddhism as quintessentially ‘rational’, more so than science, and claims that the Buddha had understood relativity and quantum physics over 2000 years ago. However, by promoting a modern Buddhism in line with Cartesian dualism rather than fashioning some kind of allegiance with quantum physics, and by citing George W. Bush to support his cause, he does not represent a Buddhism in tune with the kind of Buddhist modernism that we are more familiar with seeing in Europe and America. Rather, it is a Buddhism tailored for his Tibetan community in Tibet.

As the modern world continues to participate in and shape the development of distinctive forms of Buddhism, I think we will see this process of change continue to take place in conversation with science. Where this conversation will lead, I do not know, but I do think that a dialogue is most honest and meaningful if it is not simply two monologues, but proceeds in a way in which the voices of both sides are heard, and all participants remain open to the potential of being transformed by the encounter.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my thanks to Kin Cheung, Sarah Jacoby, and Jann Ronis for their valuable feedback on this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

NOTES

1. The selective appropriation of certain aspects of Buddhism that serve a particular rational program is a characteristic of what has been termed ‘Buddhist modernism’. There is a tendency to associate modern adaptations of Buddhism with Europe and America and overlook the importance of Asian voices to the discourses that contribute to Buddhist modernism. See McMahan 2008, 6–7.

2. For references to these figures, see Tsültrim Lodrö 2008, 18–19, 26.


4. tshul khrims blo gros is another name for Longchenpa.

5. On Ram Mohan Roy, see Robertson 1995.

6. Francisco Varela (1946–2001), the late Chilean biologist, suggested to the Dalai Lama that cognitive science, rather than physics, would be the better subject matter of discussion between Buddhists and scientists at the first Mind and Life conference.

7. For more on Tibetan categorization of these four schools, including translations of presentations from two different Tibetan traditions, see Guenther 1971.

8. Examples of this popular Tibetan genre can be found in Geshe and Hopkins 1989, and Cabezon 2013.


11. Echoing Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Evans (1992, 100) refers to impersonalism, along with perspectivalism (the Kantian presupposition that all knowledge is mediated), as ‘the two dogmas regarding skepticism of spiritual reality’.

REFERENCES


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