### COMMONWEALTH: A Journal of Political Science

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ISSN 0890-2410

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

_Consider_ is published annually under the authorization of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association and sent to all members, individual, departmental and institutional.

Subscription rates for all categories of membership: see separate announcements elsewhere in this issue. Changes of address sent to PPSA Secretary, Dr. Thomas Brogan, Albright College, Reading, PA 19603. Postmaster: send notification about undelivered journals to this address. Second class postage paid at Harrisburg, PA and at additional mailing offices. Copyright 1990 by the Pennsylvania Political Science Association. (ISSN 0890-2410).

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In the COMMONWEALTH

Donald G. Taunenbaum, Editor

In addition to the finest research offered to us in the last year, this issue of COMMONWEALTH has a special feature: the Index to Volumes 1 through 5 will be found following the articles. Covering the first five years of COMMONWEALTH, it indicates the range of quality manuscripts recommended by our reviewers. Examining the 26 we published, a breakdown by subfield reflects a pattern similar to one I noted in this space two years ago, in Volume 3. To date, the largest number of articles, 12, have been in American politics, including six on Pennsylvania government and politics, a special interest of a number of our readers. In second place were seven articles on political theory, followed by four in comparative politics, two which examined international relations, and one in biopolitics. We would have liked to have had more publishable manuscripts sent to us on these last three subjects, but for a variety of reasons, including the number of specialized journals in these areas, we were not. We continue to welcome all of the fine manuscripts we can get, in all subfields and areas.

The Index is divided into three parts. An Author Index lists the authors and co-authors of all 26 articles in the five volumes alphabetically by last name, followed by the location of each article. The Title Index lists all articles in order of appearance, beginning with those in Volume 1. Finally, a Subfield/Area Index lists articles alphabetically by the five major categories and one special interest category (Pennsylvania Politics) noted above. I want to express my appreciation to my editorial assistant, Christopher T. Leonardo of Gettysburg College, for the special effort he made in compiling the Index.

The five articles in this issue reflect, once again, a variety of intellectually stimulating subjects. In Gordon Tolle’s paper, Leo Strauss’s rejection of Nietzsche is persuasively argued, and his position is effectively contrasted with scholarship emphasizing the affinity of Strauss and Nietzsche. Tolle then indicates how an awareness of Strauss’s rejection helps to clarify the concept of natural right and the differences between ancient and modern thought.

The piece by Gerald De Maio and Douglas Muzzio demonstrates the contemporary relevance of the debates over representation which emerged at constitutional ratifying conventions early in American history. Such continuing relevance is shown by the authors as they link those early debates with political practices in American municipal government during three periods of recent history: at the turn of the century, in the 1960s-1980s, and in 1991.

Two articles in this issue speak to the role and influence of various media outlets in both contributing to and limiting public awareness of important issues. Kathleen McQuaid’s article, a case study of the growing perception of the dangers of asbestos in the United States, points to the role of the media in defining public...
policy issues for the public agenda and how media attention can wax and wane independent of how serious the problem actually is. A second paper on media influence, by Erika King and co-authors, is a model for investigating press activity in the latest political campaign for governor of Pennsylvania. A content analysis of major Pennsylvania newspapers indicates the kinds of issues the press deemed important and those the press chose to ignore or play down. The authors' findings are related to the role of the press in gubernatorial campaigns, and the hypotheses they formulated may prove useful for studying campaigns in other states.

Elmer Plischke's terse research piece illustrates, with copious examples and references to the literature, the many ways in which the United States has, since the earliest days of the Republic, participated in various cooperative international efforts. I would especially commend the data in the Appendix of this article to those who would study this aspect of international relations: the author has carefully and thoroughly compiled relevant information which is not readily available in any other single place, and scholars can confidently rely on the completeness of this data base.

Finally, I would alert prospective authors to a small change in COMMONWEALTH style, beginning with articles submitted for the next issue. The American Political Science Association's Committee on Publications has issued a Style Manual for Political Science, obviating the need for us to issue our own style manual, something we had done in the past. Beginning with Volume 6, we ask our authors to follow the style given in APSA's Style Manual for Political Science, with a few minor exceptions. These exceptions are noted on a one-page Style Sheet which is published in the back of this issue of COMMONWEALTH, and which is sent to all authors.
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Contrary to other scholarship on Strauss, this paper argues that Strauss understands himself as having decisively rejected Nietzschean thought. First, I hold that notwithstanding the agreement between Strauss and Nietzsche on the critique of modern culture, the defects of liberal democracy, and the flaws in some kinds of historicism, Strauss sees Nietzsche as unable to extricate himself from the trap of modern standards. Nietzsche's philosophy needs natural standards, but he denies that nature provides them. Second, I maintain that Strauss thinks Nietzsche differs from the classical standard of nobility and opposes the classics on the nature of man; for Nietzsche there are no natural ends. Third, I argue that in Strauss's view Nietzsche decisively rejects citizen morality and justice, whereas Strauss regards them as beneficial and politically defensible because they point the way toward his higher standard of natural right.

Scholarly treatments of Strauss's work have underemphasized the degree to which Strauss broke with Friedrich Nietzsche. Drury claims that while Strauss appeals to classical thinkers such as Plato, these classics "have been transfigured by Nietzsche" (Drury, 1988, p. 46), and she argues that Strauss thinks: justice is only conventional; one ought to prefer tyranny; the ends justify the means; and the classic natural right position advocates practicing massive injustice. She favors a modern natural law perspective and is dismissive of any view that does not secure moral rules as the peak of human intellectual and moral effort. While Drury recognizes that "Strauss does believe that nature provides man with standards," she mistakenly claims these standards do not have moral worth (Drury, 1988, p. 168). She attacks Strauss because she fears his thought will undercut her view of morality, and concludes that Strauss is profoundly Nietzschean (Drury, 1988, pp. 20, 95, 91, 170, 177; Tolle, 1988, pp. 467-470). Other scholars who lean toward the view that Strauss is heavily Nietzschean are Pangle (in Strauss, 1983, pp. 24-5), Gunnell (1985, p. 359) and Lampert (1986, pp. 9-10).

This paper examines what Strauss thinks is his intellectual relationship
to Nietzsche, whom he read as a Gymnasium student in Germany! What is at stake is much more than the intellectual development of Leo Strauss. By examining Strauss’s view of Nietzsche on modernity, nobility, and morality, I seek to demonstrate the chasm that separates modernity from Strauss’s classic natural right and to add to our understanding of Strauss’s enigmatic “natural right” doctrine. Examination of Strauss’s break with Nietzsche will help to clarify the meaning of the modernity which Strauss criticizes, the “natural right” base from which he criticizes it, and its relation to politics.

Strauss apparently learned a great deal from Nietzsche. Yet Strauss’s mature life work dealt with the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. At first glance, Nietzsche appears to straddle that gulf, asserting both an admiration for the noble heroism of the ancients and warmly embracing an extremely modern perspectivism. However, Strauss ultimately rejects Nietzsche because the latter fails to appreciate the difference between the intellectual and the philosopher. Further, Strauss thinks the flaws in Nietzsche are writ large in modernity, and therefore are responsible for the crisis of our time.

This paper will show that Strauss does indeed have a significantly different standard of morality than Nietzsche’s and this leads the philosopher to a “hierarchy of ends,” a “universally valid standard” which is “sufficient for passing judgment” on human actions (Strauss, 1953, p. 163). His doctrine is intended not to corrupt the city’s vulgar morality, but to judge it from a higher, more noble, more moral point of view.

The Critique of Modernity

In this section I discuss Strauss’s view of modernity in general and then assess the extent to which Strauss and (Strauss’s) Nietzsche agree regarding the critique of modernity. I argue that although Strauss shares some of Nietzsche’s criticisms of modernity, Strauss ultimately finds Nietzsche massively inconsistent and finally caught up in the web of modernity’s flaws. Nietzsche, in his perspectivism and historicism, fails to solve the very problems he has diagnosed. I judge that Strauss in the end describes Nietzsche as part of the third wave of modernity and as responsible for the crisis of our time.

Strauss’s critique of the standards of modernity is startlingly harsh. Strauss believes that modernity arrives in the history of political philosophy in a series of waves of thought which modify the idea of nature, eroding it and eventually destroying the classical idea of nature. Strauss sees modernity as destructive of the classical form of natural right which to him is intellectually the far superior standard. Strauss views modern political philosophy as inadequate because it presupposes certain particular views of nature (modern natural science) and history (historicism) which he says “prove to be incompatible” with that philosophy (1964, p. 1).
Surveying the first wave of modernity, we find that the attack on classical philosophy by Machiavelli, Bacon and Hobbes attempts the conquest of nature. Maximum control over nature is the goal for these early thinkers, who tended to reduce “the moral and political problem to a technical problem.” They believed nature was the enemy, a chaos to be reduced to order. This wave continues with Locke’s view that nature supplies one with “almost worthless materials;” everything that is good is the product of man’s labor. The political order “is in no way natural;” the state is an “artifact,” the result of “covenants.” Strauss condemns this development as corrosive of the proper use of nature and natural right as a standard for good states. The enlightenment view, especially as elucidated by Kant, is that the ideal is not a natural perfection but is formed by man (Strauss, 1975b, pp. 88, 89). Nietzsche later extends this notion with his will to power.

The second wave of modernity was inaugurated by Rousseau who thinks that “man in the state of nature is sub-human or pre-human.” Man’s rationality is only an acquired trait, caused not by nature but by a long historical process. Denial of the importance of rationality to the nature of man is later amplified by Nietzsche, and a result of Rousseau’s and Nietzsche’s analysis human nature is seen as “wholly insufficient to give man any guidance,” (Strauss, 1975b, p. 90) yielding a crisis in the second wave of modern political thought.

The third wave of modernity, according to Strauss, occurs with Nietzsche, in whom political philosophy reaches its second and final crisis, “the crisis of our time” (1953, pp. 26, 253; 1959, pp. 54-55). Nietzsche not only rejects nature as a standard for political order, he also rejects procedures for achieving proper political order. The classical solution, says Strauss, had supplied a “stable standard” by which one could judge actual existent regimes. However, modern solutions, including that of Nietzsche, destroy “the very idea of a standard that is independent of actual situations” (Strauss, 1959, p. 225).

The modern solution emphasizes tolerance which, in extreme twentieth century forms, eventually means the “abandonment of all standards” (Strauss, 1968a, p. 63). Strauss is harshly critical of modern philosophy, which he thinks degenerates into positivism and radical historicism. By historicism, Strauss means the modern doctrine that all knowledge is limited by its historical situation and that, since all ideas are relative to definite historical situations, they are not meaningful beyond that situation. Thus, no transcendent standard of judgement is possible. The modern solution is “utopian in the sense that its actualization is impossible” (Strauss, 1968b, 225) because there are built-in, insurmountable theoretical conflicts within modernity.

There is some justification for ascribing to Strauss a large measure of intellectual debt to Nietzsche. Strauss described Nietzsche as “the philosopher of relativism” who had faced its intellectual problems and “pointed the way in which relativism can be overcome” (Strauss, 1989, p. 24). However, in Strauss’s
Commonwealth

opinion, Nietzsche did no more than point the way; he did not reach some standard of nature. After steering Strauss "towards the supremacy of nature" Nietzsche inconsistently "bypasse[d] the supremacy of reason" and, misunderstanding the nature of man, did not find the stable standard which nature could supply (Strauss, 1989, p. 26).

Both Nietzsche and Strauss are justly regarded as severe critics of modern life, culture and philosophy. For example, both agree that there is a crisis in modern liberalism and that the crisis consists in liberalism’s loss of confidence in itself (Strauss, 1975b, pp. 81, 98). Further, Strauss agrees with Nietzsche that science, the up-to-date aesthetic ideal, does not supply any meaning for life, because science is unable to give an adequate theoretical or philosophical defense of itself. A general process of democratization in the modern world has encouraged scholars and scientists to declare their independence from philosophy. Both thinkers recognize this attempt at independence from philosophy as a disaster (Strauss, 1967, I: p. 2, IV: p. 4, VIII: p. 5, IX: pp. 2-3, XVI: p. 14).

Both provide radical criticisms of the culture and stature of modern man. Nietzsche in particular talks about the danger of the last man, by which he means the most degraded individual, the individual with no soul. Strauss also sees philosophical and intellectual problems with modern culture. The degradation after the last wave of change in modern philosophy is, for Strauss, evidenced by its descent into positivism and historicism (Strauss, 1975b, pp. 81-83; 1953, p. 34). Strauss appears to have been influenced by Nietzsche’s rejection of the modern world. However, Strauss finds Nietzsche’s understanding deficient in that Nietzsche did not complete his vision with a classical conception of nature and of truth (Strauss, 1983, p. 145; 1967, IX: p. 6, X: p. 8; II: p. 3; 1953, pp. 34, 252-3, 320-1; 1975b, p. 94; 1959, p. 241).

Both agreed philosophy had become politicized during the period of the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. Even Nietzsche saw that the politicization of philosophy was in large part at the root of our troubles as he criticized the writings of all previous philosophers for having been motivated by a will to power rather than a will to understand (Strauss, 1953, p. 34). However, Nietzsche’s own philosophy of the will to power leaves modern society in the same tangled web of politicization, degeneracy, and arbitrarily shifting standards in which he found it.

Both Nietzsche and Strauss attacked nineteenth century historicist thinking as destructive of horizons or comprehensive views. Because people live in a protective atmosphere that is opinion-based, cultural and religious (Strauss, 1953, p. 26), such historicism undermines the foundation of human community by asserting the relativity of comprehensive views, thus deprecating their value and destroying the protective atmosphere for life and for culture.

However, Nietzsche’s critique of modernity fails to evade the defects of modernity it has discovered. Modernity at its beginning understood itself “in
Gordon J. Tolle

contradistinction to antiquity." In Strauss's view, Nietzsche's thought is in the third wave of modernity, fundamentally part of the modern project and not part of premodern philosophy (Strauss, 1975b, pp. 93, 94). Strauss claims this third wave of modernity involves a new understanding of the sentiment of existence; it involves the sense "of terror and anguish rather than of harmony and peace" and it regards man's "historic existence as necessarily tragic." Strauss views the era from Rousseau through Nietzsche as "the age of an historical sense" (Strauss, 1975b, 94, 95). In the end, Nietzsche is found to possess the historicist vision which Strauss so roundly condemns (1953, p. 26 and generally chapter 1).

Strauss thinks that because "modern western man no longer knows what he wants" and "no longer believes that he can know what is good and bad," modernity faces a philosophical crisis. To him, Nietzsche's critique of modernity sees society as in a "new situation" which calls for a "new nobility," that "of the over-men" (Strauss, 1975b, pp. 81, 82; 1983, p. 33; 1967, XIII: 5). Nietzsche believes the modern situation is a period of the "greatest danger" and, therefore, of the "greatest hope" for the superman of the future (Strauss, 1983, p. 33).

Strauss, on the other hand, thinks the human situation in this century has not essentially changed from the time of Plato, and the solution is to go back to conceptions of nobility developed in classical antiquity. Although there has been much degradation of modern humanity, there will always be a few persons who will distinguish themselves as philosophers.

Rather than calling for the transfiguration of mankind, Strauss instead suggests that the one thing needed is much more modest: the coaxing and training of potential philosophers toward philosophy as it was traditionally understood -- the philosophy of the Platonic Socrates. Like Nietzsche, Strauss preaches against the degeneracy in modern culture, but he sees the roots of the problem in "modern political philosophy," which he thinks includes Nietzsche. Strauss's concern is to turn modern life away from barbarization and toward an aristocratic noble-souled philosophy as found in ancient Greece (Strauss, 1975b, p. 82; 1968b, p. 63).

Nietzsche's criticism suggested a way to overcome the crisis in modernity, but Strauss thinks Nietzsche ultimately remained part of that crisis (Strauss, 1983, p. 185; 1967, IX: p. 6, X: p. 8, II: p. 3; 1953, pp. 34, 252-253, 320-321; 1975b, p. 94; 1959, p. 241). This is because Nietzsche's critique contained within it no adequate solution, as he provides no standards, neither from history nor from nature, which point to how we can get out of our current situation.

Nietzsche "committed the fatal mistake," says Strauss, of "ignoring the essential difference between intellectuals and philosophers." The latter pursue truth and wisdom, while intellectuals merely manipulate ideas without any necessary commitment to some intrinsic value. When Nietzsche criticized previous philosophers, he was actually criticizing intellectuals, and thus showing an ignorance of true philosophy as Strauss understands it. Therefore, Nietzsche's revolt against modernity was, from Strauss's viewpoint, a flawed attempt at a

Classical Nobility as a Standard

Strauss was preoccupied with the classics and derived his conception of natural right from the classical idea of nobility. His attempt to focus attention on understanding classical philosophers and to resurrect the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, is intended to help us do our own philosophizing by helping purge us of beliefs which obstruct our understanding.

Strauss does not believe that a simple "return to premodern philosophy" is possible. His "revitalization" of classical philosophy is "meant as a correction for the specific shortcomings of the modern mind." The primary shortcoming is the attack on philosophy by historicism. Because modern society regards the idea of philosophy, or a final account of the whole, as "untenable," it has lost the original understanding of philosophy. Because of its belief that modern thought is "superior to the thought of the past" Strauss's return to classical political philosophy is "tentative or experimental," and his views cannot be used as "recipes for today's use." The study of classical thought must lead to a "revitalization" of philosophy as the search for wisdom (Strauss, 1968a, p. 257; 1952, pp. 157-158; 1964, pp. 10-11; 1946b, p. 332; 1953, pp. 10, 22-25; Tarcov, 1983, pp. 7-9).

Strauss grounds his idea of nobility on the observation that for the classics, political philosophy was related very directly to political life, starting with what the contending (pre-philosophic) factions and politicians say. To them, seeing that "a certain habitual attitude" or act is praised, is "a sufficient reason for considering that attitude, or way of acting, a virtue" (1975a, pp. 59, 78). The classical conception of nobility emerged without a philosophic tradition to mediate it, without historicism to distort evidence of "these experiences" (1953, pp. 31-32).

Strauss understands humans and human nature as in need of the excellent and noble. In his view, we admire excellence in things without regard to particular personal benefits. Some things "are admirable, or noble, by nature, intrinsically" (1953, p. 128; see Tarcov, 1983, p. 29). Because this is the case, there is no reason to despair even when we live in very harsh or cruel circumstances. As long as human nature is not completely crushed or extinguished, there will always be those "who will revolt against a state which is destructive of humanity." Human nature simply demands the possibility of nobility, excellence, greatness. "There is something in man which" involves "the desire for the genuine, for the noble, for the great" (1968b, pp. 223-224; 1960, p. 22).

While Strauss and Nietzsche both advocate striving for nobility, only Strauss derives his standard of nobility from the classical understanding of the nature of man. Strauss, but not Nietzsche, wholeheartedly agrees with the classics.
that a "natural human good," built into man's "natural constitution," provides the basis for right or correct action. For Strauss, the good life would consist in man's acting in accordance with this natural order: "the good life is the perfection of man's nature," "the life that flows from a well-ordered or healthy soul" (1953, p. 127). Built into human nature is a "hierarchy" of goals or ends for human actions. This universally valid set of goals or ends is all that can be described, however. "There are no universally valid rules of action" (1953, p. 162) because the circumstances in which individuals act will vary greatly. This hierarchy of ends or goals sets both restraints or limits on man, and points to the direction of achievements and rewards.

The establishment of "modern" norms required a changed view of human nature: modernity, as with Machiavelli and Nietzsche, "understands man in the light of the sub-human" or beastial. Strauss grounds his norms in the classical view that humans take their bearings by their potentialities, the perfecting of man's nature. If there were to be a set of rules "circumscribing the general character of the good life," those rules could be called "the natural law," says Strauss (1969, pp. 295-297; 1983, p. 185; 1953, p. 127; 1964, p. 44).

This view, that there emphatically is a natural hierarchy of ways of life, is at the heart of Strauss's doctrine of natural right (1953, pp. 127, 162). Thus the way of life of the philosopher is higher than that of the manual laborer and artisan, and Strauss recognizes these different ways of life in terms of a hierarchy of ends found in the order of the soul. The method by which the Straussian "natural right" hierarchy is found, the Socratic dialectic, discovers that the things that are higher are, by nature, right (Strauss, 1964, pp. 38, 44; 1959, p. 91; 1953, pp. 162-163; Tarcov and Pangle, 1987, p. 924). This hierarchy of goals consists in qualities of human character and in the actions or exercise of those qualities. This Straussian natural right position is consistent with his further agreement with the classics that only the few are capable of being philosophers.

Both Nietzsche and Strauss are critics of modern society and culture; both, in part, look to classical Greece for material from which to construct a standard by which they will judge particular societies. Strauss believes Nietzsche, at least in part, looks back to Plato and the classics when Nietzsche calls for a new nobility, the nobility of the overman. When Nietzsche appreciates nobility or greatness, what he is really admiring is the greatness "of what man once was" and is not now, says Strauss (1983, p. 179). Further, Nietzsche's fundamental concept of the will to power includes an understanding of a human being who is "strong and healthy" and who is not merely concerned with self-preservation but rather with "self-heightening," involving an understanding of a hierarchy of the various types (Strauss, 1967, IV: p. 11, X: p. 3; 1959, p. 54).

Strauss apparently agrees with Nietzsche that the world needs even the least intelligent, and in Strauss's words the "almost skunkish ones" are "to be present for the sake of completeness and overall beauty which requires the ugliness
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of parts” (1957a). And Nietzsche follows the classics in asserting that human greatness requires “harshness of limitation” and placing philosophy and the philosopher at the “peak” of human existence. For Nietzsche “the complement ist man,” a philosopher, is the one in whom all “the rest of existence is justified” (Strauss, 1983, pp. 32, 187).

Yet Strauss asserts that while Nietzsche needed the Platonic notion of a natural hierarchy, his connection with historical consciousness prevented him from accepting all of the Platonic view of nature. Nietzsche hoped that his writings “would tempt the best men” to become their true selves and thus to form a new nobility which would rule the planet. Nietzsche’s “overcoming” meant to overcome the highest that had previously existed (Strauss, 1967, IX: p. 2, XVII: pp. 15, 16; 1968a, p. 236; 1959, p. 54). However, the highest class for Nietzsche contains very individualistic personalities. In contrast to the classical view, Nietzsche asserted that there would be radical differences of character or personalities among that highest class. Strauss, on the other hand, reflects the classical understanding of nobility, and thinks a natural standard unites those in the highest group.

Furthermore, Strauss thinks Nietzsche decisively undermines the classical idea of philosophy. Classical philosophy was “theoretical,” but Nietzsche’s philosophy of the future is distinguished by the fact that it is more action oriented: “it is consciously the outcome of a will.” Nietzsche’s philosophizing is based on a fundamental awareness which is not purely theoretical, but is “inseparable from an act of will or a decision” (Strauss, 1968a, p. 237). This belief significantly distinguishes Nietzsche from Strauss, who understands philosophy as purely theoretical in the Platonic sense (Strauss, 1959, pp. 11-12), and for whom Nietzsche cannot be the thinker who “replaces Plato” as the philosopher.

Nietzsche is dramatically at odds with the classics on the vision of the nature of man. For Nietzsche there is no such thing as a nature of man and there are no natural ends of man. He demonstrates this to Strauss in a vivid way by his “denial of any cardinal difference between man and brute.” In Nietzsche’s new philosophy, “the most spiritualized will to power” consists not in following or maintaining harmony with nature but in “prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be.” Strauss believes Nietzsche’s “nature has become a problem” because “man is conquering nature and there are no assignable limits to that conquest” (Strauss, 1983, pp. 185, 189, 190). In denying natural standards, Nietzsche’s “new nobility” loses sight of the fundamental experience of nature upon which classical nobility is based, and therefore Strauss criticizes Nietzsche’s modern understanding of nature as responsible for the crisis of our time.

Morality and Justice

The thought of Strauss has been interpreted by some scholars as asserting
the view that "justice is a fabrication, a ... convention". This view is partially true, but it clouds Strauss's distinction between the justice of the city (conventional or citizen justice) and "genuine justice," the standard found by the philosopher to inhere in the nature of things. For Strauss, contractually-established (conventional) justice is based on a "fictitious" argument and is found in all communities because actual cities are inferior to the philosopher's natural right. Strauss thinks wisdom entails full awareness of the natural order of things, from superior to inferior rank. He views wise actions as those responsive to the superior rank in nature. While Drury is correct that Strauss does not believe this natural hierarchy can be reduced to a set of "laws" or moral rules for conduct, she is unwarranted in concluding that this hierarchy provides no moral standard for evaluating action (Drury, 1988, pp. 77, 105, 168; Strauss, 1953, pp. 107, 119, 153, 162, 163; 1964, pp. 87, 102-103).

Strauss uses the word "morality" in at least two different senses: one is the vulgar morality of the city (which is found reducible to general rules) and a second is the philosopher's morality (the natural hierarchy of value which cannot be reduced to a set of rules). Morality in its first (vulgar) meaning is used in the way Nietzsche uses it: morality as the non-philosophic or non-thinking acceptance of the (moral) standards of a particular community. Strauss also uses "morality" in a second sense when he questions whether justice and morality as "they are required for the sake of the philosophic life" are the same as "justice and morality as commonly understood." Strauss's higher philosophic "morality," the philosopher's standard, clearly transcends the dimension of morality as understood politically (1953, pp. 151-152; 1946a, p. 3).

Strauss's model for the role of philosopher with respect to justice and morality is Farabi's description of Plato's advocacy of the replacement of the philosopher-king by "the secret kingship of the philosopher," who, as a private individual, seeks "to humanize the city within the limits of the possible." Yet this replacement of accepted opinions would not be gradual "if it were not accompanied by a provisional acceptance of accepted opinions." For this reason, philosophy, including Strauss's, must accept some mass opinions of the community. Laws require the consent of willing subjects and therefore always require a compromise between the power of the ruler and that of the ruled, or a "compromise between wisdom and folly." Moderation will help safeguard both philosophy and the city so that neither will injure the other (1952, p. 17; 1953, p. 152; see also Gourevitch, 1968, p. 302).

Strauss agrees with Nietzsche's critique of citizen morality and thinks with Nietzsche that each society has a horizon which is based in opinion and religion that is necessary for its survival. Strauss, like Nietzsche, believes that philosophers are able to see through the myths of mass opinion, such as the notion that the state is good and legitimate if the citizens agreed to its establishment (conventionalism). But Strauss does not agree with Nietzsche that the philosopher
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must trumpet his extreme skepticism about the intellectual adequacy of citizen morality. In Strauss’s view, true philosophers, like Plato, are not so stupid as to provoke mass doubt and lack of moderation, for doing so would destroy civilized social life (see Holmes, 1989, p. 1320).

Strauss advocates a solution which “removes a vast mass of evil without shocking a vast mass of prejudice.” His natural right, while by itself “insufficient for guiding our actions” because it cannot be reduced to a set of rules or formula, is nevertheless “universally valid” and by itself “sufficient for passing judgement on the level of nobility of individuals and groups and of actions and institutions.” Strauss wants to raise the level of a community’s character toward the demands of natural right without “dynamiting” the society, without destroying the consent of the community for a particular set of rules (Strauss, 1953, pp. 153, 162, 163).

While Strauss, in general, favors moderation, justice and morality, Nietzsche, writing from the perspective of the individual, opposes these values. His writings led his readers to reject the major political ideologies, but after he accomplished that, Strauss says, “he could not show his readers a way toward political responsibility.” In contrast to Strauss, Nietzsche’s philosopher of the future is distinguished by the fact that his effort is not purely theoretical but is the outcome of a will to power. The effect of this effort is that of a “loose cannon” on human affairs. For Nietzsche, everything is permitted because there is no possibility of a natural right, no transcendent standard. This immoderation and lack of natural standards decisively separates Nietzsche from Strauss. Nietzsche was a preacher of immoderation because his analysis leaves no choice, Strauss says, “except that between irresponsible indifference to politics and irresponsible possible options” (Strauss, 1959, p. 55).

Strauss insists upon moderation for political orders and for social action. For Strauss, as for Plato and the Platonic Socrates, the philosopher’s end naturally “demands” the virtues of temperance, moderation and social responsibility. While both Strauss and Nietzsche wanted the radical improvement of individual souls, Nietzsche’s writings, Strauss says, were directed primarily toward “individuals who should revolutionize their own lives.” Yet because there are social and political consequences to Nietzsche’s thought, his views pointed to immoderation and irresponsibility (Strauss, 1967, XV: pp. 9-10; 1959, p. 54; 1975b, p. 98; Detwiler, 1990, passim).

Thus Strauss, contra Nietzsche, claims that moderation, morality and justice of the community are desirable. At the same time he also regards these qualities as of lower status than his standard of natural right. And while occasional statements by Strauss appear supportive of he position of Nietzsche (i.e., “in extreme situations the normally valid rules of natural right are justly changed”) Strauss regards Nietzsche’s analysis of public affairs as ultimately quite defective because it is fundamentally grounded in “the demands of the extreme situation’’ and it denies there is a “proper order of the soul.”
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Strauss claims that, while it is necessary to have special rules for extreme situations in order to insure the survival of the community, survival most of the time (in normal situations) is nowhere near the highest end or goal of the state. The example Strauss regards as an obvious case is that of "noble statesmen" who "are not blamed for actions which under normal conditions would be unjust." In Strauss's view, contra Nietzsche and pro Plato, it is "only" in extreme situations "that the public safety is the highest law," and this fact is "justly covered" with a "veil" (1957b, p. 4; 1953, p. 160). Strauss thinks the standards of virtue of a community serve to push citizens toward a higher end than mere survival; consequently, he teaches that these moral standards should be publicly supported by the philosopher.

Strauss uses his commentary on Machiavelli to criticize the Nietzschean perspective: moral virtue (for Machiavelli and Nietzsche) has "no other source" than society; "it has no second and higher source in the needs of the mind" or in human nature. Yet this second, higher source of morality is ultimately central to Strauss's own philosophy. Strauss concludes that the Machiavelli/Nietzsche position does not, and cannot, assert that moral virtue is a "requirement of philosophy or of the life of the mind." As a result, this modern position is "unable to give a clear account" of itself (Strauss, 1953, pp. 145-146, 160, 162; 1969, p. 294), while Strauss thinks both he and the classical philosophers can. Their standards are found in nature, in a hierarchy within the soul. Strauss argues this "universally valid hierarchy of ends" serves as the ultimate standard (1953, p. 162).

Strauss's claim that "the man who is merely just or moral without being a philosopher appears as a mutilated human being," appears very close to Nietzsche's thought. Yet Strauss is not condemning the moral life; rather, he is demonstrating the way in which (citizen) morality is incomplete. The person who is merely moral has not reached the highest, natural human potential, for while Strauss regards the moral virtue of the community (though vulgar) as a standard for most people and places a higher value on this vulgar virtue than on public opinion, it only occupies a middle position which shows the way to a higher and philosophic life based on natural right for all those capable of pursuing it (Strauss, 1953, p. 151; 1959, p. 36).

So, whereas in Nietzsche's thought moral virtue and justice are not pursued for their own sakes, for Strauss "justice and moral virtue in general can be fully legitimated only by the fact that they are required" for the sake of the ultimate end of human life, that is, they are fully legitimated only because they are the "conditions of the philosophic life" (1953, p. 151; italics added).

Strauss regards Nietzsche as "responsible for the emergence of German nihilism." For Nietzsche, "man derives enjoyment from overpowering others as well as himself." Nietzsche's vision of proper action for the individual is a vision of "cruel" action. Nietzsche "points most emphatically toward himself" and/or
toward the individual, but Strauss points away from himself and toward eternal things or toward the city, duty and public responsibility. Strauss advocates just action both on the individual and political levels (1941, p. 23; 1975b, pp. 97-98; 1983, p. 174).

Nietzsche favors the individual who despises the morality of contemporary society, and he advocates the creative change of its moral standards. Each individual creates his own morality, a moral standard valid only for that particular individual. So if morality is simply the following of a "rule that is valid for all men," then in this sense, says Strauss, even "Plato and Aristotle are immoralists," because they say that an individual's compliance "with certain rules valid for all men ... does not make man a very impressive figure." Most individuals must follow moral values for the benefit of the society as a whole. For Strauss, the mere following of rules is not what distinguishes the human being (1967, XVII: p. 11).

There is yet another fundamental difference between the views of Nietzsche and Strauss on morality. Nietzsche views moral judgments as fundamentally irrational, the result of the will to power of that particular individual. The individual simply claims or accepts them; they are not built into nature as standards to be followed. By contrast, Strauss views moral rules as having a high degree of rationality, though not as much as his yet higher standard of natural right (1983, pp. 182-183, 185, 189).

Nietzsche advocates immoderation and immorality based on his analysis of modern man and modern culture. This is a situation of the greatest "exposedness" of man and the "moment of the greatest danger." It is also, thinks Nietzsche, the moment of the "greatest hope," containing "the possibility of surpassing and overcoming all previous human types" (Strauss, 1983, p. 33; 1967, II: p. 4). The presence of this greatest danger is for Nietzsche the reason why he advocates immoderate action. However, Strauss sees a stability and intransigence in the nature of man, does not see the same level of exposedness, and therefore does not have Nietzsche's reason for recommending immoderation.

The two philosophers are completely at odds concerning the role of morality among masses of people organized politically. For Nietzsche's modern understanding of man's ethical position, "man differs from the brutes not by his rationality, but by his exposedness" (Strauss, 1967, II: p. 4). Therefore, Nietzsche castigates citizen morality and asks the individual to creatively exercise the will to power.

Strauss notes that Nietzsche's call to creativity and authenticity is "addressed to individuals" and in one sense the "political use of Nietzsche" misses the main thrust of the latter's work because he did not intend to provide prescriptions for society. At the same time, analysis of Nietzsche's ideas on society and politics suggests that his doctrines have profoundly destabilizing social and political consequences (Strauss, 1959, p. 54; 1975b, p. 98).
Conclusion

There are many similarities between Strauss and Nietzsche. Both criticize modernity for its egalitarianism and mediocrity. They both advocate an alternative vision of nobility and aristocratic society. They are concerned with the hierarchical ordering of men.

Yet Strauss believes he has broken decisively with Nietzschean thought. Strauss's mature life work dealt with the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. At first glance, Nietzsche appears to straddle that gulf, asserting both an admiration for the noble heroism of the ancients and warmly embracing an extremely modern perspectivism. Only by understanding Strauss's ultimate rejection of Nietzsche can one understand the consistency in Strauss's critique of modernity. Despite contrary appearances, Strauss and Nietzsche do not share the same extremely skeptical view of the world. Nietzsche's skepticism ends in an intellectual's extreme perspectivism; there are no transcendent standards. By contrast, Strauss's skepticism travels via a philosopher's dialectic (he thinks Nietzsche is confused about the difference between an intellectual and a philosopher) and ends up with a "natural right" and a hierarchy of ends (or values) in nature which provides all one needs in the way of a standard of judgement. Strauss has an extreme skepticism with regard to the method of achieving wisdom, but not with regard to the ability of some to discover the existence of that superior standard, natural right.

Strauss thinks Nietzsche's reliance on the classical view of nobility is contradictory because Nietzsche does not agree with the classical emphasis on a permanent human nature and natural standards of right. Strauss sees Nietzsche as having been unable to extricate himself from the trap of modern standards. The modern view includes historicism and Strauss sees Nietzsche as having adopted its fundamental premise.

Further, Strauss sees a very large gap between himself and Nietzsche on the status of citizen justice and morality. For Nietzsche, morality is evidence of the degeneracy of Western civilization. Strauss believes the average citizen does not think philosophically and therefore needs a conventional right (supported by religion or accepted public opinion). He regards citizen morality as beneficial, productive of decency, community, civilization; yet the existence of Strauss's higher standard of natural right gives citizen morality a middle position pointing the way toward the philosopher's standard of judgement. In contrast, Strauss sees Nietzsche as advocating immoral perspectives and favoring the individual who despises the morality of society.

In sum, Strauss sees the differences between himself and Nietzsche as fundamental, and believes his break with Nietzsche is a move from muddle-headedness to philosophy. For Strauss, the glaring philosophic defects of perspectivism are ultimately disastrous. Although Strauss considered Nietzsche
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one of the most powerful thinkers of the modern period, he regarded Nietzsche’s thought as containing fundamental flaws. Strauss was ultimately willing to hold Nietzsche responsible for the crisis of our time, the crisis of modernity.

Notes

The author wishes to thank: Ruth Jones, Arizona State University, and Herbert Cheever, South Dakota State University, for supporting my research; Joseph Cropsey, University of Chicago, for permission to consult the “Leo Strauss Papers”; Donald Tannenbaum for editorial help; and an anonymous Commonwealth reviewer for helpful critical comments and questions.

1. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the fact that there are other interpretations of Nietzsche, or that Nietzsche may have meant something different from Strauss’s interpretation, because this paper aims to show how Strauss has broken with Nietzsche as understood by Strauss. Furthermore, while some have simplistically described Strauss’s work as writing in codes (e.g., Burnyeat, 1985, pp. 32-34), the core of Strauss’s teaching is not about the rules for the art of writing. Though he wrote on the problem of esoteric writing (Strauss, 1952, pp. 22-37; 1986; pp. 51-59), Strauss did not mistake the method of presentation for the message itself.

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Agenda Setting and the Asbestos Issue:  
The Media Role in Issue Definition

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Research on agenda setting suggests awareness of issues, discussion of particular issue topics, and identification of issues of current concern all tend to follow treatment of those issues in the media. Such research also contends that media attention to problems rises and falls independent of the severity of the problem. This study of the asbestos issue examines both the association between media definition of an issue and appearance of the issue on the public policy agenda, and the correspondence between background conditions and media issue attention. Results suggest qualified support for an issue redefinition hypothesis: replacement of one issue definition with another definition by the media is related to changes in issue publicity and issue agenda status. A second, media independence hypothesis, that media attention is only loosely associated with prevailing background conditions, was supported during both the rise and fall of the asbestos issue.

The primary purpose of this project is to examine the relationship between public awareness, media content, and the public policy agenda. Under a democratic government we expect a correspondence between the wants of the people and the deeds of the government: an opinion-policy congruence (Page and Shapiro, 1983). We also expect a demand model of public policy making, where the public’s agenda establishes the policy agenda, and the media serves to channel the communication flow between governed and governor.

Agenda setting research suggests that this traditional demand-driven model of public policy agenda setting is supplanted by a media-driven model, wherein citizen agendas are largely set by the media, and neither media priorities nor audience awareness are especially attuned to objective conditions (Nimmo and Combs, 1990). Public awareness of issues, discussion of particular issue topics, and identification of issues of current concern tend to follow treatment of those issues in the media more than they follow from direct observation (Bennett, 1988; Dearing, 1989).
It has also been found that media attention to problems rises and falls independent of the severity of the problem. Background conditions (the prevailing environmental, sociological, and economic conditions associated with the problem) could actually improve prior to their becoming the focus of media attention; or conditions could continue to worsen yet no longer receive media coverage. In addition, when objective conditions and media coverage diverge, public response is consistent with media coverage. It rises and falls with it (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).

Among the many complex relationships between public awareness, media content, and the public policy agenda, one particularly interesting aspect is the association between the media definition of an issue and the appearance of the issue on the public policy agenda. Although instant public and media attention is sometimes captured when a triggering or focus event such as a major disaster occurs, more often media discovery of an issue follows when powerful symbols are used to portray a problem.

Without media publicity, an issue is unlikely to successfully reach the public policy agenda. Even after media attention is captured, a possible issue redefinition can result in issue substitution or displacement. The substitution of one definition by another changes issue visibility and will affect the likelihood that the issue will gain public policy agenda status. The phenomena of sudden issue appearances and disappearances in the media has been referred to as an issue-attention cycle. Within the cycle, the media publicize an issue when a pre-problem stage is replaced by a stage of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm. When a stage of cost realization sets in, the media tend to lose interest and the issue goes into a stage of gradual decline (Qualter, 1989). The assumptions are that the media defines the issue for the public, and quite possibly for the policy agenda, and that media attention to the issue is only loosely associated with prevailing background conditions.

The preceding assumptions lead to two research hypotheses: 1) The replacement of one issue definition by another will be associated with changes in issue publicity and therefore in issue agenda status; and 2) Media attention to an issue is only loosely associated with prevailing background conditions and will rise and fall independent of them.

Research Design

In this paper I explore both hypotheses as they operated in one contemporary case: the debate over governmental compensation for asbestos victims. As part of the more diffuse asbestos issue, asbestos victim compensation contains all the necessary elements.

Thirty years ago occupational disability due to asbestos exposure was barely recognized. Disabled employees and their dependents were usually left to
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their own resources. Since 1969 Congress has dealt with asbestos as a health hazard and as an environmental contaminant. Every aspect of the asbestos industry has been regulated, from extraction to finished product distribution and consumer product safety. Programs and funding for technical assistance in the identification, containment, and/or removal of asbestos from public and private buildings have been established. Today compensation claims for asbestos-related occupational disability inundate workmen’s compensation systems, clog the courts, and are demanded as rights within the American tradition of equity. Yet to date, no Health Hazard Compensation Act has been passed. Thus, Asbestos Victim Compensation is an issue that has undergone alteration and redefinition over time.

The publicity accorded the asbestos issue will be operationalized through a content analysis based on frequency counts of citations in four media indexes. With between 68 and 80 percent of adults reading a newspaper on an average day, (Jeffres, 1986) it is likely that readers will be either directly exposed to an issue or exposed through a process of information diffusion. Agenda status reflects both legislation introduced and legislation passed. Background conditions include both economic and epidemiologic indicators.

Background Conditions

The general public is well acquainted with asbestos use in consumer products. Daily life in an industrialized society means exposure to asbestos in some form on a regular basis. A naturally occurring mineral with over 3,000 commercial uses, asbestos products have been available throughout the 20th century. As Chart 1 shows, use of asbestos in the United States dramatically increased as a result of wartime mobilization in the 1940’s. Following the war, economic prosperity led to its increased use, and asbestos consumption doubled in the 1943 to 1953 decade, peaking in 1973. In that year over 883,000 tons of asbestos were consumed. During the decades following 1973, asbestos consumption dropped at a rate of approximately 100,000 tons a year to the current rate of 71,354 tons in 1988 (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1933-1988). (See Chart 1 p. 19)

There are, however, populations that experience considerably greater exposure levels. Individuals employed in asbestos industries and as end-product users are exposed daily to high concentrations of asbestos dust. It is estimated that between 1940 and 1980 as many as 27.5 million workers were engaged in primary and secondary asbestos manufacturing in shipyards, construction, motor vehicle assembly, and other work that involved significant asbestos exposures (Asbestos Litigation Reporter, 1982, p. 5176). In the 1940’s over 4.5 million workers were employed in the wartime shipyards alone (Selikoff, 1981, p. 109). By 1976, just one employee group, the International Association of Heat, Frost, Insulators and Asbestos Workers had a membership of 17,800 (Asbestos Worker, 1976). When
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the Johns-Manville Corporation, the largest American asbestos manufacturer, with $2.5 billion in assets, filed for bankruptcy in 1982, it had 25,000 employees, and over 50 factories and mines throughout the U.S. and Canada (New York Times, 1982, pp 4-5).

**CHART 1. CONSUMPTION OF ASBESTOS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1923-1986**

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a In Thousands of short tons: Production plus imports, minus exports and adjustments in government and industrial stocks.


In 1984 the Environmental Protection Agency announced the presence of asbestos in over 700,000 government, residential, and commercial buildings (200,000 homes in one California county alone). It also noted the presence of asbestos in over 3,100 schools with approximately 15 million students and some 1.4 million teachers (Brodeur, 1985, p. 68).

Once thought of as a “miracle mineral”, the manufacturing, insurance, medical, and governmental health service communities became aware of health hazards associated with asbestos processing at least five decades ago. Beginning in 1914, and with increasing regularity after 1926, medical literature carried articles on asbestos associated diseases and deaths. (See Table 1, p. 22)

There are three specific diseases that have been directly linked with the inhalation of asbestos fibers: asbestosis, an incurable and irreversible pulmonary disease; lung cancer; and mesothelioma, a rare and fatal cancer of the pleural mesothelium. Conclusions drawn from medical data predict the likely incidence rate of asbestosis will exceed 50 percent among those occupationally exposed over 20 years (Selikoff & Lee, 1978). For certain occupational exposures such as shipyard and insulation workers, ten to 18 percent will die of asbestosis, 35 percent of lung cancer, and 15 percent of mesothelioma (Selikoff, 1981, p.109). With estimates of the occupationally exposed population exceeding 27 million, predictions
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of asbestos-related disabilities and deaths for that population alone range from 154,000 to 450,000 between 1982 and 2015 (Rand Corporation, 1983, p. 9). Those estimates include between 8,500 to 12,000 excess deaths per year due to asbestos exposure in schools.

Asbestos-related disabilities and deaths have been reported in every state, but are not randomly distributed. Counties where shipbuilding or factories producing asbestos products are located are associated with statistically significant increases in mesothelioma mortalities (Connelly et al., 1987, p. 1053).

The number of individuals experiencing asbestos-related diseases, disabilities, and death grew, and by the 1980s affected millions of asbestos workers and their families. Although the National Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 identified asbestos as a hazardous substance and in 1978 the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare declared a national health alert on the hazards of asbestos, disabled workers and/or their dependents were still forced to turn to workmen's compensation, social security, or welfare for financial assistance. Furthermore, benefit application procedures were slow and awards minimal. Less than half of the disabled workers ever received workmen's compensation awards (Selikoff, 1981, p. 67).

Workers filed thousands of product liability lawsuits against the manufacturers of asbestos products. The first third party product liability lawsuit in which a disabled asbestos worker successfully sued an asbestos manufacturer was decided in 1971. The number of similar lawsuits grew steadily, to 16,500 in 1981 and 24,000 by 1982. By 1982 lawsuits had been filed in 48 states, and they were being filed at the rate of 500 per month. By the end of 1982 asbestos manufacturers and their insurers had paid $400 million to claimants (Rand Corporation, 1983, p. vii). In 1983 there were 16,000 pending cases. By 1984 there were 25,000 (New York Times, 1984, p. 31). By 1990 the number had grown to 90,000 (Wall Street Journal, 1990, p. C3). The insurance industry expects between 83,000 and 178,000 additional claims by the year 2010. Estimates of industry costs for future compensation payments range from $8 to $87 billion, with the most probable estimate in the range of $38 billion (Rand Corporation, 1983, p. 9).

All objective indicators suggest highly visible background conditions. Millions of American workers were exposed in the workplace. Additional millions of Americans consumed asbestos products. Experts warned of the dangers of working with asbestos, living with asbestos, or going to school in asbestos insulated school buildings. Asbestos was repeatedly identified as a hazardous substance. Asbestos removal from public buildings was mandated, spurring a new industry (abatement), and leading to thousands of additional lawsuits for property damages. Lawsuits created a judicial logjam, and resulted in the 1982 bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville Corporation. Whether economic, physical, or commercial, some aspect of the asbestos issue was present in every arena of American life.
Asbestos Issue Visibility

As noted above, asbestos issue visibility will be measured by frequency counts of citations referencing the subject "asbestos" in four media indexes. The four indexes chosen reach both specialized and general interest audiences, the reading and the viewing public. Frequency counts of citations in an index provide a measure of the publicity accorded an issue, and are a reasonable approximation of public awareness of an issue (Donnelly, 1982, p. 14). A dramatic increase in the number of citations indicates a corresponding increase in issue visibility.

This study used data for the years 1900 through 1989 for a number of reasons. Methodologically, it provides a sufficiently broad time frame across which to test the hypotheses. Thus, the period since 1900 was a time of rapid industrial expansion which includes that of the asbestos industry, as well as a major expansion of "scientific" medical knowledge about asbestos hazards. Further, the issue of asbestos victim compensation both appears and recedes during this period.

Members of the medical community were among the first to identify a possible asbestos problem, and the professional journals in which they published were regularly monitored by the media as possible sources for news stories. To measure the level of publicity the asbestos issue received in the professional and scientific press, the Cumulated Index Medicus was examined. As can be seen from Table 1, there were only four citations between 1900 and 1926. The number of citations, although more numerous, remained consistently low until 1960. During the 1960's the number of citations began to run in double digits every year: the medical community had discovered the asbestos issue. The citation count remained consistently high, running into triple digits during the 1970's and 1980's. (See Table 1, p. 22)

The concept of an elite press wielding considerable influence is widely recognized (Jeffres, 1986; Parenti, 1986) and one, The New York Times, has been shown to have a strong agenda setting effect (Donnelly, 1982; Gandy, 1982; Kawar, 1989). It has a weekday circulation of 1,038,829 (Editor & Publisher, 1989), is read by an audience that includes a disproportionate percentage of educated professionals in both private and public sector positions, and by one account was read by 67 percent of U.S. Senators and Congressmen, 83 percent of newspaper editors nationwide, and 96.9 percent of the Washington press corp (Lichter and Rothman, 1981). It is also regularly monitored by other print and broadcast media as a source for news stories. To gauge the amount of publicity the asbestos issue received in an elite press, The New York Times Index was examined for the period 1900 through 1989. Results of The New York Times citation count appear in Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the number of these citations was consistently low for the period 1900 through 1969 (annual mean 3.53), increased between 1970 and 1976 (mean 15.14) as well as 1977 through 1981 (mean 27.83) periods, and peaked with a count of 74 citations in 1982.
Table 1. Asbestos Citations Appearing in Media Indexes 1900-1989

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Sources: New York Times Index, 1900-1989
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, 1900-1989
Cumulated Index Medicus, 1900-1989
Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts, 1968-1989
dropping off during the rest of the decade.

To measure the amount of publicity the asbestos issue received in the general readership print media, the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature was examined. As can be seen from Table 1, the number of citations is consistently low from 1900 through 1977 (annual mean 1.11). There is a noticeably higher citation count per year between 1978 and 1986, and the citation count peaked at 24 in 1986.

To estimate the visibility of an issue to the mass audience, measures deriving from the broadcast media are a more appropriate instrument, and television reaches the broadest possible audience. Over 98 percent of American homes have at least one television (Statistical Abstract, 1990, p. 544). On an average weekday, 84 percent of the adult population watches some television, and 67 percent watch one or more news programs (Jeffres, 1986, p. 123). As the agenda-setting literature demonstrates, television may not influence what an individual thinks about an issue, but it certainly influences which issues an individual thinks about (Qualter, 1989, p. 140).

The Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts, measures television news programming, providing abstracts and subject heading citations of news on the three national networks: NBC, ABC, and CBS. The Vanderbilt Index was examined for the period 1968 (the first year for which it was available) through 1989. As can be seen from Table 1, the asbestos issue received very limited television news coverage. However, even limited publicity in such an immediate medium with a mass audience will serve to increase issue visibility.

Comparing the individual indexes indicates a similar pattern of asbestos issue visibility increase. In the three print media indexes there were relatively few asbestos citations appearing between 1900 and 1959. In 1961 the count in Cumulated Index Medicus showed a sharp rise not found in either The New York Times Index nor the Reader’s Guide, and its citation count remained consistently higher than those in the other print media indexes. Asbestos citation counts in the other three indexes began to increase in the 1970s, and remained mostly higher for the duration of the period under analysis. Examination of the combined asbestos citation count data presented on Table 1 suggests the asbestos issue was considerably more visible to the audience of the professional and scientific press throughout the period than it ever became in the elite, general readership, or television media. The citation count pattern of The New York Times Index more closely parallels the professional and scientific press than do either the general readership or television data.

Media Issue Definition

To examine the issue redefinition hypothesis, media content was determined by a content analysis of The New York Times Index citations for subject
heading "Asbestos". All citations for the years 1969 through 1989 were included in the analysis. This provided a sample of 673 citations for analysis. Further, a classification scheme was developed which included eight subject categories in two groupings.  

Analysis of The New York Times Index citations by subject category reveals a clear pattern of issue redefinition. (See Table 2) In 1969 and before, references to asbestos occurred as Business Information. In 1970 when what was to become the asbestos issue first received increased publicity, all symbols used to portray asbestos were symbols associated with Health. The asbestos issue continued to be portrayed as a Health issue between 1970 and 1976, and coverage of the asbestos issue increased significantly in 1974.

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* See Appendix for standardized group and subject categories.

In 1977 citations in the category Schools appeared and the category Business Information increased dramatically. The two categories Business Information and Schools received equal attention; their combined count equaled the attention the category Health received. Between 1977 and 1979 the asbestos issue continued to be predominantly portrayed as a Health issue, with a more regular inclusion of Business Information regarding the asbestos industry. In 1980 coverage which falls into the categories Litigation and Costs increased. When combined with Business Information, the three economic subject categories soon exceed Health in portraying the asbestos issue. Between 1977 and 1981, as issue redefinition occurred, asbestos issue coverage remained at a fairly constant level.
(mean 19.6), but the asbestos issue was transformed from primarily a health issue to an issue in which the coverage of health was shared with the economic issues of liability claims (Litigation) and financial costs (Costs). The subject Asbestos Victim Compensation appears only infrequently.

Public Policy Agenda

To measure the presence of the asbestos issue on the public policy agenda, the Congressional Information Service Index for the subject heading "Asbestos" was examined. All legislation proposed and passed during the 1969 through 1989 period that either directly or indirectly addressed asbestos was included for analysis.

As can be seen from Table 3, legislation that was enacted into public law between 1969 and 1981 was mostly defined as a health issue. From 1983, most such legislation addressed the economic aspects of asbestos. On the legislative agenda concern for asbestos in the schools took a distinctly economic form, resulting in programs designed specifically for asbestos removal from schools and public buildings.

The issue of compensation for asbestos victims was initially viewed as a

Table 3. Public Policy Agenda for the Asbestos Issue 1969-1989

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Source: Congressional Information Service Index, 1969-1989

*I=Legislation Introduced  P=Legislation Passed
**H=Health  BI=Business Information (Economic)
VC=Victim Compensation (Economic)
S=Schools (Health and Economic)
L=Litigation (Economic)
Commonwealth

matter to be dealt with under existing workmen’s compensation programs, despite extensive evidence of the inadequacies of the workmen’s compensation systems. Over the period 1974-1985 victim compensation was on the public policy agenda. Asbestos workers were included in the National Worker’s Compensation Standardization Act passed in 1979, but no legislation creating a program specifically for compensating asbestos victims resulted.

Proposals for a national program specifically to compensate asbestos victims were introduced in 1977 as the Asbestos Health Hazard Compensation Act, and reintroduced every year through 1982. Each time the bill died in committee. A revised bill, the Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act was introduced in 1982 but it also died in committee. In that same year, however, Congress did pass Joint Resolution 621, declaring Asbestos Victims of America Day. And in 1985 The Asbestos Worker Recovery Act was introduced and hearings were held, but no further action was taken and the bill died in committee. That year the Occupational Disability Compensation Act passed. It included limited provisions for certain asbestos workers, but was not comparable to the earlier asbestos victim legislation packages. Since then, the legislative agenda on this subject reflects only the economic aspects of the asbestos issue.

Conclusion

Examination of both objective indicators of asbestos background conditions and of the media data suggest that the assumption of independence between background conditions and media coverage of those conditions is supported for the asbestos issue. As a comparison between Chart 1 and Table 1 shows, when asbestos consumption was at its highest levels (about 1950-1973), there were few references to it in the media. Even as the issue became increasingly visible in the media, asbestos consumption plummeted: public visibility of the issue grew as the reason for it declined. Further, with one minor exception, elite media “discovery” of asbestos litigation occurred roughly a full decade after the judicial precedent was established. (Table 2)

One final piece of evidence. Media attention to the asbestos issue was not the result of investigative journalism, or some disastrous triggering event. The media did not invent a conceptual framework within which to interpret the multiple indicators existing in the world around them. They publicized information that was initially thrust upon them by activist doctors who had available the increasing amount of evidence published in the specialized sources cited by the Index Medicus.

Between 1979 and 1981 the asbestos issue was transformed from a health to an economic issue. When the “explosion” in publicity concerning the asbestos issue occurred in 1982 it was a major corporation that captured headlines. The
immediate economic costs of bankruptcy, litigation, court settlements, abatement, etc. replaced the potential costs of health impairment and loss of life in the media lexicon.

For most media the 1980s were the period of highest visibility of the asbestos issue. As Table 1 indicates, while Index Medicus coverage of asbestos issues began to increase in the 1960s, and again from 1972, and yet again from 1980, New York Times coverage did not begin to grow meaningfully until the 1970s, when health was a major concern (Table 3), peaking during 1982-1984, and then declining. Reader's Guide citations in the low double digits (with one exception) only began in the 1980s, reaching a high point in 1986, while television citations only reached as high as the low double digits from 1976-1978.

The public policy issue agenda followed the media portrayal. With the exception of one year, legislation concerning asbestos was introduced annually from 1969 to 1988; further, a cluster of bills was passed in 1970 and 1976, and others were approved more gradually in each year between 1979 and 1988 (Table 3). Asbestos was described as a hazardous substance in 1970 legislation. The Secretary of HEW declared a national health alert for it in 1978, the high point of television coverage of the asbestos issue, but prior to the peaks reached in the three print media indexes. (Table 1)

The growth of lawsuits and the increase in New York Times coverage of the economic aspects of the asbestos issue (Table 2) was accompanied by related federal laws and regulatory standards addressing many of the economic matters publicized in the media. Legislation addressed the issues of the reform of bankruptcy and product liability laws, revised judicial jurisdiction for product liability lawsuits, mandatory inspection of public buildings for asbestos exposure and mandatory asbestos removal, public funding for asbestos removal from school buildings, and numerous rules governing asbestos abatement including requirements that abatement contractors have sufficient insurance coverage to avoid future liability claims. (Table 3)

Although asbestos victim's compensation legislation was introduced annually between 1977 and 1985, during those eight years the only media references appeared in 1982, 1983, and 1985, when the issue of asbestos victim compensation was portrayed primarily as a private-sector economic matter not as an issue for public policy. And, as Table 3 indicates, while many health hazard compensation bills were introduced in Congress, none specifically for asbestos victims ever passed.

With the passage of regulatory legislation, the asbestos manufacturer bankruptcies in litigation, and modifications to the workmen's compensation system undertaken, media visibility of the asbestos issue began to decline. After 1984 the asbestos issue was significantly less visible in all but the professional/scientific media. (Table 1) The issue attention cycle had apparently run its course. Although examination of this data is far from conclusive, it does provide
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support for both the issue redefinition and media attention hypotheses. The data revealed a distinct association between issue redefinition and issue success on the public policy agenda. Substitution of economic themes in the place of health themes affected asbestos issue visibility and policy passage. Higher levels of media attention to economic issues is consistent with prior findings that the news media reports on the actions of those on top of economic, political, social and cultural hierarchies (Parenti, 1986). The appearance of the asbestos issue as a major health issue in 1970 would also be consistent with observations that in a hierarchy of political cognition, those symbols most directly associated with emotions of fear and anger will be at the top of the hierarchy. (Edelman, 1985)

Unfortunately, during the entire time frame of this analysis, there were no public opinion poll data on the subject of asbestos. Thus it is impossible to determine the association between public awareness of the asbestos issue and the public policy issue agenda, or public awareness with the media agenda.

The available data do suggest an association between the media agenda and the public policy agenda. The nature of the association is, however, uneven. Within the scope of this study, it is impossible to determine if the media agenda led the public policy agenda, or whether the media was responding to political elite activities. What is clear is that the agendas do coincide, particularly when the issue is defined in terms that are traditionally construed as being within the public jurisdiction, i.e., protection of the public welfare (health) and concern for the economy.

APPENDIX

Standardized Subject Category Designations for Table 2

HEALTH CATEGORIES:


SCHOOLS Asbestos in school buildings, asbestos exposure in, monitoring in, exposure of schoolchildren, inspection for, removal from school buildings, abatement programs for.

ECONOMIC CATEGORIES:

BUSS Business Information: Price information, price changes, stock INFO sales and values, mergers, acquisitions, sales, etc. Non-issue related business activity.


USES Substitute substances. Alternative products.


COMP Compensation.

NOTES

1. *Cumulated Index Medicus* indexes articles appearing in 2,784 biomedical journals, and is the definitive reference source for biomedical journal literature. Citations appearing under subject headings “pneumoconiosis,” “asbestosis,” and “asbestos” were examined for the years 1900 through 1989. During the period 1900 through 1927 references to “asbestosis” were subsumed under the subject heading “pneumoconiosis.” Only those citations under “pneumoconiosis” which referred specifically to asbestosis have been included in the citation counts.

2. Citations appearing under the subject heading “asbestos” along with cross references were examined. Cross references that directly referred to asbestos (i.e., air pollution, cancer, etc.) and that were not duplications of citations previously listed were included in a citation count.

3. The exact size of the audience reached by the general readership press is extremely difficult to estimate. *The Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature* currently indexes 182 publications, and circulation figures alone do not provide an accurate estimate of audience size. While total magazine circulation may exceed 300 million copies, approximately 40 percent of magazines have circulations under 150,000. The most comprehensive information regarding magazine readership estimates that in an average month, 94 percent of adults read at least one copy of a magazine. (Dominick, 1987)

4. Citations for the subject heading “asbestos” and only those cross references dealing directly with asbestos which did not duplicate a prior citation were included.

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5. Each subject category represents a distinct issue definition. These subject categories and groupings are defined in the appendix.

6. Note again, however, the relatively greater coverage in Table 1 for the Index Medicus.

REFERENCES


The will of the Community: Theories of Representation at the Founding and in Recent Political Practice

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In this essay, we develop the contrasting perspectives on representation advocated by the opposing sides at Poughkeepsie and the other state ratifying conventions, with some reference to the Philadelphia convention as well. The ratification struggle in New York State is emphasized because it produced America’s contribution to the classics of western political thought, The Federalist and a well-articulated debate between two key protagonists, Alexander Hamilton and Melancton Smith. The continuing relevance of the positions advanced during the ratification debates of 1787 and 1788 can be found in the municipal reform movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the “apportionment revolution” of the last generation, and in the redistricting of the New York City Council in 1991.

The idea that naturally suggests itself to our minds, when we speak of representatives, is, that they resemble those they represent. They should be a true picture of the people, in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests.

Melancton Smith
Poughkeepsie, June 21, 1788

It has been further, by the gentlemen in opposition, observed, that a large representation is necessary to understand the interests of the people... The position appears to be made upon the unfounded presumption that all the interests of all parts of the community must be represented. No idea is more erroneous than this.

Alexander Hamilton
Poughkeepsie, June 21, 1788
Representation -- "the delegation of the government to a small number of citizens elected by the rest" -- was the paramount political issue confronting the founders of the American republic and the framers of its constitution (Rossiter, 1961, No. 10: p. 82). Indeed, it is representation that explains "the uniqueness of the American politics" of the Founding (Wood, 1972, p. 506).

The central question, according to Gordon Wood, was "whether a professedly popular government should actually be in the hands of, rather than simply derived from, common, ordinary people." (Wood, 1972, p. 516) In the words of Melancton Smith at the 1788 New York ratifying convention at Poughkeepsie, "How was the will of the community to be expressed?" (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 227)

The founders' answers to Smith's query can be found in embryonic form in the debates in Philadelphia. The subsequent pamphlet literature and the debates at the state ratifying conventions of 1787 and 1788, as well as the early state constitutions, together present a more fully developed body of thought on the nature of representation and the role of the representative. For the "founders" include not only the Philadelphia framers, but also the delegates at the state ratifying conventions, drafters of the early state constitutions, and the Antifederalists. The Constitution "did not finish the task of making the American polity;" American political life has been and continues to be "a dialogue in which Antifederalists concerns and principles still play an important part." (Storing, 1981, p. 3)

Themes evident at Poughkeepsie and the other state ratifying conventions have continued to inform American political thought and practice. In this essay, the crucial New York ratification debate, which centered on representation, is the focus. After discussing the Poughkeepsie debates, we treat manifestations of the debate themes in American political practice such as the municipal reform movement at the turn of the twentieth century and the "apportionment revolution" which commenced in the 1960s. In the conclusion we discuss the contemporary relevance of the Founders' debates over representation, which is vividly underscored by recent developments in New York City, where charter writers and a districting commission have translated the "one person, one vote" standard into a mandate for descriptive representation, a central theme of Melancton Smith and other Antifederalists.

The Concept of Representation

Representation, or the science of indirect government through intermediaries, is a modern concept first explicitly articulated by Hobbes (see Pitkin, 1967, 1989; Mansfield, 1968a, 1971; Mansfield and Scigliano, 1978). Hobbes had an authorization view of representation, holding that "a representative is someone who has been authorized to act... given a right to act which he did not have before,
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while the represented has become responsible for the consequences of that action as if he had done it himself. It is a view strongly skewed in favor of the representative.” (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 38-39)

Hobbes was a paradigm creator, that is, one who breaks with existing tradition and “proposes different rules of inquiry, a different problem-field, as well as different notions of significance and of what constitutes a solution.” (Wolin, 1968, p. 138) A paradigm creator defines model problems or “puzzles” within the paradigm which Kuhn calls normal science (Wolin, 1968, pp. 132ff). Hobbes’ successors may be thought of as paradigm workers seeking to solve problems related to major concepts such as representation. Hobbes’ authorization view was modified through the introduction of elective representation by Locke, Montesquieu and the American founders (Mansfield and Scigliano, 1978, p. 26). The concept of representation came to include the components of accountability and substantive “acting for” constituents (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 55-59; ch. 6).

The Federalist-Antifederalist dialogue is an example of puzzle solving by paradigm workers. Specifically, the concept of representation was given substantive meaning during the ratification process by an elaboration of such attributes as “descriptive representation,” and various plebiscitary-type devices to effect it. Related concepts such as republicanism and federalism also underwent conceptual development. However, the puzzle of representation remains to be “solved.”

The American founding is often portrayed as a transition from classical republicanism with its stress upon cultural presuppositions of harmony and homogeneity (and the view that civic virtue is the animating principle of a republican regime) to the “new science of politics” (see Diamond, 1959) in which men’s passions, interests, and ambitions are channeled through institutional devices and circumstance in the cause of stable and decent government. Thus Wood (1972, p. 606) asserted that the Americans of 1787 “shattered the classical Whig world of 1776.” However, rather than a sharp break, there was a fusion of Federalist and Antifederalist positions during the crucial decade of the 1780s especially with respect to representation (see Yarbrough, 1979a). This fusion is in large measure, a result of the presumed antagonists’ shared assumptions, despite their rhetorical differences. Both Federalist and Antifederalist views on representation are liberal; they both seek to represent “people who have interests” (Pitkin 1967, ch. 9).

The Federalist/Antifederalist dialogue on representation captures innovations within the social contract-natural rights paradigm. Throughout th Federalist Publius extols the “novelty” of American constitutional experimentation and improvements made over ancient and modern political science (Rossiter 1961, Nos. 1, 9, 10, 14, 37). The Founding events at Philadelphia and in the state ratifying conventions provide us with a written record of the evolution of the concept of representation in our early history.
The Philadelphia Convention

The delegates who met in Philadelphia did not develop a theory (or articulate competing theories) of representation. That was left to the pamphleteers, essayists (particularly Publius), and those who considered the new constitution at state ratifying conventions. Scant attention was paid in Philadelphia to the character of the representative or the nature of representation; indeed, no delegate offered an explicit definition of the process over which there was so much debate (Elliot, 1836, 3: p. 199).

The delegates' foremost concern was the pragmatic task of forging a nation, of building a structure of government that would be acceptable to the large and small states, north and south, to commercial and agricultural concerns and to slaveholding and non-slaveholding interests. The framers were concerned with the mechanics of representation, with its nuts and bolts. The paramount issue -- "everything depended on this" -- was whether representation in the new national legislature was to be equal or proportionate (Madison, 1966, p. 103).

The debates in Philadelphia did anticipate the richer theoretical discourse that was to follow. Thus, certain discussions go beyond mechanics and the immediate exigencies of union to the heart of the nature and function of representation and the role of the representative (Madison, 1966, pp. 99-100, 106-107, 263-264, 609, 655).

For a full expression of the role and character of the representative we must look at the written and spoken record following Philadelphia. The New York ratifying convention of June and July 1788 and the preceding pamphlet war produced the most articulate expositions of Federalist and Antifederalist perspectives on representation. Embedded in these debates are such themes as: extensiveness, descriptive representation, virtual and actual representation, constituency influence, federalism, and plebiscitary devices.

Extensiveness

The theoretical backdrop to the Poughkeepsie debates on ratification reflected in the contrasting Federalist and Antifederalist perspectives was the issue of the size of republics. Indeed, the American founding "decisively altered the tradition of republican politics." (Hanson, 1988, p. 166) During the pamphlet war in New York, the Antifederalist essayist Brutus (probably Robert Yates) expressed the basic leitmotif of the Constitution's opponents on the issue of size. Brutus maintained, following Montesquieu, that ""it is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist." Brutus argued that in a large, extended country it is "impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people." For the confidence of the people in their rulers "arises from knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they have of
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displacing them when they misbehave.” In a republic, “the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar.” But the number of members proposed for the national legislature was not “sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants of the different districts.” (Ketcham, 1986, pp. 275, 277, 278, 279) Thus, at the Poughkeepsie Convention Smith expressed doubts concerning the viability of federal republics, implicitly indicating that true republicanism could be maintained only in smaller units (Elliot, 1836, 2: pp. 224, 228).

The Federalists redefined republicanism; they extolled the large republic (Rossiter, 1961, Nos. 10 and 39). To Madison, a republic has “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place” and he further maintained that it was “essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of society” and “sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people . . . .” (Rossiter, 1961, No. 10: p. 81; No. 39: p. 241). Representation permits extensiveness, which in turn provides the countervailing balance solution to the problem of factions, the ostensible theme of Federalist 10.

Furthermore, Publius thinks that representation will afford the republic a better quality of governors than direct democracy. The “delegation of the government” to “a chosen body of citizens” will refine and enlarge public views, thereby filtering out “temporary and partial considerations.” The circumstances afforded by large districts make it less likely that “men of factional tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs” will be chosen (Rossiter, 1961, No. 10: p. 82). Publius viewed representation as a refining process “in which higher faculties (that is, motives and abilities) were sorted out, concentrated, and strengthened.” (Howe, 1988, p. 126) Publius would accomplish through the science of politics and circumstance (that is, large districts in a large republic) the selection of “fit” characters to replace a view of republicanism associated with previous theorists, ancient and modern (including the Antifederalists), who held that the character of a citizenry and its rulers was the central feature of a republic.

The Antifederalists’ rhetorical emphasis on character formation and virtue belied their generally pessimistic view of human nature (Storing, 1981). That they were “men of little faith” (Kenyon, 1955) was very much in evidence during the New York ratification debates. There is precious little in the Poughkeepsie debates on character formation and citizenship participation. The New York ratifying convention concentrated instead on the adequacy of representation of the state’s various orders and classes and on mechanisms to achieve it.

Descriptive Representation

The most notable aspect of the Poughkeepsie Convention debates was the Antifederalist articulation of descriptive representation -- when a representative
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body is characterized “by an accurate correspondence or resemblance to what it represents, by reflecting without distortion.” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 60) Following this perspective, the legislature should be a “mirror” or “true picture of the people”: The various social groupings within a society should be accurately reflected in the representative institutions of the society.

The most forceful expression of descriptive representation in American political thought occurred in Melancton Smith’s speeches of June 21, 1788 at Poughkeepsie. Smith maintained that “in order to exercise their power discreetly for the happiness of the people,” representatives should be “a true picture of the people, possess a knowledge of their circumstances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 245) In the rhetoric of the Antifederalists, representation is often portrayed as a substitute for the face-to-face meeting of the people. However, direct participation is not a dominant concern. Rather the object is representation of orders and classes. Thus, the legislature should be an exact miniature of the people, containing spokesmen for all classes, all groups, all interests, all opinion in the community. (In “Letters from a Federal Farmer,” the author, believed by some to be Smith, argued that a “full and equal representation of the people in the legislature” was an “essential part” of a “free and good government.” Full and equal representation is “that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would were they all assembled.” A fair representation entails “that every order of men in the community . . . can have a share in it . . . Professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc.” must be allowed “to bring a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the legislature.” In order for this group representation to take place, “the representation must be considerably numerous” (Ketcham, 1986, pp. 264-265).

Actual vs. Virtual Representation

Representation, for Smith, the Federal Farmer, and those of like mind, was to be “actual.” The Antifederalists rejected the assumption that there was a public interest that transcended special or local interests and so they also rejected the concept of “virtual representation.” The most celebrated formulation of virtual representation was by Edmund Burke to his Bristol constituents: Parliament was a “deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.” Virtual representation rested on “a communion of interests and a sympathy of feeling and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them.” (Birch, 1971, p. 39; Pitkin, 1969, p. 169) Burke “almost never speaks of an individual’s interest, or the interest of a group,” says Pitkin (1967, p. 174). However, group interests and
class divisions were very evident in the debates over ratification, especially in New York.

The fear of domination of the "better sort," the well born, etc., was expressed throughout the debates over the Constitution. The Pennsylvania minority, for example, believed that under the new government "men of the most elevated rank in life, will alone be chosen. The other orders in the society, such as farmers, traders, and mechanics, who all ought to have competent number of their best informed men in the legislature, will be totally unrepresented." (Ketcham, 1986, pp. 235, 248)

The advocacy of actual class representation is perhaps most strikingly expressed in Smith's paean to the yeomanry during the New York debates. Smith and other Antifederalists believed that the "middling" classes would safeguard the republican principles of the new American regime and insure the liberty of the entire community.

Those in middling circumstances have less temptation; they are inclined by habit, and the company with whom they associate, to set bounds to their passions and appetites. If this is not sufficient, the want of means to gratify them will be a restraint: they are obliged to employ their time in their respective callings; hence the substantial yeomanry of the country are more temperate, of better morals, and less ambition, than the great. The latter do not feel for the poor and middling class; the reasons are obvious -- they are not obliged to use the same pains and labor to procure property as the other. They feel not the inconveniences arising from the payment of small sums. (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 247)

Here are the central Antifederalist themes: the necessity of civic virtue, frugality, the enervation of manners and morals that wealth entails, the association of the sturdy man with a stake in society (but unspoiled by riches) as the proper steward of the public trust and treasury. These ideas had formed the core of republican political thinking for a century.

A similar class analysis is present in pro-Constitution advocates as well. Charles Pinckney at the South Carolina ratification convention offers an encomium to the yeomanry almost equal to that of Smith in New York. Pinckney sees three classes in "the people of the Union": commercial men, professional men, and the mechanical and landed interests. Of men of commerce, Pinckney recommends having nothing to do with their politics and as little as possible with their commerce. Of the professional men, Pinckney states that "from their education and pursuits, [they] must have a considerable influence, while your government retains the republican principle, and its affairs are agitated in the
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Assemblies of the people." The mechanical and landed interest -- "the owners and cultivators of the soil" -- are the men "attached to the truest interests of their country from those motives which always bind and secure the affections of the nation." It is in these men that "consists the great body of the people," to Pinckney, "and rests, I hope ever will continue, all the authority of the government." (Elliot, 1836, 4: pp. 321-322)

In modern terms, the analysis offered by Smith, the Pennsylvania minority and Pinckney can be seen as an interest group analysis based on social class. To Smith, "Every society naturally divides itself into classes" (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 246), and he wants the legislature to reflect this division.

Society was already too fragmented in the large heterogeneous republic to make the idea of the legislature as a mirror of society tenable. What Smith argued for "is not an actual representation of all the different interests or a true picture of the people," but an increase in middle class representation." (Yarbrough, 1979b, p. 86) The middle class as an interest acts as a balance between rich and poor, as well as serving its own legitimate class interests. Smith's arguments, if carried to their logical end, would require a proportional representation of group interests built into the electoral process (Yarbrough, 1979b, p. 87). Neither Smith nor other Antifederalists took this next logical step, as later constitution designers and charter writers would do. In Yarbrough's (1979b, 88) view, "the intellectual heirs of the Antifederalists are the proponents of interest group representation, who stress the reflection of group interest as a means of securing individual rights."

Hamilton, responding to Smith, presented an outline theory of representation which contrasted sharply with the Antifederalist's rhetorical espousal of the legislature as a mirror of the populace. Smith's premise was wrong, Hamilton argued: "the presumption that all the interests of all parts of the community must be represented is unfounded." No idea, indeed, is "more erroneous than this." It was Hamilton's position that when representatives mirror the opinions of their constituents, representative government is likely to suffer the same defects as pure democracy whose "very character was tyranny; their figure, deformity." (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 253) In place of reflecting the wishes of the people, the theory of representation in The Federalist Papers rested on the refinement of public wishes and opinions.

The purpose of representatives, to Publius, is to sift and weigh the wishes of their constituents; representation should do more than approximate pure democracy. A large republic with a small legislature was the instrument which would achieve the refinement of public opinion by passing it "through the medium of a chosen body of citizens." (Rossiter, 1961, No. 10: p. 82)

Hamilton then proceeded to challenge Smith's encomium to the yeomanry. After urging his fellow delegates to "[l]ook through the rich and poor of the Community, the learned and the ignorant," he asked "Where does virtue predominate?" The differences between the wealthy and other classes that
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Hamilton saw lay “not in the quantity, but kind, of vices which are incident to various classes; and here the advantage of character belongs to the wealthy. Their vices are probably more favorable to the prosperity of the state than those of the indigent and partake less of moral depravity.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 257) To Hamilton the vices of the prosperous are socially useful, but they must be properly channeled.

Perhaps the best exposition of the counter to Smith’s advocacy of descriptive representation is the sociology of representation found in Hamilton’s Federalist 35. Hamilton’s legislator is no ordinary man. He is a person who is best able to determine and act for the interests of the community. In his examination of the process of coalition building and representation, Hamilton explains why the merchant is a logical choice to represent the interests of mechanics and manufacturers.

The idea of actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each class is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution that each different occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants in preference to persons of their own profession or trades... They are sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which in a deliberative assembly the greatest natural abilities are for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight and superior acquirements of merchants render them more equal to a contest with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. (Rossiter, 1961, No. 35: pp. 214-215)

To Hamilton, individuals can be adequately represented if their interests, here chiefly economic, are addressed by the representatives who in all likelihood will be of higher social standing, but still dependent on the electorate for reelection.

But the businessman was not Hamilton’s exemplar of the representative. Rather, it was members of the learned professions, notably lawyers like himself. Such persons would (and should) be chosen, since “they form no distinct interest in society, and according to their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of each other and of other parts of the community.” (Rossiter, 1961, No. 35: p. 215)

Smith’s espousal of descriptive representation drew the ire of Federalists at Poughkeepsie. Robert Livingston castigated Smith for “observ[ing] that ambition is peculiarly the vice of the wealthy. But have not all classes of men,”
including the poor and the ignorant, "their objects of ambition." Livingston asks, if the rich and the wise are not to be the representatives, "Whom then?" His sardonic response: "Why those who are not virtuous, those who are not wise; those who are not learned: these are the men to whom alone we can trust our liberties." Where would Smith find the "other classes" of men that the Antifederalists wanted in the legislature? "Why he must go out into the highways and pick up the rogue and the robber; he must go to the hedges and ditches and bring in the poor, the blind and the lame." (Elliot, 1836, 2: pp. 276-277)

Smith grew irritated during the debates by what he felt were deliberate misstatements of his position by the Federalists. He declared that he did not consider the members of the first class to be "destitute of morality and virtue," nor was he an "enemy of the rich." Rather he maintained that the rich "could not feel sympathetically the wants of the people." Their conditions and circumstance, Smith averred, "exposed them to those temptations which rank and power hold out to view: that they were more luxurious and intemperate, because they had more fully the means of enjoyment; that they were more ambitious, because more in the hope of success." (Elliot, 1836, 2: pp. 260, 280) Smith, like Madison, expected representatives to be "advocates and parties to the causes which they determine." (Rossiter, 1961, No. 10: p. 79) He merely wanted the yeomanry to have sufficient representation to adequately advance their class or group interests.

The Antifederalists' advocacy of descriptive representation relates to the issue of the relationship of the representative to the constituency. Put in classic Burkean formulation, should the representative act on behalf of collective interests of the nation (trustee role) or according to constituency wishes (delegate role)?

Constituency Influence: Trustee v. Delegate

Empirical research on constituency influence has demonstrated that American legislators assume trustee and delegate roles depending on issue salience, areal focus, and competitiveness. Legislators make considerable efforts to develop a "homestyle" so as to convey a sense of "sympathy" (to use the words of the Poughkeepsie debaters) to their constituents (Eulau et al, 1959; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Fenno, 1978). The issue was not broached in such conceptual terms at Poughkeepsie. However, the New York ratification struggle demonstrates that the delegate/trustee dichotomy masks something more fundamental, namely that both sides shared common assumptions which were far different than Burke's in his depiction of the trustee.

American legislators, in the view of Federalists, Antifederalists, and contemporary political scientists, were to represent particular interests. While Antifederalist insistence upon descriptive or actual representation perhaps most readily fits the delegate role where representatives must stay "in synchrony with the distribution of voters' preferences" (Schwartz, 1988, p. 30) and the Federalist
advocacy of representation as a means of refining public opinion to filter out disruptive passions might be viewed as a trusteeship conception, both perspectives share the assumption of a society of fragmented interests.

Pitkin’s (1967, pp. 197, 192) contrast between Burke and Madison applies to the Antifederalists as well.

Unlike the Burkean representative . . . Madison’s representative does not know his constituents’ interest better than they do themselves; if anything, he is in this respect roughly their equal. His furtherance of their interests is conceived as fairly responsive; and when, in time, an enlarged and rational view prevails, it prevails both in the legislature and in the minds of the people. Politics is not a realm of knowledge and reason for Madison as it is for Burke. It is much more a realm of pressures and opinion. . . A man’s interest is what he thinks it is, just as his opinion is what he thinks . . . they are subjective, personal, shifting, unreliable, and usually antagonistic to the real welfare of the nation.

Inherent in both Federalist and Antifederalist conceptions of representation is what Schwartz (1988, p. 131) calls a “transmission belt” theory which “sees society as made up of individuals ‘distrustful of one another.’” The Madisonian system relies on a plurality of shifting interests whereas the Antifederalist rhetoric seems to suggest more or less permanent group interests, but both view the legislator instrumentally, that is, he is to represent localized and particular interests as Madison explains in the “parties and advocates” passage in Number 10. To Publius, to Smith, and to their counterparts in other states, the representative is a transmitter of interests. It matters little if this transmission occurs because of the representative’s intimate sympathy with the people or through plebiscitary-type devices. The remainder of the Poughkeepsie debate centered on how best to achieve representation of interests in a fragmented community.

Federalism

At the Poughkeepsie debates the Federalists were able to use their articulation of a “new federalism,” re-defining the term “federal” from a league of states to the exposition of a compound republic of “a partly national, partly federal” regime. They used this new definition to support relatively small national legislative bodies with relatively long durations. The standard Antifederalist refrain that states were better as depositaries to legislate for the people’s interest was delivered by Governor Clinton, who played a surprisingly reserved role in the convention proceedings given the unquestioned leadership of the Antifederalists in his state. He contrasted the “acquaintance with the public wants” that
characterized state legislators chosen “from the minute districts of the state” with a Congress that would (because of the size of the districts and the small number of representatives) be “totally unacquainted with all those local circumstances of any particular state.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: pp. 261-262) Only small districts could provide the legislator with the intimate knowledge of his constituents’ conditions and opinions.

Hamilton, in reply to Clinton and Smith, distinguished between the representation offered in the state legislatures with that to be provided by the new Congress. “The powers of the new government were general and calculated to embrace the aggregate interests of the Union, to the whole.” On the other hand, in the state governments “as the laws regard the interests of the people, in all their various minute divisions, it is necessary that the smallest interests should be represented.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 265)

Hamilton’s was a “layer cake” conception of federalism and he clearly distinguished the sharply differing objects of the general and the state governments. The general government would tend to “[c]ommerce, finance, negotiation and war.” The states would retain responsibility for all other governmental functions including the “administration of criminal and civil justice” which for Hamilton was the “great cement of society.” The state encompassed a “variety of more minute interests;” state legislators, therefore, would be closer to and “immediately under the observation of the mass of citizens.” (Rossiter, 1961, No. 17: pp. 118, 119, 120) Parallel arguments were also made in the Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and North Carolina ratifying conventions.

Plebiscitary Devices

Throughout the ratification process, the Antifederalists advocated a number of plebiscitary-type techniques to keep representatives accountable to the populace. The emphasis on such techniques as small districts, frequent elections, and recall and rotation has earned the Antifederalists a populist or democratic label. American political history demonstrates that these techniques have been utilized by those desiring to foster democratic accountability.

Small Districts. The call for small districts, or numerous representation, appeared in many ratifying conventions and was a prominent theme at Poughkeepsie. Governor Clinton, in Cato’s letters, advocated numerous representation to introduce knowledge and sympathy between representatives and constituents. At Poughkeepsie, the debate over representation began when Melancton Smith raised objections to Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.

One of Smith’s objections, that the number of House members proposed for the new legislature was inadequate, goes to the heart of the Antifederalist perspective on representation. The central question for Smith was “How was the will of the community to be expressed?” Since it would “not be possible” for the...
people "to come together" because of the multitude would be too great," the "scheme of representation had been adopted, by which the people deputed others to represent them. Individuals entering into society became one body, and that body ought to be animated by one mind. . . . The representative," Smith continued, "should be chosen from small districts." Otherwise, he would not "be possessed of the requisite information to make happy the great number of souls that were spread over this extensive territory." (Elliott, 1836, 2: pp. 227-228)

This belief in small districts (and concomitantly, large representative bodies) was forcefully argued by the minority delegates in Pennsylvania. The House and the Senate were "inadequate because the sense and views of 3 or 4 millions of people diffused over so extensive a territory comprising such various climates, products, habits, interests, and opinions, cannot be collected in so small a body." (Ketcham, 1986, p. 248) The belief that republican government was possible only for a relatively small and homogeneous population was "at the center of the theoretical expression of the Antifederalist opposition." (Kenyon, 1985, p. xxxix)

Hamilton confronted Smith's view that "numerous representation" was necessary to obtain the confidence of the people; instead, the confidence of the people "will easily be gained by a good administration." (Elliott, 1836, 2: p. 254) Hamilton drew upon arguments Madison had previously made. Representation should do more than approximate pure democracy. The representative who is to "refine and enlarge public views" must be elected in a large electoral district (Rossiter, 1961, No. 10: p. 82; Elliott, 1836, 2: pp. 256-257).

The tempering function, Hamilton believed, works best in the large district because "the corruption of the electors is much more difficult; combinations for the purposes of intrigue are less easily formed; factions and cabals are little known. In a small district, wealth will have a more complete influence, because the people in the vicinity of a great man are more immediately his dependants, and because this influence has fewer objects to act upon" (Elliott, 1836, 2: pp. 256-257)

The large district in a nation of heterogeneous interests would be a bulwark against the dominance of any specific interest. It will "encourage the people . . . to elect men who are not spokesmen for any social and economic issue and who possess the impartiality and comprehensiveness of vision to transcend the domain of interest group politics and to pursue particular interests common to the whole." (Yarbrough, 1979c, p. 79) This is the antidote for the unbridled majoritarianism to which small districts and republics, as well as pure democracies, are prone. The majority has the right to rule, but its excesses must be curbed. And if the fragmentation and competition provided by large districts were insufficient, Publius lists other filters and checks, such as indirect election, separation of powers, and checks and balances.

The Antifederalists fretted that the legislature would not only become too
remote because of large districts but also through at-large elections. In order to
avert his, Smith attempted to insert an amendment providing that states be required
to district instead of using an at-large electoral system. Smith explained that,

As the Constitution stood, the whole state might be a single
district for election. This would be improper. The state should
be divided into as many districts as it sends representatives. The
whole number of representatives might otherwise be taken from
a small part of the state, and the bulk of the people, there­
fore, might not be fully represented. (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 327)

Frequent Elections. A standard Antifederalist refrain, tied to the
remoteness of the legislature, was the need for frequent elections, specifically
annual ones. Americans of that period held as a tenet of their political faith that
"where annual election ends, slavery begins." (McDonald, 1985, p. 160) Annual
elections were among the chief mechanisms for achieving "actual" representa­
tion. Provisions for annual elections had been incorporated into virtually all of the
early state constitutions. The biennial elections proposed for the House of
Representatives and the six year term for the Senate sparked much controversy in
the state ratifying conventions.

Governor Clinton, citing such sources as Sydney and Montesquieu,
criticized the proposal of biennial elections to the House as "a sharp departure
from the safe democratical principles of annual ones" that lay at the core of
republican theory (Ketcham, 1986, p. 319). At Poughkeepsie, Smith also pressed
for annual election of representatives, such as was provided for Congress under the
Articles of Confederation, in order to bind the representative to constituents.
"What more powerful check" on the representative existed, he asked (Elliot,
1836, 2: p. 281). General William Heath at the Massachusetts convention quoted
Montesquieu: "The greatness of power must be compensated by the brevity of
the duration; most legislators have fixed it to a year; a longer space would be
dangerous." (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 13)

Fisher Ames countered this view by stating that "annual elections may
be highly fit for a state legislature" but imprudent for a national legislature. "Will
any man say that national business can be understood in one year?" (Elliot, 1836,
2: p. 10) Ames' argument was repeated by such supporters of the Constitution as
Thomas McKean in Pennsylvania and Archibald Maclane in North Carolina
(Elliot, 1836, 2: pp. 532-533; 4: pp. 28-29; see also Federalist 53).

Recall and Rotation. Rotation of executive (and to a lesser extent,
legislative) office was a cardinal principle of American republican political
thought as reflected by the state constitutions. For example, provisions for rotation
of the chief executive had been incorporated in seven of the ten new constitutions
drafted in 1776-1787. The Maryland constitution termed rotation "one of the best
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securities of permanent freedom.” (Wood, 1972, p. 140)

The Antifederalists at Poughkeepsie proposed to incorporate what they conceived of as republican checks into the Constitution. The plebiscitary devices that surfaced were those for recall and rotation of legislators. Gilbert Livingston offered an amendment limiting the terms of Senators, “lest that body be perpetual and lose sympathy with the people.”

That no person shall be eligible as a senator for more than six years in any term of twelve years, and that it shall be in the power of the legislatures of the several states to recall their senators, or either of them, and to elect others in their stead, to serve for remainder of the time for which such senator or senators, so recalled, were appointed. (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 289)

The limited eligibility and provision for recall (later to be identified with populist elements in American history) were defended by the Antifederalists as salutary checks on the abuse of power, but they were more than that. Representatives were obliged “to return, at certain periods to their fellow citizens,” for it was only by “mingling with the people that they may recover that knowledge of their interests, and revive that sympathy with their feelings.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 293)

Smith defended Livingston’s amendment by calling “rotation in the government . . . a very important and truly republican institution,” arguing that “it will have a tendency to diffuse a more general spirit of emulation and bring into office the genius and abilities of the continent.” It was dangerous to have only a few men capable of “discharging the duty of a senator.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: pp. 310, 311) Smith argued that many talented and qualified men ought to be encouraged to aspire to that office.

Both Robert Livingston and Hamilton responded to the Antifederalists. Their argument was that the provisions for recall and limited duration would make the Senators too parochially tied to local interests, thus compromising that chamber’s potential contribution to energy and stability in government (Elliot, 1836, 2: pp. 291-293; 300-307). In Hamilton’s words, “Is he [the Senator] simply an agent of the state? No. He is the agent for the Union, and he is bound to perform services necessary to the good of the whole, though his state should condemn them.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 320) Livingston called rotation “an absured species of ostracism --a mode of proscribing eminent merit, and banishing from stations of trust those who have filled them with the greatest faithfulness.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 293)

The Poughkeepsie Themes in Subsequent American Political Practice
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Following extensive debate the Constitution was ratified in New York without condition by a vote of 30 to 27; eleven Antifederalists, led by Smith, joined the nineteen Federalists to secure ratification. However, the answers presented by Hamilton and Smith and their associates at Poughkeepsie to the questions concerning the proper function of representation and the representative have echoed through American political history. The Antifederalist tradition has been "cast in the role of perpetual opposition in American political history, sometimes in religious form from the Right, and sometimes in secular form from the Left." (Lutz, 1980, p. 171) More generally, Antifederalists thinking has tended to inform the more populist, democratic, and majoritarian elements in the American political tradition as opposed to the refinements, filters and barriers to majority rule advocated in the Federalist. The reverberations of the ratification debates can be heard, for example, in the progressive municipal reform movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and in the reapportionment revolution of the last generation.

**Municipal Reform.** The conflict between progressive municipal reformers and supporters of the machine during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was, at its root, a debate over representation -- both over the method of representation and who should be represented (Hays, 1980, pp. 53-72). The clash has its philosophical explanation in the positions articulated by Hamilton and Smith.

At the end of the last century, machine-controlled American cities had large councils elected by ward. Reformers, in their assault on the machines, successfully advocated smaller councils to weaken the power of the lower and working class neighborhood interests, the cornerstone of the machine. Their arguments can be read as re-statements of the Federalist position at the Founding: a smaller council drawn from larger districts would be more efficient and effective; small councils were also more likely to attract better candidates and public officials; these officials would be more powerful, independent and effective; finally, small councils were seen as less expensive.

Another key change effected by the municipal reform movement was the at-large election of city legislators. In an at-large system, all councilmembers theoretically have the same constituency: the entire city. The reformers held that if a councilmember had to seek votes from the city as a whole, s/he would take a city-wide perspective on issues and policy decisions. To the reformers the "petty politics of favor-giving and of neighborhood and ethnic advantage" would be eliminated "striking a mortal blow at the machine." The reformers wanted the municipal legislature to be free from the "direct control of spatially ordered interests." (Banfield and Wilson, 1963, pp. 94-95) The small, at-large city council reflects the Federalists' filtering notion.

The reformers were vigorously opposed by locally-based lower and working (and to a large extent middle) class groups who held that neighborhood,
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or geographic, and group interests ought not be sacrificed. Local ward leaders, overwhelmingly drawn from the same classes and communities as their constituents, spoke for their local areas, the economic interests of their inhabitants, their residential concerns, their educational, recreational, and religious interests—those aspects of community life which mattered most to those they represented (Hays, 1980, p. 64). Thus, these proponents of locally based urban politics with their emphasis on large city councils elected from relatively small wards echoed Melancton Smith's conviction favoring "descriptive representation," where the legislators seek to resemble their constituents as closely as possible.

Reapportionment. The clearest current manifestations of the unresolved tensions which were revealed at Poughkeepsie are found in the "thicket" of legislative reapportionment. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent from the majority decision in Baker v. Carr, recognized that "what is actually asked by the Court in this case is to choose among competing bases of representation, ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy...." (Baker v. Carr, 1962, p. 300) Baker, together with Gray v. Sanders (1963), Reynolds v. Sims (1964), and Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) have usually been viewed as a victory for the more populist, democratic elements in America (Mansfield, 1968b, pp. 109-110; Rossum, 1981, pp. 426-427).

Until the "apportionment revolution" of the 1960s, American constitutional theory and practice had, as Justice Harlan explained in his dissent in Reynolds (1964, p. 622), allowed "a State to give effective consideration" to such criteria as history, economic and other group interests, geography, and sectional balance. Thus, the states were free to experiment and distort in order to ensure representation of interests that might be stifled by strict numerical equality. In the words of the majority in Wells v. Rockefeller (1969, p. 546), such schemes permitted "districts with defined interest orientations to be overrepresented at the expense of districts with different interest orientations." The first wave of decisions after Reynolds mandated an increasingly more exact numerical equality of districts.

Chief Justice Warren's famous dictum in the Reynolds case has historical echoes: "Legislators represent people not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests." (1964, p. 562) This position is rooted in the Antifederalist theory of representation, something which is very much a part of contemporary American jurisprudence and practice. The Antifederalists recognized that they were operating in a new world of fragmented and competing interests, however much they articulated a more direct conception of democracy. They recognized that interests were important and were concerned that the yeomanry not be given short shrift.

In coming to terms with the criterion of group interests made explicit in Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds and implicitly by Melancton Smith two hundred years ago in Poughkeepsie, the Court, in such decisions as United Jewish
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*Organizations v. Carey* (1977), *Brown v. Thomson* (1983), and *Davis v. Bandemer* (1986) has implicitly begun to recognize the legitimacy of group interests. This is a position hinted at by Smith and his cohorts at Poughkeepsie.

There has been a "shift from an individualist theory of the Warren Court to a pluralist group theory of representation" in more recent apportionment cases (Saffell, 1987, p. 16). In *Brown v. Thomas* (1983, p. 846), the Court upheld a districting plan in Wyoming that had population differences as large as 89 percent, noting that "nonpopulation criteria must be considered along with the size of population disparities in determining whether a state legislative apportionment plan contravenes the Equal Protection Clause." While the majority of the Court has explicitly refused to adopt the validity of group representation, a number of decisions by the Court clearly point in that direction. In *Davis v. Bandemer* (1986, p. 167), which held that a political gerrymander in Indiana was justiciable while upholding the state's districting plan, Justice Powell in his dissent recognized the legitimacy of group representation: "The concept of 'representation' necessarily applies to groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not." And indeed, the Court recognized "political fairness" as a valid objective in legislative apportionment when it upheld a Connecticut reapportionment plan designed to reflect the relative strength of major political parties (*Gaffney v. Cummings*, 1973, p. 735).

However, it is with respect to race that the Court has been most explicit in its recognition of group rights. In *United Jewish Organizations v. Carey* (1977), the "Court broke new ground." (Saffell, 1987, p. 25) Previously, when ruling on group representation in the apportionment arena, the Court had primarily concerned itself with determining whether there had been invidious discrimination against racial and ethnic groups. But in the 1977 case the Court ruled that the explicit use of racial criteria by New York State in a 1974 state legislative districting plan in its attempt to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

At issue was the claim of the Hasidic community in Williamsburg that the value of the Hasidic voter would be diluted by splitting the community into two state senatorial and assembly districts. This was done to augment the nonwhite population in these districts to 65 percent, so as to enhance the chances of minority representation in the two assembly and senatorial districts. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, maintained that "benign racial classification" was "permissible because it is cast in a remedial context with respect to disadvantaged class rather than a setting that aims to demean or insult any racial group." (*United Jewish Organizations v. Carey*, 1977, pp. 174, 170) And Justice White, writing for the majority, used the concept of virtual representation with respect to white (i.e., Hasidic) voters:

> In individual districts where nonwhite majorities were increased
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to approximately 65%, it became more likely, given racial bloc voting, that black candidates would be elected instead of their white opponents, and it became less likely that white voters would be represented by members of their own race; but as long as whites in Kings County, as a group, were provided with fair representation, we cannot conclude that there was a cognizable discrimination against whites or an abridgment of their right to vote on the grounds of race. (*United Jewish Organizations v. Carey*, 1977, p. 166)

Ronald Rogowski (1981, p. 424) pushes White's reasoning to its logical and, from Rogowski's perspective, absurd conclusion:

On this premise, one supposes, blacks in rural Georgia who were denied the vote before 1965 should have been consoled by the thought that 'their kin' could vote in Atlanta, and minority black voters fenced out of effective power elsewhere should have considered themselves mystically 'represented' by those few districts in Detroit and Chicago in which blacks formed the majority. . . . What Burke would have thought of the notion that black construction workers and black bank executives, or white Hassidim and white Irish Catholics, belong to the same interest merely by virtue of their shared coloration, I leave to the amused speculations of others.

While the Court has flirted with group representation or at least compensatory group representation, the effect of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (amended in 1982) has been to push jurisdictions into creating legislatures that are the Antifederalists' "mirrors" or "true pictures" of the population. The Voting Rights Act not only bans overt barriers to registration, such as literacy and language tests, but also forbids the use of electoral arrangements that "dilute" the votes of members of protected minority groups --blacks, Latinos, Asians and "language minorities." Although the Act does not endorse proportional representation of groups, interpretations by the Justice Department noted below have moved in that direction. Justice has appeared to operate on the assumption that the law requires a maximum number of "safe" districts for protected groups, premised on a purely descriptive notion of representation -- that blacks, Latinos and other protected minorities are not, and can never be, adequately represented except by members of their own group, a view akin to Smith's brief for the election of the yeomanry.

The Court's acceptance of "benign racial classification" for remedial purposes in *United Jewish Organizations* and the interpretation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by the Justice Department has set a pattern for redistricting.
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Efforts which attempt to provide for proportional representation of racial and ethnic groups. Recent developments in New York City provide an illustration of this point and the consequences it has for community fragmentation.

The Supreme Court, in *Board of Estimate of the City of New York v Morris* (1989), declared unconstitutional one of New York City's legislative bodies, the Board of Estimate, for violating "one person, one vote." Subsequently, in November 1989, New York City voters approved charter revisions which included expansion of its other legislative body, the City Council, from 35 to 51 members. The goal of expanding the Council was to make it "more representative of the city's multi-racial, multi-ethnic population." The City Charter, echoing the Voting Rights Act and *Reynolds v Sims* (1964), explicitly called for "fair and effective" representation of the various elements of the city's population. To insure that racial, ethnic and language minorities were to be "fairly" represented (that is, close to their proportion of the population), a fifteen member districting commission was selected to reorganize the city's divisions. It was comprised of four blacks, three Latinos, one Asian, and seven whites; (the city's 1990 population was 25% black, 24% Latino, 7% Asian, and 43% white). The commission was also "balanced" by geography and party.

The districting process which began in July 1990 and was completed more than a year later was rife with racial, ethnic, and political conflict, with groups pitted against each other, jockeying for "safe" districts. The result was a complicated racial gerrymander that was able to command the support of eleven of the fifteen commissioners. However, the plan failed to satisfy the Justice Department which had to "pre-clear" the proposal for the boroughs of Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx. The Department rejected the plan because it did not create enough districts where Latino voters could dictate the outcome.

Assistant Attorney General John R. Dunne, in a letter to the districting commission setting forth his reasons for rejecting the plan, repeatedly said that districting had to afford minority communities "opportunity to elect candidates of their own choice to office." (*New York Times*, 1991b, p. 23) The context of the letter clearly shows that what Dunne meant was that districts were to be drawn so as to ensure that the "choice" of minority voters would be members of their own racial, ethnic, or language group. The obvious premise was that a white candidate would be incapable of truly representing blacks, Latino, or Asian citizens, blacks are incapable of representing non-blacks, and so forth. Elected officials must "mirror" or be a "true picture" in a literal sense of the race of ethnicity of their constituents. What the Justice Department has done in its interpretation of the Voting Rights Act (legitimized by such rulings as *United Jewish Organizations v. Carey*) is to create the conditions for descriptive representation that approximates proportional representation of the city's various ethnic and racial groups without establishing a formal system of proportional representation.

The current New York experience with councilmanic districting under-
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scores Storing’s (1981, p. 3) assertion that the founding was a joint product of Federalist and Antifederalist perspectives which have continued to inform American policy to the present. The ideas articulated by the presumed “losers” in the struggle, the Antifederalists, loom large in contemporary political practice. Antifederalist calls for what is now termed descriptive representation are at the heart of the New York debate. It is particularly ironic that Antifederalist ideas should find their way into contemporary discourse, for they assumed a relatively homogeneous society, quite the contrary of contemporary America.


A core Antifederalist conception, descriptive representation without the concern for character formation and civic education, has been grafted onto an increasingly heterogeneous and fragmented community. The problem of factionalism, which gave rise to the most celebrated statement in American political thought with its images of inflamed passions, conflicts of rival parties, and instability, has appeared in a new guise.

NOTES

1. For example, the dialogue over the term of office for members of the House of Representatives on June 12 and the July 10 debates over the number of representatives in the House, Franklin’s observations on June 11, Hamilton’s arguments on September 10, and Washington’s remarks on the convention’s last day.

2. Smith did acknowledge that “a complete representation would make the legislature too numerous.” (Elliot, 1836, 2: p. 281)

3. This theme was more fully explicated in Federalist Nos. 39 and 51.

4. The Antifederalist advocacy of rotation finds contemporary manifestation in the recent movement for term limitations. In the 1990 elections, voters in three states (Colorado, California, and Oklahoma) approved referenda for term limitations for state legislators; the Colorado measure applied to federal lawmakers as well, raising the issue of constitutionality (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1990a, pp. 3144-3146; 1990b,
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p. 3798). Critics of these proposals present arguments reminiscent of those advanced by Publius and the Federalist delegates at Poughkeepsie. For example, compare Becker (1990, p. 18) with arguments made in Federalist 53 and 72 on duration and rotation.

5. For details of this struggle see De Pauw (1966).
6. In the reformers’ eyes “better” meant people like themselves.
7. Paradoxically, as we have seen, the Antifederalists can also be credited with advancing a group theory of representation.
8. See, for example, Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971); White v Regester (1973); City of Richmond v. US (1975); Beer v US (1976).
9. Sixty-five percent was a figure that the Justice Department would presumably approve, given minority registration rates in Kings County.

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Evolution of Participation in International Organizations:
The United States Experience

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The misapprehension that, because of its isolationist tradition and rejection of the League of Nations, the United States eschewed the joining of multipartite public international organizations prior to World War II is controverted by historical evidence. Except for noninvolvement in Europe's alliances prior to the 1940s, in fact, the United States has participated enthusiastically in multilateral as well as bilateral international agencies in which it has a vital interest or which it regards as beneficial in implementing its foreign relations.

Conventional thinking holds that until World War II, with the exceptions of World War I and Woodrow Wilson's promotion of the League of Nations, the United States generally eschewed involvement in the multilateral diplomacy of the European powers and the establishment of multipartite international organizations. Such thinking gives rise to the hypothesis that our extensive post-World War II involvement had no significant basis in past practice. However, this fails to account for a substantial body of evidence which indicates that active participation by the United States after World War II was founded on steady involvement in international affairs predating that war, and indeed beginning in the eighteenth century. Throughout its independent history the United States has participated in scores of multipartite public international organizations of a "permanent" or continuing nature. It also has been a member of dozens of additional bipartite and temporary multipartite organizations.

Genesis of U.S. Participation in International Organization:
The Record Through World War II

While the United States refrained from major involvement in European political affairs to the time of World War I and again from 1919 to World War II, it did not isolate itself completely from world affairs. Affiliation with international organizations is one relevant measure here: of the nearly 150 organizations in which it has participated since 1945, eight were launched in the nineteenth century,
33 more antedated World War II, and 18 were established during the war years 1942-1945. Thus, nearly 30 percent of these were joined prior to the post-World War II era (see Appendix). 6

During the period prior to World War I, the United States handled most of its international affairs by means of bilateral negotiations, treaties, and arbitrations. Thus, it signed 18 bipartite treaties with Great Britain and Mexico, and nearly 70 such treaties and agreements with the Barbary states and 23 other countries to provide for claims settlements by ad hoc joint or mixed arbitral commissions. Beginning with those with Great Britain (1794 and 1802) and France (1803), these arbitration agencies were established primarily with European and Latin American nations, but also came to include the Fiji Islands as well as Iran and Japan. 8

The United States also was party to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 which provided for the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (the Hague Tribunal) and other institutionalized processes for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 9 To implement the Hague system, the United States sought to standardize advance pacific settlement arrangements through a comprehensive network of twentieth century bilateral pacts with individual countries. 10 In the Western Hemisphere, paralleling the Hague system, the United States also joined Latin American nations in signing general multilateral treaties committing them to peaceful settlement by bipartite Commissions of Inquiry (1925), Conciliation Commissions (1929), and Arbitration Tribunals (1935). Some 35 such bipartite “cooling off” and more than two dozen arbitration pacts were still in effect at the time of Pearl Harbor. Almost all of the territorial, boundary, claims, arbitration, and conciliation arrangements were embodied in formal treaties, requiring Senate approval.

Prior to World War I, the United States also joined some 15 of 45 multipartite functional and administrative agencies created between 1804 and 1914 (Department of State, 1946 and 1950). 11 While the United States never joined either the League of Nations or the Permanent Court of International Justice, it did affiliate with two dozen multipartite organizations; roughly half were League-related and possessed global stature and half were devoted to inter-American affairs. 12

During World War II and the immediate post-surrender period, the United States joined with its Allies in a battery of mostly temporary bipartite, tripartite, and multipartite policy planning, military occupation, and post-hostilities agencies. Aside from those at the highest level, such as the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and International Military Tribunals (to try major war criminals), and their affiliates, the Department of State identifies approximately 40 such agencies (Department of State, 1950, pp. 148-179, 311-326). 13

Overall, as of the end of 1945, in addition to the United Nations and the
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Pan American Union, the United States had been a member of some 216 multipartite organizations, of which approximately 140 were "more or less active," 20 were still in the formative state, and 52 were then defunct or ceased to exist. (Department of State, 1946, pp. 304-312). By 1945 this country also had been a party to 105 bilateral agencies (Department of State, 1946, pp. 312-314).

Post-World War II Participation

The most expansive burgeoning of multipartite international organizations in the international community has occurred since World War II. These may be grouped in three categories: the United Nations system, the Inter-American system and other regional alliances and financial institutions, and unaffiliated or ad hoc agencies. Some organizations—such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labor Organization, International Telecommunication Union, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and Universal Postal Union—antedated the creation of the United Nations, and were later absorbed by it as affiliated specialized agencies. As a consequence of a major revolution in American foreign policy, accentuated by involvement in World War II and plans for maintaining world peace (Carleton, 1957, chaps. 1, 3, and 6; Perkins, 1948, chaps. IX and X), the United States played a leading role in establishing and joining not only the United Nations and its International Court of Justice, but also all of its 20 specialized agencies.15

In the Western Hemisphere, the nascent inter-American system—the core of which consisted of periodic inter-American conferences, occasional Foreign Ministers' Meetings, and the Pan American Union—was formalized as the Organization of American States in 1951. In addition to its 11 primary organs, it currently is supported by six specialized organizations.16 The United States affiliated with all of these, as well as a number of other multipartite Western Hemisphere agencies.

Since 1945 this country also joined a number of regional alliance/security organizations, including the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United States), Rio Pact, and Southeast Asia collective security organizations, and the Central Treaty Organization. It also became a member of key regional banks and development funds (for Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere).17 Finally, the United States has affiliated with an array of ad hoc multipartite organizations.18

Conclusion

To summarize, the United States plays and has played an active role in the global community. Not only has it joined many agencies, but where it has been excluded for geographics reasons, it has cooperated informally, often by means of
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observership representation, as in the case of the European Communities and the Bank of International Settlements, or by "unofficial" coordination.

Thus, contrary to the conventional view cited at the outset, the United States has been an active, if uneven, participant in a vast array of international organizations and relationships since our earliest years as a nation. The conventional hypothesis concerning our pre-World War II posture is not supported by documented evidence.

Another, related issue concerning United States participation in international organizations concerns what may be called the "League of Nations syndrome," which involves the process of affiliation. This issue pertains to the application and effect of executive-legislative relations in the constitutionally-prescribed American treaty process, which was embodied in our separation of powers system and which governs the joining of international agencies but has been tailored to facilitate the process. Treatment of this crucial issue is provided in a parallel study to be published in a subsequent article.

APPENDIX

U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN MULTIPARTITE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II *

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<th>TITLE OF CONSTITUTIVE ACT</th>
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<td>Baghdad Collective Security Alliance (see Central Treaty Organization)</td>
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<td>Bureau of International Expositions</td>
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<td>Central American Tribunal</td>
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<td>Central Bureau of the International Map of the World on the Millionth Scale</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine</td>
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Central International Office
for the Control of Liquor Traffic in Africa

Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO/METO)

Colombo Plan Council

Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

Committee of Control of the International Zone of Tangier

Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM)

Committee of Control of the General Act

International Zone of Tangier Protocol

Council of Foreign Ministers Protocol (CFM)

A Central Treaty Organization Declaration

A Colombo Plan Council Constitution

A Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention

A Committee of Control of the International Zone of Tangier Protocol

A Council of Foreign Ministers Convention

A Committee of Control of the General Act Protocol

A Colombo Plan Council Convention

A Emergency Economic Committee for Europe

A European Coal Organization Agreement

A European Coordination Group for Energy (see also International Energy Agency)

A European Space Research Organization (see also INMARSAT Notes and INTELSAT)

A European Coal Organization Agreement

A European Coordination Group Conference

A European Space Research Exchange of 1966 Organization (see also INMARSAT Notes and INTELSAT)

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<td>A Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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of Customs Tariffs

A International Union of Official Travel Organizations (succeeded by World Tourism Organization, 1975)

T International Whaling Commission

A Interparliamentary Union

INTERPOL (see International Criminal Police Commission)

T Maintenance of Certain Lights in the Red Sea ("Arrangement for")

A Maritime Consultative Council (succeeded by United Maritime Consultative Council; succeeded by Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization)

A Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

A North Atlantic Ice Patrol

T North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

T North Pacific Fur Seal Commission

A Onchocerciasis Fund

T Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

T Organization of American States (OAS) (see also Pan American Union)

T Pan American Health Organization (succeeded by World Health Organization 1951)

A Pan American Institute of Geography and History

A Pan American Railway Congress Association

A Pan American Union (incorporated into the Organization of American States, 1951)

T Permanent Court of Arbitration (see also International Court of Justice)

T Postal Union of the Americas and Spain (see also Universal Postal Union)

A South Pacific Commission

T Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

A Terbella Development Fund

A United Maritime Authority (succeeded by United Maritime Consultative Council; see also International Maritime Organization)

A United Maritime Consultative Council (succeeded United Maritime Authority, and succeeded by Maritime Consultative Council)

T United Nations (UN)

A United Nations Educational, Scientific

Elmer Plischke

Conference 1949

Convention 1948

Conference 1935

Convention 1948

Resolution 1947

Convention 1987

Agreement 1956

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## Commonwealth

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

**A** United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

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<td><strong>A</strong> World Health Organization (WHO) (see also International Office of Public Health and Pan American Health Organization)</td>
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<td><strong>T</strong> World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)</td>
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<td><strong>T</strong> World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (succeeded International Meteorological Organization)</td>
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## NOTES

* This list is arranged alphabetically by titles of international organizations. United States commitments are designated as “`T`” (treaties) and “`A`” (agreements). The treaties are approved by the Senate in accordance with the constitutionally prescribed formal treaty process. Many of the agreements are formal executive agreements approved by both houses of Congress by normal legislative process. Some agreements, primarily embodied in conference resolutions (rather than formal agreements), are confirmed by legislation authorizing participation or providing for representation in the organization and/or financial support. The dates represent not the date of consummation or signature of a treaty or agreement, but the date of effectiveness for the United States.

1. This conventional attitude was founded, to a large extent, on the experience with the Franco-American Alliance of 1778; George Washington’s admonition contained in his historic Farewell Address in 1796; such precepts of the Monroe Doctrine as nonintervention, noninterference, and noninterposition; neutrality during Europe’s wars until 1917; and espe-
cially the rejection of the Covenant of the League of Nations. For general commentary, see Lerche, 1958, pp. 394-395; Plischke, 1967, pp. 530-534; and Schmeckebier, 1935, pp. 1-12; and see note 5, par. 2. This perception supposedly flowed naturally as a consequence of several critical factors. These include geographic distance and slow transport; concentration for decades on continental expansion, internal development, and stabilization; a deliberate policy of non-involvement epitomized by isolationism (and neutrality in time of foreign wars); and the nature and functioning of the American political system. The latter hinged on the constitutionally mandated separation of powers and the resultant conflict between the Executive and Congress over the conduct of foreign affairs (more specifically the unique American treaty-making process), and the division of powers between the federal government and the constituent states.

2. For example, the American colonies established an international confederation of sovereign states in 1777, joined in an alliance with France in 1778, and sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to affiliate with Catherine the Great's "Aimed Neutrality," a "league" or alliance against the belligerents during war between France and Great Britain.

3. The term public international organization generally denotes those that foster intergovernmental cooperation and action, in which governments are represented by accredited and officially instructed delegates or agents, and which are financed primarily by government contributions. They are distinguished from quasi-governmental, non-governmental (NGOs), and private international organizations. The permanent or continuing organizations are distinguished from ad hoc arrangements established to deal with a single or limited problem or function for a relatively short period of time.

4. The exact number varies depending on the criteria applied. Aside from distinguishing multipartite from bipartite, variations arise from considerations of differences between preparatory and regularized, major and minor, temporary and permanent, and public and nongovernmental agencies.

5. For example, it joined other nations in developing trade relations and dissolving the mercantilist system; promoting the doctrine of freedom of the seas and defining the laws of war and neutrality; espousing the principles of self-determination and the rights of emigration, immigration, and expatriation; subscribing to arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international controversies by means of mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication; and cooperating with other nations to deal either jointly or collectively with a host of other non-political endeavors. These matters—as well as isolationism, non-interventionism, the Monroe Doctrine,
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alliance politics, and balance of power (which affected the joining of international organizations)—are treated in a variety of volumes, such as those concerned with conventional American foreign policies (including Borchard, 1946, Carleton, 1957 and 1963, Morley, 1951, and Perkins, 1966); general volumes on American foreign policy, relations, and diplomacy (such as those of Barber, 1953, Gordon and Vines, 1955, Leonard, 1953, Lerche, 1958, and Paterson, 1988); and basic American diplomatic histories (such as those of Adams, 1933, Bailey, 1980, Bemis, 1955, Cole, 1974, Ferrel, 1975, Leopold, 1962, Pratt, 1955, and Van Alstine, 1947).

6. Organizations with which the United States was previously affiliated include a few which were preparatory bodies that functioned pending the launching of more permanent agencies, such as the United Nations Preparatory Commission and the interim or provisional commissions for several United Nations specialized agencies; some 15 were converted into new organizations; nearly 50 were temporary World Wars I and II wartime organizations; and approximately two dozen were post-hostilities transitional agencies—including military government and occupation administrations that have ceased to exist. In addition, more than 65 other pre-1945 organizations became dormant or were discontinued. Not included in the Appendix along with these preparatory, provisional and transitional bodies are such quasi-public agencies as the International Red Cross, bipartite claims commissions and peaceful settlement arrangements, a good many administrative subsidiary and sub-agencies (such as commissions, committees, and councils of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, their specialized agencies, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and a dozen multipartite commodity agencies concerned with specific foods and other commodities. For lists of such agencies, see Department of State, 1946, pp. 314-317, and Department of State, 1950, pp. 311-326.

7. These provided for ad hoc arbitration mechanisms that dealt with 14 territorial disputes pertaining to our northeast territory, the St. Croix River, the Great Lakes, the Lake of the Woods, Oregon, the Gadsden territory, Texas, and the Rio Grande River.

8. A total of some 300 bilateral arbitration treaties were negotiated during the nineteenth century, all providing for some form of international machinery. Well over 200 formal arbitrations were decided, of which the United States was party to 69.

9. In addition to formal arbitration, these embraced good offices and mediation, conciliation, and commissions of inquiry. Significantly, at the 1907 Hague Conference, the United States also proposed the creation of an international permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, but this was not...
10. Under the Hague system, Secretary of State Elihu Root negotiated bilateral treaties with 25 nations in 1908-1909. Five years later Secretary William Jennings Bryan consummated 21 bilateral "cooling off pacts," providing for conciliation of disputes by standing commissions to investigate and report on crises, designed to defer or resolve them. And in 1928-1929 Secretary Frank B. Kellogg negotiated 19 conciliation pacts, primarily with European powers, to replace and supplement the Bryan treaties, and he negotiated 27 arbitration pacts to supersede the Root treaties. Each of these arrangements provided for standby mechanisms for resolving international disputes.

11. The earliest of these included the International Commission of the Cape Spartel Light (1867, to aid navigation in the Straits of Gibraltar), the Universal Postal Union (1874), and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1878). They were followed by the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (1884, protecting patents and trademarks), the International Center for the Exchange of Publications (1889 and 1968), the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (1896), and the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs (1896). In the early twentieth century, the International Association of Navigation Congresses (1902), the International Institute of Agriculture (1906), the International Telecommunication Union (1906) and the International Office of Public Health (1908) were added. See Department of State, 1950, pp. 95-103, 116-122, 236-239, 277-286, 302-307, 320, and 321. Within the Western Hemisphere the United States affiliated with the Pan American Union (1890), the Pan American Sanitary/Health Organization (1906), the Inter-American Commission of Jurists (1908), and the Inter-American Trade Mark Bureau (1912). All but four of these were based on formal treaties (see Appendix).

12. The Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In 1935 this country negotiated a special protocol for affiliation with the Court, but the Senate failed to approve it by a vote of 52 to 36, only seven votes short of the two-thirds majority required.

13. The global included such agencies as the International Criminal Police Commission (INTERPOL, 1938), the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1920), the International Meteorological Organization (IMO, 1930), the International Statistical Institute (1924), and the Interparliamentary Union (1935). Among those established in the Western Hemisphere were the Inter-American Children's Institute (1928), Inter-American Commission of Women (1930), Inter-American Radio Office (1938), Pan American Institute of Geography and History (1929), and Postal Union
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of the Americans and Spain (1922).

14. These range from the Allied Control Commissions and Councils for individual liberated and occupied Axis powers, the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and inter-allied reparations agencies, to the Emergency Committee for the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas, Inter-American Neutrality Committee, Pacific War Council, and Tripartite Merchant Marine Commission on Disposal of the German Merchant Fleet. Bilaterally the United States also joined various resource, commodity, and war production committees, and joint defense boards or commissions with Brazil, Canada, and Mexico. Most of these were temporary agencies, whereas some, such as the Council of Foreign Ministers, continued into the postwar years and a few, including the Inter-American Defense Board and the Permanent Joint Board on Defense with Canada, remain in existence.


16. These specialized organizations include the Inter-American Children’s Institute, Commission of Women, Indian Institute, Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Pan American Health Organization, and Pan American Institute of Geography and History. Other multipartite Western Hemisphere organizations that the United States joined since World War II include the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Development Bank, Pan American Railway Congress Association, and others. See Appendix.


The United States is naturally excluded from a variety of international organizations, primarily those of restricted regional, ethnic, or religious nature. Thus, it has not been affiliated with such basic agencies as the Concert of Europe, the Holy Alliance, and, more recently the Council of Europe, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of African Unity, or with such major economic agencies as the European Economic Community, the European Payments Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. To illustrate the massive global corpus of contemporary international organizations, the Yearbook of International Organizations (Annual) lists more than 1,700 such agencies, some of which are nongovernmental, many of which are constituent or subagencies of more basic institutions, and most of which are geographically or otherwise delimited. For example, it includes at least 725 African, Asian, British Commonwealth, European, Western Hemisphere, and similar agencies, such as those of non-aligned states. The Department of State lists 89 international organizations of which the United States was not a member as of 1945, in which this country apparently had no compelling interest at the time (Department of State, 1946, pp. 314-317). For background studies on the development of
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international organization, see Armstrong, 1982; Ball, 1944; Cheever and Haviland, 1954; Claude, 1971; Eagleton, 1948; Hill, 1931, 1932, and 1952; Lawson, 1962; League of Nations, 1938; Masters, 1945; Pan American Union, 1944; Piquet, 1945; Potter, 1948; Reinsch, 1916; Sayre, 1919; and Schiavone, 1987. For studies on the United States and international organizations, see Corwin, 1944; Karns and Mingst, 1990, and Reiff, 1937. For relevant treaties and the constitutive acts of international organizations, see Habicht, 1931, and Peaslee, 1974-1979. For bibliographical guidance on international organizations, see Aufricht, 1942; Haas, 1971; Hicks, 1919; Rudzinski, 1953; Speckart, 1965; and Zagayko, 1962.

REFERENCES


Elmer Plischke

Princeton University Press.


Commonwealth


Newspaper Coverage of the 1990 Pennsylvania Gubernatorial Campaign

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A content analysis of five daily newspapers' coverage of the 1990 Pennsylvania gubernatorial contest revealed that, as hypothesized, the "strategic game," particularly the horse race, was the predominant press theme. Also confirmed were the predictions that a gubernatorial challenger would receive as much coverage as the incumbent but that differences in patterns of incumbent and challenger coverage would appear. The press focused more on the challenger's campaign mistakes and problems and on the incumbent's record and experience. The fact that the challenger was a female and the incumbent a male received little media attention, and there were very few mentions of candidate gender. Differences in coverage patterns among the five papers were also found: the larger papers were more attentive to the campaign, but contrary to expectations were not more attentive to the issues. Issue-oriented coverage was most prominent in the paper published in the state capital.

As voting patterns in gubernatorial elections have recently become a subject of study in their own right, research has begun to focus on patterns of media coverage in these statewide contests (Tidmarch, Hyman, and Sorkin, 1984; Tidmarch and Karp, 1983; Becker and Fuchs, 1967). But far more is known about the role of the press in presidential and congressional races than in campaigns for the statehouse. To provide additional perspectives on the media in gubernatorial campaigns, this study focuses on newspaper coverage of the 1990 Pennsylvania race between incumbent Democrat Robert Casey and Republican challenger Barbara Hafer.

The Pennsylvania contest provides an opportunity to test several hypotheses drawn from previous analyses of presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional campaigns. The first hypothesis relates to substance of coverage. Studies of press coverage at the local, state, and national levels all find great media emphasis on the "meta-campaign"—press evaluations of how the campaign is going, including candidate strategies and techniques, reactions of supporters, candidate standing in the polls, the mood of the voters, and campaign problems and mistakes. Meta-campaigning consistently receives more attention than do policy issues and candidate attributes (Carey, 1976; Russenello and Wolf, 1979; Patterson, 1980, 1989; Robinson and Sheehan, 1983; Patterson and Davis, 1985; King, 1990). We therefore predict that the "strategic game" theme will dominate coverage of both candidates, with less coverage devoted to public policy issues and the candidates' personal qualities.
Research on press coverage of presidential candidates finds relatively equal coverage of challengers and incumbents (Stovall, 1984, 1988; Stempel and Windhauser, 1989). However, such is not the case for coverage of congressional candidates. In both Senate and House races, incumbents tend to receive significantly more attention than their opponents, with the difference in the amount of incumbent/challenger coverage particularly great in contests for the House of Representatives (Clarke and Evans, 1983; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Tidmarch and Karp, 1983). Which pattern applies to coverage of gubernatorial incumbents and challengers? Salmore and Salmore (1989, pp. 205, 212) suggest that because press coverage of gubernatorial campaigns is heavier than that of Senate races, the effects of incumbency in gubernatorial campaigns more closely conform to the pattern of presidential than congressional contests. Thus we hypothesize that coverage of chief executive candidates at the state level will parallel that of the national chief executive rather than national legislators, and that in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial race, the challenger and incumbent will receive relatively equal amounts of press attention.

Previous research on congressional races has also discovered that the content of incumbent coverage differs somewhat from that of challengers (Clarke and Evans, 1983; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984). Incumbent strengths, particularly their experience and previous records, are emphasized, whereas challengers' weaknesses, particularly their organizational and financial problems, garner more press attention (Clarke and Evans, 1983, pp. 60-64; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984, p. 185). However, in presidential campaigns the general pattern has been for incumbents and challengers not only to receive the same amount of coverage, but also the same type of coverage (Stovall, 1984). But Stovall’s (1988) research on the Reagan-Mondale contest provides evidence to suggest that even in presidential campaigns incumbents may receive more favorable coverage than their opponents if the race involves a highly popular incumbent and a weak challenger. Since the 1990 Pennsylvania gubernatorial campaign presented a similar situation of a popular incumbent and a weak challenger, we hypothesize that newspaper coverage of the Casey-Hafer campaign will stress the incumbent’s strengths and the challenger’s weaknesses.

In the 1990 Pennsylvania campaign the incumbent was a male and the challenger a female. Additionally, the incumbent was well-known for his anti-abortion views while the challenger adopted a strong pro-abortion position. This situation created the potential for the gender difference between the candidates to emerge as an issue in the campaign. Is the potential gender issue addressed by the media? Would the media explicitly and frequently refer to Casey as the male candidate and Hafer as the female candidate in their coverage of the candidates’ personal attributes? Although previous research does not provide an answer to this question, we predict that the press will avoid the issue of gender and concentrate instead on other background attributes of the candidates. This hypothesis does not
suggest that gender would not be a factor in the campaign, but only that the media
will be reluctant explicitly to discuss the gender difference between the candidates
for two reasons. First, the fact that one candidate was male and the other female
was self-evident and therefore the media would feel no need to point out the
obvious. Second, discussion of the gender issue could potentially raise questions
concerning the media’s fairness and objectivity toward the candidates.

Finally, there is evidence from many studies that press coverage varies
according to media size (or circulation) and prestige (King, 1990; Patterson, 1980;
Buell, 1987). This study is limited to newspaper coverage, but we predict that the
larger, more prestigious dailies will provide more campaign coverage in general,
more coverage of policy issues, and more equal coverage of the two candidates
than the smaller papers. These hypotheses are based on the assumption that the
larger papers will have access to more resources and staff (including reporters
based at the state capital) which will be reflected in better balanced and more
extensive coverage of the campaign than the smaller papers.

Method

All Monday through Saturday gubernatorial campaign news coverage
from five Pennsylvania daily newspapers—the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, the Scranton Tribune, the Harrisburg Patriot, and the Erie Morning
News—was content analyzed from October 2, 1990 to November 6, 1990, the five­
week period preceding the election. The newspapers were selected both for their
location within the state and their circulation. All geographical areas of the state
are represented, as is diversity in size of readership.

The thematic content of all five papers which spoke to the campaign
during the five-week time frame was analyzed, with the exception of editorials and
letters to the editors. An article was included in the study if its title specifically
mentioned either Casey or Hafer or the words “gubernatorial election” or
“campaign.” Because most stories contained numerous themes and many
mentioned both candidates, the unit of analysis was the paragraph. If a paragraph
mentioned more than one theme, it was coded under all relevant thematic
categories. Separate tabulations were made for each candidate to permit compari-
son of their patterns of coverage. Neutral references—i.e., those that did not refer
specifically to either candidate—were excluded from this study. Two coders
performed the analysis, and their level of intercoder agreement was 93%.

Three thematic categories were employed: “meta-campaign,’’ “policy
issues,’’ and “personal qualities.’’ To be included under the category of “meta-
campaign,’’ a paragraph had to deal with the campaign as a strategic contest.
Seven subcategories were identified: horse race (poll results and other discussions
of who was ahead or behind); activities of the candidates and/or their campaign
organizations; activities of party leaders and/or party organizations; the mood of
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the voters; campaign problems or mistakes; commentary on TV ads, debates, or other TV coverage; and disputes between the two candidates.

For a paragraph to be coded under "policy issues," it had to include a policy statement either by a candidate or one about the candidate’s policy position. Seven policy subcategories were included: abortion, budget and taxes, environment, education, automobile insurance, the Philadelphia fiscal crisis, and other. The policy areas identified in this study are issues which reflect the state news agenda. Previous research on gubernatorial campaigns indicates that the national news agenda seldom is a component of the media’s coverage of gubernatorial races (Tidmarch, Hyman, and Sorkin, 1984, p. 1239). The issues which dominate the media’s coverage of gubernatorial campaigns tend to include policy areas where state government exercises some authority and control.

The category of "personal qualities" included all paragraphs which referred to the candidates’ gender, image and/or style, record and/or qualifications, personal and/or family background, and status as the incumbent or challenger. The subcategory of gender enabled us to measure the frequency of media reference to the gender difference between the candidates.

Results

As predicted by the first hypothesis, the theme of the meta-campaign received more total coverage than did the other two thematic categories (see Table 1). Whereas the campaign as a strategic contest was mentioned in 55.6% of the candidates’ combined coverage, policy issues appeared in only 22.7% and personal qualities in 21.7%. But some significant differences in distribution of thematic coverage of the two candidates did appear. Although Casey and Hafer had almost identical percentages of issue coverage (23.4% and 22%, respectively), Hafer, the challenger, received significantly more meta-campaign coverage and significantly less coverage of personal qualities than did the incumbent, Casey. Almost 63% of Hafer’s total coverage was devoted to the meta-campaign and only 15% to personal attributes, whereas 48% of Casey’s total coverage dealt with the strategic game and almost 29% with personal characteristics (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>meta-campaign</th>
<th>policy issues</th>
<th>personal qualities</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casey</td>
<td>571 (48%)</td>
<td>279 (23.4%)</td>
<td>340 (28.6%)</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hafer</td>
<td>774 (62.9%)</td>
<td>271 (22%)</td>
<td>185 (15%)</td>
<td>1230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1345 (55.6%)</td>
<td>550 (22.7%)</td>
<td>525 (21.7%)</td>
<td>2420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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For both candidates, the press devoted more attention to the horse race subcategory of the meta-campaign than to any other theme in this study (see Table 2). An almost identical number of paragraphs focused on handicapping the race for each candidate (285 for Hafer and 282 for Casey). Poll results and other analyses of who was ahead and who was behind accounted for 36.8% of Hafer’s meta-campaign coverage and 49.4% of Casey’s (see Table 2).

Although the meta-campaign, particularly the horse race, was the predominant press theme, public policy issues were covered by the newspapers. As Table 2. Distribution of Paragraphs by Candidate and Thematic Subcategory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta-campaign</th>
<th>Casey</th>
<th>Hafer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse race</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>(49.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party activities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mood of voters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign problems</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV coverage</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>(7.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate activities</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>(23.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phila. loans dispute</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Issues</th>
<th>Casey</th>
<th>Hafer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>(14.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes, budget</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>(33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(7.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto insurance</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Qualities</th>
<th>Casey</th>
<th>Hafer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image/style</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>(23.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record/experience</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>(43.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal/family history</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>(20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger/incumbent</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(10.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 indicates, both candidates received almost equal amounts of policy issue coverage (279 paragraphs for Casey and 271 for Hafer), with patterns of issue coverage also showing some similarity. For both Casey and Hafer, state taxes and the budget received the greatest emphasis (about one-third of each candidate's total issue coverage), with the issue of abortion coming in second for both.

The second hypothesis, that the challenger would receive about as much press attention as the incumbent, was confirmed. The incumbent, in fact, got slightly less newspaper attention than did the challenger: the Casey campaign was the subject of 1190 paragraphs in the five newspapers, whereas Hafer was discussed in 1230 (see Table 1). Concerning their personal qualities, the press also tended not to explicitly discuss either candidate’s status as the challenger or incumbent. The number of paragraphs making reference to Hafer as the challenger or Casey as the incumbent was small but identical (35 for each; see Table 2).

Table 3. Distribution of Paragraphs by Candidate and Themes of Campaign Problems and Political Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Casey</th>
<th>Hafer</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign problems/mistakes</td>
<td>24 (14.3%)</td>
<td>144 (85.7%)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political record/experience</td>
<td>148 (90.2%)</td>
<td>16 (9.8%)</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>172 (51.8%)</td>
<td>160 (48.2%)</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As predicted in the third hypothesis, there were some major differences in patterns of coverage of incumbent and challenger, particularly with regard to the subcategories of campaign problems and previous political experience. Although the total amount of coverage devoted to both candidates’ campaign problems and previous experience was almost identical (168 paragraphs dealt with the former theme, and 164 discussed the latter), divergences in pattern for each candidate were extreme. The press devoted significantly more attention to the challenger’s campaign mistakes and problems and significantly less to her political record and experience than the incumbent’s, while the reverse was true for the incumbent (see Table 3). In addition, as Table 2 shows, over twice as many paragraphs made reference to Casey’s personal and family history as to Hafer’s (70 and 27 paragraphs, respectively).

The gender issue, as hypothesized, received very little press attention in the 1990 Pennsylvania gubernatorial campaign. Only five paragraphs from all the newspapers explicitly discussed Casey’s gender, and only 24 mentioned Hafer’s (see Table 2). Although the female candidate received more gender mentions than
did the male, the total number of paragraphs focusing on this subcategory of candidate personal qualities was miniscule. The personal characteristic most mentioned for Casey was political record and experience (148 paragraphs); for Hafer it was image and style (78 paragraphs).

Table 4. Distribution of Paragraphs by Candidate, Newspaper, and Theme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Casey</th>
<th>Hafer</th>
<th>totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>meta-campaign</td>
<td>policy</td>
<td>personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>issues</td>
<td>qualities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>196 (54.1%)</td>
<td>78 (21.5%)</td>
<td>88 (24.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>163 (57.6%)</td>
<td>62 (21.9%)</td>
<td>58 (20.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrisburg</td>
<td>51 (27.4%)</td>
<td>85 (45.7%)</td>
<td>50 (26.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scranton</td>
<td>87 (49.2%)</td>
<td>27 (15.2%)</td>
<td>63 (35.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erie</td>
<td>74 (40.7%)</td>
<td>27 (14.8%)</td>
<td>81 (44.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                     | Hafer         | personal     | totals |
|                     | meta-campaign | policy       | qualities|        |
|                     | N %           | issues       |         |        |
| Philadelphia        | 215 (58.7%)   | 75 (20.5%)   | 76 (20.8%)| 366    |
| Pittsburgh          | 276 (83.4%)   | 28 (8.5%)    | 27 (8.2%)| 331    |
| Harrisburg          | 130 (49.6%)   | 94 (35.9%)   | 38 (14.5%)| 262    |
| Scranton            | 80 (62.0%)    | 30 (23.3%)   | 19 (14.7%)| 129    |
| Erie                | 73 (51.4%)    | 44 (31.0%)   | 25 (17.6%)| 142    |

The final hypotheses in this study related to expected differences in coverage according to newspaper prestige and size (or circulation). As predicted,
the largest and most prestigious papers, the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, devoted more attention to the campaign than did the smaller dailies. The Philadelphia Inquirer, the only newspaper sampled which is considered to be a member of the "prestige press," had the greatest number of articles devoted to the campaign (51). The Pittsburgh-Post-Gazette was second with 35 articles, and the Harrisburg, Scranton and Erie papers had 27, 23, and 24 articles respectively. The prestigious Philadelphia Inquirer, as predicted, was almost equally attentive to the two candidates, with Casey mentioned in 362 paragraphs and Hafer in 366. But the other four papers showed a greater discrepancy in amount of coverage, with the Pittsburgh and Harrisburg papers devoting more space to Hafer and the two others devoting more to Casey (see Table 4). This discrepancy in amount of coverage does not appear to be attributable to political partisanship by the papers. All five papers editorially endorsed Casey’s re-election bid. However, this is not to say that individual papers did not exhibit signs of bias. For example, the Scranton Tribune (Casey’s hometown newspaper) ran six photographs of Casey to accompany news articles during the five-week period but none of Hafer.

The hypothesis that the larger, more prestigious papers would be more attentive to the issues than the smaller dailies was not confirmed. The Harrisburg Patriot, published in the state capital, contained more paragraphs devoted to both candidates’ policy issues than did either the Philadelphia or Pittsburgh papers. The Patriot mentioned Casey’s policy issues in 85 paragraphs and Hafer’s in 94; the comparable figures for the Philadelphia Inquirer are 78 and 75 paragraphs, respectively, and for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 62 and 28 paragraphs, respectively (see Table 4). Both the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh papers devoted over half of their coverage of each candidate to the meta-campaign (a whopping 83% of the Post-Gazette’s coverage of Hafer focused on the meta-campaign); of all the newspapers studied, the Harrisburg paper was the least attentive to both candidates’ strategic contest and most attentive to their policy issues.

One final area concerns the relative importance of campaign news compared to other news stories. In other words, how “newsworthy” was the campaign for each newspaper? Part of the answer to this question is provided by the number of news articles on the campaign which each newspaper ran (Table 4). However, total number of news articles about the campaign is also a function of both the newspaper’s priorities and its resources and staff size. Thus one would expect the large papers to carry more articles because of these factors. Another indication of the relative importance of the campaign is suggested by the proportion of campaign articles placed on the front page, and on this indicator, the five papers varied considerably. The paper with the fewest front page campaign articles was the largest: the Philadelphia Inquirer, which had only 8% of its campaign articles on the front page. The smallest, the Erie Morning News, led all the other papers with 42% of its campaign articles on the front page. The
Harrisburg, Pittsburgh, and Scranton papers had 26%, 31%, and 22% of their campaign articles on the front page, respectively.

Discussion and Conclusion

Among the most significant findings in this study was that even though the contest was very lopsided from the beginning (Casey remained far ahead in all the polls conducted during the summer and fall of 1990 and won the election by a landslide), the press still focused more on the theme of the horse race and other facets of the campaign as a strategic contest than on policy issues and the candidates' personal qualities and qualifications. Media fascination with handicapping the race has been found in numerous studies of presidential primaries and general election campaigns; it holds true also for this very one-sided gubernatorial race. The only newspaper to devote more attention to policy issues than to the meta-campaign was published in the state capital, while even the state's most prestigious newspaper addressed the meta-campaign more than issues of public policy.

Evidence from the 1990 Casey-Hafer campaign also suggests that certain patterns of gubernatorial coverage parallel those found in presidential campaigns, while other patterns of press coverage follow those found in congressional campaigns. The large discrepancy between the amount of coverage granted to incumbents and challengers noted in congressional campaigns does not seem to be followed in this case of coverage of a state chief executive campaign. The evidence from this study and from research on presidential campaigns suggests that incumbents and challengers in chief executive contests seem to garner relatively equal amounts of coverage, particularly in the prestige press, regardless of how lopsided the race may be. But equal amount of coverage is not the same as equal distribution of coverage. This study confirms previous congressional-level (as well as lopsided presidential) findings that incumbents have an advantage, as the press is more likely to focus on the incumbent's strengths and the challenger's weaknesses than the reverse. The reality of the Pennsylvania campaign was that Hafer did have many campaign problems and weaknesses including an unexpected and difficult challenge in the primary as well as poor organization and financial problems in the general election. But she also had a strong political background and substantial previous experience. These latter characteristics were virtually ignored by the newspapers, whereas Casey's record and experience got a lot of play in all five papers.

The findings of this study suggest a number of implications concerning the role of the press in gubernatorial campaigns. First, although the press gave greater emphasis to the meta-campaign aspects of the race, policy issues were covered and that coverage reflected the issue priorities of the candidates. The Hafer campaign clearly centered its message on the issues of abortion, the budget and
Commonwealth

taxes. At the same time, the Casey campaign emphasized the fiscal soundness of state government and the health of the economy. These were the issues which received the greatest coverage by the press. In other words, the candidates were successful in defining the substantive issues of the campaign which received media attention. However, a second conclusion this study suggests is that even though the challenger was successful using the free media to articulate her policy positions, Casey enjoyed certain advantages deriving from incumbency which resulted in more favorable press coverage. Incumbents and challengers are not treated the same by the press in contests for governor. To be sure, the mistakes and problems of the Hafer campaign also played a role in contributing to her electoral defeat, but Hafer's mistakes do not account for the greater press attention to Casey's background and political experience.

Finally, this study provides evidence to support the conclusion that newspapers in Pennsylvania are significantly diverse in the pattern of coverage they provide in gubernatorial campaigns. Variation in coverage stems from many factors. The list of variables would include circulation, geographical location, commitment and number of reporters, and partisanship. As a consequence, the newspapers used in this study varied in the amount, type, and quality of coverage they provided of the campaign.

Press portrayal of the gender issue remains a topic for further research. Does the pattern of press avoidance of the discussion of candidate gender occur in other statewide chief executive-level contests? In 1990, female gubernatorial candidates ran against males in several large states, and comparative analyses of their treatment by the media need to be undertaken. From this study we cannot judge the extent to which patterns of press coverage were the result of incumbency, the lopsided nature of the contest, and other factors which research suggests influence press coverage, or whether these patterns were also influenced by the gender difference between the candidates. Nevertheless, the lack of press interest in this aspect of the campaign alone was an interesting feature of press coverage of the Pennsylvania gubernatorial campaign.

Variation in patterns of gubernatorial coverage by the different media also warrants further examination. For example, is the Pennsylvania finding that the newspaper based in the state capital focuses more on policy issues than even the prestige press a generalizable one? And much comparative data are still needed about how the media in different states portray gubernatorial candidates. Only with additional research can we determine whether the patterns discovered in this study about press coverage of the Casey-Hafer contest are typical of gubernatorial coverage in general.

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of
Erika G. King, Robert A. Wells & Elizabeth W. Wells

the Pennsylvania Political Science Association, Carlisle, PA, April 12, 1991. The authors wish to thank Bruce Andrews and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

1. Two methodological issues arose which require some explanation. These are the selection of the five-week period preceding the election as the time frame for analysis and the exclusion of the Sunday editions of the newspapers from the data set. The appropriate time period for analyzing press coverage of campaigns is a matter of scholarly disagreement. Some scholars consider the entire period from Labor Day to election day as the traditional campaign beginning and ending dates (see, for example, Stovall, 1984, 1988; Stempel and Windhauser, 1989). Other scholars, however, focus only on the four to five week period preceding the election (Tidmarsh and Karp, 1983; Tidmarsh, Hyman, and Sorkin, 1984; Carey, 1976; Russenello and Wolf, 1976), as they consider the last four to five weeks of the campaign to coincide with the peak period of media interest and coverage. An examination of the five newspapers used in this study revealed that it was only in the last five weeks of the campaign that substantial coverage began to occur. Thus, only the data from the last five weeks of the campaign were analyzed for this study.

The Sunday editions of the various papers were omitted to preserve comparability of the findings. One of the newspapers (the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette) does not publish a Sunday edition, while others (the Erie Morning News and the Harrisburg Patriot) publish a joint Sunday edition with the local evening daily. Thus the absence of one Sunday edition and the lack of comparability among the rest precluded the inclusion of the Sunday editions for analysis.

2. As of 1989, the Philadelphia Inquirer had a circulation of 508,496; the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette's circulation was 168,144; the Harrisburg Patriot had a circulation of 50,425; the Scranton Tribune a circulation of 37,935; and the Erie Morning News a circulation of 28,355 (Boyden, 1989).

3. One of the authors of this study contacted William Yingling, a reporter for the Harrisburg Patriot, to discuss the distinctive pattern of coverage given to the campaign by that newspaper. Mr. Yingling suggested two possible explanations. The first centered on the location of the newspaper in the state capital which results in an environment where the reporters are more knowledgeable about state issues and also consider state politics to be their natural focus. Second, Mr. Yingling indicated that the reporters at the Patriot had made a commitment to provide substantive coverage of this particular campaign. What this study can not determine is whether, in the absence of such a commitment, the location of a newspaper in the state capital is sufficient to generate distinctive coverage of gubernatorial elections.
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