EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD

Aryeh Botwinick  
(Temple University)
David Butler  
(Nuffield College, Oxford University)
M. Margaret Conway  
(University of Florida)
Lester G. Crocker  
(University of Virginia, Emeritus)
Roger H. Davidson  
(University of Maryland)
Jean B. Elshtain  
(Vanderbilt University)
Richard F. Fenno  
(University of Rochester)
Marianne Githens  
(Goucher College)
Michael B. Grossman  
(Towson State University)
Susan W. Hammond  
(American University)
Dorothy B. James  
(Connecticut College)
Samuel Krislov  
(University of Minnesota)
G. Calvin Mackenzie  
(Colby College)
Michael J. Malbin  
(Office of the Secretary of Defense)
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.  
(Harvard University)
Kenneth F. Mott  
(Gettysburg College)
Craig N. Murphy  
(Wellesley College)
Mark. P. Petracca  
(University of California, Irvine)
Elmer Plischke  
(University of Maryland, Emeritus)
Robert J. Pranger  
(University of Maryland)
H. Mark Roelofs  
(New York University)
Bruce M. Russett  
(Yale University)
Victoria Schuck  
(Stanford University)
J. David Singer  
(University of Michigan)
Alonzo T. Stephens, Sr.  
(Tennessee State University, Emeritus)
Elliott White  
(Temple University)
Aaron Wildavsky  
(University of California, Berkeley)
The United States and Revolutions: Patterns and Response

David T. Jervis

Primates, Coalitions and Small Group Politics

Stephen A. Peterson and Albert Somit

The New Libertarianism and the Sedition Act of 1798

Gerard J. Fitzpatrick

Forsaking the Market: Price Controls and Ideological Change in the United States

Gordon P. Henderson

Independent Judges in a Democracy: A Research Note

Timothy J. O'Neill

PENNSYLVANIA RESEARCH

Gender Differences in Public Policy Attitudes

James F. Skrok
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Gerard J. Fitzpatrick is an Associate Professor of Politics at Ursinus College. His particular areas of interest are public law and the judicial process.

Gordon P. Henderson is Assistant Professor of Government and Politics at Widener University. His teaching and research interests are in political theory and American national politics.

David Jervis is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Washburn University, specializing in American foreign policy and international politics. He has published articles focusing on the American response to Third World change.

Timothy J. O’Neill is associate professor and holder of the Tower-Hester Chair in Politics at Southwestern University, Georgetown, Texas. He has published Bakke and the Politics of Equality (1985) and articles in such journals as the American Political Science Review, Law and Policy, and Polity.

Steven A. Peterson is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Division of Social Sciences at Alfred University. He has research interests in American Politics, Political Behavior, and Biopolitics.

James E. Skok is an Associate Professor of Public Administration and Public Policy at Penn State-Harrisburg. His articles have appeared in Public Administration Review, Western Political Quarterly, American Review of Public Administration, and Administration and Society.

Albert Somit is Distinguished Service Professor at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. His areas of interest include Political Philosophy, the History of the Discipline, and Biopolitics.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In addition to the Pennsylvania Political Science Association, the following institutions have provided special financial support for COMMONWEALTH:

Gettysburg College
Pennsylvania State University, Behrend Campus

Juniata College
St. Francis College

King's College
Widener University

Lehigh University

COMMONWEALTH is published annually in the Fall under the authorization of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association and sent to all members, individual, departmental and institutional.

Subscription rates for all categories of membership: see separate announcements elsewhere in this issue. Changes of address sent to PPSA Secretary, Dr. Thomas Brogan, Albright College, Reading, PA 19603. Postmaster: send notification about undelivered journals to this address. Second class postage paid at Chester, PA and at additional mailing offices. Copyright 1989 by the Pennsylvania Political Science Association. (ISSN 0890-2410) Advertising and reprint information and rates are available from the Managing Editor, who should also be contacted concerning exchange of camera-ready official announcements of reciprocating political science associations and journals.

COMMONWEALTH will print free of charge camera-ready official announcements of up to one page of the American Political Science Association, as well as the Northeastern Political Science Association and its constituent members, and other organizations whose Journals provide corresponding privileges to PPSA. Closing date is March 15. Contact the Editor.
THE PENNSYLVANIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

OFFICERS

President
Donald G. Tannenbaum
(Gettysburg College)

First Vice President
Michael Roskin
(Lycoming College)

Second Vice President
Thomas Baldino
(Juniata College)

Treasurer
Donald Buzinkai
(King's College)

Secretary
Thomas Brogan
(Albright College)

Past President
Frank Colon
(Lehigh University)

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

1987-1990
Zachary Irwin
(Pennsylvania State University, Behrend College)

W. Wesley McDonald
(Elizabethtown College)

1988-1991
Nicolas Berry
(Ursinus College)

Joan Hulse Thompson
(Beaver College)

1989-1992
Albert Dalmolen
(Mansfield University)

Joseph Melusky
(St. Francis College)
For most of its first fifty years the scholarly activities of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association (PPSA) centered on planning for and participating in the annual meeting. Recently these activities have been augmented by the inauguration of this journal. Now there is a new development: about the time that PPSA members are sent this issue of COMMONWEALTH they should also receive Pennsylvania Political Scientist (formerly the PPSA Newsletter). Designed to enhance reader awareness of new research in political science and disciplinary developments in Pennsylvania, each from a different perspective, both publications, together with the opportunity to participate in the annual meeting, constitute the core activities of PPSA as this venerable yet dynamic organization begins its second half-century.

Communication with the larger constituency of this journal is essential to its continued growth and vitality. Thus, I joined three other state journal editors at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Atlanta where, under the auspices of the "Applied Political Science" section, we presented a panel titled "Getting Published in a State Political Science Journal: Editorial Perspectives." (An account of the panel's proceedings should appear soon in PS.) The panel was chaired by APSR Managing Editor Samuel C. Patterson. In the paper I wrote for that panel, "An Author's Guide to Editorial Decision-Making in COMMONWEALTH: A Journal of Political Science," I explored some aspects of what our panel chair has called "the sociology of knowledge in political science" (Patterson et al, 1989, p. 878). While the full text of this paper appears in the first issue of Pennsylvania Political Scientist, I want to draw attention to a few items which bear on decision-making for the issue you hold in your hands.

The largest number of the articles refereed for this issue were in American politics, and this included those focusing on politics in Pennsylvania. Political theory ranked second, followed by comparative politics, international relations, and biopolitics. None were exclusively in either methodology or formal theory, but a number were grounded in statistically-based quantitative data.

One of my major tasks as Editor is to try to ensure that the editorial process is as fair and efficient as possible. While far from ideal, data indicates that the peer review process was reasonably fair, as measured by the consistency factor. Thus, over 80% of the papers refereed by more than one person had fully consistent reviews. This indicates a very strong degree of
common underlying standards of evaluation among our reviewers on the scholarly merit of submissions. Furthermore, referee views guided my editorial decision-making a significant 80% of the time. In every case when all referees said "reject" I concurred, while all papers which had either uniformly positive or mixed reviews were asked to revise and resubmit. The result is an issue a little larger than past ones: it features six articles rather than the five articles each printed in Volumes 1 and 2.

The process was also reasonably efficient, based on the time it took for manuscripts to be evaluated. While referee responses ranged from as little as one week to as long as four months, the average time from manuscript submission to my letter to authors stating my editorial decision was ten weeks. Some papers required extensive revision, and in several cases these ran into as many as five drafts. Still, the average time from initial submission to publication for the articles appearing in this issue was slightly over a year.

The comparative data given in the full paper indicates that in terms of both fairness and efficiency, decision-making on Volume 3 compares favorably with outcomes found for a range of over 50 political sciences journals, including some of the top ones in the discipline. Past and prospective authors seeking an honest appraisal from us will, I hope, be encouraged by this information.

Those who wish to evaluate for themselves the extent to which Volume 3 continues to realize the mission of this journal, "to publish important scholarly writing germane to political science," are urged to read the end product of the decision-making process described above. Among the six articles selected for this issue is an analysis and evaluation of American policy toward five major revolutions of the late twentieth century, followed by a study of implications of research into "chimpanzee politics" for human political behavior. Two other papers examine the effects of political disputes: one looks at a central controversy which strengthened early American support for freedom of speech and press, while a second examines a more recent controversy that led to a shift in elite attitudes toward a notable component of the American political economy. A research note studies the relationship between the way judges in three states are selected and their legal-democratic role orientation. The last piece, which focuses on Pennsylvania, examines some underlying reasons for gender differences found by researchers studying public policy attitudes. All these works are clearly germane to political science.

Beyond this, are they eclectic? Unquestionably. Important? "Yes" say our expert referees. Do you think otherwise? Write us!

A final word: COMMONWEALTH is a cooperative undertaking which relies on the professional efforts of a variety of participants; authors, peer reviewers, editors and editorial board members, and our other external advisors and friends, as well as the members and
CHARTER DEPARTMENTAL MEMBERS
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Commemorating its Fiftieth Anniversary, PPSA established this new category of membership. In brief, it enables each department to support PPSA by enrolling all of its faculty simultaneously for one reasonable charge. Each enrolled person is then entitled to all the benefits of membership at no additional fee. (Further information and forms may be found elsewhere in this issue.)
The Pennsylvania Political Science Association recognizes the Charter Departments of the following institutions for their special role in supporting our state organization.

Albright College Muhlenberg College
Bloomsburg University of PA Pennsylvania State University at Harrisburg
Chestnut Hill College Pennsylvania State University, Behrend College
Clarion University of PA Shippensburg University of PA
Dickinson College Susquehanna University
Edinboro University of PA Temple University
Elizabethtown College University of Pennsylvania
Gettysburg College University of Pittsburgh
Haverford College Washington and Jefferson College
Immaculata College West Chester University of PA
Indiana University of PA Westminster College
Juniata College York College of Pennsylvania
Commemorating its Fiftieth Anniversary, PPSA has established this new category of membership. For a most reasonable charge, on a single form, an entire department can now join PPSA. Membership includes, for each member of your department whom you list, the full benefits of individual PPSA membership, including:

* personal copies of COMMONWEALTH
* the new Pennsylvania Political Scientist (our expanded Newsletter)
* advance Call for Papers for the Annual Meeting

Every member department is specially recognized by being listed in COMMONWEALTH, thus marking its role in supporting PPSA; current department members are already so listed earlier in this issue.

Departmental Membership annual dues, depending on highest degree granted in Political Science on your campus:

- Doctoral-granting schools: $100.00
- Masters-granting schools: 75.00
- Bachelors-granting schools: 50.00
- Two-year campuses: 25.00

To enroll prior to the Annual Meeting, mail by April 1 to:

PPSA Treasurer, Dr. Donald Buzinkai, King's College, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711

Chairperson's Name: ____________________________________________

Address: _______________________________________________________

City, State, Zip: _________________________________________________

Check enclosed, sum of: _______________________________________

Please list current faculty members in your department who are to receive all mailings on a separate (letterhead) page, alphabetically, with academic rank next to each name.
To Individual Members: remember, when you join the PENNSYLVANIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, the oldest state political science association in the United States, membership includes COMMONWEALTH: A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

If you will not be able to attend the meeting this year and want to maintain your individual membership (enabling you to receive the next issue of COMMONWEALTH, the new Pennsylvania Political Scientist and all other mailing) please complete the form below and mail it in, postmarked before April 1.

NOTE: If your department has enrolled as a Departmental Member, you are already a member and need not personally enroll or pay additional dues to receive all benefits of membership. In addition, as long as your department continues as a Departmental Member, it will not be necessary for you to remember to renew each year in order to continue to support PPSA and receive all benefits. If your department has not yet enrolled, PPSA encourages you to share the Departmental Membership Form in this issue with your Chairperson.

Membership Rates:
- Individuals: $5.00
- Students: $3.00
- Institutional and Library: $12.00
(Add $1.00 for foreign countries)

Mail to: PPSA Treasurer, Dr. Donald Buzinkai, King's College, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711

NAME ________________________________

AFFILIATION ___________________________

ADDRESS ________________________________________________________________

CITY, STATE, ZIP __________________________

Check Enclosed, Sum of: __________________________
THE UNITED STATES AND REVOLUTIONS: PATTERNS OF RESPONSE

David T. Jervis
Washburn University

Revolutions are rare in human history. This study details and evaluates American policy toward five truly revolutionary situations in the post-World War II era: China, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua. American policy in these cases progressed through four relatively distinct phases: (1) American officials failed to recognize the seriousness of the threat to the incumbent, pro-American regime. (2) Once policymakers became aware of the threatening situation, they encouraged the leader in the target state to initiate reforms. (3) Failure of the reform effort and a successful opposition movement led the U.S. to seek to guide the transition to a new regime. (4) While opposed to the regime which was eventually established, the U.S. still hoped to establish productive relations with it. The prevailing pattern in these cases is attributed to a misunderstanding of Third World realities and the processes of change there, and to exaggerated notions of American influence. The concluding portion of the article recommends ways to improve American perceptions and policy in such situations.

Revolutions are rare in modern history. Truly successful revolutions are even more rare (Hagopian, 1974, pp. 1-40; Sick, 1985, p. 158). The United States has had to deal with only a handful of true revolutions in the post-World War II period: in China, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua. In none of these cases did the U.S. attain its goals. This study reviews and assesses the flawed U.S. policy toward revolutionary settings, suggests reasons for the flawed policy, and recommends a modified approach toward revolutions and political instability in the Third World.

For analytic purposes, American policy in these situations can be divided into four relatively distinct phases. In the first, United States officials did not recognize the seriousness of the threat to the incumbent, pro-
American regime. A second stage was initiated once policymakers became aware of the threatening situation. An effort was made to promote reforms and liberalization in the target country. The suggested reforms did not have the desired effect (or were initiated too late), which led the U.S. to seek to guide the transition to a successor regime. In this third phase, American officials encouraged the use of the mechanisms and behavior patterns common to democratic societies. Neither the transition process which did occur nor its result was favored by the U.S. Nonetheless, in the fourth phase, U.S. officials hoped to establish productive relations with the new government.

Each of these phases will be illustrated by concentrating upon one of the most conspicuous cases. However, brief mention will also be made of other cases to demonstrate that U.S. policy toward most revolutionary situations has followed this pattern. The extent to which certain cases deviate from the pattern will also be noted.

The persistence of such a pattern through these cases, which occurred over a thirty year period, illustrates the persistence of the global containment mentality in official American thinking. In each case the U.S. supported the incumbent regime primarily because it was pro-American and promised to maintain stability. U.S. support was vigorous until it was apparent that there was widespread opposition to the incumbent regime. The U.S. then sought first to encourage reforms, and later to guide the transition to a moderate successor regime when the proposed reforms either did not occur or did not have the desired impact. These extensive, though belated, efforts also illustrate the global containment mentality and a perceived need to prevent radical groups from attaining power.

Phase I: Belated Recognition

In response to most post-World War II revolutionary situations, American officials failed to recognize that the incumbent, pro-American regime was seriously threatened by domestic unrest. The best-known recent example of this problem is the Iranian revolution. Not until October-November 1978 (i.e., less than four months prior to the Shah's departure) did American officials realize that his regime was in serious trouble. An August 1978 CIA report concluded that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation." The Defense Intelligence Agency asserted in late September that "the Shah is expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years" (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980, pp. 11-12; Sick, 1985, pp. 89-93).
The intelligence community has been criticized for its failures in the Iranian case, but similar errors were also made by analysts in a number of other revolutionary situations. In the Cuban case, the State Department did report in August 1958 that the Batista government might be overthrown, but argued that the "majority of the Cuban population...is not willing to take up arms against him, is apathetic to his rule, and only desires a return to stable political conditions." Not until late in 1958 did the Department conclude that "any solution in Cuba requires that Batista must relinquish power" (U.S. State Department, 1958a, 1958b). Regarding the Nicaraguan revolution, it was not until August-September 1978 that Carter administration officials warned that an anti-Somoza government might come to power. Prior to that time the U.S. had expected Somoza to continue as President until the expiration of his term in 1981 (Riding, 1978a, p. 84; Riding, 1978b, p. 32).

A slightly different pattern prevailed in the Chinese and Vietnamese cases. Events in those countries forced American officials to recognize that the regimes there were threatened. In the Chinese case, there had been an ongoing civil war for over a decade. South Vietnam had only recently been created and its government faced a number of problems. Nonetheless, in these cases as well, American officials were very optimistic. In the South Vietnamese case, for instance, an October 1955 National Intelligence Estimate contended that "[p]rovided the Communists do not exercise their capabilities to attack across the 17th Parallel or to initiate large-scale guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, [President] Diem will probably make further progress in developing a more effective government." The government's position would "probably be strengthened as a result of increased popular support, the continued loyalty of the VNA, and a deterioration in the strength and cohesiveness of his non-Communist opposition" (Pentagon Papers, 1971, vol. 1, pp. 297-298).

Miscalculating the seriousness of the challenge to these leaders constituted a significant intelligence failure, though perhaps not a surprising one. Gary Sick, a participant in the Iranian case, has argued that a failure to perceive the onset of revolutions is "a common experience of all revolutions" (Sick, 1985, p. 157). Each of the incumbent leaders had long been in power. Each survived earlier political challenges, and there was little reason to expect that they would not overcome the current one. Thus, U.S. officials probably saw little reason to be unduly alarmed about the early manifestations of unrest. In addition, seemingly more important foreign policy concerns diverted the attention of upper-level officials. For instance, during the period of growing opposition to Batista in the late 1950s,
American attention was focused upon Berlin and a response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik. Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted that in the late 1970s, when the Shah and Somoza were facing the instability which would eventually overthrow them, American "decision-making circuits were heavily overloaded" as the Carter administration focused on the Middle East peace process and arms talks with the Soviets (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 358). Finally, the American foreign policy-making structure—with its emphasis upon continuing, day-to-day relations with established governments—may not be equipped to deal with such atypical events as revolutions (Sick, 1985, pp. 38-42).

Whatever the reasons for the failure to comprehend the seriousness of the challenge to these governments, that failure had important, negative consequences upon subsequent American efforts to promote change. Policymakers attached little significance to any instability until a very late date. As a result, U.S. policy remained constant while the situation in each of these countries changed. Moreover, prevailing policies, indicating American support for the incumbent government, continued. Once the urgency of the situation was recognized, the United States became more interested and involved. However, this increased involvement came at such a late date that U.S. influence and credibility with all participants were significantly reduced. The passage of time also allowed the domestic situation in each country to become polarized, greatly undermining the influence of those moderate pro-American elements which the U.S. hoped to encourage (W. Smith, 1987, pp. 13-41; LeoGrande, 1982, p. 64; Brzezinski, 1983, p. 355).

Phase II: Mitigating Efforts at Reform

When American officials realized that these governments faced substantial challenges, they became much more interested in the situation. Typically, they encouraged the threatened regime to initiate significant reforms as a means of alleviating discontent. However, American rhetoric and actions prior to and concurrent with the instability inhibited both U.S. leverage and the likelihood of major reforms. In each instance the United States pursued two somewhat contradictory goals: encourage the incumbent government to reform, yet support that government so that it would not be overthrown by radical forces. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson noted when detailing the aims of U.S. policy toward China in the late 1940's, the U.S. sought to bring peace "which would permit stable government and progress along democratic lines" (which would necessitate radical changes in
One way in which U.S. influence was often undermined was the extensive (and, it could be argued, excessive) American praise of the incumbent regime. For instance, President Carter praised the "great leadership of the Shah" of Iran in December 1977 and cited this as the reason that country was "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world" (Carter, 1978, p. 2222). In addition to lauding the Shah, American officials often cited the importance of good relations with Iran. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance pointed to the "long and close relationships" between the U.S. and Iran; such ties were "demonstrably in the [American] national interest" and "among our most important ties abroad" (Vance, 1977a, p. 613; Vance, 1977b, p. 245).

It was not simply American rhetoric, however, which reassured these leaders about continued American support and, consequently, undermined U.S. efforts to promote reform. The U.S. often acted in ways which had the same effect. Again, the Iranian case provides a useful example. The Shah visited the U.S. prior to the outbreak of domestic instability. Carter visited Iran in December 1977. The administration also continued arms sales to Iran despite congressional opposition and the administration's stated goal of restricting such sales (Sick, 1985, pp. 43-46).

American relations with the Diem regime in South Vietnam also provide an excellent illustration of this pattern. Walter Robertson, an Assistant Secretary of State, asserted in mid-1956 that "Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure," and that "the entire free world has become richer for his example of determination and fortitude" (Pentagon Papers, 1971, vol. 1, pp. 611-612). Vice President Johnson described the South Vietnamese leader as the "Churchill of today" after a 1961 visit (Trumbell, 1961, p. 1). It was during the Diem years that the U.S. began to provide extensive aid to South Vietnam. Between 1955 and 1961 U.S. military aid averaged $200 million per year, making South Vietnam the second largest recipient of U.S. military aid. By 1963, it was the largest recipient of U.S. military aid and the third largest recipient of economic aid (Gelb, 1971, p. 143).

Similar patterns of rhetoric and behavior were also present in other cases. The United States provided over $2 billion in aid to China from 1945 to 1949, including close to $1.6 billion in grants (U.S. State Department, 1949, p. 1042). In the Cuban case, Ambassadors Arthur Gardner and Earl
Smith were effusive in their praise of President Batista. Vice President Nixon visited the island in 1955 (Bonsal, 1971, pp. 13-14; E. Smith, 1962).

The effect of such American rhetoric and actions was to undermine American efforts to promote reforms in these countries, reforms which were believed necessary to ameliorate discontent. Statements and actions in support of these leaders had occurred prior to the initiation of any reforms. Chiang, Somoza, and other entrenched leaders could assume that American support would continue, even if American-proposed reforms were not initiated. Such an assumption was especially likely in light of the repeated American statements about the importance of U.S. ties with these countries. American support would continue because it was in American interests, regardless of whether or not significant reforms were initiated (Sick, 1985, pp. 20-21).

The U.S. did criticize several of these regimes and impose sanctions against them, e.g., Cuba in 1958 and Nicaragua in 1977. Nonetheless, the basic point remains valid. The criticisms came very late, after years of American support. In addition, the sanctions themselves were relatively modest, e.g., temporarily withholding economic and military aid to Nicaragua in 1977. Such sanctions may have encouraged the regimes’ opponents—and, consequently, had an impact upon the evolving situation—but did little to induce the incumbent government to initiate reforms.

U.S. leverage was also undermined by the tendency in several cases to praise excessively any "reforms" which had been initiated, while at the same time calling for additional changes. American officials argued in mid-1978, for example, that the situation in Iran was improving and pointed to the cessation of torture, the curtailed use of military courts, and improved prison conditions. Later, Carter asserted that the Shah had "moved aggressively to establish democratic principles in Iran and to have a progressive attitude towards social questions [and] social problems." William Sullivan, the American ambassador to Iran, claimed in October 1978 that the Shah had shown "surprising flexibility" and was "prepared to accept a truly democratic regime" in Iran (Carter, 1979, p. 1750; Brzezinski, 1983, p. 359). Of Nicaragua, the State Department asserted in February 1978 that "[a]lthough problems remain, it is our opinion that marked progress has been manifested since early 1977" (New York Times, 1978, p. 4). Carter went so far as to send a personal letter to Somoza in June 1978 praising recent improvements. The President wrote that the "steps toward respecting human rights," including cooperation with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, allowing moderate opposition elements to return, and reforms in the
electoral system, were "important and heartening signs." Once enacted, they would "mark a major advance for [Nicaragua] in answering some of the criticisms recently aimed at the Nicaraguan government" (Somoza, 1980, pp. 144-145).

Such praise had an adverse impact upon the evolving situation in these countries. One problem was that U.S. officials exaggerated the progress which had been made. Whatever improvements had been made in Iran, for example, they could hardly be interpreted as progress toward the establishment of a democratic regime, as Carter suggested. And Carter's letter to Somoza was written after the Nicaraguan leader had decided merely to permit the leading moderate opposition figures to return to the country and to allow an independent human rights group to visit. Such exaggerated praise coming from Washington likely reassured these leaders that they would continue to receive American support, while the opposition was led to question American credibility. Thus, the exaggerated American praise probably tended to persuade the incumbent leader that he did not have to respond to American calls for change and to convince the opposition that it could not depend upon the U.S. to insist upon truly significant reforms. U.S. praise thus had a polarizing impact upon the domestic situation which, ironically, made more remote the likelihood of truly meaningful reform.

Phase III: Transition Proposals

American officials eventually came to recognize that the incumbent regime in each of these countries confronted a serious challenge which might topple it. The perceived importance of each of these countries and the desire to prevent a radical opposition from attaining power (or total power) led the U.S. to seek to promote and guide the transition to a new regime. Most American-proposed transition plans had common elements: hope for a non-violent solution and calls for behavior patterns common in democratic societies. Often, the U.S. sought to preserve existing institutions as a means to these goals. This phase is also characterized by exaggerated notions of the American role, especially in light of the belated American recognition of the gravity of the crisis and U.S. partisanship in earlier phases.

American efforts to guide the transition were most extensive, and convoluted (LeoGrande, 1982, p. 70), in the Nicaraguan case. The first proposals came during the October 1978 OAS mediation effort. Additional suggestions were advanced in June and July 1979 during the opposition FSLN's (Sandinista National Liberation Front) final offensive. The initial
Commonwealth

plan called for Somoza to resign and cede power to a junta which would
include two bulwarks of Somoza's power: the National Guard and the
Liberal Party. When this proposal was rejected by each of the contending
parties, the OAS mediators proposed scheduling an internationally-
supervised plebiscite on whether Somoza should finish his term (LeoGrande,
the Nicaraguan parties to behave as if they were resolving a dispute in a
democratic society. The parties were urged to "engage in discussions" to
reach a settlement and to make "appropriate concessions and compromises"
to resolve the outstanding issues (Binder, 1978, p. 13).

When this initial attempt to resolve the conflict failed, fighting
resumed. The destruction caused by the fighting as well as the success of the
FSLN-dominated opposition forces led the United States to try a second time
to resolve the crisis peacefully. During the Spring of 1979 the U.S. sought a
short-term solution which would include the resignation of Somoza but would
avoid handing power directly to the FSLN. The U.S. proposed that Somoza
be replaced by a junta chosen by the Nicaraguan Congress. That junta would
then name a five member provisional government which would include
representatives of several existing pro-American institutions (National
Guard, Liberal Party) as well as more moderate opposition elements (Broad
Opposition Front, Superior Council of the Private Sector). Only after the
provisional government had been formed would it approach the FSLN and
ask it to appoint two additional members to establish a government of
national unity.

Not unexpectedly, the Sandinistas--who were winning on the
ground--rejected this proposal. American officials then encouraged the
FSLN to enlarge the size of its provisional government in order to increase
moderate influence. As one U.S. official noted, "Three of the five [members
of the FSLN provisional government] are leftists. We'd like to see a balance
or preferably a majority of moderates" (Riding, 1979, p. 12; LeoGrande, 1982,
pp. 67-71).

American officials were also involved in efforts to guide the
transition to a new regime in several of the other cases. The means and ends
of these efforts were often similar to those of the Carter administration in the
Nicaraguan case. For instance, in an effort to resolve the Chinese civil war,
General George Marshall was sent to the country in late 1945. His goal was
to encourage the contending parties to "adjust their internal differences
promptly by means of peaceful negotiation" (U.S. State Department, 1949,
pp. 127-229, 607).
In the Cuban case a private emissary, William Pawley, was sent in December 1958 to encourage President Batista to leave the country and to appoint a military junta which would then appoint a provisional government pending national elections. Such an effort was necessary, in Ambassador Smith's view, to avoid bloodshed and chaos which would work "for the sole benefit of the Communists." President Eisenhower believed that "our only hope...lay with some kind of non-dictatorial 'third force', neither Castro nor Batistiano [sic]" (E. Smith, 1962, pp. 164-187; Eisenhower, 1965, p. 521).

U.S. efforts to preserve existing institutions were most apparent in the Iranian case. American policy, according to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, aimed at "assuring the maximum of stability in a time of change by preserving the institutional framework of Iran under its constitution..." The U.S. had initially hoped the Shah would retain a role in a government of national unity. Once he decided to leave Iran, the Shah appointed a civilian government headed by Shapour Bakhtiar. Vance noted that this had been done in the "way prescribed by the Iranian Constitution," and asserted that the "new government should be given every chance to reconcile the differences in Iran and find a peaceful political solution" (Vance, 1979a, p. 7). Carter publicly urged the Ayatollah Khomeini to "permit the government that has now been established by the legal authorities in Iran, and under the Constitution, to have a chance to succeed" (Carter, 1980, p. 151). If the new government was to survive, it needed the support of the military. General Robert Huyser was sent to consult with the Iranian military. He later described his mission: "In general terms I was sent [to Iran] by the Government of the United States to stabilize the Iranian military to support their legal government" (U.S. Congress, 1981).

As one reviews these various transition proposals, their impracticality is apparent. The goals sought by the United States—non-violent transitions, negotiated settlements, and the establishment of democratic regimes—were desirable. However, one must question whether they could be attained in the cases detailed here. To begin to understand why such proposals would be advanced so consistently, it is first necessary to note the traditional American penchant for wishful thinking (R. Jervis, 1976, pp. 356-381). Non-violent solutions, negotiated settlements, and democratic procedures may be preferred ways to solve domestic crises, but they were unlikely to occur in China, Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, or Iran.

Could one expect a democratic society to develop in Iran, for instance, which had known only autocracy for centuries? The domestic situation had polarized to such an extent that negotiated solutions were
unlikely, especially since the U.S. urged the incumbent leader to resign (a prerequisite for a negotiated solution) at a very late date, when the opposition was on the threshold of total victory. To take another case, could one expect the FSLN to agree to a negotiated settlement in July 1979? American wishful thinking is also manifested in the exaggerated beliefs about the impact of the United States upon each situation. Thus, it was presumed that the U.S. could persuade the incumbent leader to resign, even though he had been in power for many years and had often disregarded earlier American suggestions.

The American inability to understand the nature of the crisis in each of these countries also helps clarify the persistent use of such unworkable transition proposals. Rarely did U.S. officials recognize that the opposition was opposed not simply to the person of the incumbent leader, but also to the entire system which he represented. Thus, Carter urged the Iranian opposition to give the provisional government, designated by but not including the Shah, an opportunity to succeed. The American transition proposals often sought to preserve some of the existing political institutions—for example, the Liberal Party in Nicaragua or the Cuban and Iranian militaries—while the opposition aimed at destroying existing institutions and replacing them with new ones. Finally, the opposition condemned what it perceived to be excessive American involvement in its society. American-proposed transition plans were thus questioned by one of the contenders for power, greatly limiting the possibility that those plans would be accepted.

These transition proposals also illustrate the traditional American desire to restrict the influence of radical political groups and enhance that of moderates. If compromises between the contending parties would be concluded, then the radical opposition's program and influence would be moderated. Preserving some of the existing institutions would guarantee continued influence for moderate pro-American groups and restrict that of radical elements.

A realistic assessment of these transition proposals at the time they were enunciated would have predicted their rejection (W. Smith, 1987, p. 36; Sick, 1985, p. 172; LeoGrande, 1982, pp. 70-71). Consequently, they can be considered failures for American policy. Furthermore, the proposals and their rejection had other adverse consequences for the United States. One effect was to heighten the existing distrust between the U.S. and the opposition elements before and after they came to power. Added to the opposition's traditional complaint of U.S. support for Chiang, Batista, and the others were those relating to subsequent American efforts to help
maintain the influence of the incumbent’s supporters and thus to prevent the opposition from attaining total victory. The opposition’s rejection of these proposals, in turn, exacerbated existing American suspicions about the opposition and its goals. Thus, proposals aimed partially at maintaining some pro-U.S. influence had the effect of reducing that influence both upon the opposition and the successor government which it would soon lead.

Phase IV: Relations With the Successor Regime

American policy toward the newly-established revolutionary governments was also similar in these cases. The U.S. often praised the new government and hoped that bilateral relations would continue to be productive. Typically, it was expected that economic factors would induce the new regime to maintain positive ties with the United States. American officials expected that the U.S. would have significant influence upon the new leaders, as the newly-established regimes had tremendous economic needs, which the U.S. could provide for. However, a variety of factors mitigated against close ties between the U.S. and the new government despite the economic needs of the latter. The United States had long supported the now-deposed regime, actively seeking to prevent the new government from coming to power. In addition, the new governments were dedicated to revolutionizing society, which often meant attacking the interests of private American citizens. In light of these factors, relations between the U.S. and the revolutionary government soon soured despite the initial American optimism.

In the immediate aftermath of Mao’s victory in China, for instance, the U.S. sought to distance itself from the Nationalists and contemplated recognizing the new regime. As a gesture of friendship, the U.S. announced that it would no longer give military aid or advice to the Nationalists (Gaddis, 1982, p. 68; Spanier, 1980, pp. 58-59).

The Cuban case provides another useful example of these themes. The United States recognized the Castro government soon after it came to power. A new ambassador, Philip Bonsal, was sent to replace Earl Smith, who was considered too close to Batista. Bonsal has been described by one of his subordinates as having "credentials which might enable him to establish rapport with the new Cuban government," who "did what he could to develop a cordial relationship with the new government" (W. Smith, 1987, p. 42). Bonsal has written of his "optimism" that productive relations could be established between the two countries. After his initial meeting with Castro,
the new ambassador "was encouraged to believe that we could establish a working relationship that would be advantageous to both our countries." In part, his optimism was based on the "reciprocal economic interests of Cuba and the United States" which would "exercise a stabilizing and moderating influence on developments in Cuba" (Bonsal, 1971, pp. 25-61; W. Smith, 1987, pp. 42-54). The Cubans, however, had no interest in accepting any sort of aid from the United States (W. Smith, 1987, p. 47).

The fall of the Shah in Iran did not prevent the U.S. from expecting that productive U.S.-Iranian relations could be maintained. President Carter contended in February 1979 that it was "obvious" that the new Iranian (Bazargan) government "would like to have good relations with us" (Carter, 1980, p. 352). Secretary Vance, more realistically, recognized that U.S.-Iranian relations would be "less intimate," but he expected that "over time U.S. and Iranian interests in a strong, stable, non-Communist Iran should permit a cooperative relationship to emerge" (Vance, 1983, p. 343). American officials hoped to develop a working relationship with Iranian moderates throughout the summer of 1979 (Sick, 1985, pp. 186-194). Among the actions of the new regime praised by the U.S. was its handling of the attempt by radicals to seize the American embassy in February 1979 (Gwertzman, 1979, pp. 1, 16).

American officials expressed similar sentiments about the new FSLN-dominated regime in Nicaragua. The American ambassador, Lawrence Pezzulo, claimed in August 1979 that "relations are as cordial and as easy as any I've ever witnessed" (Meislin, 1979, p.8). Secretary Vance acknowledged that it "may take time for us...to develop a relationship of mutual trust," but claimed that "so long as pluralism flourish[ed] in Nicaragua," relations would "prosper" (Vance, 1979b, p. 15). American officials cited a number of positive developments: the absence of retaliation against followers of Somoza, the retention of a mixed economy, and a new press law. To encourage and foster such developments, the U.S. provided emergency aid and pledged to send an additional $75 million in economic aid (U.S. Congress, 1979; LeoGrande, 1982, pp. 73-76). American involvement was viewed as crucial to the development of democratic Nicaragua. Vance claimed that, "[b]y extending our friendship and economic assistance, we enhance the prospects for democracy in Nicaragua." If the U.S. failed to provide such assistance, "we can almost guarantee that democracy will fail" (Vance, 1979b, p. 15).

The expectation that economic aid could moderate revolutionary animosity also existed in the Vietnam case. The U.S. proposed a variety
of economic measures to the North Vietnamese, beginning with President Johnson's billion dollar Mekong River development project in 1965, in an effort to induce moderation (Johnson, 1965, pp. 606-613).

The expectation that relations between the United States and these successor regimes could be productive is another example of American wishful thinking. In two of these countries, Nicaragua and Iran, the United States had helped establish the former regime. In all of the cases the U.S. had strongly supported the now-deposed government. More recently in each case, the U.S. had sought to prevent its client's fall from power or, minimally, to retain some support for his followers in the new government. Furthermore, the United States had actively sought to prevent the opposition forces from coming to power. When they did gain power, one would expect the new leaders to oppose all groups--foreign and domestic--which had supported the former regime. That desire, alone, would work against good relations with the United States, at least in the short run. The U.S. also tended to overestimate its influence upon the new regime, especially in light of prior American policy.

The expectation that economic ties would link the U.S. with each new government also reflects a poor understanding of revolutions and revolutionary leaders. While the new governments did have great economic needs, these were often subordinated to other concerns. As Henry Kissinger has noted with respect to the Vietnamese revolutionaries, the United States has had difficulty "coming to grips...with implacable revolutionary zeal, with men who prefer victory to economic progress and who remain determined to prevail regardless of material cost" (Kissinger, 1982, p. 38). This difficulty is certainly reflected in each of these cases, where the United States expected that material incentives would overcome or moderate the political differences between the United States and the new revolutionary government.

A final reason why it was unlikely that positive relations would be established between the United States and the new regime was the very nature of the new government. In each case the opposition forces, now governing, had vowed to reduce perceived American domination of their societies. To do so, they would have to attack those American interests present in the country, increasing the likelihood of conflict with the United States. American officials recognized that these opposition forces were radical--this was one of the reasons why the U.S. had actively sought to prevent them from attaining total power--but seemed unable (or unwilling) to understand that these groups, once in power, would initiate foreign and domestic policies opposed by the United States.
Conclusions and Recommendations

Clearly, the United States made a number of mistakes in these cases, repeating earlier mistakes in subsequent situations. Given that pattern and the rarity of revolutions, one might argue that the U.S. cannot or should not attempt to alter its policy in cases such as these (Sick, 1985, pp. 40-42). Such a conclusion is unwarranted for several reasons. The tremendously adverse consequences of these revolutions for the United States necessitate changes in the traditional American approach. In addition, although revolutions are rare in the Third World, political instability is not. Changes in the American approach toward such extreme manifestations of political instability would better enable the U.S. to deal with instability more generally.

As a first step toward improving American policy, several changes in the prevailing mind-set, i.e., global containment, are necessary. First, the United States must begin to view Third World societies on their own terms, not from the perspective of the Soviet-American competition. The U.S. needs to develop a greater understanding of foreign societies, the grievances against incumbent regimes, and the nature of opposition forces. With increased understanding, the likelihood of belated recognition of the seriousness of political instability should be reduced. A related requirement is for the United States to adopt a more sophisticated view of Third World change and to realize that American values and institutions cannot be replicated in most Third World settings (Wiarda, 1984, 1985).

Furthermore, the assumption that the crisis could be resolved much as political differences in the United States are resolved indicates a serious misunderstanding of both the process of change in the Third World and the nature of revolutionary movements. Democratic societies are not likely to emerge from conflicts between implacable enemies operating in an environment which has rarely known democracy. Similarly, negotiated settlements are unlikely when the two contending parties are engaged in what is essentially a zero-sum game, i.e., the preservation or elimination of existing institutions. The inability of U.S. officials to understand these realities led them to promote transition proposals which were totally unworkable. Also, the failure to comprehend the nature of the opposition movement caused American officials to be unduly optimistic about ties with the successor regime.

The United States must also recognize that its impact in situations such as these is limited. The various incumbent governments, upon which
the U.S. presumably had some influence, often resisted American appeals for change. U.S. influence upon the opposition was likely to be much more limited, especially after the United States began to work actively to prevent it from coming to power. In such circumstances, and in light of the belated American recognition of the extent of the crisis, American officials should realize that the opportunity for the U.S. to exert a positive influence on the evolving situation is limited. American influence upon the successor regime is also likely to be limited.

Such changes in official thinking would suggest changed policies. American officials should seek to avoid embracing non-democratic leaders. Excessive rhetoric and substantive actions by the United States can make such leaders resistant to American prodding to initiate reforms. The U.S. should also avoid giving any leader the impression that his personal survival is essential to the United States. The American desire for reform should be articulated more prominently and consistently. Sanctions could be imposed against those regimes which fail to introduce reforms. Changes such as these in American policy might also serve to improve the image of the U.S. in the eyes of the opposition forces. The United States might also consider substantive actions to reassure the opposition, e.g., dealing with it as a significant political force, not proposing transition plans aiming primarily at preventing it from attaining total power.

These changes in American perceptions and policy will not prevent political instability from occurring in the Third World. They may, however, enable American officials to better deal with such challenges in the future (Feinberg, 1983; Wiarda, 1984).

REFERENCES

(Because New York Times employees were on strike during August and September 1978, University Microfilms did not reproduce the actual editions of the Times. Rather, "Supplementary Material from the Associated Press"--listing the author of articles but not their title--was utilized. Accordingly, the references to "Binder, 1978" and "Riding, 1978a, 1978b" are necessarily incomplete.)


U.S. State Department. (1958b) *Memorandum from Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State, to the President*. December 23.


Many scholars have commented upon the tendency for human decision-making to be subject to shifting coalitions. Madison, among others, noted that this could lead to instability. This paper suggests that there is a biological basis to this propensity. Two case studies of "chimpanzee politics" are examined; both indicate that chimpanzee coalition behavior seems to be underlaid by a kind of cost-benefit calculus. Since chimpanzees are humans' closest relatives, this implies the possibility that human coalition behavior has an evolutionary basis. Implications for human politics are discussed.

Introduction

Much political activity and decision-making takes place in small groups. In contemporary American politics, for example, one finds city councils, county legislatures, school boards, other local legislative bodies, state and Congressional legislative committees and subcommittees, multi-judge courts, and executives and their immediate advisors. In each instance, small groups of persons interact regularly and frequently; in many cases, coalitions develop, and individuals shift from one to another. Why? According to one school of thought, such changes spring from and reflect a calculated attempt to further individual self-interest.¹

In his Federalist #10, James Madison lamented that this tendency, which he called the spirit of factionalism, is "sown in the nature of man" as a consequence, "instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished..." More recently, sociobiologist Richard Alexander, enumerating what he terms "universal" human traits, called attention to the same behavioral phenomenon, characterizing it more
dispassionately as (1979, p. 1) "extreme flexibility in rates of forming and dissolving coalitions."  

We are not the only species to manifest this pattern of behavior. Coalitions--and sometimes shifting alignments--also appear as central features in the social structures of many different primate species, including vervet monkeys (Cheney, 1983; Seyfarth and Cheney, 1984), the savanna baboon (Hall and DeVore, 1965; Packer, 1988), the Japanese macaque (Gouzoules, 1980; Kurland, 1977; Eaton, 1976), the rhesus macaque (Bernstein and Gordon, 1980; Meikle and Vessey, 1981), the bonnet macaque (Silk, 1982; Silk et. al., 1981), langurs (Vessey, 1981; Curtin, 1981), the gelada baboon (Bramblett, 1970), and the chimpanzee (Bygott, 1979; Nishida, 1979; Riss and Goodall, 1977).

Among male chimpanzees, in particular, these shifting coalitions seem to be driven by cost-benefit "power" calculus. Since chimpanzees are, in genetic terms, our closest living relatives, this suggests that, as Madison feared, human coalition behavior may be "sown in the nature of man." If so, there are important implications for human politics, as we noted in our concluding comments.

Primates, Coalitions, and Cost-Benefit Analysis

The study of other species, almost all ethologists agree, can be valuable in reconstructing adaptions and behavior patterns involved in hominid evolution. For some purposes, the social carnivores may be appropriate models (e.g., see Schaller and Lowther, 1969); for others, certain herbivores may be more useful (e.g., see Geist, 1978). By and large, however, ethologists focus on primates. As Bernard Campbell (1979, p. 187) has observed:

While it is clearly wrong to suppose that the behavior of the earliest hominids was exactly like that of gorillas or chimpanzees, or indeed any living primates, we can nevertheless draw certain conclusions and derive certain insights from our studies of primate behavior. We can be resonably certain that the earliest hominids showed many of the social and individual characteristics that higher primates share with each other. It also seems probable that the earliest hominids were at least as intelligent and inventive as the African apes are today.
Several studies have gone beyond the analysis of coalition formation and have described shifts in primate alliance partnerships which seem to evidence, on the individual level, the use of a cost-benefit calculus. Higher primates possess, it seems clear, the sophisticated cognitive mechanisms requisite for such reasoning (Cheney et. al., 1986). With this as background, we discuss in some detail two chimpanzee (*Pan troglodytes*) studies—one focusing on an "open zoo" colony, the other on the same species in the wild. These two studies should be viewed together, especially since questions have been raised about the reliability and validity of the zoo-based study (see Somit, 1984). Their results, however, are quite similar, and we discuss both to better illuminate possible underlying processes.

**The Arnhem Zoo Study.** For some years, Frans de Waal (1978, 1982) studied a chimpanzee colony living in somewhat confined but semi-naturalistic surroundings at the Arnhem Zoo in the Netherlands. In 1976, the colony included a number of adult males (most notably Yeroen, Kuit, and Nikkie) and nine adult females (of whom Big Mama was the most important). Yeroen was then the alpha male, as he had been for the previous three years; Luit was a second-ranked (beta); Nikkie was third (gamma). In June, 1976, Luit ceased to display toward Yeroen the type of submissive behavior normally manifested by a "subordinate"—and within two months their positions were reversed. What happened during this period?

Luit began to attack, and often savagely beat, females with whom Yeroen was "socially" close. Yeroen would immediately attempt to rescue the female and the other females would, in turn, come to Yeroen's aid. Luit would then be beaten or would flee into trees to escape. Over time, though, females began to avoid contact with Yeroen and, by so doing, avoid a beating from Luit. Along with this, the other females began to support Yeroen less when he confronted Luit. Finally, Yeroen avoided disputes with the Luit altogether—and his reign ended. Luit became alpha and Yeroen fell to gamma (with Nikkie, the third male, moving up to beta).

Interesting, too, was Nikkie's behavior over this two month span. When Yeroen and Luit would get into a fight over Luit's assault on a female, Nikkie would threaten or actually attack any female who came to Yeroen's support. Luit and Nikkie formed, for all practical purposes, a coalition.

But the drama was not yet finished. Soon Nikkie made his move to become alpha. During this second struggle, both Luit and Nikkie needed Yeroen's backing, since the females remained relatively "neutral." If Yeroen aided Luit, Luit would remain alpha; if Yeroen sided with Nikkie and this
new coalition propelled Nikkie to the alpha role. It is especially striking to note that before Yeroen made his choice, Luit allowed the "old" alpha, Yeroen, to copulate with fertile, receptive females. Nikkie did the same. Apparently, both of the more dominant males were trying to "buy" Yeroen's support. According to van Hooff (1982, p. 13):

In [Yeroen's] position at the bottom..., none of the others could obviously permit himself to destroy the chance for a positive coalition between him[self] and Yeroen by preventing Yeroen from mating. In terms of evolutionary profit, is a very high price to pay.

Van Hooff concluded that the males used a cost-benefit calculus to guide their coalition behavior. The coalition shifts that occurred were the result, in his judgement, of this calculus.

One other significant aspect of dominance relations among the Arnhem chimpanzees calls for comment—the efforts of both Luit and Nikkie, during Luit's tenure as alpha, to prevent Yeroen's alliance with the other. There was much more to this than merely letting Yeroen copulate with females. As de Waal said (1978, p. 297):

The best way to stability is the formation of a strong bond by Luit with his former rival Yeroen. So, Luit should support Yeroen (which might lead to reciprocation by Yeroen) and he should prevent bond formation between Yeroen and Nikkie at the cost of everything.

De Waal noted (1978, pp. 278-279) that Nikkie confronted a similar situation:

Nikkie, faced with the loss of such a powerful supported like Luit [after Luit's accession to alpha and Nikkie's subsequent move to become alpha], should prevent bond formation between Yeroen and Luit and try to form himself an alliance with Yeroen by supporting him against Luit and others.

What actually happened? Luit threatened or actually attacked Nikkie whenever the latter played with or groomed Yeroen, apparently trying to block the development of a bond between Yeroen and Nikkie.
Concurrently, Nikkie’s support for Yeroen increased in competitive or aggressive interactions. Similarly, whenever Yeroen played with or groomed Luit, Nikkie would try to drive him away to prevent bond formation between Luit and Yeroen.

Subsequent developments demonstrated that these shifting coalitions were the initial phases of what eventually became a deadly game. Although there had been an uneasy truce among the three for the two previous years, in July, 1980, Yeroen began actively to side with Luit after Nikkie barred Yeroen’s access to receptive females. Fighting among the males broke out and grew more violent, and Nikkie was ultimately deposed after losing Yeroen’s support. As Luit ascended once more to alpha, the dynamics of the Luit-Nikkie-Yeroen relationship were again altered. As de Waal notes (1986a, p. 242), "It seemed that neither Luit nor Yeroen wanted to be left out if the other two males managed to get together."

On the night of September 12-13, Luit was savagely beaten, suffering deep gashes and losing several fingers; he died shortly thereafter. The only way this could have happened, de Waal believes, is via the active collaboration of Yeroen and Nikkie, neither of whom could defeat Luit alone. Yeroen and Nikkie resumed their alliance after Luit’s death—and Dandy, a younger adult male who had not played much of a role in the July-September period, soon emerged as the "common rival" holding Yeroen and Nikkie together.

According to de Waal (1986a, p. 249):

Quite sophisticated social processes may underlie at least the first big fight, that is, the one between the two members of the ruling coalition. By bringing Nikkie to alpha rank, Yeroen had regained both the group’s respect and a good share of sexual activity. I tend to regard this as a ‘deal,’ whose fulfillment was closely monitored by Yeroen. When Nikkie failed to keep his end of the deal, starting to lean more and more towards Luit in the sexual context, Yeroen simply ended the coalition.

The resulting power vacuum was immediately filled. Luit was the first male to become alpha overnight, apparently without conquering the position. He seemed somewhat uncomfortable, however, perhaps realizing from previous experience that his strength was also his weakness. There is no way of knowing whether the murderous attack
on Luit was a purposeful act of trying to ‘solve the problem’ by eliminating a rival, or an act of blind frustration by Yeroen and Nikkie due to the sudden loss of status after the break in their coalition, or something else. The fact is, though, that it did solve their problem.

In sum, de Waal’s detailed observations strongly suggest that the male Arnhem chimpanzees used a rational cost-benefit calculus to further their self-interest in dominance relations. "Shifting coalitions" provided the basic mechanism for advancement of their respective goals, and their tactics included the use of both the "carrot" and the "stick."

The value of such behavior for the "alliance" members is evident. First, the alpha or dominant animal generally has preferential access to valued resources (e.g., food, receptive females, space). Second, supporters of the alpha may also reap considerable rewards. For instance, when Luit became alpha, he permitted Yeroen (whose support was vital if Luit was to remain alpha) to copulate with receptive fertile females. Finally, if Luit’s death is a guide, alliance members may be simply more likely to survive.

Nishida’s Mahale Mountain Study. The fact that the de Waal research focused on a captive colony raises the possibility that the behavior observed there was, at least in part, a function of an unnatural setting. But essentially similar findings have been obtained with free-ranging chimpanzees. Toshisada Nishida’s (1983) study of chimpanzees in the Mahale Mountains in Tanzania provides another example of an apparent cost-benefit calculus and the resultant payoffs for being an "unpredictable" ally.

Nishida observed one group of chimpanzees (K-Group) from 1967 to 1974 and from 1975 to 1978. In May, 1975, Kasonta was alpha, Jajabala beta, Sobonogo gamma, and Kamemangu delta. Later in the year, Jajabala disappeared for unknown reasons. Starting in March, 1976, Kamemangu began behaving as "holder of the balance" in a manner which rivals Great Britain’s role in the classical 19th century European balance of power system. Table 1 depicts the nature of shifting patterns of alliances from March through May, 1976—the crucial time frame.

Kasonta had been alpha in K-group since 1969; on May 14, 1976, he lost that position to Sobongo. The most striking features of the table are the several shifts in coalition made by the lowest ranking male, Kamemangu "finally" siding with Sobongo.

23
Kamemanfu’s importance in the male dominance structure is even more critical than the chart indicates. On April 17, Sobongo defeated Kasonta in a one-on-one fight. Nonetheless, Kamemanfu’s continuing support of Kasonta allowed him to retain his status as alpha—a status now totally dependent on Kamemanfu’s support. Thereafter, Kasonta was most solicitous toward Kamemanfu and even seemed, on occasion, to register anxiety when he lost sight of his “ally.”

Sobongo’s strategy over the period covered by the table was to avoid the other two males when they were together. But if Kamemanfu happened to approach Sobongo, the two would groom each other for a time. When Kamemanfu ceased grooming Sobongo, the latter continued to groom Kamemanfu. Sobongo was not seen to approach Kamemanfu on his own; he waited for signals from Kamemanfu.

While Kamemanfu usually sided with Kasonta against Sobongo, he displayed much milder aggressive behavior against Sobongo than did Kasonta, avoiding an open break with either of the two more dominant males:

What seemed most important was that Kamemanfu occasionally changed alliances between the other males. Kamemanfu had close bonds with one of the fighting pairs in one period, but with the other in a subsequent period, as evidenced in grooming relationships. In the middle of the fighting, he suddenly and directly approached Sobongo and engaged in mutual grooming with him. His attitude towards Sobongo appeared ambivalent. Moreover, he seemed to manipulate the fight between Kasonta and Sobongo. (Nishida, 1983, p. 327)

One of the major benefits to Kamemanfu was access to sexually receptive females, and Kamemanfu retained that access no matter which male happened to be alpha. His reproductive success was apparently dependent on an unstable relationship between the more dominant males, since neither of the two seems to have dared risk losing Kamemanfu’s possible support by not allowing him to copulate. It appears that Kamemanfu was playing off Kasonta against Sobongo.

After Sobongo became alpha on May 14, he actually allowed Kamemanfu to lead the entire group on a number of occasions, presumably seeking to retain his support. To small avail. In late 1977, Kamemanfu’s
Machiavellian nature reasserted itself and he re-allied with Kasonta, who then regained his alpha status. But this ascension was brief, for Kasonta's disappearance may reflect the same dire consequences of alliance politics as did his own study; that is, he suspects that Kasonta was killed by the other two males, just as Luit was apparently killed by Nikkie and Yeroen.

Nishida interprets this sequence of events in terms of reproductive success (1983, p. 333):

Since both rivals depend on the cooperation of the third male in order to win, neither can afford to show aggression to the third male even when he tries to mate. The third male manipulates the unstable relationship between his superiors by giving indications of a change in allegiance. Quite likely, the third individual's strategy succeeds most when the others' rivalry remains unstable. Moreover, by occasionally cooperating with the defeated male, the third male can improve his own relative status toward the winning male, thus improving his copulatory share.

Both studies, however different their settings, come to strikingly similar conclusions. Chimpanzees can and do enhance their reproductive payoffs, as well as other benefits, by manipulating the dominance relations of higher ranking individuals. A conscious, deliberate cost-benefit calculus appears to guide their behavior as they shift from one alliance to another. Coalitional politics, moreover, may have significant additional implications for their member's survival. If de Waal's speculation is correct, shifting coalitions eventually led, in both cases, to the death of the losers.

**Discussion**

We remarked earlier that frequently changing coalitions characterize human small group politics, a phenomenon often inspired by cost-benefit calculations. We have also summarized two studies of chimpanzee behavior which suggest a similar dynamic. We are as yet unable confidently to determine the extent to which this behavioral similarity is a consequence of genetic homology or of evolutionary convergence to meet common survival problems (see note 3; see also Peterson, 1978; Peterson and Somit, 1978). But whatever the specific mechanism might be, coalition behavior apparently
reflecting cost-benefit calculations also characterizes the chimpanzee--our closest living relatives (e.g., see Lewin, 1987).9

To conclude, we consider two basic items: (1) the important political issues raised by our analysis; (2) the extent to which humans are condemned to suffer the negative consequences of the purported biologically rooted coalitional behavior.

First, results of our analysis bear directly upon some major points of controversy in political philosophy, indicating the importance of the issues that we address above. To take only the most obvious example, one school of theorists, running from Karl Marx to Lenin to Mao Zedung, contends that politics, political factionalism (and even the state itself) spring from economic factors (e.g., class and class warfare) and that all of these will disappear when the classless society is achieved. They hold also that it is possible--perhaps even essential--for the revolutionary movement to engage in coalitions, united fronts, and so on, even with class enemies, as a tactical necessity, a temporary expedient to gain power. But once in power, factions and coalitions would end and an egalitarian society would emerge. Whether force, persuasion, changes in human consciousness, or some other factor would bring about this ultimate utopia is unclear, but their goal is manifest.

Madisonians, on the contrary, are not utopians. They see that to rid states of factions can only be done in two ways--"by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same options, the same passions, and the same interests." The first is undesirable, the second impractical, since factionalism, as outlined in Federalist #10, is a part of human nature.

Coalitional politics is unreliable, can lead to instability, and is the bane of any society--but humans must live with it, says Madison. Hence, the only viable course is to moderate the evil effects of faction. Indeed, a "well-developed Union" has a "tendency to break and control the violence of faction." And factionalism may actually be valuable in protecting liberty, so long as there is an array of factions, each checked by others, none of which can gain power.

Madison then sets out the architecture of governing that peacefully controls factions, most notably a large republic (so that the many factions check one another) and representative government (so that the citizens' views are "refined" through their deputies). Ultimately, such institutions enhance the positive impact and reduce the iniquitous effects of faction--including violence. Limiting violence this way reduces the odds of the
sanguinary chimpanzee politics described by de Waal and (perhaps) by Nishida.

This brings us to our second point, which suggests the significant role that culture plays in shaping "human nature." As biologist Benson Ginsburg has stressed (1988, p. 19), although "evolutionary legacies are at the basis of our behavioral potentials, the way in which these potentials are expressed is no longer a matter of biology, but of culture acting upon biological capacities." Thus, once aware of our biologically based predispositions, we can seek to develop social mechanisms which would help to constrain and control, if not eliminate, the deleterious consequences of this tendency. In the end, the Greeks' admonition to "know thyself" may be one means of reconciling our biological natures with our culture and enable us to make significant progress toward 'a kinder, gentler' world.

NOTES

We would like to acknowledge useful comments made on earlier drafts by James Schubert, Glendon Schubert, Frans de Waal, and Donald G. Tannenbaum. The Primate Information Center at the University of Washington provided us with an extensive bibliography on coalition behavior among primates. We wish to acknowledge this organization's assistance in updating our command of the relevant literature.

1. Perhaps the best known theoretical example is William Riker's work (1962). Coalition and dominance behavior occur also in human children's small groups, which seems to signify that these are normal and important parts of human ontogeny (see Barner-Barry, 1977; Edelman and Omark, 1973; Omark and Edelman, 1975).

2. Alexander (1979) has further suggested that the underlying cost benefit calculus behavior is the product of human evolution. See also J. Schubert (1983).

3. Given the apparent similarity if these aspects of human and chimpanzee behavior, two specific evolutionary hypotheses may be advanced: (a) This trait has independently evolved in each species to meet common survival needs (this is referred to, technically, as analogy). In such a case, species' adaptations to similar environmental pressures during their respective phylogenies (evolutionary histories)
lead to convergent evolution (see, e.g., Lorenz, 1965 for an explanation of this logic).

(b) It could have been transmitted to each species by a common ancestor (referred to as homology). Here, the behavior has been "passed down" to both species from that common ancestor (see Reynolds, 1980, ch. 5 for a brief discussion of this).

4. Also, see Kinzey (1987); F. King et al. (1988). Furthermore, chimpanzees have chromosome patterns strikingly similar to humankind's (Yunis et al., 1980). This close relationship also hints at the value of considering chimpanzees.

5. For the possibility that a similar phenomenon may occur among dolphins, see Booth (1988).

6. However, a word of caution is in order about the use of zoo studies, since neurotic or even psychotic chimp behavior may be aggravated or caused by such conditions (compare Davenport, 1979; N. King et al., 1980). Van Hooff found that chimpanzees living in semi-naturalistic settings (i.e., the Holloman Air Force Base colony in New Mexico) behaved quite similarly to free-ranging chimps in Tanzania. He used his experience at Holloman to create the Arnhem chimpanzee consortium in 1971 (van Hoof, 1973). Since the consortium's origin, many hours of observation have been undertaken and a number of reports published (e.g., see Noe et al., 1980; de Waal and Hoekstra, 1980; de Waal and Roosmaalen, 1979; de Waal, 1984).

7. Our discussion of coalition behavior in the Arnhem Zoo colony has been rendered as a "story." However, de Waal's findings are detailed and much quantitative data support the substance of our summary. The reader should not think that our description of his findings is based solely in a few dramatic instances (see, e.g., de Waal, 1984).

8. Dominance, of course, is a much more complex phenomenon than this simple phrase might indicate. Compare, for example, Popp and DeVore (1979); Bygott (1979). For humans, see Omark et al. (1980); J. Schubert (1983).

9. Rather than discuss methods of testing our hypothesis in the body of the paper, which will be of less interest to our readers than the implications of our argument--if correct--we make a few brief comments in this footnote for those who might be interested. We would suggest that the observations of the other primate species which exhibit coalition behavior should be closely scrutinized to determine if these changes also seem to manifest some type of cost-
benefit thinking (See Manzur, 1973 for a clear model of this approach). If we discern consistently positive findings across a broad range of primates, the hypothesis that genetic factors play a role in human coalition behavior would be rendered increasingly plausible.

Table 1

Chronological Development of X-Group Coalitions, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early March-May 9</th>
<th>Kasonta-</th>
<th>Sobongo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasenani</td>
<td>Sobongo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May 10</th>
<th>Kasonta-</th>
<th>Sobongo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasenani</td>
<td>Sobongo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May 10-13</th>
<th>Kasonta-</th>
<th>Sobongo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1316 hours and after)</td>
<td>Kasenani</td>
<td>Sobongo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May 14</th>
<th>Sobongo-</th>
<th>Kasonta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1500 hours)</td>
<td>Sobongo</td>
<td>Kasonta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table was constructed by the authors from the narrative provided in Mianida (1963).
REFERENCES


---


---


---


---


---


---

THE NEW LIBERTARIANISM AND THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798

Gerard J. Fitzpatrick
Ursinus College

When the First Amendment was ratified in 1791 many Americans still regarded trenchant criticism of government, its officers, or its policies to be criminally punishable "seditious libel." Not until the bitter controversy ignited by the Sedition Act of 1798 did Americans formulate a theory of political expression in a republic that undercut arguments justifying prosecution for seditious libel. The result was a new libertarianism with regard to freedom of speech and press.

The ratification of the Constitution in June 1788 and the launching of the new government under the leadership of George Washington the following April offered Americans hope that their differences were behind them and that national unity was finally at hand. Within a few short years, however, the country found itself more deeply divided than ever as the new Federalist and Jeffersonian-Republican parties increasingly clashed over the proper course of public policy. The partisan rancor reached a crescendo in 1798 when the Federalists enacted the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts to quell their political opposition (see Miller, 1960).

These bitter policy disputes were part of a larger and older ideological debate over the meaning of free government. Unearthing the origins of this debate has led over the past quarter century to a shift in scholarly perspectives on the ideological roots of the Founding era. Earlier studies traced these origins to the towering influence of John Locke (see Hartz, 1955). "Revisionist" scholars (see Bailyn, 1967; Wood, 1969; and Pocock, 1975) argue that an intellectual tradition imported from England but traceable to the ancient world, and known as "republicanism" or "civic humanitarian," was more important for the Founding mind than Lockean liberalism. In place of the Lockean emphasis on estranged individuals selfishly pursuing private, especially economic rights without regard to community, the republican paradigm posited public-spirited citizens actively participating in small republics so that civic virtue would combat governmental corruption. As long as political authority remained
surrogate to political liberty, citizens in such republics would be free to
develop their faculties as human beings by promoting the public good.

Republican writings were immensely popular in the American
colonies, where people came to understand the conflict with the mother
country in terms of an eternal struggle between virtuous citizens trying to
sustain public liberty and corrupt, selfish rulers using arbitrary power to
quash it. This ideological framework also affected American political
thought during the Founding era when both Federalists and Jeffersonians
used the language of republicanism to denounce their opponents. The two
parties differed dramatically, however, in their conceptions of republicanism.
These differences can help us better appreciate the controversy surrounding
the Sedition Act of 1798 and how it sparked a revolution in our
understanding of the place of dissent in a republican government.

The Seeds of Suppression: Federalist Fears of Political Dissent

Although Federalists as well as Jeffersonians professed dedication to
republicanism, they disagreed over how to ensure it. Distrusting the
judgement of the common people and fearing their passions, Federalists
believed that free government required popular deference to the rule of the
"rich and well-born" who would use vigorous, centralized government to
promote stability and thus the public good by means of a large commercial
republic. Jeffersonians, by contrast, defined republicanism as rule by the
common people through a decentralized government that would promote the
virtues of agrarianism and individual freedom by resisting political
consolidation. To Jeffersonians, Federalists were "monarchists" in republican
garb. To Federalists, Jeffersonians were "mobocrats" rather than democrats.
Each party saw the other as perverting the principles of republicanism and
scheming with a foreign power to overthrow the American regime. The
Jeffersonians were especially fearful the the Federalists would use the excuse
of war to undermine popular government (see Hofstadter, 1969, chapter 3).

The threat of war between the United States and France in 1798
further exacerbated the already bitter division between the politically
dominant Federalists, who generally sympathized with aristocratic Britain,
and the increasingly numerous Jeffersonian-Republicans, whose hearts went
out to the new French republic. Moreover, the steady influx of political and
economic refugees from Europe strengthened the Republicans, as these
emigrants felt little regard for the elitism of the Federalists, in contrast to the
more egalitarian tenets of the Jeffersonians (see Smith, 1956, part 1).
Consequently, the more reactionary Federalists sought measures that would at once strike at the "Jacobins" of the French Directory and pull the rug out from under the "democrats, mobocrats & all other kinds of rats" whose swelling ranks threatened the party with impending electoral defeat (quoted in Miller, 1960, pp. 228-229). The hopes of these Federalists were realized during the summer of 1798 when, without even waiting for a formal declaration of war against France, Congress passed four laws intended to stifle political dissent.

The capstone of this program, "An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States," more commonly known as the Sedition Act, imposed heavy fines and imprisonment on anyone who should "write, print, utter or publish" any "false, scandalous and malicious" statements against the government of the United States, the President, or Congress with intent to "defame" them, to bring them into "contempt" or "disrepute," or to excite against them "the hatred of the good people of the United States" (Sedition Act, 1798). The Sedition Act punished the common law crime of "seditious libel," a vague, and variable offense defined by historian Leonard Levy as "defaming or condemning or ridiculing the government: its form, constitution, officers, laws, conduct, or policies, to the jeopardy of the public peace" (1985, p. 8). Under this harsh legal concept, scores of political dissenter had been prosecuted in England and the American colonies for what would today be called "political subversion" or threats to "internal security." With the Sedition Act the Federalists declared that the national government possessed the same power to punish its critics.

Furthermore, the Federalists equated "the government" with their own policies and politicians. As one scholar has put it, "by identifying their administration with the government, and the government with the Constitution, the Federalists concluded that criticism of their administration was an attempt to subvert the Constitution and to overthrow the government" (Smith, 1956, p. 420). For example, Samuel Chase, a justice of the United States Supreme Court and a staunch Federalist, contended that "if a man attempts to destroy the confidence of the people in their officers, their supreme magistrate, and their legislature, he effectively saps the foundation of the government" (quoted in Miller, 1951, pp. 86-87). The Federalists, in short, saw themselves as patriotic defenders of truth and order and their Republican opponents as scheming traitors plotting to hand over the nation to vile foreigners. Accordingly, the Federalists regarded vigorous enforcement of the Sedition Act as vital to the nation's security. They eventually brought 14 indictments, obtained 10 convictions, and almost
silenced the opposition press (see Miller, 1951; and Smith 1956, parts 2 and 3).

Equating dissent with discord and disagreement with disloyalty, the Federalists in essence made it a crime to criticize those in power. Although the First Amendment denied Congress power to abridge freedom of speech and press, the Federalists insisted that the proper definition of these rights was that given by the respected English legal authority, Sir William Blackstone:

The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public... but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity (Blackstone, 1769, pp. 151-152).

Congressman Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts, one of the Federalist leaders responsible for the Sedition Act, accepted the Blackstonian position, telling the House of Representatives that freedom of the press "is nothing more than the liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking, one's thoughts, under the condition of being answerable to the injured party, whether it be the government or an individual, for false, malicious, and seditious expressions" (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, pp. 2148-2149). Representative Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina, who helped draft the Sedition Act, agreed with his colleague and asked:

Did this liberty of the press include sedition and licentiousness? Did it authorize persons to throw, with impunity, the most violent abuse upon the President and both Houses of Congress?...Every man possesse[s] liberty of action; but if he use[s] this liberty to the detriment of others...he [becomes] liable to punishment for this licentious abuse of his liberty (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, p. 2167).

The Federalist pamphleteers also contended that the Blackstonian definition of freedom of speech and press was the correct one. The most
articulate of these writers, Judge Alexander Addison of Pennsylvania, noted that "this right of free communication of thoughts and opinions is, like all other rights, limited by responsibility for its abuse; and laws to prevent its abuse are not, in constitutional or just sense, restraints on the liberty of the press" (Addison, 1978, p. 9). To Judge Addison, freedom of the press meant "that any man may, without the consent of any other, print any book or writing whatever, being in this, as in all other freedom of action, liable to punishment, if he may injure an individual of the public" (Addison, 1798, p. 14). Indeed, the judge insisted that the Sedition Act supported a free press because "to censure the licentious is to maintain the liberty of the press" (Addison, 1798, p. 16).

**Republicans in Rebellion: The Emergence of the New Libertarianism**

The Republicans attacked the Sedition Act on three fronts. First, they invoked the cause of states' rights. Next, they repudiated the Blackstonian understanding of free expression. Finally, they offered their own theory of political dissent.

**The Initial Debate: Limited National Power and States' Rights**

Initially, the Republicans responded to the Federalist defense of the Sedition Act not by focusing on freedom of speech and press but by emphasizing states' rights and limited national power. Whatever might be the true definition of freedom of expression was in a sense irrelevant because the Constitution created a national government of limited enumerated powers, all powers not delegated remaining with the states as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. By this argument, the important words of the First Amendment were not "freedom of speech, or of the press" but "Congress shall make no law..." The central government was meant to be totally powerless with regard to freedom of expression, and the First Amendment was intended to make that point emphatic. Representative Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina asserted in Congress that "it was never understood that prosecutions for libels could take place under the General Government; but that they must be carried on in the State courts, as the Constitution gave no power to Congress to pass laws on this subject" (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, p. 2152). Representative Edward Livingston of New York agreed, adding that "there is a remedy for offences of this kind in the laws of every
state in the Union" (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, p. 2153). Congressman John Nicholas of Virginia summed up the argument succinctly:

In order to quiet the alarms of the people of the United States with respect to the silence of the Constitution as to the liberty of the press...one of the first acts of the Government was to propose certain amendments to the Constitution, to put this matter beyond doubt...On this account, the General Government has been forbidden to touch the press (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798 p. 2139).

Thomas Jefferson, the titular head of the Republican party, used the states' rights position in his celebrated "Kentucky Resolutions" which, along with James Madison's Virginia Resolutions," formally protested the Sedition Act and urged the other states to repudiate it. Because the Constitution granted no power over speech or press to the national government, Jefferson reasoned, such authority was reserved to the states, which "retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom" (Elliot, 1907, pp. 540-541). His libertarian reputation notwithstanding, Jefferson never challenged the concept of seditious libel. As Leonard Levy has demonstrated, Jefferson "accepted without question the dominant view of his generation that government could be criminally assaulted merely by the expression of critical opinions that allegedly tended to subvert it by lowering it in the public's esteem" (1985, p. 250). Once he became president, Jefferson encouraged the prosecution of several Federalist enemies for seditious libel. His only requirement was that sedition trials be prosecuted in the state courts (Levy, 1985, pp. 340-347).

The Federalists were not convinced by the Republicans' states' rights attack on the Sedition Act. To their way of thinking, all governments possessed an inherent right to self defense against words as well as actions that threatened their security. As Representative Otis put it in Congress, "every independent Government has a right to preserve and defend itself against injuries and outrages which endanger its existence; for unless it has this power, it is unworthy the name of a free Government, and must either fall or be subordinate to some other protection" (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, p. 2146). To suppose that the Constitution reserved the power to enact laws against seditious libel exclusively to the states, Judge Addison suggested, would be to suppose "that the government of the United States must, unless
the individual states choose to offer it, be without defense against the most
dangerous enemy that can attack it, slander; against which, if unrestrained,
no government can support itself" (Addison, 1798, pp. 13-14). If the state
governments could protect themselves against the evils of seditious libel, the
Federalists reasoned, then surely the national government could not be
denied this vital right. Asked General Henry ("Light-Horse Harry") Lee in
the Virginia legislature, "Is government worth preserving? If not, let it be
annulled. If it is, deny not to it the means of preserving itself" (The Virginia
Report, 1850, p. 105).

Contrary to the Republicans' position that the First Amendment
deprived the national government of all authority over freedom of speech and
press, the Federalists contended that the Amendment actually supported a
sedition law. While the amendment prohibited any law respecting religious
freedom, they argued, with regard to freedom of speech and press it
prohibited only laws abridging liberty of expression. Because seditious libel
was not considered a legitimate form of expression under Federalists' Blackstonian understanding of freedom of speech and press, the national
government was not restrained by the First Amendment from legislating
against it. The Federalist minority in the Virginia legislature advanced this
interpretation of the amendment in arguing unsuccessfully against adoption
of Madison's "Virginia Resolutions:"

Congress is prohibited from making any law respecting a
religious establishment, but not from making any law
respecting the press. When the power of Congress relative
to the press is to be limited, the word respecting is dropt,
and Congress is only restrained from passing any law
abridging its liberty. This difference of
expression...manifests a difference of intention with respect
to the power of the national legislature over those subjects
(Address of the Minority 1799, p. 12).

Judge Addison also adopted this approach, arguing that "forbidding
power to abridge, implies a previous general power over the subject, and
leaves a power to punish an abuse of this freedom without abridging it"
(Addison, 1800, p. 44). If the drafters of the First Amendment had intended
to deprive the national government of all power to legislate with respect to
freedom of speech and press, he insisted, they would have used language as
explicit as that denying Congress authority to enact laws concerning religion.
James Madison, who had submitted the Bill of Rights to Congress for approval, replied that a "studied discrimination" of the phraseology of the first Amendment, rather than focus on its principles, risked obscuring the amendment's objectives. Both freedom of religion and freedom of expression, he said, "rest equally on the original ground of not being delegated by the Constitution, and consequently withheld from the [national] government" (The Virginia Report, 1850, p. 229). Any interpretation of the First Amendment "that would attack this original security for the one, must have like effect on the other," for "they are both equally secured...being both included in the same amendment, made at the same time, and by the same authority" (The Virginia Report, 1850, p. 229). In Madison’s view, the difference in terminology was unimportant; the intention was the same: the national government could not restrain religion, speech, or press. The Sedition Act therefore could find no support in the First Amendment. On the contrary, it exceeded the limited powers of Congress and invaded the prerogatives of the states.

A Changing Emphasis: The Overthrow of Blackstone

Although the initial Republican response to the Sedition Act generally emphasized states' rights and the limited nature of national power under the Constitution, critics of the law occasionally took aim at the narrow Blackstonian notion of freedom of expression—even as they defended the right of the states to punish seditious libel (see Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, pp. 2140-2141 and 2160-2161). This apparent inconsistency left the Federalists in a quandary. One anonymous pamphleteer in Virginia asked, "Will not such prosecutions under the state governments equally affect [freedom of expression] with like prosecutions under the general government?" (An Address to the People, 1799, pp. 54-55). Representative Otis agreed, pointing out that if the Sedition Act violated freedom of speech and press under the federal Constitution, then "each state has infringed upon its own constitution" since the states also guaranteed freedom of expression (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, p. 2149). While Republicans generally argued that seditious libel was a matter reserved to the states, many did so only as a tactical maneuver to try to undercut Federalist repression at the national level (Levy, 1985, pp. 301-308; but see Berns, 1970). Beneath the surface of the debate something much more radical was occurring: the emergence of a genuinely libertarian understanding of political dissent in a
republican government that would repudiate entirely the crime of seditious libel.

Unlike Thomas Jefferson's "Kentucky Resolutions," which attacked the Sedition Act only from the perspective of states' rights, James Madison's "Virginia Resolutions" also condemned it on the basis of a libertarian conception of freedom of speech and press. Madison referred to the power of government to punish seditious libel as "a power which more than any other ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against that right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right" (The Virginia Report, 1850, p. 23). In later defending his resolutions, Madison contended that the Blackstonian definition of freedom of expression was unacceptable in the United States. Where "the people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty," he wrote, freedom of speech and press must be ensured "not only from the previous inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws." Any other notion of "freedom of expression would be a "mockery" (The Virginia Report, 1850, p. 220).

The Republican pamphleteers soon picked up this idea. In New York, John Thomson called liberty of the press "the palladium of freedom, which if once destroyed, Liberty is no more" (Thomson, 1801, p. 8). Tunis Wortman, another New Yorker, referred to the notion of seditious libel as "the offspring of a Monarchy" and a "dangerous exotic" that "can never be reconciled to the genius and constitution of a Representative Commonwealth" (Wortman, 1800, p. 262). Of all human rights, Wortman continued, that of communicating one's sentiments is "the most sacred and inestimable" (Wortman, 1800, p. 146). It would be impossible to conceive "a more horrible and pernicious tyranny than that which would restrain the intercourse of Thought" (Wortman, 1800, p. 146). From Virginia, James Ogilvie observed that "as moral and political truth does not visit the human mind by indirect inspiration or intuition, it can be discovered and diffused only by unshackled and conscientious discussion" (Ogilvie, 1798, p. 5). George Hay, son-in-law of James Monroe and a member of the Virginia legislature, went so far as to claim:

A man may say everything which his passion can suggest; he may employ all his time, and all his talents...in speaking against the government matters that are false, scandalous, and malicious...[Surely freedom of the press...will not
permit a man to be punished, for publishing any opinion on any subject, and supporting it by any statement whatever (Hay, 1803, p. 25).

The Republicans based their new libertarianism on two points in particular: the need for an unrestricted flow of political information in a republican government, and the role of public opinion in supporting that government. As to the first point, they argued that if the people are to make intelligent choices in the voting booth, they must have complete and accurate knowledge of what office holders are doing, and they cannot have such knowledge if they are prevented from questioning the conduct of their political officials. Thus, after expressing confidence in the ability of the people to judge their own interests, Congressman John Nicholas told his colleagues that the press "should remain perfectly free to give them every information," for to restrict freedom of speech and press, he warned, "is striking at the root of free republican Government" (Annals of Congress, July 10, 1798, p. 2104). The connection between republicanism and the unimpeded flow of political information was crucial in Nicholas's view because in a free government the people have a "duty to elect all the parts of the Government, and, in this way, to sit in judgment over the conduct of those who have been heretofore employed" (Annals of Congress, February 25, 1799, p. 3006).

Further, Thomas Cooper of Pennsylvania asked, "How are the people in a representative government, to judge of the respective merits of those whom they are to reject or appoint to public situations, if [freedom of inquiry] be not granted?" Only through a broad diffusion of political information "will the electors be qualified to choose, and the persons chosen, to act, with superior discernment and ability" (Cooper, 1800, p. 81). James Ogilvie summed up the Republican case on this point:

Free discussion is the source, the safeguard and sanctuary of free government...In order to qualify the people, to discharge with wisdom and success their electoral duties, it is necessary that...everything interesting to their prosperity and welfare be submitted to the deliberate, unshackled and solitary scrutiny of superior genius and general reason. How otherwise can they distinguish between...those who pervert public trust, treasure, and power...and those who employ
Commonwealth

them to promote the real happiness of society? (Ogilvie, 1798, pp. 5-6).

The second part of the Republicans' new libertarianism focused on the role of public opinion in a free government. They argued that public opinion was the mainspring of popular government and could not be ignored without dire consequences. Tunis Wortman, for instance, warned that public opinion is "the vital principle of Civil Society: The healthful existence of a state requires that it should always possess a considerable latitude and extensive sphere of operation, and that it should never be approached without the utmost deference and circumspection" (Wortman, 1800, p.181; also see Cooper, 1800, pp. 11-15). John Taylor of Virginia concurred in this analysis but went further by recognizing that not only does public opinion shape government, but government often shapes public opinion. "If public opinion were to be directed by government, by means of fines, penalties, and punishments," he observed, "public opinion itself would be made the stepping stone for usurpation," and "the most dangerous effect would be the abolition of the right to examine public servants" (The Virginia Report, 1850, p. 27). And John Thomson feared that if government suppressed public opinion, "either it will drive the people into immediate acts of violence against the Government; or, if they silently submit, it will ultimately deprive the people of that free energy of thought, word, and action, which the consciousness of liberty and independence never fail to inspire." The government, he concluded, "will then cease to direct the public concerns of free men; and [it] will rule over a nation of degraded slaves" (Thomson, 1801, p. 58).

The most articulate Federalist response to the Republicans came from Judge Alexander Addison. Invoking republicanism was meaningless, he claimed, "unless it be meant to establish that because the sovereign American people can change their government when they please, every individual is at liberty...to incite the people to change their government whenever he pleases," or that it is "more an offense to abuse the government [in England] than to mislead the people here" (Addison, 1800, p. 41; italics in the original). To Addison, simply because a government is elected, it does not follow that freedom of expression should be less restrained. A broader degree of freedom of speech and press would give every individual "a right to misrepresent the character and conduct" of public officials, making it impossible for the voters to choose intelligently. To mislead the people where their power is limited poses few risks, but to mislead them "where they have all power, must produce the greatest possible mischief" (Addison, 1800, p. 44).
42). Going beyond Blackstone's narrow definition of freedom of expression would "tend only to make the people miserable, to corrupt and destroy the government, to introduce anarchy, and, in the end, despotism" (Addison, 1800, p. 43).

Addison further argued that while the people's right of inquiry may be important, it cannot take precedence over the natural right of reputation, particularly that of individuals in public office. Reputation, is a kind of property that "every man, who has honestly acquired it, has a right to enjoy" (Addison, 1798, p. 6). It is especially important that those in public stations, "for the sake of the benefits we receive from them," have an unassailable right to "reputation, good name, and opinion" (Addison, 1798, p. 6). Political discussion can never be so free as to allow debasement of the good reputation of those in public office, for to do so would risk undermining the confidence of the people in their governors and thus in their government. For Addison, the rights of the political community were subordinate to those of individuals, even when those individuals might profoundly affect the entire community and even when they were technically responsible to the community.

As for the Republicans' emphasis upon the importance of public opinion in government, Addison agreed with their premises but drew sharply different conclusions. "Speech, writing, and printing are the great director of human opinion," he observed, "and public opinion is the great director of human action. It can support the worst or topple the best government" (Addison, 1798, p. 18). Those who command the press command the country, for they will control public opinion, which controls everything else. Asserting that public opinion had brought about the French Revolution, Addison wondered if the specter of anarchy had now reached America. If so, he concluded, the only remedy was to harness public opinion in support of the government by vigorously enforcing the Sedition Act. Addison thus turned the Republican argument on its head. Because the people cannot be trusted to distinguish truth from falsehood, republican government requires less, not more, freedom of political inquiry.

The Revolution Completed: A New Theory of Political Dissent

The Republicans, however, would not be silenced. With the double-barreled argument of unlimited political inquiry and sovereign public opinion, they had cast aside the Blackstonian definition of freedom of expression and were ready to complete the construction of their new
Commonwealth

libertarianism by destroying the other tenets upon which the Federalist understanding of legitimate political dissent was founded. Their first victim was the concept of "licentiousness," which they rejected completely. The licentiousness of the press, John Thomson wrote, "is a term destitute of any meaning," for definitions of it have "uniformly proceeded from men who evidently wished nobody to enjoy the Liberty of the Press, but such as were their opinion" (Thomson, 1801, p. 7). George Hay reasoned that "if no man can tell where freedom stops, and licentiousness begins, it is obvious that no man can say, to what extent a law against licentiousness shall be carried." Consequently, "no law can be made to restrain the licentiousness of the press," and it "may do whatever it pleases to do...taking care, however, to do no injury to any individual" (Hay 1803, pp. 22-23).

Ironically, the Republicans' next target was something libertarians had long sought but would now reject as too confining: the idea of "truth" as a defense against a charge of seditious libel. This concept prevented conviction if the challenged utterance or writing could be shown to be incontrovertibly true. The catch was that "truth" protected only facts, for they could be proved; but opinions would not be proved to be true, their acceptability being left to the whims of juries. Because a jury of twelve people could rarely be found to agree on the truth of any one opinion, Congressman Nicholas noted, "chance must determine whether political opinions are true or false, and it will not unfrequently happen, that a man will be punished for publishing opinions...merely because accident, or design, has collected a jury of different sentiments" (Annals of Congress, February 25, 1799, pp. 3005-3006). John Thomson thought trying to determine the truth of opinions would be as absurd as "deciding which was the palatable food, agreeable drink, or beautiful color" (Thomson, 1801, p. 68). In strikingly modern vein, George Hay remarked that "there is truth in opinion, as well as in fact" (Hay, 1803, p. 26). This idea was a far cry from the claim of Alexander Addison that "truth has but one side: and listening to error and falsehood is indeed a strange way to discover truth" (Addison, 1798, p. 23).

Anticipating by 60 years John Stuart Mill's classic defense of freedom of expression in his book On Liberty, the Republicans radically transformed the concept of "truth" with respect to freedom of speech and press, making it a tool not for narrowing but for broadening expression. "Diversity of sentiment," wrote Tunis Wortman, "is far from being unfavourable to the eventual reception of Truth. It produces Collision, engenders Argument, and affords exercise and energy to the intellectual powers; it corrects our errors, removes our prejudices, and strengthens our
perceptions" (Wortman, 1800, p. 123). John Thomson captured the spirit of the new libertarianism when he implored: "Let then public discussion be unrestrained. The ideas of the first proposer may be improved on by succeeding writers, and from collision of sentiment, truth will ultimately be produced...Coercion may silence, but it never can convince" (Thomson, 1801, pp. 79 and 83).

Having swept aside the Blackstonian definition of freedom of speech and press, the idea that political opinions could be licentious, and the defense of truth against prosecution for seditious libel, the Republicans were ready to submit their own conception of the legitimate bounds of political dissent in a free government. They had been arguing that not only was political dissent harmless, but that it was beneficial because it ultimately resulted in truth. It was not critical opinions that should be feared, but rather violent actions based on those opinions. Accordingly, the Republicans offered a kind of "clear and present danger" test for judging the propriety of political dissent in place of the Federalists' more repressive "bad tendency" approach. John Thomson stated the new formula this way:

Political opinions never can be destructive of social order, or public tranquility, if allowed a free operation. The law is at all times sufficiently energetic to punish disturbers of the public peace. When men are found guilty of this, let them be punished; it is well. It is not then punishing opinion, it is punishing actions injurious to the peace of the community (Thomson, 1801, p. 79).

Tunis Wortman also believed that because "our Natural liberty terminates at the precise point at which our conduct becomes injurious," government should be "positive and stern with regard to every act of open disorder" but that "nothing more can be required" (Wortman, 1800, pp. 140 and 253). Congressman Nicholas summed up the new attitude toward political dissent when he told the House of Representatives that the whole notion of seditious libel in a republican nation was "obsolete" and "inconsistent with the nature of our Government" because elected officials should not have "power to restrain animadversions on public measures" (Annals of Congress, February 25, 1798, p. 3014). A new age had begun in the history of American constitutionalism.
The New Libertarianism and the Liberation of Republican Government

The battle between the Federalists and Jeffersonians over the Sedition Act was the logical culmination of the war between power and liberty that was so central to republican thought. Just as the American revolutionists had viewed the British as tyrants scheming against liberty, so too did the Jeffersonians regard the Federalists as corrupt monarchists, drunk with power, conspiring to overthrow the principles of freedom embodied in a popular constitution by forcing into slavery those citizens who dared to question autocratic rule. While Federalists saw power as necessary for republican government, Jeffersonians saw power as its nemesis. As Forrest McDonald has argued, the Federalists "trusted themselves and therefore trusted power if it was in their hands," whereas the Jeffersonians "did not trust themselves and therefore did not trust power in anyone's hands" (1985, p. 205). The safest depository for power, the Jeffersonians believed, was the people. This was the essence of republicanism, and it triumphed in what Jefferson called the "revolution" of 1800.

To Gordon Wood the controversy over the Sedition Act "marked the crucial turning point in the democratization of the American mind. It fundamentally altered America's understanding not only of its intellectual leadership but of its conception of public truth" (1977, p. 123). As a result, Americans believe more firmly that in a popularly based regime political truth is to be found by the people, not imposed by the government. Citizens should be free to criticize their government. Citizens should be free to criticize their government's notion of political truth without fear of being punished for subversion, for there is a difference between political opposition and political insurrection. So long as the critics of those in power do not attempt to overthrow the government by force, their dissent, no matter how incisive or derisive, must be tolerated, otherwise governmental authority becomes authoritarian government. In liberating the American mind, the debate over the Sedition Act thus liberated our understanding of republican government as well.

As the nation expanded after 1800 and new political issues emerged, ever more voices of dissent were raised against perceived threats to liberty from abusive governmental power. Such cries came first, ironically, from Federalists in commercially dominated New England, some of whom advocated secession in response to Jefferson's Embargo of 1807 and Madison's War of 1812. As the crisis over sectionalism and slavery intensified after 1820, talk of nullification and secession moved south. Ever
since these early instances of protest, the right of political dissent, while often controversial, has been regarded as crucial in protecting liberty against arbitrary government. The clash over the Sedition Act therefore not only sparked a dramatic breakthrough in libertarian thought, but also secured a vital pillar in the edifice of American constitutionalism.

REFERENCES


Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature to the People of that State; Containing a Vindication of the Constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Laws. 1799.

An Address To The People of Virginia, Respecting the Alien and Sedition Laws; By a Citizen of the State. 1799. Richmond: Printed by Augustine Davies.


OGILVIE, James. (1798) *A Speech Delivered in Essex County In Support of a Memorial, Presented To the Citizens of that County And Now Before the Assembly On The Subject of the Alien and Sedition Acts*. Richmond: Printed by John B. Dixon.


[Sedition Act]. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States. 1798. 1 Statutes as Large 596.


FORSAKING THE MARKET: PRICE CONTROLS AND IDEOLOGICAL
CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES

Gordon P. Henderson
Widener University

A central component of the American political ethos has been that there ought to be a complementary relationship between the liberal polity and free-market capitalism. When such a relationship exists the distinction between the two spheres is presumably dissolved by the liberty guaranteed by each to the other. This paper consists of an analysis of editorials and columns in the American prestige press on the question of the desirability of price and wage control during the 1940s and 1970s and assumes that such an issue highlights the relationship of politics and economics. The analysis reveals that the editorial position of the New York Times had changed from reluctant to strong support for controls based on a perceived crisis of fairness in the American political economy during the early 1970s. The concern with fairness during the 1970s was mirrored in reverse in Wall Street Journal editorials and columns opposing controls and suggests that a scramble for economic shares had taken precedence over the more traditional concern to preserve political and economic liberty.

Introduction

It is widely argued that liberal democracy and market capitalism are vitally related to one another in a complementary way (Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1944; Lindblom, 1977). According to this argument, economic and political liberty are regarded as so essential to one another that the distinction between them becomes meaningless. As long as this relationship persists, the technical dynamics of the market can be relied upon to adjust periodic fluctuations in its economic performance. In the political sphere, policy making and conflict resolution are to occur through processes
Commonwealth

characterized by equality, liberty, and fairness. Liberty in the one is a precondition of liberty in the other.

In liberal democracies, then, policy and institutional measures which appear to substitute for or disrupt this complementary relationship of polity and economy are regarded with suspicion. Economic planning is anathema to such societies, in part because it would disturb this relationship of economic and political freedom. Of the world’s current liberal democracies, none is perhaps more fervently committed to this point of view than the United States (Hartz, 1955; McCloskey and Zaller, 1984). Yet in the years following the tumultuous 1960s, Americans began to question the ability of the market to perform its economic and/or political functions. Explanations of this perceived failure have included excessive government intervention and regulation (Higgs, 1987; Kristol, 1980; Olson, 1982); the increasing concentration of private wealth and power (Galbraith, 1967, 1973; McConnell, 1966); and the increasingly interdependent yet highly competitive global economy (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Etzioni, 1980; Reich, 1983; Rohatyn, 1983). Finally, some scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with free market economics as an analog for decision-making in a democratic polity. Lowi (1969), for instance, questions the ability of the market-oriented style of conflict resolution in pluralist polities to produce rational and just policies in a complex post-industrial world. Others have argued that a vastly unequal distribution of wealth has come increasingly to characterize market societies and has begun to undermine the most basic of democratic processes (Dahl, 1982, p. 170; Lindblom, 1977, pp. 222-233; Okun, 1975, p. 1; Thurow, 1980).

Such criticism strikes at the foundations of established orthodoxy. Increasing challenges to market capitalism led in the late 1960s to a perceptual breakdown among elite opinion-leaders of the once symbiotic relationship between economics and politics (Gouldner, 1979, pp. 57ff). Among the evidence that this breakdown became a part of mainstream elite opinion are the debates in the American prestige press (Pool, 1970, p. 17) over wage and price controls which took place immediately following World War Two and again during the Nixon Administration. For purposes of this study, documentation is based on analysis of the ideologically symbolic content of 447 editorials and columns which appeared in the New York Times (NYT) and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) during those two periods. Table 1 categorizes these 447 editorial page discussions of wage and price controls.

Note that the editorial content of the earlier period greatly exceeds the later period. One reason for this is a change in the formats of these two
newspapers; another is simply that the issue received far less editorial attention during the Nixon era. The format change has to do with a reduction in actual space devoted to editorials and, as Table 1 also indicates, an increase in the number of columns written by regular and guest columnists.

Method

To reinterpret and somewhat invert a methodological suggestion offered by Karl Mannheim, the editorial page discussion of public policy issues is a particularly sensitive index of ideological change (Mannheim, 1936, p. 83) because in addition to the fact that it is watched by the attentive public (Key, 1961, pp. 189-192) as well as by key decision makers, it constitutes a forum where the "prevailing ideology" (Pool, 1970, p. 17) is applied to the salient issues of the day. Thus, this study focuses on the ideological dimensions of a concrete public policy debate through the analysis of a medium which has the likelihood of influencing the most significant portions of American society.

The analysis of the data for this paper is not, strictly speaking, a content analysis as traditionally understood, for instance, by Berelson (1954, p. 489) because a quantitative account of the arguments in this policy debate is neither the exclusive nor the most central mode of analysis. Rather, ideologically relevant arguments of differing frequencies are accorded relatively equal status because each is a part of the debate. When juxtaposed on one another, certain of these arguments assume special importance regardless of their frequency, either because they appear to be central to a particular cluster of arguments or because they make greater sense of others (Macpherson, 1962, pp. 4-8). As one might expect, however, the linchpin arguments tend also to be the most numerous.

The manner by which the data are analyzed and reported also differs from a traditional content analysis in that the editorials and columns are, so to speak, permitted to speak for themselves. First, the editorials and columns from both periods were screened to determine whether they individually favored or opposed controls. Then, based on principal disputes which usually arise in debates over economic planning, a set of three issues was devised to identify the arguments used to defend these positions. In a sense, this method of analysis permits the investigator to "interview" the data (Krippendorf, 1980, pp. 79-80).
The first of these, the "Normative Issue," addresses the suitability of controls and planning for the central features of the American political ethos. It asks: To what extent and in what ways are the components and functions of wage and price controls consistent or inconsistent with traditional features of the American political ethos? The second, the "Knowledge Issue," addresses the empirical question of whether, technically, economic planning is possible, and asks: To what extent do the administrative and informational capacities of government justify the substitution of its own judgment for that of the market and/or any other relevant economic decision makers? The third, the "Public Issue," addresses the political question of whether individuals and groups, as economic actors, can be expected to fit their behavior to government's economic judgment. This question asks: To what extent does the behavior of groups and individuals as politico-economic actors facilitate, obstruct, or require the imposition of a controls apparatus? The editorial page responses to these three questions are reported in summary fashion for each time period, respectively, in Tables 2 and 3. 3

Analysis of the Editorial Page Perspective: 1945-46

During the 1940s, both the NYT and the WSJ favored a return to the market, agreeing that controls should not become a permanent fixture of the American political economy. At the heart of this position was the belief that to institutionalize wage and price controls would severely corrupt what was believed to be the proper relationship between economy and polity. The question was one of how quickly controls should be abolished. Until November 1946, when it finally called for an end to all controls, editorials in the New York Times reluctantly favored limited controls on the most inflationary items. These would gradually diminish as the inflationary pressures the war emergency generated subsided.

The Wall Street Journal did not support the Times' more gradual timetable, preferring, instead, an immediate end to all wartime controls. The following discussion of the arguments marshalled in behalf of these positions is based on editorials in each newspaper and/or the columnists it published, as summarized in Table 2.

The Normative Issue

Each newspaper argued that the OPA might easily become a runaway agency whose thirst for power threatened the foundations of limited
government in the United States. The nucleus of these concerns consisted of a set of arguments about the appropriate extent of the discretionary authority to be granted OPA, if re-authorized. As indicated above, the NYT and columns advocating re-authorization insisted that OPA authority be geared toward decontrol, while the WSJ almost uniformly advocated the immediate termination of OPA authority. These positions, especially in the WSJ, were based on a genuine fear that OPA, no matter how noble the intentions of its administrators, would seek to extend its authority in the direction of a permanently planned economy.

To the WSJ, controls were inherently inconsistent with the limiting conditions of "parliamentary government" (WSJ, 4/8/46, p. 6). Both newspapers argued that because OPA would become an attractive tool for manipulation by politicians, temporary extension of its authority in peacetime would lead to its permanent institutionalization. In light of these concerns, the WSJ claimed that "the way to stop price control is to stop" (WSJ, 3/14/46, p. 6).

OPA was subjected in both newspapers, especially in the more strident WSJ, not only to these hypothetical criticisms of OPA extension but also to concrete charges that the agency and its supporters had indeed embarked upon the achievement of a hidden agenda. The WSJ, and to a lesser but still significant extent the NYT, both believed this agenda was to perpetuate and extend the agency's authority. The WSJ cited such evidence as that the agency had continually denied that certain commodities, such as oil and cigarettes, had reached non-inflationary supply levels (WSJ, 4/3/46, p. 6). In arguments which also found their way onto the NYT editorial page, the WSJ accused the agency of employing propaganda about economic conditions and the correctness of its policies.

Consistent with its characterization of OPA as totalitarian, the WSJ also found the agency's enforcement tactics to be excessive and accused the agency of intimidating its critics through public abuse, blackmail, and suppression on 19 occasions, primarily in 1946. On one occasion in 1945, it likened the agency to the Nazi Gestapo by citing such enforcement tactics as the New York City program in which school children were to compare the prices paid by their mothers with the legal price ceilings (WSJ, 1/26/45, p. 4). On 11 occasions, the WSJ accused the agency of attempting to sabotage capitalism by undermining the politico-economic freedom intrinsic to it in the name of a faith in national economic planning (WSJ, 10/19/45, p. 8).

From the normative perspective, then, OPA received far more criticism than praise. Both supporters of limited extension and outright opponents regarded controls as a serious threat to the American political
Commonwealth

economy precisely because it was not considered possible to separate political and economic power. As the nation was just ending a war with regimes whose physical, political, and economic domination of their respective societies were almost indistinguishable, this should not be surprising.

The Knowledge Issue

That the discussants in the debate during the 1940s believed the market still to be adequate to its responsibility as guarantor of free and stable political and economic institutions is also evident from their arguments in response to the knowledge issue. The WSJ’s principal response to the question raised by the knowledge issue was that the economy was far too complex and the information resources available to OPA far too limited to assure successful implementation of controls. One of its editorials expressed this lack of confidence with the comment that “no flat, uniform price can be made to fit the necessities of an infinite variety of big and little producers operating under widely different conditions throughout the country” (WSJ, 2/5/46, p. 6). Thus, while it often attributed evidence of OPA’s failures to administrative and personnel factors, such as in the comment that many OPA staff members “are merely immature and inexperienced,” (WSJ, 10/19/45, p. 8) its principal position was that the application of limited knowledge to a highly complex economy could only lead to chaos.

Fully 67 WSJ editorials made the argument, for instance, that OPA policies severely restrained production and, in consequence, increased shortages and black markets. On 20 occasions, the WSJ deduced that only comprehensive control could manage such complexity, while it implicitly denied that such comprehensive control was possible. Thus, the WSJ had no use for controls, constructing an argument that OPA would only create economic chaos and perpetuate its own existence until it seized control of the entire economy, and eliminated the market system and with it the liberal polity.

The NYT seems to have agreed, but with far less stridency and on far fewer occasions. Although it endorsed extension, it employed arguments under the knowledge issue which were similar to those of the WSJ in their skepticism about a successful long-term program of controls. Its reluctant advocacy of a limited, diminishing program of selective controls was meant to meet only what it believed were the lingering trappings of a war-generated economic emergency which might only be exacerbated by an
immediate return to market forces. Controls, however, dealt only with the symptoms, and not the true causes, of inflation. Specifically, the NYT argued on 48 occasions that loose fiscal and monetary policies, though essential to the war effort, had distorted the market and made controls necessary. Once such policies were brought into line, however, the market would re-emerge as the best and most desirable economic regulator.

Under the knowledge issue, then, each newspaper brought to bear arguments which supported and in some cases mirrored those that had been made in response to the normative issue. A continued faith in the wisdom of the marketplace coupled with a strong sense of its vulnerability in the immediate post-war period were drawn together by a thoroughgoing skepticism about OPA’s ability to substitute for the market.

The Public Issue

The key to the ideological perspective of these two newspapers during the 1940s is found in their response to the question raised under the public issue. Their arguments here demonstrate that both agreed, despite their disagreement regarding OPA extension, that the market economy in the United States was both a normative and an empirical reality. This position emerged in two basic types of responses to the public issue.

The first of these was that economic actors would choose how or whether to respond to government actions on the basis of their own self-interest and competitive instincts as though they were signals generated in the open market.11 The WSJ, for instance, argued 26 times in defense of its complete opposition to controls that, as during Prohibition, people would second-guess government orders, even if it meant violating the law (see, for example, WSJ, 7/1/46, p. 4). On 16 occasions the WSJ deduced from this historical analogy that substantial evasion of OPA policies demonstrated the lack of economy-wide support for controls while on another 17 occasions it attributed statements and actions supportive of OPA to those for whom, in the absence of a war emergency, controls offered at least a temporary competitive advantage. Clearly, the WSJ was satisfied that New Deal and wartime economic controls had not stifled the American competitive spirit.

For its part, the NYT was also aware of the degree of evasion, but given its position in support of limited controls it regarded evasion and self interest as an inevitable, albeit regrettable, consequence. While the NYT acknowledged that temporary controls would become more difficult to administer as the psychological trappings of the war emergency diminished, it
nevertheless regarded them as essential to the restoration of the market. The inevitable evasion and self-interest, it concluded, were no reason to reject controls and risk further economic damage.

The NYT bolstered its position by referring to a second type of response to the public issue, shared by the WSJ, which held that in the absence of the war emergency and the patriotic cooperation generated by it, agencies such as OPA would have to convince the public of the fairness of its policies to all sectors of the economy. Both newspapers were very concerned that in the absence of a public perception of OPA fairness, economic actors would have an even greater incentive to evade and/or ignore OPA decisions.\textsuperscript{12}

Given these emphases on the inherently market-oriented behavior of economic actors, we can relate the response to the public issue to responses to the normative and knowledge issues. In particular, the responses in both newspapers to all three issues hinge on the concern that OPA would seek comprehensive control over the economy. The WSJ regarded this as an OPA goal which could not be realized in practice. It supported its position by referring not only to the intractable complexity of the economy under the knowledge issue but also, under the public issue, to the equally intractable competitive spirit of the American public. As for the inherently competitive American spirit, WSJ references to the gestapo, propaganda, and an anti-American agenda seemed to anticipate a nightmare of political, economic, and physical control were OPA to be extended.

While for the NYT short-term controls were preferable to immediate termination, its position was also market-oriented. Like the WSJ, it also feared for the future of the polity under continued OPA authority. It shared with the WSJ a skepticism about the effectiveness of controls, especially in peacetime, but seems to have advocated their limited extension so as to prevent an even greater post-war economic chaos which would inevitably be met, however wrong-headedly, with even stricter, and hence more threatening, controls.

Analysis of the Editorial Page Perspective: 1969-74

In spite of the Vietnam conflict, the debate over wage and price control during the 1970s was essentially over the imposition of peacetime controls. While this is similar to the debate over post-war controls in the 1940s, it differs in that controls advocates could not, and did not, point to Vietnam as a justification for their position. Rather, both advocates and
opponents focused on the question of whether there was a peacetime economic crisis and, however that question were resolved, whether government intervention or free enterprise would be best able to correct it.

The NYT uniformly endorsed wage and price controls in all 20 of its editorials on the subject. Its endorsement of peacetime controls is strikingly different from the position it had held during the 1940s and was based on the belief that the stagflation of the period was symptomatic of an economic crisis requiring drastic policy action. As the analysis will show, the central component of the perceived crisis was that the market economy was neither as fair nor efficient as it had been and that this required extraordinary peacetime government intervention.

The basic position of the WSJ opposing controls had changed little from the 1940s. All 37 of its editorials on the subject took this position. The analysis will show that arguments against controls which expressed concern about their normative implications for the American polity were overshadowed by an evaluation of their potential for unfairness to specific political and economic groups. The total frequencies of the arguments are summarized in Table 3.

The Normative Issue

If in the 1940s the central normative issue was the extent of discretionary authority which should be granted to OPA, the central issue in the 1970s was by whom and how a similar kind of authority would be exercised. While much of the discussion in the 1970s did focus on the idea that controls would result in the centralization of authority, it is a different concern from the earlier period in that the arguments focus not so much on the potentially totalitarian character of such authority but rather on the consequences controls might have for specific groups and individuals.

Those normative arguments opposing controls in the 1970s, appearing mainly in the WSJ, emphasized threats to liberty, democracy, and fairness in a way reminiscent of the 1940s. For example, economist Alan Greenspan (1973) wrote that whereas "controls cannot supersede the laws of supply and demand," in a free society, "justice cannot prevail," in any society in which they can. There was significant concern that those principally responsible for making policy decisions under controls would give little consideration to what might be correct or just. Rather, there seems to have been an assumption that if, as the WSJ (7/6/71, p. 14) put it, "government functionaries try to manage markets determining just what is ‘fair’ for all of
us" the political distribution of power at a given moment would shape the distribution of economic power. While the principles of liberty and democracy figured prominently in normative arguments opposing controls, they were overshadowed by concern about the fairness of specific outcomes.

This fairness-based perspective on the normative issue was mirrored by arguments marshalled in defense of a controls program by the NYT and columns in both newspapers. Advocates believed that the need for controls had grown out of the unfair economic advantage possessed by certain economic groups over others. Eight NYT editorials and 12 of the columns it published argued that compulsory economic cooperation was essential to protect weaker economic actors from stronger. NYT columnist Leonard Silk (1971), supporting the 1971 freeze on the ground that ours was "no longer a Smithian economy," contended that powerful groups, when they "cannot work out an adjustment of their conflicts without hurting the rest of the community," must be subjected to public authority to "effect a better balance of community interests".

In addition to advocating controls in order to achieve such a balance, however, advocates were also concerned that controls not be subject to political abuse by the concentrated economic powers which had made them necessary. Thus, they often criticized the Nixon Administration for various forms of favoritism and were generally critical of government officials for lacking the political will to act because of strong counter-pressures from concentrated economic powers. It is not surprising, then, that advocates very often expressed concern that any controls program, while necessary, nevertheless be subject to both democratic checks and traditional market restraints so as to avert economic harm to disadvantaged groups which they believed could result from too tight and unsupervised a relationship between politics and economics.

The normative perspective on controls during the 1970s, then, while often rhetorically consistent with that of the 1940s, differed in the sense that its focus was on the consequences for certain groups; opponents feared that the responsibility for sorting economic interests would be taken from the market while advocates emphasized their doubts about the market's ability to do so fairly. Especially significant is the change in the NYT's editorial position in that while it remained a reluctant advocate, the reluctance it shared with like-minded columnists in both newspapers was based less on a concern about the threat of controls to the liberal polity than on the possibility that the economic groups whose power controls were meant to restrain might succeed in using controls to perpetuate and strengthen it.
The Knowledge Issue

On the knowledge issue, opponents held to the position, consistent with that of their counterparts in the 1940s, that government's ability to successfully implement a program of controls was limited by its access to information and the sheer complexity of the economy. In March of 1971, for instance, the WSJ counseled against the development of a program of controls with the comment that "[a]s long as the instruments of economic policy are imperfectly understood, the policy-makers had better handle them cautiously," (WSJ, 3/18/71, p. 18). Indeed, opponents of controls were confident that the true source of the nation's economic problems was the result of government's "distorting" influence over the market.

The widespread conviction among advocates of control that the economy had reached a state of crisis led them to support drastic policy measures, partly with the confidence that what they viewed as the principal cause of the crisis, the concentration of business and organized labor, would also facilitate controls since they were so easily identifiable. Thus, in March 1971 the NYT urged the president to replace the policy of gradualism with direct controls on the construction industry so that it would become "vastly easier to take the additional steps needed for a genuine national incomes policy to halt the shrinkage of the dollar" (NYT, 3/28/71, p. iv: 14).

Control advocates were careful to argue that any incomes policy must nevertheless rely on market forces, partly as a response to their critics but also as a check against their normative fear, noted earlier, that the authority for controls might be seized by the very forces which had necessitated them. Rather than dismiss the market altogether, advocates looked to government with the confidence that, if managed properly, controls could rectify the economic outcomes they found so distressing without forsaking the market altogether.

The debate on the knowledge issue during the 1970s, then, illustrates sharper disagreement on the informational and administrative questions it raises than in the 1940s. In the first place, the two sides disagreed about whether there was indeed an economic crisis requiring economic controls. Opponents of controls were as confident of their conclusion that there was no such crisis as advocates were confident of its urgency. Secondly, while the WSJ and columnists opposing controls were convinced, as in the 1940s, that the economy was too complex for economic control, advocates of controls believed the economic concentration which had caused the crisis they defined
would also make controls that much more effective. Rather than lacking confidence in controls from the perspective of the knowledge issue, then, advocates lacked confidence in the political institutions which would administer them.

The Public Issue

As was the case in the 1940s debate, the response of advocates and opponents of controls to the questions raised by the public issue serve to tie together their responses to the other two issues. The response to the public issue reveals that the discussants held two different perspectives on the political and social climates within which controls would be imposed and as a result they disagreed on their necessity and workability.

Opponents of controls did not share the belief of advocates that the market had been distorted to a point which required drastic and direct government intervention. Rather, they regarded controls as a threat to an otherwise stable political economy. For instance, conservative economist Milton Friedman (1971) argued in a scathing column in the NYT that Nixon's new freeze would encourage political appointees to exercise "arbitrary judgment," and that these decisions would be based on "political power" and "visibility". This being the case, controls would likely result in greater conflict among economic groups, thereby exacerbating the already divisive political issues of the day.

Furthermore, opponents believed that controls and their implementation would quickly become a political issue that would misdirect the competitive activities of economic actors toward seeking political influence with the controls authority. Consistent with this, the WSJ argued in 1973 that those in the business community who had supported controls "as a pleasant way of avoiding nasty labor confrontations, must now ponder the profit implications of a one-sided freeze" on prices and not wages (WSJ, 6/15/73, p. 12). Such government-inspired calculations could only lead to further economic chaos and conflict which would then be resolved in the political arena. Furthermore, opponents believed that controls would cause important economic actors to lose confidence in the economy and to adjust their activities accordingly with potentially disastrous economic results.

To advocates of controls, the market economy no longer served political or economic freedom. Rather, since the Smithian conception of a competitive political economy had been supplanted by the unfair domination of powerful economic groups, government had the right and responsibility to
intervene and compel cooperation. Thus, in endorsing Nixon’s 1971 freeze, the NYT wrote that it would be "a test of the ability of this democratic nation to develop workable curbs on the abuse of private power without a total suspension of voluntary decision-making," and that "government has an inescapable obligation to protect the total community against excesses by big business or big unions where they exercise monopoly control over vital services" (NYT, 8/30/71, p. 28). In other words, since advocates saw the market system itself causing the need for controls, they saw no reason to protect it from direct government intervention.24

In the 1970s, then, opponents argued that economic actors would interpret controls as an invitation to seek economic gain through political, rather than market, means, thereby corrupting both arenas. They viewed this politicization of the distribution of economic power as potentially threatening to the status of the large corporate and financial interests whose health and independence they regarded as crucial to a strong economy.

Advocates, on the other hand, supported government neutralization of concentrated power. They were fearful that the Nixon Administration's implicit ties to concentrated corporate and union power would lead it to use its economic authority to enhance, rather than to restrict, that power. Since, from their perspective, the market system had become a threat to political liberty and fairness rather than a guarantor, they regarded direct intervention as essential.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the debates over wage and price controls during the 1940s and the early 1970s has shown that there were significant changes in the intensity and justification of positions for or against controls. Most notably, a shift to editorial support for controls by the NYT from the earlier to the later period may be contrasted with the consistent opposition to controls found in the WSJ during both periods. Further, in the 1970s all sides employed as justifications of their respective positions a more particularistic concern with fairness rather than the more general concern of the earlier period to preserve liberty.

This development hinges upon a change in the conceptual relationship between polity and economy. In the 1940s, the discussion of controls was founded upon a firm ideological belief that economic planning was unsuited to an American political ethos which acknowledged no distinction between economic and political liberty. In the 1970s, the
Commonwealth

economic consequences of controls were considered independently of their consequences for the polity, although they were obviously understood by both sides to have important political consequences as well. Considering the economy as an independent object, then, the advocates of controls had only slight difficulty endorsing direct political control and the limitation of economic freedom—their difficulty being uncertainty about the fairness of the political authority implementing it. Opponents were content to argue for complete depoliticization so as to preserve the market’s economic outcomes. In each case, the fairness of specific economic outcomes was measured in isolation from their effect on the general distribution of economic and political liberty.

This might be explained by noting that in the later period the debate was conducted on less ideological grounds. Since these debates took place in a nation where a deeply-rooted liberal ideology (Devine, 1972; Hartz, 1959) would be expected to play a major role on such a question, the apparent lack of intense ideological concern in a debate over planning is significant. Given the emphasis on fairness for particular groups, this change might be attributable to an effort to calculate the utility of such policy proposals based on the expected outcomes for specific "distributional coalitions" (Olson, 1982) at a given moment in political time as part of a broader strategy for controlling the extension of the "scope of conflict" (Schattschneider, 1960).

Thus, while it would be a misrepresentation to claim that the editorials and columns analyzed here were devoid in the 1970s of rhetoric regarding the importance of a free economy to a free polity, it was clearly concern over a possible scramble for economic shares which determined a position for or against controls. As the conception of political economy became increasingly technical, ideological concern for the effects of economic policies on the integrity of the polity was displaced. The earlier complementary relationship between polity and economy had been supplanted in the 1970s by the myth of their objective separation. This finding is consistent with the view that a polity whose fairness was based on republican virtue had been supplanted by an "interest-group liberalism" (Lowi, 1969) which placed a premium on the attainment of "justice as fairness" (Rawls, 1971; see also Nozick, 1974).

NOTES

1. It may be useful here to briefly outline the historical context of the two debates, based on the account found in Rockoff (1984). By January
1945 the Roosevelt Administration and most of the rest of the nation were preparing for "reconversion" to a peacetime economy. One of the most controversial issues was the fate of the vast wage, price, rent and rationing controls administered by the Office of Price Administration (OPA) which was formally abolished in November 1946. During the Nixon Administration, unusually high inflation combined with rising unemployment created a phenomenon dubbed stagflation which, whatever its cause, was highly unpopular. In August 1970, Congress passed the Economic Stabilization Act authorizing the President to impose wage, price, and rent controls as he saw fit to fight inflation. Few observers thought he would invoke those unsolicited powers, but he did on August 15, 1971, imposing, among other measures, a freeze on wages, prices, rents, and salaries. Nixon's surprising turnabout lasted through four "phases" until its expiration in April 1974. Throughout the four phases, wage labor bore the brunt of restraint while business and financial interests enjoyed greater independence and the inflation rate continued to climb.

2. Except for the Wall Street Journal during the immediate post-war period, all material was gathered by way of the indexes published by those two newspapers. All editorials and columns having to do with wage and price controls were identified using the widest number of subheadings possible and spot checks were employed to compensate for inaccuracies and idiosyncrasies attributable to indexing. Due to the lack of readily available indexes for the post-war Wall Street Journal, each editorial page for the entire two-year period was screened for relevant editorials and columns which were then catalogued and coded. (See Hobbie 1977, pp. 35-51; Krippendorf, 1980; and Holsti, 1969). Hereafter, the Wall Street Journal will be abbreviated as WSJ and the New York Times as NYT.

3. Contact the author for a detailed breakdown of some 73 specific positions found in the editorials and columns, with specific frequencies for each position.

4. This position appeared in 62 editorials and one column in the WSJ and 17 editorials and two columns in the NYT.

5. Fifty-seven WSJ editorials expressed this concern as did 21 editorials and 5 columns in the NYT.

6. WSJ editorials made this accusation on 30 occasions as did ten editorials and four columns in the NYT.
7. The WSJ characterized OPA as totalitarian on 25 occasions as did five NYT editorials.
8. Sixty-nine editorials and two columns in the WSJ expressed this position.
9. On 93 occasions the WSJ editorialized in part that OPA would further aggravate economic instability.
10. Twenty-four NYT editorials expressed doubt about OPA's economic knowledge while 30 of its editorials suggested the possibility of economic chaos stemming from OPA policies.
11. Sixty-one editorials and one column in the WSJ made this prediction as did 25 editorials and five columns in the NYT.
12. Seventy-three editorials and two columns in the WSJ expressed this concern about the perceived fairness of OPA policies as did 57 editorials and five columns in the NYT. Thirty-five editorials in each newspaper, for instance, were critical of the Truman Administration's reluctance to control wages along with prices. Sixteen NYT editors argued that such a policy imbalance placed an unfair burden on business in the form of de facto profits control.
13. A position in support of controls was also taken by 18 columns in the NYT and three such pieces in the WSJ.
14. Twenty-four columns in the WSJ and 14 such pieces in the NYT opposed controls.
15. Thirteen editorials and ten columns in the WSJ raised these traditional normative concerns as did nine columns in the NYT.
16. Thirteen editorials and 12 columns in the WSJ raised this specific concern as did 12 columns in the NYT.
17. Sixteen editorials and six columns in the NYT specifically charged that the Nixon Administration was manipulating controls for ideological and political gain as did two columns in the WSJ.
18. Twenty editorials and 12 columns in the WSJ raised this doubt as did five columns in the NYT.
19. Ten editorials and seven columns in the WSJ and three columns in the NYT assailed government in this way.
20. Sixteen editorials and 16 columns in the NYT as well as four columns in the WSJ made this claim.
21. Five editorials and three columns in the NYT and two columns in the WSJ expressed this caution.
22. The general argument that controls would distort the behavior of economic actors and thus the economy itself appeared in 22
editorials and 18 columns in the WSJ as well as in seven columns in the NYT.

23. Ten editorials and nine columns in the WSJ as well as 7 columns in the NYT made the argument that controls would compel economic actors to seek political influence for economic gain. In addition, six editorials and eight columns in the WSJ along with three columns in the NYT made the argument that such politicization of economic activity would heighten distrust and conflict between individuals, groups and sectors of the economy.

24. The notion that controls could redirect economic behavior toward the public good was expressed in 15 editorials and 12 columns in the NYT and three columns in the WSJ.
TABLE 1

Frequency of Editorial Page Discussion of Wage and Price Controls, by Source and Type, During Two-Key Periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type:</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>Column</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>312</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE 2**

Number of Unfavorable Positions on Price and Wage Control by Issue, Newspaper, and Source 1945-1946.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York Times</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>Columns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Issue</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Issue</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Issue</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The number of favorable positions during this period, all found in the NYT, was insignificant: 19 editorials and 0 columns.
TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York Times</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Editorials</td>
<td>Columns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


INDEPENDENT JUDGES IN A DEMOCRACY: A RESEARCH NOTE

Timothy J. O'Neil
Southwestern University

This research note tests the proposition that different local selection processes recruit judges with different outlooks about the roles they ought to perform as democratic officials and as legal professionals. Based on interviews with ninety-four state and local trial judges in California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts, I conclude that there is no statistically significant relationship between selection process and role orientation.

This is a report on research in progress. The broader research project explores the proposition that different local political cultures recruit judges with different perspectives about the roles they ought to perform as accountable democratic officials and as independent legal professionals. The data reported here deal with a narrower issue: Does the judicial selection process predict the role orientations of state and local trial judges?

Previous research has been conflicting. Jacob (1964) uncovered significant differences in the backgrounds of state trial and appeals court judges chosen through different selection processes. There is a suggestion in his study that partisan elections tend to recruit judges with closer ties to the local community than do "merit" or Missouri plan procedures. Canon (1972) discounts the importance of selection processes, finding regional differences rather than the actual selection process better predictors of the background characteristics of the state supreme court judges he studied. Other studies, such as Dubois’s analysis of non-southern state supreme court judges (1980), conclude that ideological affiliation rather than selection process best explains how judges decide controversial political and economic disputes.

I begin from the premise that the relationship between selection process and judicial attitudes may be more subtle than previous research allows. Different selection processes may not recruit trial judges with
powerfully different individual characteristics, but a selection process may exert a more indirect but nevertheless important influence. A particular selection process may be an expression of the local political culture's expectations about the kinds of factors that ought to influence a judge when governing in the locality. Specifically, selection processes may recruit personnel with the type of role orientations which satisfy the local culture's estimation of what tradeoffs are permissible between democratic and legal professional norms.

Case studies conducted by Levin (1974), Howard (1977) and Gibson (1978) lend credence to this approach. For example, Levin reports that Minneapolis and Pittsburgh judges bring very different perspectives to the ways they conduct their trials and their sentencing practices which coincide with the local political culture's expectations about what judges ought to do. Gibson's 1978 analysis of the sentencing behaviors of Iowa trial judges suggests that role orientations are weak but significant predictors of sentencing patterns. Finally, Howard's 1977 study of selected federal circuit court judges found that political attitudes and role orientations tend to coincide rather than conflict.

In this paper I explore the proposition that different local selection processes recruit judges with different outlooks about the roles they ought to perform as democratic officials and as legal professionals. I hypothesize that the more involved citizens are in the selection of judges, the more judges will define their role as that of "democratic officials" rather than as "legal professionals."

Election, Selection, and Judicial Roles

Data for this analysis is based upon interviews with twenty-eight state or local trial judges in Orleans Parish, Louisiana; thirty-five judges in Alameda County, California; and thirty-one judges in Suffolk County, Massachusetts. These judges comprised approximately eighty percent of the sitting judges in Orleans Parish, fifty percent in Alameda County, and forty percent in Suffolk County. Alameda County interviews were conducted in 1976-1977 and 1982, in Orleans during 1979-1982, and in Suffolk between 1982 and 1984.

Orleans is the home parish of New Orleans. It possesses strong racial and religious divisions, a history of machine politics, and has recently experienced a reinvigorated two-party system, albeit in the peculiarly
southern form of "old-line" versus "progressive" Democrats. The latter reflects the growth in political awareness and power among blacks.

Louisiana law mandates an open, bipartisan election process. Vacancies are filled by special elections; until filled, the state supreme court appoints an acting judge. Acting judges are barred from running as candidates for the regular positions. This procedure prevents the informal practice in some states where judges are encouraged to resign during their terms of office in order to allow the governor to appoint a replacement from the same party. Given the low voter turnouts for special elections and the advantages of incumbency, more than half of the judges in states with nominally partisan or nonpartisan election procedures were originally appointed by governors and retained office at the special election (Dubois, 1980, p. 105; Herndon, 1962, pp. 64-65; Baum, 1983, pp. 424). Louisiana has deliberately foreclosed opportunities for ostensibly electoral selection processes to be displaced by an informal process of gubernatorial appointments.

Contests for judicial seats in Orleans Parish have been vigorous in the last two decades. Elections have been hard fought, attracting several qualified and well-financed candidates. While incumbents have not been rejected in large numbers, they have not been unopposed. Incumbents have had to confront challengers, have had to seek campaign moneys and endorsements from local groups, and have occasionally suffered defeat.

Alameda County contains Berkeley (home of the University of California), Oakland (site of one of the world's largest ports), and smaller suburban communities such as Alameda (a haven for retired naval officers). While there are considerable differences among these cities--Berkeley is controlled by a socialist mayor and left-leaning city council, Oakland is governed by a black mayor and a "reform government" administration--county politics reflects a strong professional middle-class influence with some ethnic factions.

California law prescribes that judicial elections be nonpartisan at the trial court level. However, the governor fills vacancies until the next election, and most interim judges run and are elected to full terms of office. Moreover, there is little vigorous competition for posts held by incumbents. Most lawyers abide by the "sitting judge rule" and are unwilling to challenge incumbents unless there has been a powerful demonstration of the incumbent's ineptitude. Open seats are contested, but local bar endorsements are highly valued and holders of such endorsements typically win election.
Suffolk County contains Boston and a few smaller communities. Like Orleans Parish, Suffolk is divided by racial, ethnic, and socio-economic identities. There is a long tradition of ethnic politics with vestiges of an Irish-Catholic urban machine.

In some respects, the Massachusetts approach to judicial selection approximates the federal procedure. All judges are appointed by the governor with the consent of an Executive Council. The Executive Council rarely rejects appointees. The real check on gubernatorial discretion comes from the executive's sensitivity to the mores of the locality about who should be appointed to serve in the county and from the role played by the Judicial Nominating Commission which advises on judicial appointment. Dominated by lawyers, the Commission emphasizes standards of legal professionalism. However, as Watson and Downing have noted about the so-called "merit-selection" or Missouri plan, such a process tends to replace the politics of elections with the politics of the local bar (1969). There are some indications of similar influences at work in the Judicial Nominating Commission especially in small and large firms' efforts to affect outcomes.

Orleans, Alameda, and Suffolk offer three different kinds of selection procedures and encourage three different levels of citizen involvement. Orleans Parish with its populist political tradition and its competitive judicial elections offers the greatest opportunity for citizen input into the recruitment of judges. If a selection process stands as a surrogate for a local political culture's expectations, Orleans is the most likely recruiter of judges who identify themselves in terms similar to other political officials--as members of a responsive and accountable democratic system. The federal model followed by Massachusetts minimizes citizen participation while emphasizing the legal-professional norms dominating the law guild. Alameda's selection process would appear to stand somewhere between the Orleans and Suffolk extremes.

These selection processes are assigned a place on an ordinal scale with the Suffolk procedure labeled "1," Alameda's "2," and Orleans' "3." This corresponds with the narrowness ("1") or breadth ("3") of direct public input into the recruitment of judges.

The dependent variable "role orientations" is defined as the expectations judges have about how they ought to act in their capacity as judicial officials. For the purpose of this analysis, a "democratic official" role orientation would prompt a judge to view his or her proper duties as a willingness to invoke other than strictly "legal" factors in determining how his or her courtroom is to be conducted and how decisions are reached. A "legal
professional" orientation concentrates on purely legal attributes, emphasizing an attention to the values of due process and impartiality, and a cultivated inattention to the personal attributes of litigants. A "midrange" orientation supports a judge's self-image as both a democratic official and a legal professional as we have used these terms.2

Indicators of role orientation were responses to a set of intentionally provocative questions prepared for this study asking, "Would you agree or disagree with the statements:

"1. A trial judge's responsibility is to insure that justice is done to the individuals present in his/her courtroom. Broader community interests are not appropriate considerations."

"2. A good judge appraises his/her performance in terms of due process values such as adversarialness and the testing of evidence and arguments, not public satisfaction with his/her decisions."

"3. Judges are legal professionals. Their abilities are best evaluated by lawyers, not by lay members of the community. Elections introduce undesirable partisan influences in the election of qualified judges."

Respondents were encouraged to go beyond simple "agrees" or "disagrees." It was the overall expression of support for or objection to the statement which form the data.3

An index was constructed with judges agreeing with two or more of the assertions being called "legal professional," those agreeing with one labeled "midrange," and those disagreeing with all three called "democratic official." Using Kruskell's gamma and Kendall's tau c, I tested the relationship between selection process and role orientation.

There are some cautionary caveats that must be attached to an enterprise such as this one. Most of the day-to-day routine of state and local trial judges has little to do with grand policy making or challenging public opinion. Plea-bargaining dominates the criminal justice courtroom while the civil justice system spends much of its time processing settlements made outside of the courtroom. Thus, role orientations may not often be significant in the everyday operations of lower courts. We are obliged to be cautious about generalizing too broadly about what judges actually do by extrapolating from what they think they ought to do in extraordinary
situations. However, while grander notions of what judges ought to do are seldom explicitly called upon, their more indirect and subtle effect may mold even the everyday conduct of "normal" judging. Role orientations may also be affected by socio-economic or other background variables. However, an earlier presentation of the data discussed here concluded that background characteristics such as working class origins or status of law school did not predict role-orientation (Parsonian r ranged from -.07 to .13, p<.05) (O'Neill, 1987).

Finding

The expected relationship between selection process and role orientation did not occur. As Table I demonstrates, there was no significant relationship between the kind of selection process and a judge's tendency to be a "legal professional" or a "democratic official." Gamma was .15 and tau c was .10 (p<.05); both tests indicate that there is no significant level of association between our set of variables. Since Alameda County possesses the least homogeneous political culture of the three counties tested, it may distort our findings. However, when the Alameda data is dropped from our sample in order to consider the effect of selection process on the two most cohesive cultures, Gamma was still only .23 while tau c was .15 (p<.05).

It is interesting to note that there is a slightly greater tendency for the Suffolk County judges to reflect a "legal professional" orientation than their peers in Alameda and Orleans. When the "midrange" column is removed in order to sharpen this distinction, only a slightly stronger Gamma of .24 and a tau c of .15 (p<.05) result. The tau c measure is critical here since Gamma yields deceptively high values when margin totals are skewed. The difference is thus insufficient to satisfy standard measures of statistical association.

Conclusions and Speculations

The lack of an association may be the result of a defect in the study such as the crudeness of the measure of role orientation used. Moreover, we may need to compare within as well as between selection processes. There may be significant differences between different kinds of partisan elections or between true "merit selection" and the gubernatorial approaches. The fact that there is a slight tendency for Suffolk judges to be "legal professionals" may indicate that "merit selection" would result in more self-consciously
"legal" judges than those recruited by other selection procedures. But given the low associational levels, there seems little reason to pursue the matter. The clear and convincing distinctions between the "legal professional" and "democratic officials" roles Levin and others found are not generalizable to the three counties studied in this analysis. Whatever may be the tie between political culture and role orientation, the selection process is not the mechanism.  

It is possible that selection process and role orientation were unrelated because the socialization experience of being a judge outweighs the influence of the processes through which an individual becomes a judge. Interactions among judges and with practicing attorneys may overcome any influence exerted by the process of recruitment. If we could compare the responses of successful candidates for judicial office with their responses after sitting on the bench, we could check the independent effect of judicial socialization. 

Another possibility is to refine the hypothesis by exploring whether a self-selection process affects who enters the race for judicial office. Lawyers believing strongly that judges ought not to conduct themselves as if they were robed politicians may be discouraged from entering judicial elections with their strong "political" overtones. If self-selection operates on a subtle level, a level which is not tapped by the formal selection process, then we may be able to understand how judges are preselected for desirable traits. A study investigating how a self-screening process filters out lawyers with the "wrong" outlook, as defined by the local political culture, while encouraging lawyers with the "right" outlook to run would be useful. Such a study would have to be more subtle in its examinations of motivations than this study has been and would have to explore the self-perceptions of lawyers in the community from which candidates for judicial office are drawn. Perhaps the development of a more sophisticated personality inventory assessing self-image and perceptions of the legal profession is called for.
Table 1. Relationship Between Selection Process and Role Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection Process</th>
<th>&quot;Legal Professional&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Midrange&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Democratic Official&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk County (N=31)</td>
<td>52% (16)</td>
<td>29% (9)</td>
<td>19% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda County (N=35)</td>
<td>46% (16)</td>
<td>20% (7)</td>
<td>34% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orleans Parish (N=28)</td>
<td>43% (12)</td>
<td>21% (6)</td>
<td>36% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gamma = .15
Tau_c = .10
p < .05
NOTES

1. Federal and state appellate judges were purposely excluded since the hypothesis concentrates on local political cultures and local selection processes. It is rare that the same political culture so dominates an entire state, especially one as populous as California or as different in its religious, racial, and cultural antecedents as Louisiana, that sensible connections could be found between appellate judges' role orientations and local expectations. In order to insure consistency, only judges presiding over courts of original jurisdiction—trial courts—were interviewed. Juvenile court judges, justices of the peace, magistrates, land, housing, and probate judges, small claims judges, and traffic court judges were excluded because not all kinds of courts are present in the three jurisdictions. Moreover, traffic, small claims, and juvenile courts tend not to be operated as normal courts are, while land, probate, and housing courts often serve as "appeals" courts for state or local administrative agency decisions.

2. Originally, I used "strict" and "moderate" categories in order to differentiate between "strict legal professional" and "moderate legal professional" or between "strict democratic official" and "moderate democratic official" role orientations. However, the number of respondents fitting the "strict" cells were so small that I was obliged to collapse a five cell division into three cells.

3. In order to insure consistency in categorizing responses, panels of students at the University of California, Santa Cruz, at Tulane University, and at Wellesley College and M.I.T. were asked to listen to tapes of selected interviews and to code each respondent's remarks. When discrepancies arose between the panels' assignments, I conducted follow-up interviews with the pertinent judges.

4. Flango and Ducat (1979) offer some interesting speculations on other factors which may affect selection processes and judicial behavior which might serve as the starting point for further analysis.

REFERENCES


HERNDON, James. (1862) "Appointments as a Means of Initial Accession to Elective State Courts of Last Resort." North Dakota Law Review. 38: 60-73.


GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC POLICY ATTITUDES

James E. Skok
Penn State Harrisburg

Persistent differences between men and women in regard to their public policy attitudes have been found by various researchers. In this article, a state-wide survey in Pennsylvania is used to compare attitudes of men and women in the state with those at the national level. Using these data, three hypotheses frequently offered to explain attitude differences are subjected to evaluation. The major finding is that the male-female differences in policy attitudes may be related both to the sex-role behaviors learned by children and to economic conditions experienced in later life.

Studies of gender differences in policy preferences indicate that there are significant and persistent differences between men and women in their attitudes on public policy issues. These differences are especially apparent in four broad policy concerns: 1) the use of force and violence as an instrument of policy; 2) government regulation and protection of individuals and the environment; 3) compassion issues such as aid to minorities and spending for welfare, education and health; and 4) social conservatism and traditional family values (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984; Klein, 1984; Public Opinion, 1982; Andersen, 1975).

Explanations advanced to explain these differences may be grouped under three broad hypotheses: "economic deprivation," "sex-role stereotyping," and "political culture." The first of these, most commonly expressed in the "feminization of poverty" literature (Weitzman, 1985; Smeal, 1984; Freeman, 1975), suggests that the economic deprivation of women, resulting from disadvantages in the labor market, inequitable divorce settlements, and the increase of female-headed households, leads to a general state of economic insecurity and dependency. As Weitzman (1985, p. 351) states, "The structure of the job market is such that only half of all full-time female workers are able to support two children without supplemental income from either the children's fathers or the government." Since women
are more economically insecure, this hypothesis suggests they tend to be more favorably inclined toward government assistance through social welfare programs. A second, the "sex-role stereotyping" hypothesis (Andersen, 1975; Greenstein, 1961; Poole and Zeigler, 1985), holds that women have been socialized into nurturing behaviors, thus causing greater compassion toward the deprived members of society. A third explanation is also explored in this article. Called the "political culture" hypothesis, it claims that persistent male-female differences in age, education, income, and occupation result in general feelings of powerlessness, a withdrawal from participation in public life, and resultant attitudes of dependence upon authority on the part of women (Poole and Zeigler, 1985, pp. 127-140).

Survey Research on Gender and Policy Attitudes

Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) systematically studied national opinion surveys of six polling firms taken over a twenty-year period (1964-83) yielding a data base of responses to 267 different reported policy questions. They concluded that the gender differences are substantial. On "the use of force and violence in domestic policy" they found an average gender difference of 8 percentage points, with women less inclined to select the violent option. In two other policy categories, similar, but slightly smaller, differences were found. These showed women more supportive on "government regulation and protection of individuals and the environment," and the "compassion" issue (additional aid in welfare, health, education & civil rights).

Another series of studies supports the finding of gender differences in public policy attitudes. Using the "don't know" responses often given in public opinion surveys, Smith (1984) and Rapoport (1982) found that women are significantly more inclined to express uncertainty than are men. Rapaport (1982), using data sets from the Center for Political Studies National Election Study of 1972, 1974, and 1976, found that the spread ranged from 6.9 to 1.4 percentage points depending upon the level of knowledge about politics held by the respondent. Among politically-knowlegeable individuals, gender difference on use of "don't know" responses was slight; but, among less knowledgeable men and women, the women were considerably more inclined to give the "don't know" responses.
Commonwealth

The Pennsylvania Poll

There is a lack of systematic study of gender and differences in policy attitudes at the state level. In an effort to add to our knowledge regarding these gender differences and their possible causes, a public opinion poll using standard survey research methods was conducted in January and February, 1987, by researchers at the Pennsylvania State University at Harrisburg (PA POLL). The survey is based on a random sample of 671 Pennsylvanians 18 years old or older, 329 males and 342 females. Interviewing was conducted by telephone between January 16 and February 2, 1987, using standard random digit dialing sampling procedures. The survey questionnaire consisted of 34 questions covering a range of public policy issues and demographic information. The poll has a sampling error of plus or minus 3.8% at the .05 significance level. 1 All data in the tables are from this poll.

The primary research questions are: What are the differences between Pennsylvania women and Pennsylvania men in relation to their attitudes on public policy issues; and how do these differences compare with those found at the national level? Will an examination of the findings of the state poll and a comparison of this information with findings from national-level studies yield support for one or more of the hypotheses posed above?

Gender Differences and Demographic Characteristics

Responses to the poll show there are substantial demographic differences between men and women in Pennsylvania that mirror differences in the national population. Pennsylvania women in this survey, as compared to Pennsylvania men, are older, poorer, less well educated, and in lower status occupations (Table 1). Women in the state have the demographic characteristics normally used to identify lower socio-economic status populations. This finding raises the possibility that these status differences account for the differences in policy attitudes between the genders in the state. This hypothesis is examined below.

Gender Differences and Economic Attitudes

As one might expect from the findings on demographic differences, Pennsylvania women are somewhat more pessimistic about their economic situations than are Pennsylvania men. When asked to compare their present
financial situation with that of one year ago, the state's women, more so than its men, consider themselves "about the same" or "worse off" at the present time. Only 19.6% of the women compared to 28.3% of the men consider themselves "better off" (See Table 2).

Gender Differences and Public Policy Attitudes

As with demographic characteristics and economic attitudes, the PA POLL shows systematic differences between the policy attitudes of men and those of women in the state. Pennsylvania women clearly differ from their male counterparts on the use of force and violence in the state. Beyond this difference, Pennsylvania women clearly are more inclined than men to want the state government doing more to support social programs and to control dangerous or threatening activities. While these differences parallel those in the nation as a whole, they actually are somewhat greater than the male-female differences found in national opinion studies. These findings are discussed systematically below.

Use of force and violence

As with women across the U.S., Pennsylvania women are more strongly opposed to the use of force and violence than are the state's men. When asked whether they support stronger gun control laws on handguns, Pennsylvania women are much more inclined than men in the state to favor such laws (75.4% of women; 59.0% of men, Table 3). This 16.4 percentage point difference in Pennsylvania is somewhat higher than the 13 point difference found in national opinion on gun control by the Gallup Poll in 1986 (The Gallup Report, May, 1986, p. 17). In the Shapiro and Mahajan study (1986), an 8 percentage point gender difference was found nationwide on a series of "force and violence" questions in various surveys.

Government regulation and protection

On issues dealing with government regulation or with protection of consumers, citizens, and the environment, Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) found an average gender difference of 7.2 percentage points in surveys covering the period 1977-83, with women being more supportive. In Pennsylvania there is a similar, but apparently larger, difference in attitude between the sexes. On 7 questions covering a range of such issues, the differences between male and
female attitudes were found in the Pennsylvania survey to range from 6 to 14 percentage points with women consistently favoring more state involvement.

The differences varied from 6.2 percentage points on protection of the environment (spending for toxic waste disposal, Table 4) to a range of 6.7 to 9.9 percentage points on protection of health (drug abuse, AIDS, Table 4), and to a range of 11.7 to 13.1 percentage points on protection of public safety (crime, seat belts, 55mph speed limit, and state control of liquor sales, Tables 4 and 5).

The average difference on these seven questions is 10.4 percentage points, somewhat larger than the 7.2 point difference found by Shapiro and Mahajan. It is risky to generalize on the basis of these findings since there is no assurance the questions are directly comparable. Therefore, specific comparable questions in national polls were sought. The PA POLL included questions on concern over AIDS and removal of the 55 mph speed limit, and two comparable questions were found in the Gallup Poll. In Pennsylvania, 59.7% of women and only 49.8% of men were greatly concerned about the issue of AIDS, a difference of 9.9 percentage points (Table 4). In a question that seems comparable at the national level, the Gallup poll (The Gallup Report, Jan/Feb, 1988, p. 34) found that 52% of men and 53% of women agree that the government is not doing enough about the problem of AIDS, a difference of 1 percentage point. On this issue, the gender difference in Pennsylvania is greater than that in the whole U.S. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, it was found that 49.9% of men and 29.3% of women strongly or moderately favor eliminating the 55 mph speed limit, a gender difference of 20.6 percentage points (Table 5). In the U.S. as a whole, the Gallup Poll (The Gallup Report, October, 1986, p. 30) found that 48 percent of men and 28 percent of women are opposed to keeping the 55 mph speed limit, a gender difference of 20 percentage points. The difference between men and women over this government protection issues is about the same in Pennsylvania as in the nation as a whole.

Compassion Issues

The PA POLL included a series of 6 questions dealing with public welfare, aid to cities, unemployment, and general state services. Pennsylvania women, when compared to men on these issues, were more inclined to favor liberalizing governmental aid.

Further, women were more concerned about unemployment and the quality of education, and were less inclined to cut state services (Table 7).
The percentage point difference between the sexes on these compassion issues ranged from 4.9 to 8.1 and averaged 6.7. Women consistently took the more compassionate position. These figures are somewhat higher than the 3.3 percentage point difference found by Shapiro and Mahajan (1983) in national opinion on compassion issues.

In order to find a more solid basis for comparison on the compassion issues, the gender difference on three questions from the Pennsylvania survey were compared to three similar questions from a national survey. On the 3 issues covered in Table 6 (welfare, aid to colleges, and aid to Philadelphia) women were more supportive of additional aid than were men, and the difference between the genders averaged 6.9 percentage points. In two national polls, gender differences were found on two related issues—increased spending for social programs such as education and medicare, (The Gallup Report, October, 1984, p. 11) and Reagan administration treatment of poor people (The Gallup Report, May, 1983, p. 12). Nationally, women are also more supportive of increased social spending than are men, and fewer women than men feel that poor people are being treated fairly. The gender differences nationally on these two questions averaged 6 percentage points. Once again the gender difference in Pennsylvania is comparable to that of the national as a whole.

Gender Differences and Alienation

Three questions in the PA POLL were designed to look for gender differences in attitudes of support for, as opposed to alienation from, state government. Respondents were asked whether they voted for governor in 1987, what effect they feel the new governor will have on their lives, and how often state government officials can be trusted to do what is right (Table 8). Approximately the same percentage of the state’s women (60.8%) voted for governor in 1987 as was the case for the state’s men (59.6%). However, the state’s women, more so than its men, feel the new governor will have a great deal of effect on their lives. Similarly, the women report a higher level of trust in state government than do their male counterparts.

Gender Differences and "Don’t Know" Responses

Rapoport (1982) argued that the tendency to give "don’t know" ("DK") responses to questions on public policy issues is a relatively stable individual trait, and that women are considerably more inclined to respond in
this fashion than are men. Rapoport found the women "DK" response rate to exceed the rate for men by as much as 6.9 percentage points.

In the Pennsylvania survey, 22 questions received "DK" responses in excess of 5% of the total respondents. On 17 of these 22 questions, women chose the "DK" response more frequently than men, and the gender difference on these 17 ranged from .3 to 7.7 percentage points, for an average difference of 3.75 percentage points. This finding seems compatible with the data presented by Rapoport.

Conclusions

The *PA POLL* data reported so far support the following conclusions: First, Pennsylvania women are older, poorer, less well-educated, and more likely to hold lower-status jobs than are men in the state, and this parallels national census data. Second, Pennsylvania women, like women throughout the country, tend to be more supportive of "compassionate" government policies, more supportive of government protection of citizens, and less supportive of policies based on the use of force and violence than are men in the state. Once again, the difference between men and women in the state on these attitudes is slightly larger than the difference between men and women in the nation as a whole. Third, Pennsylvania women are more pessimistic about their economic situations than are their male counterparts, and they are more inclined to view government and politics positively, as factors critical to their well being. Fourth, Pennsylvania women are more inclined to give the "don't know" response than are men in the state. These findings plus other data presented below will allow some observations regarding the validity of the three hypotheses discussed in the introduction.

Economic deprivation hypothesis

The hypothesis suggests that the economic deprivation of Pennsylvania women may result in a general state of economic insecurity and a greater desire among the state's women to see government provide higher levels of economic support and social services, and such an interpretation receives support from the data provided above. Pennsylvania women are considerably poorer than their male counterparts, and they are also more supportive of government aid and protection.
In order to test this hypothesis further, responses of a subgroup of Pennsylvania women - homemakers - were compared with all women in the state. In the Pennsylvania survey, 74 of the 627 respondents reported their occupation as "homemaker." Seventy-three of these are women. Pennsylvania homemakers are poorer than Pennsylvania women in general (60.8% of homemakers report incomes under $25,000 compared to 52.9% of all women and 39.5% of men) and experience greater economic insecurity (77% of homemakers are "greatly concerned" over unemployment compared to 64.9% of all women and 56.8% of all men, Table 7). Following the "economic deprivation" hypothesis, low income should contribute to economic insecurity and more support for government social programs on the part of homemakers; and the data support this interpretation. On the issues of welfare and aid to the poor, aid to colleges, and aid to Philadelphia (Table 6), homemakers generally are more supportive of increased state spending than are all Pennsylvania women. In a comparable finding in national polling data, Poole and Zeigler (1985, p. 62) conclude that "housewives" are more inclined than "working women" to want the federal government to guarantee a decent standard of living for everyone.

Also supportive of the economic deprivation hypothesis is the pattern of responses produced by the following question in the *PA POLL*: When asked whether they are "better-off" or "worse-off" today than they were one year ago (Table 2) homemakers were significantly less inclined to see themselves as better-off today than all women, as well as the men in the state. Again, this finding clearly fits with the economic deprivation hypothesis since one would expect that homemakers, who clearly are poorer, would express greater economic insecurity on this question.

**Political culture hypothesis**

A second hypothesis centers on political culture, and relates gender differences on socioeconomic variable in the nation to measures of political alienation (Milbrath, 1965; Lane, 1959; Buchanan, 1956; Poole and Zeigler, 1985).

While Pennsylvania women are more deprived on a number of socio-economic variables and more supportive of governmental assistance, they do not demonstrate attitudes of powerlessness, cynicism, or non-participation. The survey shows (Table 8) that Pennsylvania women voted in approximately the same or slightly greater percentages than men in the state in 1987, they are more inclined than men to feel that the gubernatorial
Commonwealth

election was meaningful to them and their families, and they express more trust in state government than their male counterparts. The demographic differences have not led to feelings of powerlessness and cynicism among Pennsylvania women as compared to men in the state. While Poole and Ziegler (1985, pp. 130-138) found that women at the national level have become more cynical about government and feel less efficacious politically than men, Pennsylvania women have not followed this trend. The political culture argument seems the least appropriate of the three to explain the survey findings of greater dependence of Pennsylvania women on government. Future studies systematically comparing state to state differences on attitude surveys and demographic variables may profitably test this hypothesis further.

Sex-role stereotyping hypothesis

Also satisfying as an explanation of the findings is the sex-role stereotyping hypothesis which suggests that women are socialized as children into nurturing roles and that this stereotyping influences them to support governmental protection and social welfare programs in later life. The data appear to fit with this hypothesis. As Tables 3 through 7 indicate, Pennsylvania women are considerably more supportive of governmental services and protective programs than men in the state.

Rapoport (1982), in support of this hypothesis, argued that the tendency for women to give "don't know" responses more frequently than men is a product of sex-role stereotyping. He found that as the level of their knowledge of public affairs approaches parity with men, women tend to be less influenced by sex-role stereotyping, and their use of the "don't know" response in opinion surveys is virtually the same as that for men. This finding suggests that as women enter the work force, they become more knowledgeable about public affairs, less inhibited, and thus less dominated by sex-role behaviors such as responding "don't know" when questioned about public policy issues. Poole and Ziegler's argument (1985 pp. 13-19) that women's endorsement of feminist ideology increases with education and work experience outside the home lends additional support for this hypothesis.

To test this hypothesis further, it is necessary to return to the cohort of homemakers discussed above. Assuming that women who consider themselves homemakers are probably those most likely still to be influenced by sex-role stereotyping (Poole and Zeigler, 1985, p. 8), they should also
exhibit a greater tendency to give the "don't know" response than men in the state and also a greater tendency to do so than all Pennsylvania women. This hypothesis is supported by the data. On the 22 questions for which "DK" data are available, homemakers responded "don't know" more frequently than men and more frequently than all women in the state. The mean "DK" response rates for all 3 groups on the 22 questions are as follows: men, 14.4%; all women, 16.7%; and homemakers, 18.2%. Thus, as predicted by the hypothesis, women who remain at home are most inclined to give the "don't know" response.

Of the three hypotheses explored here, the "sex-role stereotyping" hypothesis and the "economic deprivation" hypothesis both fit with the findings of this survey. This article suggests, therefore, that the persistent male-female differences in policy attitudes are related both to the sex-role behaviors learned by children and to economic conditions experienced in later life.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Professor Carol Nechemias of the Division of Public Affairs, Penn State-Harrisburg, for her assistance in locating bibliographic courses for this article.

1. For further information contact the author at The Division of Public Affairs, Penn State Harrisburg, Middletown, PA 17057.

Throughout the tables, Chi Square tests of significance scores are presented for response to individual questions. The use of data for which scores exceed the .05 level is deemed justified due to the large sample size used in the PA POLL. Weisberg and Bowen (1977, p. 166), speaking specifically about the use of Chi Square tests in surveys, state "Weak relationships are found to be statistically significant when sample are large, such as those for national surveys with a typical 1500 respondents. Thus, except for very small samples (especially those of size 100 or less) tests of statistical significance are not very discriminating."
TABLE 1: Gender Differences on Selected Demographic Variables in Pennsylvania  
(N = 671; M = 329, F = 342)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Respondent</th>
<th>18-21</th>
<th>22-39</th>
<th>40-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education of Respondent</th>
<th>Some H.S. Grad</th>
<th>Some College Grad</th>
<th>College Grad</th>
<th>Post Grad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income of Household</th>
<th>Under $15,000</th>
<th>$15,000-$25,000</th>
<th>$25,000-$40,000</th>
<th>$40,000-$60,000</th>
<th>Over $60,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation of Respondent</th>
<th>Prof/Mgr.</th>
<th>White Collar</th>
<th>Blue Collar</th>
<th>Homemaker</th>
<th>Retired</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2: Gender Differences in Attitude Toward Economic Pessimism in Pennsylvania

(N = 671; M = 329, F = 342; H = 74)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial situation today compared to 1 year ago:</th>
<th>Better Off</th>
<th>Worse Off</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H*</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<.01

*Homemaker
TABLE 3: Attitudes Toward Strengthening Controls on Handguns in Pennsylvania

(N = 671; M = 329, F = 342)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
<th>Strongly or Moderately in Favor</th>
<th>Strongly or Moderately Opposed</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen Hand Gun Control Laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < .001
TABLE 4: Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Government Protection from Drug Abuse, AIDS, Crime, and Toxic Waste in Pennsylvania 
(N = 671; M = 329, F = 342)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Issue</th>
<th>Great Concern</th>
<th>Somewhat Concerned</th>
<th>Little Concern</th>
<th>No Concern</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Concern over Drug Abuse</td>
<td>M 60.8</td>
<td>F 67.5</td>
<td>M 25.8</td>
<td>F 23.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not significant at .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>M 49.8</td>
<td>F 59.7</td>
<td>M 27.4</td>
<td>F 25.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; .001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>M 57.0</td>
<td>F 70.2</td>
<td>M 29.0</td>
<td>F 22.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; .001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State funds: toxic waste</td>
<td>M 99.6</td>
<td>F 65.8</td>
<td>M 7.9</td>
<td>F 3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 5: Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Government Regulation of Seat Belt Use, Speed Limits, and Liquor Sales in Pennsylvania
(M = 671; M = 329, F = 342)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Issue</th>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Favor</td>
<td>Moderately Favor</td>
<td>Moderately Oppose</td>
<td>Strongly Oppose</td>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory Seat Belt Law</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate 55 MPH Speed Limit</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Monopoly Liquor Sales</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Quit</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Continue</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p < .001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Issue</th>
<th>Spend More</th>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
<th>Spend Less</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Spending: Welfare and Aid to Poor</td>
<td>N E H*</td>
<td>M E H</td>
<td>N F H</td>
<td></td>
<td>N E H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.0 41.2 47.3</td>
<td>21.3 19.6 12.2</td>
<td>40.4 33.9 35.1</td>
<td>3.3 5.3 5.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not significant at .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to Colleges and Universities</td>
<td>34.1 62.0 64.9</td>
<td>7.9 4.1 5.4</td>
<td>35.3 32.2 28.4</td>
<td>2.7 1.8 1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not significant at .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to Philadelphia</td>
<td>16.1 22.8 24.3</td>
<td>41.0 26.6 23.0</td>
<td>32.8 36.3 33.8</td>
<td>10.1 14.3 18.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Homemaker
TABLE 7: Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Education, Unemployment and State Services in Pennsylvania  
(N = 671; M = 329, F = 342; H = 74)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Issue</th>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
<th>No Concern</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great Concern</td>
<td>Somewhat Concerned</td>
<td>Little Concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Education</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not significant at .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p&lt;.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut Services</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Local Taxes</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More State Aid</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Hosemaker
### TABLE 8: Gender Differences on Participation, Alienation and Powerlessness in Pennsylvania

(N = 671; M = 329, F = 342)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did you Vote for Governor</th>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not significant at .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of new Governor</th>
<th>Great Deal or Some</th>
<th>Very Little or None</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not significant at .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in Government</th>
<th>Almost All or Most</th>
<th>Some or None</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not significant at .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


REFERENCES


THE EISENHOWER LEGACY

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER SYMPOSIUM
October 11, 12, 13, 1990
Gettysburg College
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

CALL FOR PAPERS

White House Structure
Nuclear Strategies
Civil Rights
Containment
Foreign Policy
United Nations
Economic Policy

Domestic Policy
Elections
Press Relations
Federalism
Leadership
Bureaucracy
Executive-Legislative Relations

Papers should be focused on the legacy of the Eisenhower policies on successive administrations. For further information, contact Dr. Shirley Anne Warshaw, Department of Political Science, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA 17325, at (717) 337-6863.
1. political organization: civil order...2a. a specific form of political organization: a form of government... 3. an Aristotelian form of political organization in which the whole body of the people govern for the good of all and that constitutes a fusion of oligarchy and democracy 3: the management of public and private affairs; esp. prudent, shrewd, or crafty administration... 4. a politically organized unit (as a nation, state, or community)... 5. the form or constitution of a politically organized unit (as a nation or state)... 6: the form of government or organization of a religious denomination...

6: THE JOURNAL OF THE NORTHEASTERN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Subscription Rates
Individuals: $20.00 (including membership in the Northeastern Political Science Association)
Foreign: $22.00
Institutions: $35.00, Foreign: $36.00
Student: U.S.A. $7.00, Foreign: $10.00

Mail (subscription orders) to: POLITY, Thompson Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003

Name

Address

Payment enclosed, sum of __________________