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It is especially satisfying to bring to life a new scholarly publication. The primary gratification comes from making available new and valuable research to the readers, as each article demonstrates how sophisticated inquiry directed to salient questions yields important findings and conclusions. Working with our authors, editors and reviewers has been another major source of pleasure; my special thanks to these colleagues from Cambridge to Berkeley, to those at APSA and abroad, to a number of editors of established journals who provided helpful guidance, and to the executives and council members of PPSA. Finally, the opportunity to engage in an enterprise supported by a number of excellent educational institutions occasions considerable satisfaction. We who have been involved in the creation of COMMONWEALTH hope that our readers derive as much value from its contents as we did in putting it together, and we invite your comments and suggestions.

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Hobbes developed two theories of language, each with peculiar implications for his views on reason and truth, and each applied throughout his political philosophy. As a nominalist, Hobbes argues that individuals subsume particular things under general names by an act of will. Nominalism supports his view of the moral anarchy of the state of nature, and helps justify an arbitrary sovereign. Conceptualism allows Hobbes to picture the sovereign as a rational rule-creator and his subjects as rule-followers. Either theory, however, taken alone, contradicts important parts of Hobbes's political project. The contradictions between the two theories result from difficulties inherent in the attempt to reconcile reason and passion in politics.

Hannah Arendt once remarked that flagrant and fundamental contradictions, while rare in the works of second-rate writers, lead into the very center of the work of "the great authors" (Arendt, 1959, p. 90). By this standard, Thomas Hobbes was very great indeed. The routes into the center of his work are numerous. He contradicted himself, some interpreters charge, when he tried to combine a value-free science with a prescriptive theory of political right (Strauss, 1936, p. ix; 1934, p. 235). Others notice contradictions in his theory of obligation. Hobbes describes the state of nature as a condition in which men have no moral obligations (Raphael, 1962, p. 347). Nonetheless, Hobbes seems to presuppose that men are obligated to obey laws of nature which are in fact commands of God (Warrender, 1957, pp. 101-102). Yet another "flagrant contradiction" arises in his metaphysics of language, and it is on this that I propose to focus in this article.
Hobbes tries to hold simultaneously two incompatible theories of the relationship between speech and reality. As a nominalist, he believes that only particular things exist. General, collective entities like "mankind" or "church" are only verbal representations of individual entities that people have grouped together arbitrarily. Nothing objective justifies the inclusion or exclusion of any given particulars in a general category. As a conceptualist, he acknowledges that generality is inherent in experience; observed resemblance relations among individual objects give rise to general mental entities called concepts. Those objective relations and their concomitant concepts justify grouping certain particulars in certain categories.

I make two arguments with regard to Hobbes's metaphysics of language. First, I demonstrate that those two contrary tendencies are irreducibly present in his remarks on speech. Interpretations which acknowledge only Hobbes's nominalism are incomplete (Wolin, 1960; Oakeshott, 1975; Krook, 1956), while those that argue he was really a conceptualist understate the radicalism of much of what he says about language (Danford, 1980, pp. 116-120; Watkins, 1973, pp. 108-109; Woozley, 1969, pp. 87-90; Hubener, 1977, pp. 77-100). Hobbes was, in fact, both a nominalist and a conceptualist. Second, I show that nominalism and conceptualism, although contradictory as philosophical positions, are for Hobbes complementary in political function. Each is necessary to support important aspects of his political theory.

**HOBSES'S NOMINALISM**

It is a measure of the importance of language to Hobbes's political argument that he states his position on universals in the opening arguments of *Leviathan*.

Some (names) are common to many things, Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one name is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an universal there being nothing in the world universal but names,
for the things named are, everyone of them individual
and singular (Leviathan, Ch. 4, p. 21).

Only particular things exist. Universals are purely
phenomena of language. Since universal things do not exist,
the reality behind a universal name is no more than the group
of particular existents that that name denotes. Like Ockham
more than three centuries earlier, Hobbes explicitly adopts a
nominalist account of universals (Largeault, 1971, pp. 170-175).

Hobbes seems to be denying that our use of universal
terms is imposed on us by the real world. There are no
common existents, he is saying, to warrant such usage. Why
then do people categorize certain objects in one group and
others in different groups? Aware of the importance that this
issue has for his entire theory, Hobbes discusses the process of
attaching names to things in numerous passages. In his earliest
systematic political work, he speaks of names as "arbitrary," as
voiced marks that "man erecteth voluntarily" (Human Nature
V.2). People stipulate the meaning of words by an act of will.
In De Corpore, Hobbes reconfirms the stipulative theory of
meaning by asserting that a name is a word "taken at pleasure,"
that "the origin of names (is) arbitrary," and that "names have
their constitution not from the species of things, but from the
will and consent of men" (De Corpore 1.2.4 and 1.5.1). Names
have no intrinsic connection with "the species of things." The
origin of common names is not in the external world; it is in
us, in our decision to use common names to refer to groups of
particular objects.

Hobbes's characterization of that decision as "arbitrary" or
"voluntary" points to the will as the human attribute that
assures the disconnection between words and things. He
defines "will" as "the last appetite or aversion, immediately
adhering to action, or to the omission thereof" (Leviathan, Ch.
6, p. 48; cf. De Corpore IV. 25.13). Hobbes does not mean,
however, that the will is a regulatory power of the personality
that decides in favor of some actions and against others. He
excludes that possibility when he admits that a process of
"deliberation" precedes the "last" passion, but then defines
deliberation as an "alternate succession of appetites, aversions,
hopes and fears" (Leviathan, Ch. 6, p. 48). The words
"alternate succession" signal a process of apparently random fluctuation, not of rational evaluation. The conclusion of the deliberative process is defined temporally rather than logically. The will is the "last" passion to move the body in the sense that it is the voluntary motion that occurs just prior to the moment when action intervenes. In the nominalist terms, the will is simply a general name for a passion which happens immediately to precede an action. It implies no rational structure, no necessary consistency, no subordination of appetite to long-term goals. It is true that for Hobbes, "will is precedent to reason" (Oakeshott, 1975, p. 60), but it should be understood that in the passages under discussion, such precedence implies more than Hume's view that reason is slave to the passions. The shifting passions of Hobbesian man escape entirely the ordering discipline of reason.2

Can a nominalist who denies any necessary connection between words and the world make any sense of man's persistent aspiration to distinguish the "true" from the "false?" Can he claim that his own theory is in any sense true? Hobbes believes these questions pose no unique problems for his theory of language. "True" and "false" are "attributes of speech, not of things" (Leviathan, Ch. 4, p. 23). They have, like all other general terms, an arbitrary, stipulative sense. For a proposition to be "true," it suffices that all particulars denoted (arbitrarily) by the grammatical subject be comprehended by all the particulars denoted by the predicate (De Corpore, I.3.7). "Man is a living creature" is true, for example, because "living creature" signifies at least all the particulars that "man" does. If two or more people disagree about the particulars included in the subject or predicate, a practical solution must prevail: they must submit their controversy to "some arbitrator or judge, to whose sentence they will both stand" (Leviathan, Ch. 5, p. 31).

The arbitrator's sentence is not just the conclusion required to avoid conflict; it is the true conclusion. Where "the will and consent of men" decide the particular referents of words and where wills clash, there is no objective way of settling a dispute; it can only be handed on to another will. The arbitrator's decision then yields universal agreement as to the meaning of terms. For the nominalist, the arbitrator's decision is "true" because it is universally accepted, not universally
accepted because it is true. Hobbes unflinchingly acknowledges that he means that truth originates in the "arbitrary" imposition of names (De Corpore, I.3.8). Leibniz was right when he observed that Hobbes is an "ultranominalist," "for not content, like the nominalists to reduce universals to names, he says that the truth of things itself consists in names, and what is more, that it depends on the human will" (quoted in Watkins, 1973, p. 104).

NOMINALIST POLITICS

Nominalism is the foundation of many of the most distinctive aspects of Hobbes's political theory. Most importantly perhaps, it explains why there can be no "natural" agreement about the meaning of moral names. Moral universals like "good," "bad," and "just," since they cannot correlate to the nature of objects, must have their origin in another type of mental conception. They originate, Hobbes says, in the passions (Leviathan, Ch. 6, p. 41). Those who invoke moral universals describe not the object of their discourse, but instead their subjective appetites or aversions with respect to that object (Watkins, 1955, p. 140; Mintz, 1969, pp. 25-26). Moral reasoning cannot take the form of an Aristotelian practical syllogism; the "alternate succession" of the passions that shapes all deliberation characterizes moral choices also. Opinions of good and evil result when "you break off the chain of man's discourse" (Leviathan, Ch. 7, p. 52). Because moral deliberation is only a mechanical "interruption" in the flow of the passions rather than a process of rational evaluation, it is completely predictable that the objects called "good" and "evil" will differ from person to person, and even that an individual's own assessments may differ from time to time (Leviathan, Ch. 15, p. 146). Moral terms lack a consistent referent in the world that might stabilize their meaning and induce the assent of others.

The consequence of acting according to our passions is that our behavior conforms to no rules. Since the referents of our terms are intrinsically subjective, there can be no common agreement about the meaning of the rules. Even when we appear to set up external standards in the form of moral rules, those are only the expression of our appetites, and we dispense
with them when it suits our interests. Without common rules, we fail to direct our behavior in ways consistent with our own goals, and we fail to coexist peacefully with other similarly motivated beings.

This set of nominalist assumptions underlies the description of the state of nature. By nominalist analysis, individuals are ontologically prior to any society. Hobbes avoids any assumption that individuals strive for association or find fulfillment in community with others (*De Cive* I.2). That is an Aristotelian metaphysical error; it assumes that community in a sense pre-exists the individuals who compose it and structures their behavior to promote its own realization. Hobbes does believe that people are language-users, but their language describes their idiosyncratic passions rather than the regularities of the world. Their talk of "mine" and "thine," "just" and "unjust," "good" and "evil" conforms society to their wills, that is, to their appetites and aversions. Because passion prescribes conduct, rules are foreign to them. Passion, by definition, pursues the objects of desire, and the language of good and evil is an instrument of this pursuit. In the event of interpersonal conflict over the objects of desire, there can be only the dissatisfaction of each disputant's desires going unfulfilled, or the mortal danger of the disputants coming to blows. There is no rational way to adjudicate conflicting claims, for a rational decision presupposes mutually agreed-upon standards of adjudication and such standards are precisely what is contested in the state of nature. The state of nature is an "anarchy of meanings" (*Wolin*, 1960, p. 257). That anarchy represents not some unfortunate deterioration of order, but a metaphysical condition. The prospects of peaceful community must be assessed within these limits.

The social contract answers to the political problem of ultranominalism by specifying the sense in which existing particulars (a multitude of inherently separate, egocentric individuals) can be collected into a universal (a "common power" consisting of a sovereign who represents them all) by an act of will (a covenant wherein all "submit their wills, every one to his will") (*Leviathan*, Ch. 17, p. 158). The contractarian solution requires, however, that there be at least one point of agreement even among egotistic individuals. That point,
Hobbes argues, is the overwhelming fear of violent death. Because the danger of violent death is so great in the state of nature, each individual wills—still separately and egocentrically, to be sure, but in accord for once with all others—to put and end to anarchy by erecting a common sovereign power to settle all their disputes.

The sovereign answers to the political problems of nominalism only by staying within the bounds of its assumptions. Sovereigns are individuals (either one person, or some group united by a single decision rule). The sovereign need have no special qualifications. The diversity and inconstancy of the multitude’s passions precludes any agreement on the desirable attributes of a sovereign. The only attribute required of the sovereign is one had by all parties to the contract; the unity of a single will. No superior education, virtue, genealogy, foresight or even rhetorical skill is required. At least in the original contract, the commonwealth is an equal opportunity employer.

It is not, however, simply the creation of a sovereign that ends the violence of the state of nature. The sovereign ends anarchy by issuing rules to resolve disputes. Hobbes’s unqualified assertion that “the skill of making and maintaining commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules” (*Leviathan*, Ch. 20, p. 195) reveals how dependent he believes political order to be on rule-following. Peace requires the voluntary obedience of most citizens to established law. From the citizens’ point of view, the burden of Hobbes’s argument is that, in the interest of civil peace, subjects ought never to challenge the commands of the constituted authority; they should subject their wills to his laws. The sovereign who had to depend wholly on direct force to regulate the motion of his subjects would be faced with an undoubtedly futile task. Peace requires subjects who learn to carry on their affairs within the universe of meaning that the sovereign’s commands establish. Rules provide the general direction that personal behavior lacks in the state of nature. Or to highlight better the metaphysical basis of the solution: the sovereign stipulates meaning by establishing general rules denoting what particular forms of behavior will be called "right" and "wrong." These rules serve as the moral universals absent from mankind’s natural condition.
The sovereign's rules, it must be emphasized, issue from will (Leviathan, Ch. 25, p. 241). Because the sovereign is only human and human will suffers the inconstancy described in Hobbes's nominalist theory of the will, it follows that the sovereign's rule can be inconsistent without being illegitimate. His government is entirely "arbitrary" (Leviathan, Ch. 46, p. 683). This means, first, that since the sovereign's will is civil law, no law can bind him. He issues or retracts any general law according to his pleasure. Second, even though he issues general rules, he is the ultimate judge of what particulars fall under his rules, so he may rightfully intervene in specific legal controversies (Leviathan, Ch. 18, p. 165). Thus the sovereign might punish a subject who could not have known that the general law proscribed his particular type of conduct. The sovereign compels and punishes "by his own discretion" (De Cive V.6). Not even the moral duty to act for the public good really constrains sovereigns, for they "may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions" (Leviathan, Ch. 24, p.235). The logical conclusion of the ultranominalist theory of the will would be an assertion that the wildly fluctuating commands of an insane monarch retain the character of valid law—and Hobbes accepted even this conclusion. A recently discovered manuscript reveals that he defended the right of a sovereign to impose on his subjects an heir who suffered from a "want of natural reason" (Okin, 1982, p. 59). The subjects can demand not even the most minimal standards of rationality of the sovereign's conduct, and may be obliged to tolerate the laws of a mad monarch. Hobbes believes that allowing one will to govern in a way absolutely unconstrained by rules is a necessary condition for having a system of rules under which others can live in peace.

PROBLEMS WITH ULTRANOMINALISM

Utranominalism seems to furnish an admirably solid foundation for the sovereign's unrestricted authority by making any questioning of his commands seem inconsistent in principle with civil peace. Closer examination, however, reveals several serious defects in the structure Hobbes has erected.
The first problem is that ultranominalism makes the concept of obedience to rules incoherent. Of course Hobbes would not easily agree. He seems to believe that the natural anarchy stems from an absence of known, clearly interpreted, and enforced rules, not from man's inherent inability to follow rules. His descriptions of rule-following behavior suggest how direct and unproblematic he considers such behavior to be in principle: laws are like chains extending from the sovereign's lips to the subjects' ears (Leviathan, Ch. 21, p. 198). A simple tug, one supposes, keeps errant subjects in line. Hobbes adopts a refrain of "simple obedience" (Leviathan, Ch. 20, p. 193). But just how simple is obedience for a nominalist subject? If the previous analysis of the will is correct, then people in the state of nature are not rule-followers at all. Each person is directed by will, and from the point of view of the will, it does not matter that now the subject is inclined to one thing and now another. Nothing in the concept of will requires that the objects of appetite have any essential similarities among them. Volition is private and possibly patternless.

Yet, creating patterns in behavior and insuring that persons subject their behavior to consistent rules in similar circumstances is the very purpose of law. Rule-following requires that the subject see relevant similarities in legally regulated circumstances in at least two ways (Hart, 1961, p. 21). The subject must understand that he is or is not a member of the general group to which the rule applies (e.g., head of family, preacher, baker, taxpayer), and that the law applies to a general type of conduct (e.g., educating, preaching, paying for goods). If there is not to be a separate rule for every citizen and for every particular situation of importance to civil peace, then subjects must be able to generalize, to perceive similarities between situations. The very concept of a rule is interwoven with an ability to discern such similarities (Winch, 1958, pp. 27-28). People who can regulate their conduct by rules must be, in other words, native rule-followers—a possibility that Hobbes's ultranominalism precludes.

This problem can be given a yet more radical formulation. The previous example assumes that, at the very least, when a sovereign makes an ostensive connection between a type of conduct and a rule, the nominalist subject understands him.
But that is to presuppose that the sovereign's words are not singular data, like any other data accessible to the senses. If people are beings who stamp arbitrary meanings onto sense data, then they will do so as much with the sovereign's words as with any other perception. The sovereign's commands will mean to them not what the sovereign intended them to mean -- subjects have no access to the sovereign's mind -- but whatever meaning their interests dictate. The consequence would necessarily be the failure of any attempt to govern people by the use of rules.

The second problem with ultranominalism is that it cannot prescribe the conditions under which a legal system becomes operative. It is a point of agreement among both legal positivists and philosophers in the natural law tradition that the very enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules puts some formal constraints on the types of commands that can form a legal system. What H.L.A. Hart calls "principles of legality" and the rules Lon Fuller regards as the "inner morality of law" express the minimal standards for legal rules; among other things, they must be general, intelligible, prospective, and internally consistent (Hart, 1961, p. 202; Fuller, 1969, pp. 46-81). When these conditions are frequently violated, governing by law breaks down. A different method of social control, perhaps rule by terror, is then in effect. A "legal system" can no longer be said to exist where laws are so obscure or inconsistent that citizens cannot know how to obey them.

What is important in the present context is that the ultranominalist sovereign may well violate even these standards and fail to create a legal system. If his commands are no more than the expression of his most recent appetites, law may lack even a minimum of structure. He may one day grant property and the next confiscate it. He may decree a law that applies to one subject and not to another. He may promulgate retrospective laws. Hobbes cannot proscribe these actions, although he may counsel against them. Still, it is unclear even what wise counsel can accomplish, for if law is nothing but the command of the sovereign's will, then whatever course his will may take, there the law follows. What Hobbes needs is an argument for the rationality of the sovereign. The sovereign
must consider to what degree the laws he authorizes are consistent with his goal of guiding his subjects’ conduct by rules. But such an argument does not accord with Hobbes’s ultranominalist metaphysic.

The allusion to wise counsel suggests the third inadequacy of nominalism: Hobbes’s reasoning calls into question the status of his own philosophical truths. His assertion that the sovereign has the right to censor his subjects’ intellectual endeavors is grounded in something other than the tyrant’s concern to control the circulation of troublesome ideas. In the ultranominalist universe, the sovereign’s will actually determines the truth of doctrine. It is conceivable then that the sovereign might find the teachings of *Leviathan* incompatible with civil peace, and ban them. Hobbes can plead that his work not be censored (*Leviathan*, Epistle Dedicatory); he can hope that the sovereign will adopt his views (*Leviathan*, Ch. 31, p. 358). But he cannot claim that his views are "right" or "true." If the sovereign objected to his work, Hobbes would find himself in an uncomfortable intellectual dilemma. Either he could claim that his work was true in spite of the sovereign’s will (and thereby contradict his nominalist principles) or he could agree with the sovereign and be obliged to repudiate his work. That would be a curious repudiation, however, because the grounds for considering the work untrue must be derived from the repudiated work itself. The work must be seen as at once true and untrue.

**HOBBS’S CONCEPTUALISM**

Given ultranominalist premises, Hobbes could hardly avoid these peculiar contradictions and deficiencies. He does avoid them—or thinks he does—only by tacitly shifting his metaphysical premises. Intertwined with nominalism is a pattern of conceptualist assertions. His numerous remarks on similitudes, evidence, understanding, and reason appear to throw him in a different metaphysical camp and allow him to draw some different political conclusions.

An alternative reading of Hobbes’s position on universals begins to take shape from his confident assertion that sensation
originates in a natural order. On the very first page of *Leviathan*, Hobbes announces his empiricist credo: "There is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first...been begotten upon the organs of sense" (*Leviathan*, Ch. 1, p. 1). This entails no contradiction with nominalism as long as conceptions represent only particular bodies and qualities. There are no general conceptions, no Platonic forms to apprehend. In a crucial passage, however, Hobbes explains how universal terms apply to these conceptions, and he does so in a way that leads away from his theory of arbitrary naming. "One universal name," he says, "is imposed on many things for their similitude in some quality or other accident" (*Leviathan*, Ch. 4, p. 21; cf. *De Corpore* I.2.7; *Human Nature* V.5). "Similitude" refers to some quality of the objects themselves, or at least of our conceptions of them. Objective resemblances justify applying the same name to a variety of unique objects. The similitudes are "natural" in the traditional sense; they exist independently of human will.

"Similitudes" are universal conceptions and universals are actually central to Hobbes's scientific project. His famous "resolutive-composite" method entails breaking observed, complex wholes down into their simplest component parts in order to explain how causal relations among the parts generate the complex whole. Understanding a square, for example, requires resolving it into lines, planes, straightness, terminated angles, and so forth. Hobbes speaks of these simplest parts as "universals" because they are components not just of the unique, complex whole with which the analysis started, but of all entities of its type. Definitions, in turn, are "nothing but the explication of our simple conceptions" (*De Corpore* I.6.6). Language is then tied to the natural order in a way not conveyed by ultranominalism. When Hobbes writes of "the visible things of this world, and their admirable order," he implies that there is a structure of conceptions and categories that pre-exists the structure of language. A truly scientific language would simply reflect this order.

His discussions of the "evidence" of truth and of communication confirm this conceptualist reading. Evidence, in Hobbes's theory, mediates conception and word. It explains the condition of the meaningful use of language for the
subject. Hobbes grants that a person could conceivably use a word correctly (that is, accurately denoting the similitude with which that name was conventionally associated), and yet not understand it. Knowledge requires more than a contingent association of word and thing; it requires "evidence of truth," "the concomitance of (a man's) conception with his words" (Human Nature VI.4). If there is to be "evidence" one must identify a conception. One must recognize its similarity to a conception one has had before, and because of that similarity, understand that it demands the same label as before. The doctrine of evidence implies that the connection between words and mental images that make up their meaning is not arbitrary. The very notion of meaning requires that the individual be supposed to use terms at least self-consistently.5

Conceptualism also explains how Hobbes can believe that communication between individuals is possible. "Understanding mediates the conceptions of one speaker with those of another. Understanding occurs when one person, upon encountering another's words, has those conceptions that the words were "ordained and constituted to signify" (Leviathan, Ch. 4, p. 28). Such understanding is possible only if people's passions do not necessarily attach arbitrary meanings to every word they hear. At least if words are well-defined, speech can play an important role in unifying people's conceptions of the world by calling to mind in the listener or reader the conceptions that the language-user intended.

The ultranominalist model of deliberation is contradicted by a conceptualist theory of reason. Reason, in Hobbes's most famous definition, "is nothing but reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts" (Leviathan, Ch. 5, p. 30). Successful reasoning presupposes settling upon certain definitions, employing these definitions without equivocation, joining terms according to rules of grammar, and making deductions according to the rules of logic. Ultrannominalism predicts that the passions will disrupt this process. Appetites will cause words to adopt new referents, aversions will prevent men from reaching painful conclusions. Conceptualism asserts that inferences can derive from the logical structure of the analysis, not from the
momentary status of the reasoner's passions. Reason must be able to fend off the passions and to guide the use of language by consistent, logical criteria. Hobbes even argues that "all men by nature reason alike, and well when they have good principles," (Leviathan, Ch. 5, p. 35; Elements of Law II.1). Reason is a universal human potential.

The conceptualist believes it possible to measure language against a natural order and grants that rational processes of thought can govern the use of language. He cannot therefore be satisfied with the nominalist's stipulative theory of truth. Ultranominalism does not make sufficiently clear that, whatever the chosen symbols, names denote groups united by genuine similitudes. Hobbes's call for the "apt imposing of names" (Leviathan, Ch. 5, p. 35, emphasis added) shows that he believed that standards of correctness apply even to the "arbitrary" act of naming. Apt names put all instances of a single concept under the same rubric. Hobbes's seeming restriction of "true" to its analytical sense then conceals a rather ordinary correspondence theory of truth. "Man is a living creature" is true because in the world (or in man's conceptual mirror of it), the natural group "living creature" comprehends the natural group "man." Hobbes's truths have an empirical content that no individual's will can alter. An analytical definition of truth only seems satisfactory to Hobbes because he assumes that the human senses and even language can connect unproblematically to an ordered world.

What emerges from this collection of arguments about sensation, language and truth is a metaphysics parallel to, but quite different from, ultranominalism. The conceptualist Hobbes believes that a real world presents itself to us in sensation. These sensations, ordered in similitudes, become the basis for linguistic distinctions. Someone who applies a name to a thing that is objectively dissimilar to other things called by that name can be criticized as mistaken; the conceptualist asserts our capacity to verify consistent usage. On the foundation of language is built a human capacity for consistent reasoning. Reason implies using names properly, following standards and engaging in logical analysis of propositions. Analytically true propositions predict empirical consequences because the terms of the propositions reflect actual structures
of the world. It is this conceptualism that salvages Hobbes's political theory from the absurdities of his nominalism.

CONCEPTUALIST POLITICS

Conceptualism explains how Hobbes can expect the promulgation of laws by a sovereign to end the anarchy of the state of nature. Conceptualist subjects can understand and follow rules. In fact, Hobbes describes the linguistic foundation of rule-following quite well when he recounts how the first pupil learned to apply names. "The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight... This was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion" (Leviathan, Ch. 4, p. 18). God’s ostensive definitions could be sufficient to teach Adam only if he could understand the relevant similarities in groups of creatures that justified applying a common name to them. Even as God taught Adam simple names, Adam was following rules, for using a word correctly implies picking up on a rule that specifies features common to an extended series of its possible uses (Pitkin, 1972, pp. 45-46). Insofar as he is a being capable of using language at all, he is a rule-follower.

Hobbes’s assumption that people are rule-followers explains the prominence of education in a theory that supposedly regards man as moved by passions inherent in his biological constitution. For all his insistence on the place of fear in the human psyche and on the importance of force in backing up the laws, Hobbes knows that civil peace cannot depend on the constant intervention of arms. The jab of the sovereign’s sword can redirect the motion of the errant subject only briefly. Mute terror teaches no rules. Peace depends on the subjects’ learning the sovereign’s rights and understanding "what doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the defense, peace and good of the people" (Leviathan, Ch. 30, p. 323). If people are "made fit for society not by nature, but by education" (De Cive 1.2 fn.), Hobbes must be supposing that subjects can understand concepts in a consistent way. They are able to subsume their particular conduct under general rules and to regulate their actions accordingly. Conceptualists can be
rule-followers; rule-followers properly instructed can be obedient subjects; and obedient subjects obviate the need for the sovereign to maintain a climate of pervasive fear.

Moreover, a sovereign who can be presumed to reason can be counted upon to do what is necessary to establish a system of laws. At times, Hobbes even talks of law as the command of the sovereign's reason, not his will (Leviathan, Ch. 26, p. 256). Certain that he is dealing with a rational person, Hobbes points out the logic in observing certain limits in the formulation of law. The limits he proposes in Chapter 26 of Leviathan are strikingly similar to Hart's principles of legality. Laws must be "signified by certain signs," preferably written. They must be prospective and general. Law should be administered equitably (Leviathan, Ch. 30, p. 332) and should avoid the punishment of innocent subjects (Leviathan, Ch. 28, p. 304). A rational sovereign would observe these limitations simply in order to insure the effectiveness of his own rule.

Finally, conceptualism retrieves the special theoretical status of Hobbes's counsel. In the only sense Hobbes believes possible in the context of political controversy, the Leviathan is true. True statements hold universally, without exception. Now, the political problem as Hobbes sees it is that people's conflicting passions, and the language they use to express them, lead to a Babel of claims on the public authority. No one claim about the "right" political order, it seems, can distinguish itself as true. Conceptualism, however, allows Hobbes to devise an argument with universal appeal. It begins when he discerns a common structure of passions in all persons. "Whosoever looketh into himself and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc. ...shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions" (Leviathan, Introduction, p. xi). While the objects of passions differ from person to person, the passions themselves do not. Appetites and aversions are universals of human behavior (Danford, 1980, p. 119; Spragens, 1973, p. 151).

The universal structure of the passions would support a universal judgment if there happened to be one object that affected all people with the greatest urgency and in a uniform
way. The object, Hobbes argues is death, especially violent
death. It is the "chiefest of natural evils" because it represents
the negation of every good, every appetite, every pleasure (De
Cive I.7). Fear of it should impel rational people to do
whatever is necessary avoid it. Every person should consider
peace the primary good. By deduction, Hobbes then leads the
rational subject to the conclusion that the institution of the
absolute sovereign is the necessary condition of the attainment
of peace. Assuming his logic is sound, the truth of his
conclusion derives from the truth of his premises, and his
premises are true because they accurately reflect a fact about
the human passions. This conclusion is "true" in the
conceptualist sense; it corresponds to a world that exists
independently of the sovereign's judgment. The truth of
Leviathan is not simply stipulative.

Why then did Hobbes not ground his theory exclusively in
conceptualism? After all, the rationality of conceptualism
permits him to explain how it is possible to avoid anarchy, and
conceptualism does not compromise his ability to describe
conflict. Conceptualist subjects can use words consistently but
may not. They can reason but may make errors. They can
follow rules but may ignore them. Surely "the inconstant use
of names" that Hobbes so deplores results only from the
contingent misuse of language (because of ignorance, custom,
or self-interest), not from the inherent relationship between
human will and nature.

PROBLEMS WITH CONCEPTUALISM

To understand what ultranominalism depicts that
conceptualism cannot is to penetrate to the very heart of
Hobbes’s work. Ultranominalism expresses, first, Hobbes’s
sense that human reason is never secure from the dominance of
passion. Conceptualism implies that reason can partially tame
the passions. It can control them at least to the extent that it
can rank them and keep the less urgent passions from
displacing the most urgent one. That view is not entirely
satisfactory to Hobbes because he is aware that "self-love" often
upsets the neatly ordered schemes of reason (Leviathan, Ch. 26,
p. 262). Especially in politics, where the material stakes are
high and the potential tributes to vanity great, the most rational
decisions are all too often set aside by passionate impulses. The "alternate succession" of passion in the ultranominalist
theory of the will expresses well the irrationality endemic in
political decision-making. It is a sign of Hobbes's recognition
of this problem that he does not simply present his countrymen
with an ideally reasoned doctrine of political obligation. Few
are the subjects whose reason is strong enough to subordinate
all their actions to the necessities of avoiding violent death. Hobbes relies on a new education to redirect men's passions
themselves so that they conform to what perfect reason would
dictate--even if their own reason is weak.

Second, ultranominalism explains why citizens may contest
absolutely no pronouncements of their sovereign. Conceptualism suggests that individuals can legitimately judge
at least some such pronouncements. The correspondence theory
of truth which conceptualism implicitly adopts could lay the
groundwork for the citizens' right to question the sovereign's
statements if they did not accord with the facts. If, for
instance, people believed that the authorities had used trumped
up charges to jail an innocent citizen, conceptualist citizens
could ascertain what really happened, describe the facts in
commonly understood terms, and compare the facts with the
established laws. Yet when citizen and sovereign disagree,
there are two conflicting assertions of right. Who is to judge
which is applying the law correctly? It is insufficient to say
that reason decides, for reason is always the reason of some
individual. If that individual is just an ordinary citizen, other
citizens with different judgments have equal standing and are
likely to challenge the first. The danger of anarchy looms
ominously over any solution that does not accord to a single
will the sole right to make decisions on all matters it deems
important to public order. If that person is the sovereign,
order is preserved, but the sovereign will is left as the sole
judge of its own rightness.

From a conceptualist perspective, this solution seems
irrational to the point of madness; it compels us to abandon
truths established by our own senses and reason. Ultranominalism, on the other hand, shows why there is no
alternative to the sovereign's arbitrary judgment. Where there
are no natural universals, where will establishes the meaning of words, where deliberation follows the flux of the passions, there is no certainty of a natural convergence of judgments toward objective truths. The very words people use to testify to what they have seen and believe are likely to have different meanings unless the sovereign defines them uniformly. Hobbes cannot be certain of solving the problem of political disorder unless he can persuade citizens that, paradoxically, the only rational way to avoid anarchy is for each to forfeit the right to employ the standards of his own reason in judging the commands of the public authorities. Ultimately it can only seem rational to suspend one's rationality if the very premises of rationality are questioned. Ultranominalism--but not conceptualism--casts doubt on the assumptions that people have similar sense experiences under similar conditions, that language can express objective universals, that deliberation is guided by logic rather than by passion. Only ultranominalism gives metaphysical support to Hobbes's practical conclusion that disagreements must be settled by an arbiter who cannot himself be held to rational standards of judgment.

The third reason for adopting ultranominalism is that it accounts for a residual arbitrariness inherent in the categories of language. When Hobbes explains why he asserts that "the original of names (is) arbitrary," it is not to appetite, aversion or partisan interest that he points, but rather to human invention in creating new words and to the diversity of linguistic practices among nations (De Corpore II,4). Empirically, he finds it impossible to "make any comparison betwixt a name and a thing;" silent objects cannot dictate the categories in which we speak of them. Whatever meanings different cultural processes generate, those are the meanings to which people will adhere in their deliberations. There will consequently be a variety of conventions governing the meaning of words, and no way of stepping outside of language to criticize alternative conventions.

Hobbes builds this cultural notion of arbitrariness into his ultranominalist theory of the passions. "The diversity of our reception of (the nature of things)," he observes, "in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions" (Leviathan, Ch.
4, p. 28). "Passion" here refers not just to the particular interests, but also to differences of perception and ingrained differences of judgment. "Differences of customs, and education" form differences of language and judgment in different men (Leviathan, Ch. 8, p. 61). Conceptualism implies that careful observation and the use of a consistent descriptive language could overcome such differences. Ultranominalism expresses Hobbes’s belief that language always retains a residuum of arbitrary categorization. No educational process can attune us directly to reality because our sense of reality is mediated by language. Different educations simply school the passions in different ways. Controversy is the intractable problem that Hobbes knows it to be because differences over the referents of general terms are deeply rooted in human experience, desire, and learning.

CONCLUSION

The flagrant contradiction between ultranominalism and conceptualism does—as Arendt suggested—lead to the center of Hobbes’s work. Ultranominalism accounts for the utter discord that rends the state of nature, and helps justify the rule of a sovereign whose commands can be questioned on no rational basis whatsoever. At the same time, ultranominalism would preclude the possibility of obedience under a sovereign, would prevent the sovereign from constructing a system of followable rules, and could force a repudiation of Hobbes’s entire work on logical grounds. Conceptualism accounts better for the obedience of subjects, the creation of a working legal system and the philosophical power of Hobbes’s own theory. Yet it also implies the possibility that disputes can be settled by rational procedures and thereby potentially legitimates disobedience to authorities who fail to adhere to such procedures.

Hobbes’s contradictions are profound not only in the sense that they are firmly rooted in his views on human nature and science, but more importantly in the sense that they represent some of the deeper complexities of political life. Conceptualism reflects our hopes that reason can guide our politics. It anticipates the aspiration of modern liberalism to
use empirical evidence, rational self-interest and settled procedures to regulate social conflict. Ultranominalism mirrors our fears that irrationalities entrenched in our judgments will disrupt even our most carefully considered cooperative ventures. It also represents Hobbes's recognition that politics is practical. In an arena where the greatest values are at stake, we demand results. And yet reason is often unable to quiet the prejudices, passions, and absurd beliefs that motivate real citizens to provoke disorder. Practical politics requires arbitration, compromise, and consent—procedures that appear absurd from the perspective of reason because they settle for opinion instead of demanding truth. It was the attempt to encompass all the complexity of political life—its reason as well as its unreason—in a single theory that drove Hobbes to contradiction. That is to say that his contradictions are truly a mark of his greatness.
NOTES

1 The labels that scholars use to distinguish the variety of positions philosophers have held with respect to universals are notoriously varied and even inconsistent. (Hobbes might smile ironically at this.) The difference between nominalism and conceptualism has been explored by A.D. Woozley (1967, 199-204); Armstrong (1978, pp. 12-17) examines five varieties of nominalism, including "Concept Nominalism." While most interpreters agree that Hobbes was some sort of "nominalist," there is no consensus on what to call the other tendency in his theory of language. I have chosen to follow the usage (but not always the interpretive conclusions) of Krook (1956, pp. 9-13) and Laird (1968, pp. 148-149).

2 Goldsmith (1966, p. 58) and Laird (1968, pp. 166 & 194) elaborate on Hobbes's concept of will and on its implications for his theory of deliberation.

3 See Quentin Skinner's argument that Hobbes was a defender of "de facto" sovereign authority, in Aylmer (1972, pp. 95-97).

4 Lucid explanations of the role of universals in Hobbesian science can be found in Spragens (1973, pp. 146-151) and Danford (1980, pp. 116-120).


6 Missner (1977) subjects this important passage to exciting interpretive analysis.

7 A particularly useful review of all the sources of political disorder that Hobbes associates with the abuse of language can be found in Whelan (1981).
REFERENCES


COSTA RICAN DEMOCRACY;
PLURALISM AND CLASS RULE

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The article argues that the emergence and maintenance of Costa Rican democracy cannot be attributed to unique economic or social circumstances, but rather to identifiable elite actions that changed the character of political life. The argument is supported by a review of recent political history and an analysis of the functioning of the contemporary political system. This runs counter to a very common argument that attributes Costa Rica's unique democracy to the relative equality of wealth and status that has characterized the country since colonial times. A second persuasion emphasizes the virtual powerlessness of the mass of the population, but sees the maintenance of democracy as an outgrowth of a pluralistic dispersion of power and divergence of interests among the powerful minority. A third viewpoint, essentially the opposite of the first, sees the democratic regime as a continuation of patterns of class domination with deep historical roots. This article stands between the second and third schools of thoughts, attributing the democratic regime to explicit accommodations of interests among rival elites, while emphasizing the persistence of class domination in Costa Rican politics.

INTRODUCTION

The recent crisis in Central America has brought renewed attention to the most peaceful and democratic of the countries in the region, Costa Rica. While her neighbors have suffered dictatorship, political violence and revolution, Costa Rica has avoided, thus far, the destabilization of its democratic regime,
in spite of a severe economic crisis and pressures from the United States to involve itself in the counterrevolutionary insurgency against Nicaragua. Such an apparent anomaly needs to be understood, not only for itself, but because the "Costa Rican model" is frequently cited as an aspiration by reformers elsewhere in the Isthmus. (For a comparison with other Latin American democracies, see Peeler, 1983 and 1985.)

It will be the argument of this article that the emergence and maintenance of Costa Rican democracy cannot be attributed to unique economic or social circumstances, but rather to identifiable elite actions that changed the character of political life. This runs counter to a very common argument that attributes Costa Rica's unique democracy to the relative equality of wealth and status that has characterized the country since colonial times (see, e.g., Aguilar Bulgarelli and Araya Pochet, 1970; Monge, 1980; Busey, 1962). A second persuasion emphasizes the virtual powerlessness of the mass of the population, but sees the maintenance of democracy as an outgrowth of a pluralistic dispersion of power and divergence of interests among the powerful minority (Denton, 1971; Ameringer, 1982). A third viewpoint, essentially the opposite of the first, sees the democratic regime as a continuation of patterns of class domination with deep historical roots (Vega Carballo, 1982; Seligson, 1980). The argument of this article stands between the second and third schools of thought.

LAYING THE BASIS OF DEMOCRACY

Costa Rica was poorer than most Latin American territories in colonial times, and had a somewhat more egalitarian social structure. These differences were not sufficient to make Costa Rican politics strikingly different from those of its neighbors. Coffee cultivation began early, in the 1830's, and rapidly came to dominate Costa Rica's exports. By 1850, in the heavily populated meseta central which was most apt for coffee, the majority of the rural population were either landless or owned small plots intensively planted in coffee. There were a few larger farms that required extra labor during the harvest, and provided beneficio (processing) services and credit to the neighboring smallholders. Economic
power was virtually monopolized by a small number of great *caféaleros* who were also engaged in commerce and finance, and closely linked to foreign financial interests. The majority of the population was tied to the coffee economy either as landless workers or as smallholders who worked part-time on the larger farms (Cardoso and Perez-Brignoli, 1977).

Such an economic structure provided the larger landowners with political clienteles at election time or on occasions when there were battles to be fought. Moreover, the clienteles would be more reliable, productive and conservative because many were landowners and others might hope to become so. The reality of concentration of land and capital provided the means for such economic development that took place in Costa Rica in the nineteenth century, while the ethic of egalitarianism and self-reliance—actually reinforced by the land tenure pattern of coffee culture—helped lay the basis for democratization of the political system.

Politics consisted essentially of a struggle for hegemony (i.e., control of the government and other centers of power) for the sake of the economic benefits and glory it might bring. There was a discernible hegemonic cycle that, with variations, can be seen in operation as late as 1948. These began at the point when a large coalition from among the elite (each leader with his own clientele) combined to remove an incumbent president or boss (e.g., 1842, 1859, 1902, 1936, 1940). There would typically follow a period of instability characterized by a series of truncated presidential terms, disputed elections, and unrest. Eventually, one person would assemble enough support to impose some stability. The scramble for political control that characterized the preceding stage would be replaced by a scramble for access to the clientele of the new leader. If a leader had enough allies within his personal network he would be able to control the indirect elections that were the norm in the nineteenth century. He could thereby assure himself a docile congress and municipal authorities, and he could place himself or a personal ally in the presidency. He could reward his allies with public office, with access to government contracts, or with favorable legal and administrative action. When the ruling coalition became too narrowly based to sustain itself, when too many powerful people were excluded from its
benefits, they might be able to coalesce and force the hegemonic leader to yield. An economic crisis might weaken the regime by diminishing its ability to deliver benefits. A weak leader might lose the support of the armed forces and be ousted by a coup. The poorer masses of the population were involved in this in only the most peripheral way, as low-ranking members of clienteles, and certainly not through political participation in the twentieth century sense.

This model of a personal hegemony was approximated—though never exactly—by the dominant political figures named in Table 1. The table also shows a periodization of Costa Rican political history.

The political system underwent some gradual changes during the period depicted. After 1870, the great coffee growers ceased to control the state directly, but remained a very strong interest. Beginning in the 1880’s, the State actively promoted popular education, laying the groundwork for the high literacy rates of the mid-twentieth century. The extent of control by the hegemonic figure tended to decrease, though even Jiménez still got his way most of the time. Elections were indirect, though with a broad male electorate at the initial level. In 1913, the first direct national election was held. The development of political parties was slow, beginning only in the 1890s. Parties did not become central to the political process until the 1940s (Monge, 1980; Stone, 1976).

When Jiménez reached the end of his third term in 1936, there was little indication that the political system was about to change. In the time-honored manner, he arranged the nomination, by the governing Republican Party, and election of León Cortés Castro, a prominent coffee grower and conservative. Cortés moved quickly, however, to take over control of the party and to set aside the aged Jiménez. Cortés’ policies tended to unify the propertied classes behind him and to accentuate the resistance of the Communists and their working class supporters. In 1940, when Cortés secured the Presidential nomination for Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, he could deliver overwhelming political support: Calderón’s only national opposition was the Communist leader, Manuel Mora (with about ten percent of the vote). The Communists opposed
Calderón because he presented himself as representing continuity with the pro-capitalist, pro-German policies of Cortés, an expectation surely shared by Cortes. But that was not to be.

**TABLE 1**

**Personal Political Hegemony and the Succession of Regimes***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Hegemonic Figure</th>
<th>Approximate Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Founding Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1821 - 1849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juan Mora Fernández</td>
<td>1824 - 1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Braulio Carillo</td>
<td>1835 - 1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coffee Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1849 - 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juan Mora Porras</td>
<td>1849 - 1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Francisco Montealegre</td>
<td>1859 - 1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tomás Guardia</td>
<td>1870 - 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1882 - 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rafael Yglesias</td>
<td>1890 - 1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ricardo Jiménez</td>
<td>1910 - 1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rafael Angel Calderón</td>
<td>1940 - 1948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Monge Alfaro (1980), Ch. 8-13
THE CRUCIBLE: 1940-1949

The complex and turbulent period from the election of Calderón to the inauguration of Otilio Ulate was the crucible of modern Costa Rica. In less than a decade, the political scene was completely transformed. (Good sources for this period include Aguilar Bulgarelli, 1974; Bell, 1971; Navarro Bolandi, 1957; Schifter, 1979, 1982; Salazar, 1974, 1981; Rojas Bolaños, 1980; Cañas, 1955.) The first stage of that transformation took place under the hegemony of Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia.

A physician and a devout Catholic, Calderón received his education in the progressive environment of Belgium, where he gained exposure to the new social doctrines of the Church. In the course of his medical practice he became widely known as a philanthropist, and in the 1930s pursued a successful political career as a loyal supporter of Ricardo Jiménez and then of León Cortés Castro. It was this record that led to Cortés' support for his presidential nomination in 1940. As Cortés had done before, Calderón moved successfully to take over the Republican party apparatus and isolate Cortés. It was evident that he intended to secure political hegemony for himself and would be willing to use office, patronage, corruption and fraud to do so.

Calderón was more than a traditional politician, though. He showed himself to be a political innovator in his efforts to strengthen his own hand. He was the first President since the early 1880s to have a cordial relationship with the Church. Even more importantly, he sought to mobilize a working class following by means of social legislation benefiting the workers and an administrative posture that favored labor unions. He was able to transform the political system without fundamentally altering the structure of economic power. Mass political mobilization meant the end of the elite monopoly of political power, and the initiation of welfare programs vastly expanded the role of the state (Rosenberg, 1983, Ch. 3).

Calderón soon found himself opposed by virtually every significant political force. The big coffee growers and other employers opposed his mobilization of the workers, his encouragement of unions, and his welfare state schemes. The
Communists opposed him as a demagogic competitor for working class loyalties. An emerging social democratic sector opposed him because of the remarkably obtuse corruption of his administration. From 1942 on, the United States and the Soviet Union were allies in World War II, and it became acceptable for Communist parties in Latin America to support bourgeois governments. With the conservative opposition actively conspiring to overthrow Calderón, Communist leader Manuel Mora offered to support Calderón in return for further programs beneficial to the working class.

This alliance provided Calderón with important support, but also further provoked and unified his opponents. Disastrous financial management by the government during the war years further strengthened the opposition. The conservatives and social democrats probably could agree on very little except anticommunism and the need to get rid of Calderón. The most important opposition element through the presidential elections of 1944 was the Partido Demócrata of Cortés, which tended to represent the more conservative bourgeois sectors, such as the coffee growers. A more moderate conservatism was articulated by newspaper publisher Otilio Ulate and his party, Unión Nacional. In 1945, the reformist, social democratic sector of the opposition coalesced into the Social Democratic Party, formed from the Center for the Study of National Problems (an intellectual "think-tank" dating from the late 1930s) and Acción Demócrata (the former left wing of Cortés' Partido Demócrata, led by José Figueres). The Center provided most of the programmatic ideas while Acción Demócrata provided the organizational drive.

In the 1944 elections, Calderón's candidate, Teodoro Picado, won easily over León Cortés (though not as overwhelmingly as Calderón had done in 1940). Allegations of government electoral fraud were widespread and the opposition remained unreconciled. After 1944, the Picado government and its Communist allies were too weak to do more than try to survive and defend their social programs. With the end of the war, United States policy became steadily less tolerant toward the alliance with the Communists as the cold war emerged (see especially Schiffter, 1982). Still, even though both the calderonistas and the Communists were embarrassed by the
alliance, a split would have put them and their programs at the mercy of their conservative opponents. So they stuck together to the end.

The governing coalition again won the midterm elections of 1946, again with charges of fraud. The political climate continued to deteriorate. Remarkably, though, shortly after the elections Cortés offered to throw his support to the government if Picado and Calderón broke completely with the Communists. But Cortés’ sudden death ended the possibility of a bourgeois coalition (Aguilar Bulgarelli, 1974, pp. 158-162).

It was apparent that Calderón intended to seek another term as President in 1948. The three opposition parties agreed to support Ulate. In July and August of 1947, a strike of merchants and employers induced Picado to agree that the Electoral Tribunal, responsible for supervising the electoral process, would be composed of persons having the confidence of Ulate. The government would retain control of the police, but the opposition would nevertheless control the electoral process. Both sides were then to agree in advance to respect the ruling of the Electoral Tribunal. Calderón reluctantly did so, but the Communists did not.

The election returns showed a substantial victory for Ulate over Calderón, while the congressional results showed a victory for the Republicans. Calderón refused to recognize the victory of Ulate, accusing the opposition of fraud. The Electoral Tribunal decided that whatever irregularities had occurred, they were not sufficient to invalidate the election (but cf. Schifter, 1979, p. 82). The calderonista-controlled Congress then voted to annul the elections. José Figueres, already waiting with armed forces at his farm, declared that the revolution had begun.

In six weeks, Figueres’ Army of National Liberation reduced the government to the necessity of surrender. Between 14 and 24 April, Figueres negotiated settlements with the government and with the Communists on the basis of maintenance of the social legislation and respect for the persons, property and political rights of those associated with the government. In these negotiations, both Archbishop
Sanabria and the United States ambassador played critical mediating roles.

Interestingly, these same two figures had also worked actively at the end of March to promote an agreement between Ulate and Calderon that provided for an interim President for two years, followed by new elections. It indicates the two bourgeois leaders' distrust of Figueres and the Social Democrats and was, in effect, the beginning of the durable—if perpetually fragmented—antiliberalcionista coalition that has remained a feature of Costa Rican politics ever since. However, Figueres refused to be bound by the agreement. The Army of National Liberation entered San José on 24 April and set up a provisional junta. On 1 May Figueres signed a pact with Ulate providing that the latter should assume office within 18 months, that until then a constituent assembly would be elected to draft a new constitution, and that Ulate would be the first President under that new constitution. In the interim, the Junta would rule by decree.

The Junta decided to continue the major social and labor legislation of the Calderón period, to nationalize banking and electrical power, to create mechanisms and authority for state guidance of the economy, to abolish the army, and of course to sponsor a draft constitution in the Constituent Assembly. The proposed constitution envisioned a social democratic state empowered to act in defense of the common interest even when this might conflict with individual interests.

To the surprise of the Social Democrats, the Constituent Assembly was completely dominated by Ulate's Unión Nacional (33 of 45 seats; the Social Democrats received 3) (Aguilar Bulgarelli, in Zelaya, 1981, pp. 66ff). Although the old liberal constitution of 1871, rather than the Social Democratic draft, was made the basis of discussion, several amendments did move the country in the direction of social democracy. These included full political rights for women, creation of a fully independent Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) charged with supervision of the electoral process, and the prohibition of immediate reelection for members of Congress as well as presidents. Moreover, the abolition of the army was confirmed in the Constitution.
The promulgation of the new constitution in 1949 and the inauguration of Ulate mark the birth of the democratic regime in Costa Rica. Many conditions may have permitted or assisted the establishment of a democratic regime after 1949, but none determined it. Economic and social conditions such as a relatively egalitarian land tenure or income distribution or a relatively high literacy rate are scarcely sufficient in themselves to account for the emergence of democracy in Costa Rica. The Costa Rican export economy is fundamentally indistinguishable from those of its neighbors. The political tradition of Costa Rica prior to 1940 weakened clientelism and established the norm of universal suffrage, but its establishment did not of itself constitute the establishment of democracy.

The emergence of the democratic regime occurred in four phases beginning in the early 1940's. First, the mass of the working population was incorporated into the system by Calderón, to an extent never before achieved. Participation was democratized. Second, in response to this development and to other circumstances discussed above, the political elite polarized into pro- and anti-Calderón camps, and fought the civil war of 1948. Third, the anti-Calderón forces, triumphant in the war, excluded their opponents from the system and agreed to establish democratic competition among themselves for the votes of the people. Fourth, in the course of the period 1949–1970, first the calderonistas and later the Communists were reincorporated into the democratic political system.

Each of these four stages was defined by a political choice: Calderón's decision to mobilize the working class as a base for his own hegemony, the opposition's decision to drive Calderón from power, the agreement between Ulate and Figueres, and finally, the decisions to accept the return of the former opponents and their corresponding decisions to accept incorporation into the democratic regime. None of these decisions was inevitable, and the latter two were certainly made with the conscious intent of fostering a democratic regime by reducing the likelihood of the sort of conflict that had brought the country to civil war in the 1940's.
ECONOMY, STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY COSTA RICA

As a small, underdeveloped country, Costa Rica remains dependent on coffee and banana exports, has seen its program of industrialization falter, suffers rapid population growth and urbanization, and has high unemployment. Like most countries in the Third World, it is presently suffering a prolonged and severe economic crisis. Its high literacy rate distinguishes it from many neighbors (Carcanholo, 1978; Acosta, 1969; Soto Badilla, in Zelaya, 1979, V. I; Lizano, in Zelaya 1979, V. I; Stone, 1976; Vega Carballo, 1981; Bogan, in Zelaya, 1979, V. II).

Costa Rica must deal with these growing economic and social problems through a combination of a strong state and a weak government. The State has had an important role in the economy and society since the 1840s, and it has indeed been central since the 1940s. It promotes, participates in, directs and guarantees economic activities (Cerdas Cruz, in Zelaya, 1981, p. 146). It absorbs the social costs of capitalism through its many social programs and manages the economy through diverse mechanisms.

If we look at the government that administers the state, however, we find checks and balances, decentralization and bureaucratization carried to the point of virtual immobility (Denton, 1971, pp. 34-44). The unicameral Legislative Assembly under the 1949 Constitution has substantial powers vis-a-vis the President. On the other hand, the Assembly suffers the disadvantages of being a collective body elected for the same term as the President, so that on most major issues it responds to executive initiative. Because it has been common to have the Assembly controlled by the President's opposition, the response has not always been favorable. The Assembly is also weakened by a constitutional prohibition, since 1949, of the immediate reelection of legislators, which makes it difficult for the institution to build up a core of experienced and expert leaders. The judiciary, although not activist to the same degree as the federal judiciary in the United States, is nevertheless relatively independent of political pressure.

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The President is the dominant figure within the government, but he is nevertheless set about by a variety of limits on his effective power. Many of his responsibilities constitutionally require the concurrence of the Assembly or of cabinet ministers. The President has no role in the appointment of Supreme Court justices. The numerous and diverse autonomous institutes are essentially beyond the control of the President and may have independent or earmarked sources of funding. The President does not have extensive decree powers.

Since the 1950s the rapidly growing public bureaucracy has been governed by a civil service system that tends to insulate public officials not only from political pressures but from effective control. This is true even within the ministries; in the autonomous institutes the situation is even more acute. These are structures whose size cannot be effectively limited, and whose policies cannot be centrally controlled. The civil service and the complex governmental structure that it staffs are both creature and creator of the urban middle class whose importance has grown vastly since 1950 (Vega Carballo, 1981, pp. 219ff).

Denton (1971, pp. 43-44) has pointed out that the pattern of a government with divided and mutually checked authority reflects a conscious preoccupation of the framers of the 1949 constitution who wanted to prevent the concentration of power. Both Ulate's conservatives and the Social Democrats thought Calderón had abused power. Moreover, the conservatives and the Social Democrats did not trust each other. The army was abolished by Figueres at least in part because he did not want Ulate to have access to such an instrument. The Ulatistas wrote the same prohibition into the Constitution at least in part because they did not trust Figueres. The autonomous institutes were intended to eliminate the possibility of the sort of rampant political favoritism characteristic of the Calderón government. It is, then, clear that the formal structure of democratic checks and balances was set up quite intentionally.
CONTEMPORARY INTEREST GROUPS

Costa Rica has a very active interest group life: most sectors of the society are ostensibly represented by organized groups. Nevertheless, within each sector most people are not effectively organized and do not participate actively in the groups that supposedly represent them. The influence of the groups, of course, varies widely. Those representing more privileged economic sectors tend to be more influential (Arias 1980; Carvajal, 1978; Denton, 1971, pp. 44-52; Stone, 1976, Ch. 5). We will examine economic, ideological, and official interests.

Among interests that are specifically economic, those who control productive property--the bourgeoisie--are organized at multiple levels, ranging from narrow sectors such as coffee growers or dairy producers to broader groupings such as the vigorous and powerful National Economic Development Association (ANFE), which includes a few hundred important businessmen who support its neoliberal, laissez faire economic policies. ANFE is the key bourgeois interest group concerned with economic policy.

Among mass organizations, the general pattern shows organizational fragmentation and a low level of popular participation. Total union membership is well under ten percent of the economically active population and is divided into competing, partisan confederations (Backer, 1975, pp. 19-20).

Several sources confirm the low propensity of Costa Ricans to participate in organized groups (Costa Rica, Casa Presidencial, 1978, p. 47; Gómez, 1977, V. II,p. 72; Carvajal, 1978, pp. 153-154). The lower one's social status, the less likely one is to participate. This pattern, almost universally valid cross-nationally, has the effect of freeing the elites from interference by the population as a whole, and specifically by the poorer sectors.

To be sure, economic interests may also be defended by less formal means. Frequently, the people in a neighborhood or community spontaneously organize to put pressure on the
government to correct an unsatisfactory situation (e.g., inadequate bus or water service.) Still, it appears unlikely that more than a small proportion of people actually get involved in such efforts.

Organized ideological interests, dedicated to the advocacy of a set of political ideas rather than the defense of economic interests, are of much less importance than the economic groups. The most important group in this category is the Movimiento Costa Rica Libre (MCRL), a far-right anticommunist paramilitary group that is dedicated to preparing for civil war between communists and anticommunists. Since the Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua in 1979, MCRL has had a prominent role in pressing the government to adopt an anti-Sandinista policy.

The sector against which MCRL is directed has been numerically very weak. The universities and progressively oriented sectors of the Church have provided the main thrust and leadership for left groups. None of these groups has attracted significant mass support and even in the current context of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence in the Isthmus, only a few infinitesimal cells have engaged in leftist political violence.

In the context of a discussion of organized political interests, the Church must be given special attention (Backer, 1975; Denton, 1971; Richard and Meléndez, 1982). About ninety percent of Costa Ricans are nominally Catholic and the Church is constitutionally established. Nevertheless, most governments except for Calderón’s have not been proclerical. The Church has occasionally involved itself directly in the political process. Still, the Costa Rican Church has not approached the political impact of its counterparts in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

The Church is a highly pluralistic institution within which a wide variety of individuals and groups pursue various political and social ends, even when their goals and methods are not approved by the hierarchy. The dominant tone of the hierarchy and most of the clergy is conservative at present, but there are active sectors committed to liberation theology.
Also, there are numerous evangelical denominations active in Costa Rica in both proselytizing and social action, with theological and political positions covering a very wide range.

A final, very important category of interest groups in addition to those with economic and ideological motivations, is composed of official institutions (Denton, 1971, pp. 41-45).

The autonomous institutes previously discussed function in some ways as interest groups, defending their programs, pressing for more funds, articulating the interests of their clients. The universities are a special sort of autonomous institution because their very nature makes them seedbeds for various autonomous and semiautonomous interests, ranging from the schools and institutes to ad hoc ideological groups that use the university as shelter and recruiting ground. Finally, local governments function fairly effectively as defenders of local interests, demanding action from the government on roads or schools, for example (Denton, 1971, p. 39).

The armed forces, in contrast with the rest of Latin America, have not been politically important in Costa Rica. Since the Tinoco dictatorship (1917-1919) they were kept small, poorly armed and poorly trained. Since the abolition of the armed forces in 1948, the country's internal security functions have been served by the Civil Guard and the Rural Guard, separate forces reporting to different ministries, and even less well armed and trained than the old army. Furthermore, they are completely subject to patronage turnover at all levels with each change of government (Mesoamerica, April 1984). There has been, in short, little chance of military intervention in Costa Rican politics up until the current international crisis in Central America. Now the United States government, in alliance with MCRL and other anticommunist forces within the country, has been actively pressing for an upgrading of Costa Rica's armed forces and a more direct involvement in the anti-Sandinista effort.
The contemporary party system might be classified as a one party dominant system in the sense that the Partido Liberación Nacional (PNL) has been the only continuously organized party and has been consistently able to attain or approach an absolute majority in both presidential and legislative elections. However, the party has only exceeded 60% of the vote once, in Figueres’ 1953 victory. The PLN has tended to lose when conservative opposition elements have been unified (1958, 1966, 1978). But the opposition has been consistently unable to forge a durable union. (On parties, see Trudeau, 1971; Jiménez, 1977; Jiménez, in Zelaya, 1979, V. I; Schifter, in Zelaya, 1979, V. I; Denton, 1971; Romaro Perez, 1979; English, 1971; Araya Pochet, 1968; Delgado, 1980; Monge, 1976; Salazar, 1981, 1974; Castro Esquivel, 1955; Ameringer, 1978, 1982; Vega Carballo, 1982; Aguilar Bulgarelli, in Zelaya, 1981; Aguilar Bulgarelli 1977; Stone, 1976; Arias, 1978; Fernández, 1974; Wells, 1970; Roscnborg, 1977, Cerdas Cruz, 1978.)

The victory of Ulate’s Unión Nacional in the Constituent Assembly elections of 1948 impelled Figueres and the Social Democrats to organize a truly mass-based party, which became the PLN in 1951. The party drew on the social democratic thinking of its predecessor, but also sought to set up a network of organizations for popular mobilization and to establish the principle that party organization should remain in being between elections. These goals have been quite imperfectly realized, but PLN has become by far the best organized mass party in Costa Rica. That organization carried Figueres to victory in 1953 and in five elections thereafter (1962, 1970, 1974, 1982, 1986) and PLN has held the majority in the Legislative Assembly in every term except two (1974 and 1978).

The continuation of diluted versions of the Junta’s reformist policies in Figueres’ government of 1953-1958 tended to consolidate the opposition in defense of propertied interests. But personal rivalries between Calderón and his former opponents impeded formation of a stable anti-PLN party. Even when an alliance could be formed, the constituent parties were careful to maintain their own identities and organizations.
Only after their devastating loss to PLN in 1982 was an opposition party (Social Christian Unity) formed that explicitly did away with its constituent parties (Mesoamerica, January 1984). It remains to be seen whether this new party will be any more durable than its predecessors.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize electoral results at presidential and legislative levels. The durability of PLN strength is evident from these tables, as is the fragility of its majority. A unified opposition has usually been able to capture the presidency, except against Figueres in 1953 and 1970. The persistent fragmentation of the opposition is evident in the legislative results. Seats are allotted by proportional representation so the parties are not hurt in the legislative races. However, PLN has gotten a legislative majority except in 1974 and 1978.

The 1986 election tended to reinforce the domination of PLN and the consolidation of the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) and the main opposition. The victory of Oscar Arias (PLN) over Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier was widely interpreted as a mandate for a less belligerent policy toward Nicaragua.

The emergence of modest leftist strength can be seen with the emergence of Acción Socialista in 1970 and 1974, and Pueblo Unido in 1978 and 1982. This leftist emergence reflects legal changes. In 1949, the constitution ratified a Junta decree prohibiting parties whose programs, means of action or international links tended to undermine the democracy or threaten the sovereignty of Costa Rica. This provision was of course directed against the Communist Party, and was used to prevent it, or any front, from competing in the elections, though the party was never forced completely underground. In 1970 and 1974, the restriction was tacitly ignored, and in 1975 the constitutional prohibition was repealed.

In 1959, a constitutional amendment made voting a legal obligation. From an average of 34% for 1953 and 1958, abstention declined to an average of about 20% in subsequent elections. This is evident in the increase in vote totals between 1958 and 1962.
There is no definitive study of the social bases of the parties, but some tentative generalizations can be made (Trudeau, 1971; Schifter, 1979; Schifter, in Zelaya, 1979, V. I; Carvajal, 1978). While there are sociological patterns in the sources of support of the parties, the demonstrable patterns are much weaker than the stereotypes and in some cases contradict the stereotypes. All organized parties are weaker in the metropolitan area than outside of it. PLN draws more support from the less educated and lower income groups; Unidad and Pueblo Unido show the opposite tendency. PLN is strong in all provinces, but weakest in Limón, Puntarenas and San José, where Unidad and Pueblo Unido are stronger. Pueblo Unido and the left in general are weak everywhere, but perhaps growing stronger. Neither the middle class nor the working class can be associated in any reliable way with any particular party.

Several studies of public opinion and political participation provide substantial information of perceived efficacy and activity (CID, 1979-1981, Carvajal, 1978; Gómez, 1977; Costa Rica, Casa Presidencial, 1978; Booth, 1976; 1978; Booth and Seligson, 1978; Seligson, 1978; 1979; 1980a; 1980b; Seligson and Booth, 1979). The picture that emerges is of people who do not think their potential political power is very great, and who seldom test the limits of that power by actions beyond voting. There is of course a tendency for the lower strata, whether urban or rural, to participate less. Seligson and Booth (1979) have shown the countervailing role of organization in promoting the participation of peasants and workers. But the problem, as noted above, is that no part of the mass population is very well organized. In consequence, this population makes few demands on the political system. The normal Costa Rican response to problems is not to complain or to demand solutions from the government, but rather to cope with them on an individual or family basis. One side of this cultural trait is self-reliance; the other side is the tendency of people to passively accept problems not of their own making. That they do so of course reduces demands on a political system which would otherwise have to deal more effectively with the problems.
**TABLE 2**

Presidential Election Results, 1953 – 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
<td>Independiente</td>
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<td>Republicano</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Unión Nacional</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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TABLE 2 con’t.

Presidential Election Results, 1953 - 1982

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<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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TABLE 3

Legislative Election Results, 1953 - 1982

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<tr>
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<th>Percent</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberación Nacional</td>
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<td>Republicano</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independiente</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>Unión Nacional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicano</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td><strong>1970</strong></td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>530,425</td>
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### Legislative Election Results, 1953 – 1982

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1974</strong></td>
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<td>Acción Socialista</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>664,964</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1978</strong></td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td><strong>1982</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unidad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pueblo Unido</td>
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<td>Movimiento Nacional</td>
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<td>Social Christian Unity</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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CONCLUSIONS

The democratic nature of the regime that has existed in Costa Rica since 1949 is clearly limited. Economy and society remain profoundly unequal in the distribution of resources and power, so that the degree to which genuine democratic equality could be realized in the polity is quite restricted. While democracy presupposes effective popular control of the government and public policy, power in the Costa Rican polity is highly concentrated in the hands of a socioeconomic elite that is able to lead and manipulate the mass base of the parties and pressure groups, rather than being controlled by the masses. Further, the elite that holds power is highly pluralistic, divided by divergent interests that check the ability of any one party or group to carry through a coherent program. The separation of powers of the democratic constitutional structure reinforces this tendency to ad hoc, unsystematic policymaking. Costa Rican "democracy" is not fully democratic, but it is liberal in the sense of maintaining individual liberties and political competition among parties and pressure groups, with periodic competitive elections that are frequently won by the opposition. What we have, to use Robert Dahl's term, is a polyarchy.

Poor and isolated in colonial times, Costa Rica never developed the huge latifundia and the massive landless peasantry that evolved in many other Latin American countries. With the rise of coffee in the 1840s the landed elite was able to enrich itself and concentrate capital, but not to the point of eliminating the small landowners, who also benefited from the coffee boom. By 1900, the country was controlled by a diverse but still quite small ruling class; yet the mass of the population did not suffer exploitation as intense as occurred in many other countries of the region.

Gradual political transformations were already well under way by 1900. The basic education of the mass of the population was given decisive impetus beginning in the 1880s. The autonomy and the capabilities of the state were progressively enhanced. The legitimacy of unadorned personal or family rule was eroded. The norm of tolerating opponents and respecting their civil liberties was strengthened. The idea
of popular participation in elections gained increasing acceptance, the notion of political parties as instruments for mobilizing that participation emerged and developed, and the legitimation derived from popular consent became increasingly indispensable. It came to be widely accepted that popular consent ought not to be manipulated, but rather be freely given on the basis of meaningful alternatives. Active state intervention in economy and society to provide for the well-being of the population became increasingly legitimate.

By 1949 the country was ready for the establishment of democracy. Much of the groundwork laid during the preceding century was built by people who had no conception of democracy, much less any intention of establishing one. Beginning in the 1920s we find some elite members explicitly calling for democratization, and correspondingly we find increased mobilization and participation of the mass of the population. A stable democratic regime could not have emerged if it had not been built on the liberal norms established by the preceding elitist political system. However, there was nothing inevitable about the democratic regime. The 1948 decision by the triumphant rivals, Figueres and Ulate, to subsume their rivalry in a democratic political process, was critical because it ended in struggle for political hegemony. The later expansion of that self-conscious accommodation to take in the calderonistas and the left has brought the democratic regime to a high level of maturity.

In an increasingly complex society, those who hold economic power find their interests diverse and often divergent on specific policy issues. The political structure of polyarchy makes it almost impossible for any one interest or party to monopolize power, and tends to allow every significant economic interest some political power. The system structures and stabilizes the complex interplay of established interests so that no one risks losing everything. Since the society is too complex now for anyone to hope for stable hegemony (Calderón was the last to try) polyarchy provides all vested interests a piece of the pie.

The conservatism built into the delicate balance among established interests tends to retard the emergence of new
interests (e.g., leftist parties). Lacking bargaining resources, as long as they remain within the pluralist system they will find it difficult to get more resources from the already powerful who control the system. The system's delicate balance virtually assures that there will be no radical changes in policy that might prejudice the interests of some recognized sector.

The built-in conservatism of pluralist democracy is only one face, though. Within the range of its established alternatives it is flexible. This feature has been of great importance in enhancing the system's stability. The alternation of parties in the presidency, shifting power balances and alliances have provided a safety valve when things have not gone well, permitting changes of personnel and policy within the context of the constitutional structure. The opportunity to choose between PLN and anti-PLN alternatives under the effective guarantee of electoral honesty gives people a sense of input and some hope for change if they are not happy with the current state of affairs. The availability of participation within the pluralist system of interest groups has provided an outlet for the activist minority, while making known to the nonactive majority that if they wanted to, they could participate with reasonable hope of achieving some of their goals. For the most part, that seems to be all the majority expect.

The elites worry constantly and publicly about the viability of the democratic regime and devote considerable energy to maintaining enough civility and cooperation between government and opposition to keep the regime functioning. Indeed, the idea of democracy as a national patrimony is intensely propagated in the schools and the press. When Costa Ricans contemplate the tribulations of their neighbors, it is not hard to convince them that they are fortunate. A regime that does not torture and murder its own people is no mean achievement in Central America today.

Much injustice remains in Costa Rican society. Still, neither the times nor the people have yet demanded more than the democratic regime can produce. Up to now, the Costa Rican democratic regime has cushioned the injustices and delivered enough benefits to keep most people below the threshold of resistance. Pressures from the Reagan
Administration for remilitarization, active support of the Nicaraguan *contras*, and confrontation with Sandinista Nicaragua, have imposed grave strains on the political system at a time of economic vulnerability. But the Monge Government (1982-1986) blunted those pressures while avoiding direct defiance of the United States. Whether the new Arias Government and the democratic regime as a whole can continue the balancing act is a question asked anew each day.
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PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA:

REFORM OR PARALYSIS

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The present debate in Yugoslavia about "democratization" of the League of Communists is a consequence of the Party's heritage of anti-Stalinism, the constitutional evolution of the country, and the situation after Tito's death. Nearly two decades ago the Praxis group of political philosophers were the first to criticize the absence of intraparty democracy, and while many of these critics were silenced, their ideas have re-emerged in Yugoslavia during the economic crisis of the 1980's. Within the League, the debate has touched on its responsibility for public policy, its organizational principles, and its monopoly of power. Opposition to reform and fear of political change have limited practical effect of the debate, but it continues to raise fundamental questions about the meaning of democracy in a one party system.

Discussion about "democratization" of the Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) has been a persistent feature of the country's political life since Tito's death in 1980. I wish to examine the arguments advanced by some proponents of "democratization" in Yugoslavia and to address a familiar but important question: Are polemics about the preferred evolution of Yugoslavia's political system a cyclical phenomenon common to other communist party states, or is the Yugoslav situation an unprecedented, if yet unfulfilled, extension of "self-management"? Support for the unique promise of LCY "democratization" may be sought in the radical nature of the arguments advanced, in the passing of a single authoritative source of ideological interpretation, and in Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union. An observation of Adam
Ulam's offers an equally powerful argument for the contrary viewpoint.

The tragedy and paradox of all communist systems in this direction [of democracy and decentralization]... is that in a sense they only make more essential the ubiquitous grip of the party on all spheres of political, economic and social life. The more necessary it will become to assure the unity of political centralization...
(1965, pp. 151-152)

A corollary of this position is that if "depoliticization," the "essence" of Titoism in Ulam's judgment, succeeds too well, the regime is threatened by a loss of identity because "it is impossible to run a communist state without a nucleus of devoted and ideologically minded people." Cycles of Yugoslav liberalization and authoritarianism appear to support Ulam's view, but Tito's role in the process is unmistakable and irreplaceable.

Before 1980, ideological change in Yugoslavia was associated with conflict with the Soviet Union (1948, 1958), or with disruptions within the League itself (1954, 1966, 1972). Since Tito's death, dissent about the character of intraparty democracy and mutual relations of LCY and the state has reached unprecedented levels, despite the absence of earlier sources for change. It is not unusual for League spokesmen to speak defensively. Fuad Muhic of the LCY Bosnia-Hercegovina Central Committee admitted the existence of those who claim "the party possesses legality but that [it] lacks historical legitimacy, because it is losing support of the working class" (Borba 1983d). The unsatisfactory situation brought on by the inaccessibility of LCY decisions is in turn associated with the country's economic crisis, the "federalization" of the LCY itself, and a general malaise after the 1982 12th LCY Congress. Within a year of the congress, a member of the Montenegrin Central Committee presidium, Vukola Vasiljovic, spoke of a "climate of insecurity, suspicion, tension, and wavering being created in which pressure [was generated] to change the system or to set actions in motion outside the political system" (Tanjug, 1983b). Support to "change the system" has been diffuse and enjoys the support of acquiescence of LCY officials at the highest level.
For the first time Yugoslav theoreticians have acknowledged a source of "antidemocratic" attitudes that cannot be associated with "cominformists" or supporters of the ousted Rankovic. Nadjan Pasic has held that western "neoconservative" trends have created such epigeous offshoots in Yugoslavia as "Balkan authoritarianism" under a veneer of Marxism. In a seminar organized by the Serbian League's Central Committee, Pasic acknowledged that such "neoconservatism" in Yugoslavia had taken the form of "institutional fetishism in defense of the status quo. Of course, those defending the status quo are those who enjoy positions of authority and this means the factions of the professional administrative structure in the economy, and especially in politics" (Borba, 1983c). Supposedly such "factions" wanted to turn the LCY into a "party of order" as part of a "strategy for saving socialism." Surely, Pašić was aware that the paradox of "conservative" Yugoslav communists drawing inspiration from bourgeois political trends took away the stigma of any similar influence on communist "liberals" advocating pluralism.

Whatever the accuracy of Pašić's claim about the source of "neoconservatism" in Yugoslavia, evidence for his concern soon emerged. In April 1984, less than four months later, twenty-eight Yugoslavs of various ideological outlooks were arrested for attending a talk given by Milovan Djilas (New York Times, 1984). Several were beaten, charged with disseminating "hostile propaganda" and were sentenced. For his efforts on behalf of the accused, the lawyer Srdja Popović was arrested and then interrogated while his apartment was searched and papers seized. The association with Djilas provided the apparent pretext for the arrests, yet the arrested could not be accused of political naivete. Leading members of the LCY Presidium had called for greater tolerance of political viewpoints outside the LCY and accelerated democratization within. According to Presidium member Alexander Grličkov, editor of the theoretical journal Socijalizam, democratization required

demonopolizing the LCY from its leadership role as the [exclusive] ideological political force... this means creating a socialist league as a real front for all socialist forces whose boundary markers are the constitutional system, socialist self-
management, equality of nations... and a state of nonalignment (Borba, 1983c).

In effect, the notion of "boundary markers" defining the substance of LCY assumptions excluded their procedural counterparts, that is democratic centralism. Implicitly, Grlickov was supporting tolerance of those who sought basic changes in the LCY. The move against Djilas's audience established a de facto "boundary marker" when few apparently existed.

Any impression of novelty in the situation must be tempered by the historical perspective of Yugoslav ideological development. The problem of "democratization" in the LCY originates in the Yugoslav criticism of the Stalinist political system. As early as 1950, Edvard Kardelj attacked the Soviet practice of "making a fetish of the State," and in so doing attributed a negative cast to states that could not be separated from the party itself. He wrote, "It is not the task of the workers' state to 'create' socialism, to conceive and construct it... its task is to clear the way for social and economic forces which by their inner essence are necessarily socialist and therefore develop freely, and must inevitably create socialism" (Johnson, 1972, p. 147). Initially, the state would retain its functions of external defense and repression of class enemies; "democratization" was identified with decentralization, rather than with the transfer of governing responsibility to workers' councils. Nevertheless, as Yugoslavia's ideological profile became sufficiently distinguished from the Soviet Union's, and as the federation was established, the party, soon to be renamed the "League," began to surrender its insistence on specific political outcomes founded on democratic centralism.

At the Sixth Congress in 1952, both Tito and Ranković emphasized the LCY's commitment to democratic centralism and its increased responsibility, but Djilas's call for separation of party and state meant that the League would only prescribe general policy lines and suggestions for their implementation (Borba Komunista Jugoslavije, 1952, pp. 289-302). Lower party organs would enjoy substantial autonomy. How decentralization and democratic centralism could be reconciled was never explained. According to Dennison Rusinow:
Those who had the new definition [of the League's role] did not have an answer. Neither did the perplexed Party members in the field who were now told in one and the same breath that their responsibility for the making and implementation of 'correct' socialist decisions had increased but their power to fulfill that responsibility must diminish (1977, p. 77).

Much of Yugoslavia's postwar political history can be explained in terms of the costs in party morale of such slogans as "decentralization, desatization, democratization, and depolitization" (Bičanić, 1966, p. 643). The defection of Djilas from the League presents in microcosm the dilemma of communist reform. Communist party states may no more "democratically" abolish the heritage of Leninism than liberal democracies may vote to abolish limited government.

Less abstractly, Yugoslav communism has grappled with the dilemma of democratization through constitutional experiment and ideological variation that is both utopian and vaguely repetitive. In 1951, Pašić wrote:

It is not difficult to understand how the socialist state becomes stronger and at the same time withers. The state becomes stronger as the true representative of the interests of the whole society... but this process, this transformation by means of ever broader democratization into the organization of the [workers] themselves simultaneously signifies its withering as a special apparatus of class force separated from society. (Johnson, 1972, p. 152)

The problem was taken up again in the 1958 Program; "The leading political role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will gradually disappear in the perspective, as the forms of direct Socialist democracy become stronger, develop and expand" (Pribicevich, 1958, p. 253). Thirty years after his 1951 statement, Pašić concluded that the development of socialist self management democracy and the socialization of politics does not lie in some new redivision of power... [could more be imagined?] but in self management integration which will empower
all functions of executive power and administration of state functions placed directly in the service [of workers] and under their direct democratic control. (Nase Teme, 1982, p.2026)

Lacking such integration as the cause and consequence of democratic reform, the LCY has coexisted uneasily with constitutional innovation and critical interpretations of Marxism that promised "democracy."

Of course, the Praxis episode of Yugoslav Marxism is the best known example of organized demands for democratization of Yugoslav political life. The Praxis philosophers saw the true meaning of socialism in the freedom of creative political activity to overcome individual alienation (Gruenwald, 1981, pp.227-250). Through various colloquia and their own journal, the Praxis group sought an independent position from which they could criticize League policy. The timing of the enterprise followed the adoption of the 1963 constitution and preceded the eighth LCY Congress. In retrospect, the harassment and eventual banning of the journal Praxis demonstrated the incompatibility of a ruling communist party and potential opposition. In June 1964, Svetozar Stojanović, Mihailo Marković, and Gajo Petrović, among other philosophers, met in Novi Sad with party regulars at a conference sponsored by the Institute for the Study of the Workers Movement. Stojanović put forth his ideas for a democratic reform of the LCY, including the rotation of cadres, open discussion, use of the referendum, respect for minority opinion, democratic nomination, election of party officials, and full accessibility of the work of party organs to public scrutiny (Sher, 1977, p. 41). The veteran League ideologist Veljko Vlahović curtly rejected this barrage because "self-management" within the LCY amounted to a "serious mistake."

The League would find and continues to find much objectionable in "leftwing intellectuals." But it is easy to overlook the support for Praxis that was implicit in Yugoslav communism's heritage of anti-Stalinism, its rejection of simple determinism, and in its denial of claims to ideological monopoly. Some five years after the Novi Sad meeting, Latinka Perović, Secretary of the Serbian League's Executive Committee, penned
a plea for open discussion that the *Praxis* group could not have bettered.

The essence of intraparty democracy leads mainly to freedom of thought and the right of criticism. It is a phase through which organizations pass. But this problem is not limited to that of democracy within the League of Communists but [requires] the creative participation of communists in working out the strategy and tactics of the League. The general ideational and political level of the League may make this unrealistic. Yet the League is a revolutionary, not a 'pedagogical' organization. Therefore the constant confrontation of their members with the contradictions created in a Socialist society and the active democratic participation of all in the right of decision making have become the order of the day. (Perović, 1969, pp. 14-15)

If the party was in need of pedagogy, the *Praxis* philosophers were quite ready to assume the task; and, as distrustful or supportive as many officials of the LCY might be, the survival of the journal through 1973 was due in part to the state of the League itself after 1966. Lacking a reliable means to prosecute its editors, communist opponents of *Praxis*, particularly those in the Croatian leadership, were unable to censor the journal, while the Serbian League would not interfere with the *Praxis* bastion at the University of Belgrade.

Critical thought about "democratization" of the League of Communists and the "humanization" of Marxism could not easily be channeled through a decentralized and often incoherent LCY. As long as dissent did not endanger public order, the LCY might afford to loosen its ideological monopoly. But as early as 1968, the disorder of student demonstrations brought down censure. Tito lashed out against "individual professors, semi-philosophers, Praxsovci, and various dogmatists... For them the working class and its role means nothing. For them the League of Communists means nothing .... Do such people educate our children in schools and universities? There is no place for them there" (Sher, 1977, p. 213). Yet, before expulsion of the "Belgrade Eight," as they were called, from the University's Philosophy Faculty in early 1974, the philosophers had an important place, for as much as Tito might complain, his will
would not be brought to bear without a restructuring of the LCY.

By dramatizing the threat of the Croatian crisis to Yugoslav integrity and by purging local party leadership, Tito laid the basis for a restoration of central authority and inaugurated a new "ideological offensive." Talk about LCY "democracy" would now mean Leninist norms of democratic centralism, or as Kardelj explained, "democracy" would exist "for socialism but not against it." In the spring of 1974, the Tenth LCY "Congress of Unity" convened to proclaim the vigor of the LCY, the relevance of "moral-political criteria" in education and to condemn the "so-called 'left critics'" who had attempted "to replace the avantguard role of the LCY by false liberalism and super-class illusions about freedom and democracy" (Dokumenti i platforma, 1973, p. 130). The 1970's produced abundant evidence to support Adam Ulam's comment (above) that the more communist regimes attempted to reform, the more necessary they made "the ubiquitous grip of the party." To the extent that the LCY tolerated a plurality of viewpoints in public life, it confronted intellectuals more concerned with the development of nationalist sovereignty than humanist universals.

Tito's death in 1980 removed the sole obstacle to a renewal of debate. As Pedro Ramet commented, "The chief adjudicator is gone, and there is no one, thus far, able to take his place. Hence the democratization debate is wide open" (1980 p. 45). Comparison with the content of earlier and present ideas about ideological reform and "democratization" are hard to avoid. Part of the process has been a restoration of the Marxist left. In November 1983, the Institute for the International Working Class Movement of Belgrade convened a three day conference in Novi Sad on the topic "Marx and Socialism - Contradictions and Prospects." Fifty intellectuals gathered to disagree about the "crisis of socialism" in a way reminiscent of the Novi Sad meetings in 1964 prior to the foundation of Praxis. A Borba correspondent noted a "nostalgic recollection of 20 years ago [when] again in Novi Sad, almost the same people discussed the same topic; it is evident how much has changed. Some have altered their views radically, and others have held to the same." Svetozar Stojanović spoke for the reformers in affirming that "self-management cannot be realized without a radical democratization of society," and (more boldly) that Marxism was
vulnerable to "abuse in the ideological sense" and "authoritarian communism." Stojanković, Ljubomir Tadić, and Predrag Vranicki, among others, repeated many of their arguments penned in Praxis and in so doing provoked some of the same ad hominem criticism from LCY officials. Petar Živadinović compared Stojanović with the anti-Marxist French noveaux philosophes for allegedly deriving Stalinism from Marxism and for showing a "touching predeliction" for "liberal bourgeois democracy." Fuad Muhić attacked the idea of "constitutional pluralism" and any "negation" of the LCY (Borba, 1983b).

The Conference might have little importance were it not symptomatic of several features that transcend the pattern of "democratic" reformism and "authoritarian centralism." First, renewal of the debate had coincided with a time of economic dislocation and nationalist discord. Thus, just one month before the Kosovo demonstrations in 1981, Aleksandar Grlićkov had called for a "wide-ranging dialogue in the League of Communists" and the "promotion of dialogue between the LCY and other socialist forces in Yugoslavia" (Stanković, 1983b, p. 3). Second, any "ideological offensive" on the part of LCY is unlikely because of its incompatibility with the collective presidencies of the LCY and the Federation.

The Chairman of the LCY Presidium, Mitja Ribičić, ruled out such a development in a lengthy interview given on May Day 1983. Ribičić reaffirmed the 1958 LCY program as a source of "new instruments for debureaucratizing society and the League of Communists." Unacceptable ideologies of "bureaucratic dogmatism" and "anarcho-liberalism" were not associated with any present social groups but with the historical persons of Ranković and Djilas (Tanjug, 1983a). As for the question of "what new forms of democracy should emerge from socialist development," Ribičić recalled an old Praxis vision as nothing less than "the need to develop self-management in the direction of going beyond the framework of enterprises and extending it to the entire direction of society" (Tanjug, 1983a).

Whether the collective presidency is unable to agree on a more precise definition for the LCY or whether Ribičić in fact expects social revitalization from outside the LCY command structure is difficult to assess. The Twelfth League Congress in 1982 suggested the latter possibility. An editorial in Borba
(1983a) recalled the Congress' demand: "It's more and more obvious each day that if the League of Communists does not 'divorce' itself from centers of power, it will not be possible [for Yugoslavia] to find a more decisive and quicker way out of the current dangerous situation in self-management... or [eliminate] the considerable irresponsibility in realization of a stabilization policy."

DEMONCRACY: FROM THE STATE TO THE LEAGUE AND BEYOND

Yugoslavia's present economic situation has created a "crisis" of political innovation in the traditional sense of the word. On the one hand, austerity imposed to cope with economic difficulties threatened to stifle change through greater centralization, while on the other hand, the staggering dimension of its economic problems created opportunities for political innovation. Decision making remained fragmented in a bewildering array of republican, federal, provincial, and local executives, but the League of Communists retained responsibility for the appointment of personnel and for setting the boundaries of debate. Few League spokesmen suggested a concentration of economic decision making authority in the League and Central Bank, and many found the economic situation a consequence of the League's ideological monopoly.

In a recent interview, Ljubislaw Markovl collected the University of Belgrade claimed that the economic situation had "restricted the relevance of dogmatic concepts of Socialism." The dogmatists had tried "to make people happy by means of various promises propagated by ruling political forces adding to Yugoslavia's foreign debts" (Stankovic, 1984). The result of centralized power was a situation in which "people care only for their own and their families' food and clothing, while everything else - from housing to education - is something taken care of by the State." Supposedly, because the "State fills a central area" of working life, work fails to surpass a low level of productivity. Markovl argued for greater individual initiative in an economy more sensitive to market forces.

This relatively "neoliberal" viewpoint shares the same logic of mainstream arguments for democratization. As a Borba
editorial explained, "One gets the impression that at any moment there are only two actors on the social scene: the LCY on one side and enormous problems facing society on the other" (1983a). The result of this perception develops into an unholy alliance of "bureaucracy and technology" through the "negative teamwork" of LCY leaderships, banks, and political-economic organizations. Meanwhile, self-managing institutions and rank-and-file communists become irrelevant to decision makers who look upon them as "some sort of surplus" grudgingly accepted.

Democratization of relations within the LCY requires a change of attitude needed to engage the support of broad segments of the population on behalf of economic stability. In a sense, the proponents of reform appear to be asking that Yugoslavs accept the burden of imposed austerity caused by errors in the League's judgment but clearly promise more sweeping change. Presidium Chairman Ribičić has put the matter bluntly: "The League of Communists can no longer be engaged in an alliance along two tracks, the statist pragmatic and the socialist self-managing" (Borba, 1983c, p. 1). Only "revolutionary pressure" from below on behalf of self-management can insure the economy's recovery. This view differs fundamentally from that advanced by the Praxis group; it argues that democracy is not to be pursued for the abstractly humanist goal of overcoming alienation but for protection of socialism itself. The themes of economic stabilization based on self-management and of pernicious evils due to "bureaucracy and technocracy" attempt to legitimize demands for change and mobilize the LCY rank and file.

The upper leadership could not reach a consensus defining "democratization," a condition that allowed political figures of lesser status than Ribičić or Grličkov to become involved. Indeed, both the institutional details and the theoretical basis of democratic self-management had been debated since the publication of a lead article in Socijalizam in July 1980. The timing of the "Plea for a Dialogue about the State in Socialism" (Jovanov, 1980, p. 81) indicates that Tito's death was a signal for debate. Although the extent of Yugoslavia's economic situation had not yet become apparent, the material imperative for democratization formed a central premise of Jovanov's argument. He wrote that "according to all analyses of social accounting, for a relatively long period of time, Yugoslavia has
maintained a surplus of resources in banks and socio-political associations at all levels." The surplus raised a question in itself and generally about "the decisive influence in the distribution of newly created value... [which] effectively prevents the expression of economic power." Loss of working class economic power had occurred under self-management because of the conflict with "bureaucracy" and more exactly by the "hyperproduction" of institutions and by decision making whose "consequences [stood] in direct conflict with the interests of the working class." Excessive institutional norms simply exhausted energy and creativity and "formal" voting served to aggravate the contradiction of the State and self-management.

Jovanov had put forward a variant of the same argument about the LCY that Ribičić would use four years later, namely, the "party's practical political action in oscillation between the State and self-management." Only a "public dialogue" about the LCY and democracy could restore the communists as an "integrative factor of the working class with a historic role." Unlike earlier arguments on behalf of "decentralization," Jovanov's article disavowed a new attempt at "decentralization," since experience had shown that whether power was divided horizontally or vertically, it ended up creating "closed circles" of decision making and ultimately "disintegration" (Jovanov, 1980, p. 95).

This broadside in Socijalizam provoked little open opposition, yet one reply is interesting for its paucity of theoretical force. According to Jože Goričar, the "Plea for a Dialogue" had inaccurately described the relation of the State and self-management as "contradictory" rather than "dialectical." It was necessary to "integrate the movement with the regime into a single system of socialist democracy" rather than to set off each antagonistically. An "order" (poredak) would be necessary for progressive change, however pure the "movement" (pokret) that inspired it. Failures of self-management, according to Goričar, were not due to the absence of democracy but to personal defects and political culture. "A great majority of our citizens are nearer to the mentality and value system of a meddling industrial western country than of a free socialist community of politically and culturally developed people who decide democratically about their life and work" (Goričar, 1980, p. 134). Such a viewpoint might preserve a tutelary role for the
League, but could do little to inspire the energies of ideological fidelity.

Support for Jovanov's "Plea" and democratization became more voluble and radical. Extraordinarily bold assertions seconded the distinction of "order" and "movement." In some of its elements, the socialist State is identical to a greater or lesser degree to the "bourgeoisie form of the State," because of its potential to become alienated from "the real interests of the working class," and the "polarization of civil and political society" (Blagojević, 1982, pp. 48-49). The "dialectic" of "order" and "movement" now became a "continuous struggle for the division and redivision of social wealth." Implicitly, Yugoslavia had allowed the "order" to dominate the "movements," that is, to make impossible the redivision of wealth or the function of Marxist criticism. In this view, the separation could be overcome by the abolition of a "professional" political class, a development that could be "opened" by democratization of self-managing relations critical of the "State in socialism," rather than an attempt to improve the "socialist State" (Blagojević, 1982, p. 41).

Some writers saw sufficient wealth in the history of Yugoslav practice to seek a relevant reform model (Djordjević, 1980, pp. 78-86), while others, such as Branko Horvat, found occasion to resurrect the distinction of "scientific Marxism," "vulgar Marxism," and "Marxology." Among valid Marxist methodological innovations, Horvat found the organizing slogan of the Praxis group: "Criticism of everything that exists - not, of course, in a nihilistic sense, but in the sense of critically examining unrealized possibilities" (Horvat, 1983, p. 1777).

Clearly, the League could not be exempt from criticism. Enver Redžić, a veteran of the organization in Bosnia-Hercegovina, presented one of the most damning indictments. Redžić cited the low representation of workers in the party and its leadership organs, and the apparent instability of their membership. The resulting "dominant bureaucratic stratum" survived to engage in an "unprincipled struggle for functions and position," an evil drawn from Tito's Opus (Redžić, 1982, p. 399). Redžić saw little "dialectical" in the process; instead, it amounted to a "permanent conflict of bureaucratic tendencies and methods" and "efforts to change and transform them into
democratic relations." The "bureaucratic ruse" consisted of preserving its "methodology and mechanism" of deciding on behalf of "direct producers" through indirect mediation. Placid platitudes of "continuity" embodied in the 1982 Party Congress documents would not meet the urgency of "deprofessionalization" and "democratization."

Redžić's mention of the Party Congress touched a sensitive nerve. The revival of Marxist criticism could be salutary, providing it did not challenge authority itself. The Congress had drawn a careful boundary in affirming the League's "democratic centralism." LCY Presidium member Branko Mikulić held out democratic centralism as "an essential condition for the democratic development of our society as a whole" (1982, pp. 49-50). "Dialectical" now came to include a sense of animation, for at once it implied a "united organization and a uniform ideological orientation" alongside the "equal position, independence, and responsibility" of League members. The reaffirmation of the party statute on democratic centralism was a test case, since it confirmed the power of leading organs to expel members who resisted League policy. However, the momentum generated on behalf of "democratization" was registered clearly at the Congress. First, former Presidium Chairman Dušan Dragosavac repudiated "persistent centralist tendencies" in the LCY; the LCY Central Committee gained a number of powers exercised formally by the Presidium, and only six members of the 23 member Presidium were re-elected (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1982, p. 31672).

More radical steps towards democratization were turned back. Bogdan Crnobrjina had demanded that LCY rank and file be permitted to recall members in executive position; to convene an "extraordinary" Congress within a year, if needed to implement adopted policies; and to use the secret ballot for multi-candidate elections (Keesing's, 1982, p. 31674). Although Mikulić reported that the Statuary Commission had not accepted the proposals, he acknowledged the disagreement over "verification" of party positions, and proposed that the LCY Statute be changed further before the Thirteenth Congress in 1986.

The question of League decision making had been intensely debated prior to the Congress, and, in view of its willingness to
consider further changes by 1986, the debate has become more intense. Conservatives have praised existing LCY relations as an embodiment of interparty democracy, while advocates of change have called for a replacement of "democratic centralism" by the more vague "democratic unity." A "moderate" viewpoint in the debate has endorsed democratic centralism, because the League, unlike self-managing organizations, is a "voluntary organization."

Those who form the SK do so voluntarily, that is, one decides consciously to associate his personal will with the general will as a synthesis of individual wills. That association is carried out by the principle of democratic centralism, which means in a certain sense a limitation of democracy and with respect to its voluntary component, is not imposed as someone else's will (Markovic, 1982, p. 574).

Of course, such apologetics may seem fatuous either to outspoken advocates of interparty democracy or to western students of communist politics. However, the argument's conclusion acknowledges the urgency of central questions about democratization in Yugoslavia. First, how can the LCY expect to abolish relations of "hierarchy and subordination" in social relations, if it does not alter its own decision making structure? And, second, how can an organization based on democratic centralism assume a leading role with self-managing and federal institutions? Significantly, few theoreticians have simply invoked the authority of Tito and Kardelj to support their viewpoints.

One possible alternative to democratization within the League is suggested by the transformation of other institutions into effective rivals. For example, one possibility suggested recently has been to revitalize the Socialist Alliance. SAWPY Federal Conference Chairman Marjan Rožic has acknowledged the "cohesive" influence of the League on the Alliance as a "red thread" running through its actions. Yet, he demands a more complementary relation between the two organizations. Specifically, he argues that the Alliance should express the will of "organized socialist forces" which are not subordinate to the personnel of the organization; that it discuss "the most sensitive questions" of art, literature, and culture; and that it exercise "social controls and criticism which contribute significantly to
realizing a cadres policy that is still not sufficiently democratic" (Rožic, 1984, p. 237). In mentioning a "cadres policy," Rožić avowedly seeks to replace various "coordinating bodies" with the Socialist Alliance - a proposal that would attenuate a key principle of political control in all communist party states.

Organizational heresies have inspired theoretical dissonance as great as any propounded during the late 1960's in Yugoslavia. Clearly, certain works demonstrate that the leading figures of the LCY have surrendered a claim to ideological monopoly. Milivoj Oreb, a lesser known Slovenian, has elaborated upon an explanation of why socialist states resort to war which identifies the bellicose propensity of the classic bourgeoise imperium with the systemic imperatives of "bureaucratic" socialism (Oreb, 1982, pp. 3-17). Ljubomir Tadić, a Praxis figure, returned to demonstrate the fundamental idea of "criticism of everything that exists" as basic to all of Marx's writings in his attack on ruling ideologies (Tadić, 1983, pp. 316 - 382). Finally, the most innovative and surprising work has examined the "mythology of the revolution" and the "aphoristic, uncritical and a priori attitudes about socialism - its possibilities and institutions" (Milosavlevski, 1983, p. 11). Examining "myths about consciousness concerning the revolution" promises a means of approaching Tito's role in Yugoslavia and the corollary of the "partisan myth" of the war.

Any criticism of Tito's legacy implies discussion about generational change. Older communists, critical of intraparty debate, have blamed the postwar generation for the dysfunctions of "localism" and the variety of "ideologies" within LCY ranks. Such sentiment is typified in the writing of the Croatian communist Stipe Suvar who holds that the League suffers from the passing of its "creative minority" within the wartime generation and the "careerist, mediocre, and parvenu mentality" of its successors (Suvar, 1985, pp. 47,53). The malaise of ineffectiveness in the face of economic decline likely sharpens anxiety about the new generation. Between 1980 and 1984, average personal income declined 34%, and inflation approached 100%; some communists consider the 1983 stabilization measures to have failed (Stanković, 1985b). Spokesmen acknowledge the relation between dissent and the economic situation. Introducing the League platform for the thirteenth Congress, LCY President Vidoje Žarković acknowledged that "the
unfavorable economic situation and [the League's] slowness in dealing with accumulated problems... gave heart to all those who act from antisocialist and anti-self-management positions" (Žarković, 1985, p. 16). Challenges to the regime's legitimacy from without are easily identified and condemned, but Žarković was at a loss to explain the "contradictions, problems, and obscurities" arising from within the LCY in its action and discussion.

Surely, a source of ineffectiveness lies in the conflict between the interests of individual republican and provincial leaderships with respect to one another and with respect to the needs of the Federation. The platform for the thirteenth Congress recognized a "basic conflict between the working class and the alienated holders of economic and political power who control surplus value" (Platform, 1985, p. 25). League documents have interpreted the relevance of "democratization" to mean greater discussion and mobilization through the Socialist Alliance, improvements in local assemblies, and the federal delegate system, as well as broader involvement in personnel (cadre) appointments (Borba, 1985). Democratization does not entail a revision of decision making within the LCY itself. A Central Committee Plenum of July 30, 1985, reaffirmed the League's commitment to democratic centralism, threatening the expulsion for those acting contrary to adopted policy positions (Stanković, 1985a). Thus it is not surprising that any question of the League's central role in political life, as Neca Jovanov suggests in a recent work, has been dismissed as a prescription for "anarchy" (Bošković, 1985, p. 416).

PRAXIS RECIDIVUS?

"Democratization" in Yugoslavia may be approached in various ways. To minimize its distinctiveness, one might find parallels in earlier abortive phases of Yugoslav liberalism. To accentuate its distinctiveness (or disgrace) is to emphasize the institutional possibilities brought on by the death of Yugoslavia's immediate post war leadership. To an extent, both views find comparative reflection in a Yugoslav equivalent of "de-Stalinization" or "de-Maoization," that is, a kind of "de-Titoization" without criticism of Tito. I suspect that the significance of the movement may best be understood by
reconsidering some aspects of the Praxis period. Several assumptions of recent ideological change in Yugoslavia originated in the Praxis period and contributed an important dimension to the meaning of "democratization" in Yugoslavia today. First, the use of theory as a means of criticizing institutional arrangements is implicit in both periods, although it is also a means of political struggle within the party since 1980. Second is the renunciation of ideological monopoly by leading political figures. The Praxis group pretended to instruct the League from the outside, while theories for "democratization" have been put forward by younger or academic League members without major responsibility. Third, the concern over "alienation" bridges the two periods. While discussion about the "young Marx" of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts amounted to a central tenet of Praxis, the current theorists favoring democratization assume greater involvement of Yugoslav citizens, representing a necessary step in overcoming the alienation created by the economic crisis. Unlike the Praxis philosophers, the current theorists have challenged their opponents in the League. The deeper and disturbing question concerns the ultimate compatibility of democracy in its conventional sense and socialism in any sense. More exactly, as Oskar Gruenwald describes the dilemma, how can Marxist humanism avoid remaining "hostage to anti-humanist, dogmatic, and totalitarian aspects of Marx's Weltanschauung" (1983, p. 299).
NOTES

1 The first scholarly attention to the debate may be found in Ramet (1980). Subsequent works from Yugoslavia cited in the body of the paper will demonstrate the continuing nature of the "democratization" theme since 1980.

2 For example, a closed session of the Yugoslav assembly of July 2–3, 1984, endorsed the government’s central role in all foreign economic transactions. An account of the meeting in Stankovic (1983) suggests some unusual efforts at discipline on the part of the Federal Executive.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE IX:
PERSPECTIVES OF PENNSYLVANIA SPORTS LEADERS

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Title IX of the Higher Education Act is to provide women with legal protection against discrimination in educational programs and activities, including intercollegiate athletics. The purpose of this research is to examine the attitudes and perceptions of male and female sport leaders toward Title IX and the specific democratic value, equality, which underlays it. This article reports the findings of an attitudinal survey of sport leaders in selected public institutions of higher education in Pennsylvania. The survey addressed the sport leaders' attitudes toward political and social equality and the enforcement issue of Title IX. The thesis of this report is that so long as there is a gap between persons' support for democratic values in the abstract and their actual behavior, enforcement of Title IX will remain controversial and equality between the sexes will not be achieved.

INTRODUCTION

A fundamental raison d'être of a democratic society is that it is inexorably committed to the achievement of the "good life." Although various meanings can be given to that concept, a political meaning can be the enhancement and advancement of personal self-respect. The enhancement and advancement of personal self-respect constitutes a democratic ideal because man's self-respect is an understanding of his dignity. It is the value he sets on his own full development, the condition and result of his self-actualization. It is his recognition, with neither pride nor groveling, of
his indispensibility to society and his insignificance in the universe. Most of all, within the limits society allows, it is a function of his self-direction and self-control, of the choice and living of the life he thinks best (Riker, 1970, p. 17).

Personal self-respect, and, by implication, collective self-respect is striven for by individuals, groups and organizations and attained, although never in an absolute sense, when their affairs are conducted according to certain "process values." In a democratic polity, the most salient process values are: participation--engaging in activities either directly or indirectly as an individual and/or group or organization member in various decision-making processes so as to have an impact on the decisions; liberty or freedom--engaging in a plethora of culturally defined behaviors so that reasonable self-determined goals may be achieved; equality--recognizing the essential legal, political, and opportunistic parity of oneself with others and of all members of the society; tolerance--restraining one's impulses to interfere in the lives of others insofar as others' expressions and behaviors do not interfere with one's own life; and obedience--complying with the established rules of society or its relevant subparts to the extent that the rules reflect a consensus achieved through legitimate procedures (Riker, 1970, pp. 17-21).

The presence of these process values within the American political culture suggests an essential purpose of the governmental apparatus, namely, that the government is to establish the conditions whereby the process values may be actualized, i.e., become increasingly operational for more and different citizens of the society. To achieve this purpose, the government (often times following a lengthy struggle) enacts legislation and regulations, establishes enforcement mechanisms, and engages in adjudication procedures that are designed to foster the conditions deemed necessary to advance and enhance personal self-respect. While the Black civil rights movement provides a classic example of the process involved, it also demonstrates that the struggle to actualize the process values in one's own and others' lives is a continuing struggle. More recently, the efforts to actualize the process values has been carried forward by the women's movement. A particular
focus of that movement has been on the nature of the educational institutions of society; and their efforts culminated in 1972 when Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965. Title IX states that:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.... (Section 901, Public Law 92-318).

According to Senator Birch Bayh, who introduced the legislation, education was just another area of American life in which differential treatment between the sexes had been documented. Title IX was to "provide women with solid legal protection" against discrimination in a wide variety of educational programs and activities (118 Cong. Rec. 5804). Among these are housing, access to course offerings, financial and employment assistance, and health and insurance benefits and services. Furthermore, Title IX applied to any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletic program and/or activity offered by an educational institution which received Federal financial assistance. It is this area of Title IX which, although obviously not the sole focus of the legislation, has received probably the most national attention (Underwood, 1979; Newsweek, 1981).

Enforcement of Title IX was the responsibility of any federal agency that extended federal financial assistance to educational institutions or programs. Initially those agencies were located primarily within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (and since its creation, in the Department of Education) and its Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The agencies were to enforce Title IX "...by issuing regulations prohibiting sex discrimination... and they may terminate or refuse to extend financial assistance for failure of a recipient to comply". (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1980, p. 3). Specifically, the OCR collects and analyzes information from recipients of federal assistance and from its own regional offices. To detect violations, the OCR relies
upon complaints filed by individuals or groups and compliance reviews of recipients' programs. When violations have been identified, the OCR attempts to gain voluntary compliance through negotiations. Should the negotiations fail, the OCR may take steps to terminate a recipient's financial assistance or refer the case to the Department of Justice for prosecution (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1980, p. 12).

The purpose of this research is to examine the attitudes and perceptions of a selected group of persons toward Title IX and the democratic values which underlay it. The selected group of persons consists of Pennsylvania sport leaders and includes coaches, athletic directors, and others associated with intercollegiate athletics in the state-owned institutions of the Pennsylvania System of Higher Education. In particular, this study seeks to examine a particular aspect of the "enforcement dilemma" of Title IX. That is, the enforcement dilemma can be explained in part by the presence of attitudes that resist the changes implied by Title IX. Until such time as the attitudinal sets of those most directly involved in the effort to achieve equal opportunity in education generally and intercollegiate sport in particular are altered or changed in such a way as there is congruence between attitudes and behavior, the efforts to achieve compliance will remain controversial and continue to fall short of the intended mark. Finally, and most importantly, until the attitudinal sets are altered, the actualization of the process value toward which Title IX compliance efforts are directed will remain unachieved and the "good life" unattained.

SUBSTANTIVE CONTEXT

The difficulties associated with the enforcement of Title IX and other similar legislation can be traced to a classic paradox that exists within the American democratic political system. The paradox, quite simply stated, is that while the vast majority of citizens believe in democratic principles and values in the abstract only a minority of citizens are either willing or able to live their lives, i.e., conduct their affairs, according to those beliefs. Until a congruence emerges between the individual's abstract beliefs in the meanings of democracy and the concrete behavior that should follow from or be
triggered by those beliefs, there will continue to be a gap between a preferred state of behavior and actual behavior.

The paradox was described initially several years ago by political scientists such as Stouffer, Prothro and Grigg, and McClosky. Their studies, although concentrating on the value of tolerance, asserted on the basis of empirical findings that a democracy could be maintained so long as citizens remained attached to democratic principles and constitutional procedures. Attachment to the symbolic meaning of democracy enabled the system to survive even though citizens showed relatively high levels of intolerance and unwillingness to extend civil liberties to "objectionable" groups in their day-to-day affairs. More recent studies (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978; Davis, 1975; Lawrence, 1976; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1979) have tended to qualify these initial findings either substantively or to attempt to reinterpret them on methodological grounds.

It is in the general context of these studies that the current research is undertaken. McClosky's study is particularly relevant because of the nature of his subjects and his findings. With respect to the former, McClosky studied the levels of support for democratic principles and for their specific applications among two groups of individuals, political influentials and rank and file citizens, and was able to make comparisons between these two groups. The immediate research that is reported cannot make intergroup comparisons because the subjects of this study are sport leaders. This group, however, is analogous to McClosky's group of political influentials. That is, sport leaders are directly involved with the issue of equal opportunity in sport and can be viewed as constituting influentials with respect to the purpose of Title IX legislation. Finally, the nature of the data does allow comparisons to be made between male and female sport leaders.

McClosky's findings also provide guidance for this research effort. His findings were that political influentials showed higher levels of support both for democratic principles and for their application in specific situations than were the levels of support among rank and file citizens. Accordingly, we should expect to find comparable if not higher levels of
support for democratic principles among sport leaders. Because of the nature of the issue, we should expect to find not only significant differences between the sexes on democratic principles but, also, significant differences between the sexes on the specific application of the democratic principles.

METHODOLOGY

In the fall, 1982, a two-phase mail survey was distributed to a sample of 355 individuals in the (now) Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education. The names of the individuals to whom the survey was sent were ascertained from the Sport Information Directors of the fourteen institutions; all were directly or indirectly involved in intercollegiate athletics at the fourteen institutions in the SSHE system. Specifically, the survey was sent to the head and assistant coaches, athletic directors, assistant athletic directors, Affirmative Action officers, and the Directors of Equal Opportunity in Sport. Obviously, the sample is a non-probability sample; it, therefore, contains within it all the inherent dangers of inference.

The survey was composed of four major parts. The first part consisted of ten (10) items which raised questions of a personal nature, e.g., the age and the current position(s) occupied by the respondent. All subjects were to complete this part of the survey. Part II consisted of nine (9) items that requested information on a particular sport such as the athletic organization to which the team belonged, the number of athletes on the team, etc. This part of the survey was sent only to identified coaches. Part III of the survey consisted of six (6) items that dealt with "Institutional Information," e.g., the total athletic budget of the institution, and was to be completed by Athletic Directors and those involved with affirmative action programs.

Part IV of the survey consisted of a series of fifty-six (56) attitudinal items that were divided into two major categories. The first of these, titled "Contemporary Issues," presented a variety of liberal-conservative items and items
which addressed a number of democratic principles (Robinson, Rusk, and Head, 1969). The level of support among members of the sample on several of the latter items will be examined subsequently. The second component of Part IV was titled "Equal Opportunity in Sport" and consisted of thirty-six (36) items. These items were developed from a "Feedback Mechanism for Intercollegiate Sport," a survey instrument used by the Pennsylvania Department of Education to ascertain whether institutions of higher education are in compliance with Title IX requirements. Several of these items are presented in this research effort (Table 1).

For this Table, the smaller percentage of respondents who are in agreement with the item, the stronger the expression of belief in the democratic principle. Because the expressions of belief were not as strong as he had anticipated, McClosky interpreted his findings by stating that political influentials "...are torn sharply not only on the empirical question of whether men are in fact equal but also on the normative issue of whether they should be regarded as equal" (p. 367). Even though the political influentials do not approach the desired level of consensus on political and social equality questions, McClosky nevertheless concluded that "support for these equalitarian features of 'popular' democracy...is greater among the elite than among the masses "(p. 368).

The information on sport leaders, however, is not as uncertain or ambivalent. Indeed, sport leaders to a remarkable degree express reasonably to extremely strong beliefs in these indicators of political and social equality. It appears from these findings that sport leaders believe that "men " are not only regarded as empirically equal but that they are seen as normatively equal as well. The interesting question with respect to the findings on sport leaders is why their expressed beliefs in political and social equality are so strong. Two explanations can be suggested. The first is an historical reason, namely, that a fantastic amount of movement has occurred with respect to the actualization of equality since McClosky collected and reported his findings. Sport leaders have been neither isolated from nor immune to the meaning of the movement and/or the presumed actualization. The second reason flows from both the educational background and the
work environment of the sport leaders. It seems reasonable to assume that individuals with high levels of educational attainment who work in an intellectual atmosphere where values such as equality are discussed frequently are likely to express strong support for political and social equality.

Assuming that these explanations constitute a reasonable interpretation of sport leaders' beliefs in political and social equality, is it reasonable to assert that sport leaders are willing to apply their expressed beliefs in their work-a-day world of intercollegiate athletics? If they are willing, then they should express belief in specific Title IX applications of the democratic principle of equality. Finally, if sport leaders do express belief in the Title IX applications, is it then possible to at least argue that the general principle of equality is being actualized? Table II provides the relevant data.

In Table II, the larger the percentage of respondents in agreement with the item, the greater the expression of belief in the application. First, the data suggest that sport leaders express reasonably strong beliefs in the selected Title IX applications of political and social equality. With the exception of the two items that deal with athletic funding and budgets, more than 60% of all the sport leaders are in agreement with the applications. In comparison to their level of agreement of the abstract political and social equality item in Table I above, however, their level of agreement on the applications is lower. That is, there is less congruence between the abstract statements about belief in political and social equality and the belief in the specific applications of same. Second, an examination of the actual percentages in Table II for all sport leaders shows that there is considerable variation in the level of agreement on the specific applications. The levels of support for the more remote applications are greater than for the more concrete applications. For example, while a high level of agreement is found on the prime practice time item, small levels of agreement are found on the athletic funding and budget items. These two comments when taken in combination support the generalization that the more abstract the question or issue, the greater the expression of agreement or support for it.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>McClosky's Political Influentials (N=3020)</th>
<th>Sport Leaders (N=218)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Strongly Agree</td>
<td>% Agree or Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Equality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what's best for them.</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run.</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Issues&quot; and &quot;arguments&quot; are beyond the understanding of most voters.</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people don't have enough sense to pick their own leaders wisely.</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything.</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>McClosky's Political Influentials (N=3020)</th>
<th>Sport Leaders (N=218)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Agree</td>
<td>% Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have to teach children that all men (people) are created equal but almost everyone knows that some are better than others.**</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just as is true of fine race horses, some breeds of people are just naturally better than others.</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When it comes to things that count most, all races (the sexes) are certainly not equal.**</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data on the political influentials is from McClosky, 1964, p.369.

**In the 1982 survey, the words in parentheses replaced the immediately preceding words.
TABLE II. Sport Leaders' Responses to Title IX Applications of Beliefs in Political and Social Equality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title IX Application</th>
<th>All Sport Leaders (N=218)</th>
<th>Male Sport Leaders (n=156)</th>
<th>Female Sport Leaders (n=49)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both sexes participate equally in determining overall athletic program policies.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds to support athletics are allocated nearly equally to men's and women's programs.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male and female coaches have an equal voice in determining each year's athletic budget.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime practice times are distributed fairly between male and female athletes.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Strongly Agree or Agree
### Table II cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title IX Application</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=218)</td>
<td>(n=156)*</td>
<td>(n=49)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Strongly Agree or Agree</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men and women coaches cooperate in determining when facilities will be used by male and female teams.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The difference between the total group N and the male and female sport leader n's is due to coding procedures or missing data. Statistical significance was determined by using the formula $D=\frac{|P_c-P_f|}{\sqrt{\frac{|P_c(1-P_c)|}{n_c} + \frac{|P_f(1-P_f)|}{n_f}}}$ at the .05 level of probability.
We should also note the different levels of response of male and female sport leaders. On each of the specific Title IX applications, male sport leaders express higher levels of belief in the applications than do female sport leaders. Indeed, the expressions of belief by male sport leaders on several of the items in Table II approach the levels of support found on the abstract statements of political and social equality in Table I. Conversely, the expressions of belief registered by female sport leaders indicates a strong sense of disbelief in several of the applications. These differences in the level of belief between male and female sport leaders are, with a single exception, statistically significant. The exception to this is the Title IX application that deals with the equality of the voices in determining each year's athletic budget. Neither male nor female sport leaders express belief in this application. An explanation for this disbelief may lie in the notion that, traditionally, the responsibility for athletic budgets has been with athletic directors and not with coaches per se. Overall, however, male sport leaders perceive much greater equality between the sexes in intercollegiate athletics than do female sport leaders. The different levels of belief in the application portends future controversy with respect to Title IX.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this research effort has been to reexamine the relationship between individual beliefs in abstract democratic principles and the willingness to apply those principles in one's work-a-day world. In particular, the focus of this study has been on the democratic principle of equality and the application of that principle in intercollegiate athletics through Title IX, based on the view that until such time as there is congruence between the level of expressed beliefs in abstract principle and the application of that principle, controversy over the means of application will remain and democratic principle will not have been actualized.

The study was conducted by surveying over 300 persons identified as sport leaders in the public institutions of higher education in Pennsylvania. Their responses to a variety of
items dealing with political and social equality and a number of items drawn from a Title IX feedback mechanism comprised the data base for the study. The former set of items permit attention to be directed toward expressed belief levels in abstract democratic values while the latter set of items constitute specific applications of those principles.

The substantive context of the study drew heavily from the work of McClosky. Based on his research, McClosky was able to assert that while most persons give high levels of support to abstract democratic principles, political influentials, even though they may be somewhat ambivalent or uncertain, are more likely to express stronger belief in the principles than are rank and file citizens. This study has confirmed McClosky's general findings. Furthermore, it has demonstrated convincingly that expressions of belief in democratic principles are clearly less ambiguous and uncertain among a selected group of Pennsylvania sport leaders. Sport leaders' strong expressions of belief in democratic principles of political and social equality are credited to historical and work environment explanations.

The examination of sport leaders' responses to Title IX applications of the democratic principles in question suggests that belief in general principles was stronger than belief in applications. Further, the more "abstract" the application, the greater the level of expressed belief. Finally, significant differences were found between male and female sport leaders' expressions of belief in the applications. Male sport leaders consistently had higher levels of belief in the applications than did female sport leaders. This incongruence between the beliefs of male and female sport leaders on the Title IX applications suggests not only that Title IX will continue to be controversial, but also that additional, concerted efforts must be undertaken if the value of equality is to be actualized.
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PATTERNS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN
PENNSYLVANIA'S
1982 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

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Pennsylvania State University

This paper analyzes sources of contributions to virtually all candidates for Pennsylvania legislative office in 1982 who reported raising or spending more than $250 in any of six reporting periods. Contributions totaling nearly $7,750,000 were examined. Almost half came in amounts greater than $250. About 20% came from contributions of $50 or less from individuals; an equal proportion came from individuals giving between $50 and $250.

Political Action Committee contributions received special scrutiny. About 27% of all money raised came from PACs, split evenly between Republicans and Democrats. But PAC money heavily favored incumbents by a three to one margin. In sharp contrast to political party contributions, PACs gave almost as much to candidates assured of victory or even unopposed as to those in close races. Labor PACs gave about as much as professional PACs, but were outspent two to one by business PACs. Overall, PACs accounted for nearly 37% of incumbents' receipts, suggesting their role is greater than in U.S. Congressional elections.
INTRODUCTION

Two significant but little noticed developments suggest the increasing importance of studies of state legislative campaign financing. First, the amounts raised and spent jumped substantially in the past several years. Second, Political Action Committees (PACs) and lobbyists affiliated with them devote increasing attention and resources to state legislatures. Both the study of state politics and the role of PACs in the political system require that we acknowledge PAC activity in the states and study its form and impact.

Even an unsystematic and quick examination of state legislative campaign expenditures demonstrates their rapid escalation. Average campaign receipts in contested State House races in Florida for incumbent Democrats jumped from $25,217 in 1978 to $41,595 in 1980; for incumbent Republicans the increase was from $22,642 to $28,958 (Giles and Pritchard, 1983). Total spending for races in both houses doubled between the two most recent elections in California, Michigan, and New Jersey (Jaffe, 1983). The actual amounts spent are substantial. Winning candidates for California's State Assembly in 1982 spent an average of $429,000 (Turner, 1984). Total expenditures for California's legislative races in 1982 topped $42 million (Jaffe, 1983). While other states haven't matched California's totals, the amounts spent are substantial by historical standards. Ruth Jones, a political scientist specializing in studying state campaign finance, was recently quoted as identifying the increasing cost of state legislative campaigns as "a sleeper. It's been happening all over the country, but nobody has realized it" (cited in Jaffe, 1983).

At the same time, PACs have become increasingly active at the state level. Membership in The State Governmental Affairs Council, a Washington based association of corporate lobbyists working in the states, increased from 36 to 110 during the last eight years. An analyst for the Council of State Legislatures noted an increase in national lobbies' influence: "National interests are starting to have an effect on state government." As state responsibility for the expenditure of federal block grant money increases, and as state regulation replaces federal
regulation, the significance of state legislative actions to major lobbies has grown.

To what extent has Pennsylvania experienced growth in campaign expenditures and lobbying activity? I know of no scholarly studies of recent vintage of either topic. But a recent two-part newspaper series on the growth of lobbying in Pennsylvania by Gary Rotstein (1984a, 1984b) offers some interesting highlights. Rotstein reports that the number of registered PACs at the end of 1983 (487) represented close to double the number registered in 1980. His interviews with lobbyists and legislative leaders led him to conclude that powerful lobbying groups have come to play an increasingly influential role in the legislative process. Particularly telling is the observation attributed to Republican Majority Whip Senator John Stauffer: "I can't think of a time before when we had outside groups doing so much of our work." When it comes to the totals raised and spent in Pennsylvania legislative campaigns, however, practically no published data are available. This study presents preliminary analysis of data on the financing of Pennsylvania's 1982 legislative elections.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

To permit comparison of campaign finance patterns between winners and losers in both the primary and general election, an effort was made to gather data on all candidates. The Bureau of Elections' "official results" of the 1982 primary provided the basic list of candidates for whom data was sought. Each candidate listed in the official results was assigned an identification number (the candidate "ID"). Some candidates withdrew or died after the primary; their replacements received new identification numbers. The candidate's name, ID number, party, district, office sought (house or senate), and primary performance (won/lost/withdrew; margin in percent of total vote cast by which the candidate won or lost) were entered on the first page of the data gathering form.

Two techniques were used to transfer information for the candidates' campaign expense reports to the form. Student volunteers who went to their county board of election over
vacation completed some. The rest were filled out by two research assistants who took the remaining uncompleted forms to the Bureau of Elections in Harrisburg. Work study students filled in the rest of the information on the first page of the form, and edited the forms for completeness and consistency. The data was then entered and verified. The data were placed in an SPSS system file and checked for wild data entries and consistency before analysis began.

The data set produced was rather large. Each of the 630 candidates for whom information was found could have reported campaign receipts and expenses on as many as 12 separate reports. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the 630 candidates. Campaign finance information exists for 64 Senate candidates and 556 House candidates. Data on every winner and loser in the general election for the Senate is included (25 winners, 23 losers, with 2 winners unopposed); all 203 House victors, including 25 losers, with 2 winners unopposed); all 203 House victors, including 25 who were unopposed, are in the data set, along with 181 losers. This constitutes virtually the complete universe of candidates who ran and filed reports.

Several checks on the internal consistency of the data suggest no major errors. For example, the number of incumbents for whom we have data is 202; the number of candidates who are coded as being in the legislature in the "CHAIR81" variable [was this candidate a committee chair or vice chair in the past legislature?: 1=yes, 5=no, 9=not in legislature] was also 202. Most crucial was the comparison of the total amount of money received. Two independent calculations of the total contributions received, each based on independent entries in the campaign expense reporting forms, were made. The first consisted of adding the entries make in item "B" in each report filed, the "Total Receipts." The second was computed by summing the contributions reported in each report filed by each candidate in three categories ($50 or less; $50.01 to $250; and more than $250) on a separate "summary" page in the campaign expense reporting form. The first total [the variable termed "GOT"] equaled $7,744,667. The second method produced a total of $7,696,649. The difference of $48,018 is only about 0.6 percent of the total. Part of the small
Table 1
Summary of Data Set Characteristics
1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Candidates’ Campaign Finance Patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pennsylvania House of Representative</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRIMARY ELECTION</td>
<td>GENERAL ELECTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winners</td>
<td>Losers</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Winners</td>
<td>Losers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incumbents)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-incumbents)</td>
<td>(107)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
<td>(215)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICANS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incumbents)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-incumbents)</td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(163)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEPENDENTS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                     | Pennsylvania Senate |                       |                       |                       |                       |
|                     |                     |                       |                       |                       |                       |
| DEMOCRATS           | 24                  | 10                   | 34                   | 12                   | 12                   | 24                  |
| (incumbents)        | (9)                 | (1)                  | (10)                 | (9)                  | 0                    | (9)                 |
| (non-incumbents)    | (15)                | (9)                  | (24)                 | (3)                  | (12)                 | (15)                |
| REPUBLICANS         | 22                  | 6                    | 28                   | 13                   | 10                   | 23                  |
| (incumbents)        | (11)                | 0                    | (11)                 | (10)                 | (1)                  | (11)                |
| (non-incumbents)    | (11)                | (6)                  | (17)                 | (3)                  | (9)                  | (12)                |
| INDEPENDENTS        | 2                   | 2                    | 1                    | 1                    | 1                    | 1                   |
| Total               | 48                  | 16                   | 64                   | 25                   | 23                   | 48                  |
discrepancy is due to the fact that the candidates' reports were sometimes internally inconsistent, listing different totals for the two entries.

Table 2 displays the principal analysis variables. The amounts received constitute the principal dependent variables. In addition to the total received, contributions are classified by the size of the contribution (the three categories mentioned above) and the source of the contribution. The principal independent variables are the candidate's party affiliation, the office sought (House or Senate), status as an incumbent or non-incumbent (and if an incumbent, whether a leadership post or committee chairmanship or vice-chairmanship was held), election outcome, and size of the margin of victory or defeat. For some purposes, of course, election outcome measures can be treated as the dependent variable.

For many of the variables, separate values were calculated for the primary and general election. These variables are designated in the dataset by a "P" or "G" in the variable name (for example, "LABORP" is the amount of labor PAC contributions in the primary). Since many candidates lost in the primary, they cannot be included in analyses of general election patterns. But money spent in the primary in a winning cause affects the general election to some extent since publicity, campaign organization, literature, and so forth can be utilized in the general election. Further, some candidates (especially those unopposed in the primary) raise money during the primary season but do not spend it till the periods covered by the general election reports are filed. These complications require that both elections' reports be analyzed separately for some purposes, and that they be combined for others.
### Table 2
Principal Variables Used in Description and Analysis of 1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Campaign Finance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COT</td>
<td>Total contributions received calculated by summing amount listed in &quot;receipts&quot; for each report filed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Total contributions (COT) plus carry over from previous campaigns (Previous balance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPENT</td>
<td>Total expenditures made calculated by summing amounts listed in &quot;expenditures&quot; for each report filed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C55D</td>
<td>Total contributions summed from each report filed in amount of $50 or less (C55D), $50.01 to $250 (C55D), and more than $250 (C55D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACTOTAL</td>
<td>Total contributions from all Political Action Committees listed on all reports filed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
<td>Total contributions from business PACs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOR</td>
<td>Total contributions from labor PACs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESS</td>
<td>Total contributions from professional PACs (lawyers, optometrists, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIDEO</td>
<td>Total contributions from ideological PACs (NRA, NOL, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCPACS</td>
<td>Total contributions of unidentified or unclassifiable PACs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTYS</td>
<td>Total contributions from all committees affiliated with a political party listed on all reports filed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAMCOSM</td>
<td>Total contributions from legislative campaign committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COINCOSM</td>
<td>Total contributions from county party committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITTPARM</td>
<td>Total contributions from city party committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERPARM</td>
<td>Total contributions from other party committees (GOP women, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANDCOOH</td>
<td>Total contributions from all committees affiliated with other candidates for political office listed on all reports filed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELFROI</td>
<td>Total of contributions from &quot;self&quot;--the candidate and his/her immediate family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARTINS</td>
<td>Total contributions given in the name of law firms on all reports filed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVER250</strong></td>
<td>Total contributions from individuals who gave more than $250 in any one reporting period on all reports filed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISCTOT</strong></td>
<td>Total contributions from miscellaneous sources (interest, refunds on deposits, fund raisers, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTY</strong></td>
<td>Candidate's party affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAMBER</strong></td>
<td>Office sought: House or Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCUMB</strong></td>
<td>Whether candidate was an incumbent legislator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEADER81</strong></td>
<td>Whether, if an incumbent, the candidate was a leader in his or her party caucus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAIR81</strong></td>
<td>Whether, if an incumbent, the candidate was a committee or subcommittee vice-chair or chair in the previous legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.RESULT</strong></td>
<td>Whether the candidate won or lost the primary election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G.RESULT</strong></td>
<td>Whether the candidate won or lost the general election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.MARGIN</strong></td>
<td>Margin of victory or defeat: the percentage points separating the winner from the loser (e.g., 56% to 44% race = 12% &quot;Margin&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G.MARGIN</strong></td>
<td>Margin of victory or defeat: the percentage points separating the winner from the loser (e.g., 56% to 44% race = 12% &quot;Margin&quot;)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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GENERAL PATTERNS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 1982 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Background

Elections to the Pennsylvania legislature always coincide either with a Presidential election or a Gubernatorial contest. The 1982 race for Governor appeared to be a walkover for the popular incumbent Republican, Richard Thornburgh. Only in the final days of the campaign did the surge of his significantly outspent rival, Congressman Allen Ertel, become evident. But the closeness of the battle for party control of the legislature, particularly the House of Representatives, was clear from the outset. The Republicans held a 26 to 24 edge in the Senate and a five vote margin (103 to 98 with two vacancies) in the House. Complicating the election was the fact that this was the first election contested under the new legislative reapportionment. Despite the substantial population shifts necessitating a significant revision of district lines, the reapportionment commission's five members (a law school dean and an incumbent party leader from each party in each house) managed to almost completely avoid putting incumbents in the same district.

Whether or not the Reapportionment Commission sought explicitly to protect incumbents, the fact remains that those who sought re-election did very well. In the Senate, 21 of 25 incumbents up for a new term sought re-election. All but two succeeded. In the House, 172 incumbents ran in the general election; seven lost—a 97 percent return rate. Another eight lost in the primary. Thus, of the 180 House incumbents trying for a new term, 167 (93 percent) succeeded. The Republicans increased their Senate margin by one (27-23), but lost control in the House by a one seat margin (102-101).

Although the partisan balance hung by a thread in both chambers, competition in the individual districts was much less vigorous. In the House, only 11 percent of the general election candidates got between 45 percent and 55 percent of the vote; another 17 percent received 40 percent to 44 percent or 56 percent to 60 percent; fully 72 percent of the candidates won or lost by more than a 20 percent margin. Even less
competition emerged in the primary, where 78 percent of the candidates won or lost by more than 20 percent. In the Senate, the comparable figures are 70 percent in the general election and 90 percent in the primary. Table 3 summarizes these data.

Total Contributions and Their Sources

The 630 candidates reported contributions of nearly $7,750,000, and expenditures of nearly $7,400,000. The ending balance of some $367,000 of receipts over expenditures nearly matches the total reported as carry-over "previous balance" in the first campaign expense form filed in January 1982 ($382,000). These figures put Pennsylvania's legislative election costs about the same level as New Jersey (1981) and Michigan (1982). As expected, House candidates raised and spent more money as a group, but the averages for the Senate are three to four times higher. Table 4A summarizes total receipts and expenditures. The averages displayed must be viewed cautiously, since they include candidates who spent nothing or (in the case of primary losers in the general election) did not run.

Table 4B summarizes data on contributions in a slightly different way. The disclosure statute requires candidates to list the total of all contributions of $50 or less, $50.01 through $250, and over $250.

As the first column of Table 4B shows, almost half of the money raised to finance the 1982 legislative elections came in the form of large contribution of over $250. Contributions in amounts of $50 or less, within the range of most citizens, account for only one in every five dollars raised. House candidates rely a little more on such small donations (23.6 percent versus 13.1 percent for Senate candidates), and a little less on large ones (45.7 percent versus 53.7 percent). The tendency to rely on large contributions seems a little more pronounced for the general election than for the primary.
Table 3
Margins of Victory or Defeat for House and Senate Candidates,
1982 Primary and General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Margins</th>
<th>HOUSE Primary</th>
<th>HOUSE General</th>
<th>SENATE Primary</th>
<th>SENATE General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close: 45% to 50% of vote</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56% to 60% or 40% to 44%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61% to 70% or 30% to 39%</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assured:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71% to 99% or 1% to 29%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unopposed</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Candidates</td>
<td>House Candidates</td>
<td>Senate Candidates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=630</td>
<td>N=566</td>
<td>N=54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions Received</td>
<td>7,744,677</td>
<td>5,375,027</td>
<td>2,369,650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Primary only)</td>
<td>3,356,821</td>
<td>2,239,442</td>
<td>1,117,379</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(General only)</td>
<td>4,387,856</td>
<td>3,135,585</td>
<td>1,252,271</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditures</td>
<td>7,377,768</td>
<td>5,223,918</td>
<td>2,153,850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Primary only)</td>
<td>2,852,929</td>
<td>2,012,768</td>
<td>840,161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(General only)</td>
<td>4,524,839</td>
<td>3,211,150</td>
<td>1,313,689</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Funds Available*</td>
<td>8,122,979</td>
<td>5,660,849</td>
<td>2,462,130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Funds available consist of contributions received plus balances acquired prior to the first reporting period (including funds left over from the previous campaigns).
Table 4B
Proportion of Funds Received by Size of Contribution, 1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Candidates N=633</th>
<th>House Candidates N=566</th>
<th>Senate Candidates N=64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All contributions of $50 or less</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Primary only)</td>
<td>(1,571,858)</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>(1,261,201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(General only)</td>
<td>(773,819)</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>(625,100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions between $50 and $250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Primary only)</td>
<td>(1,063,477)</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>(645,063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(General only)</td>
<td>(1,355,654)</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>(990,523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All contributions over $250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Primary only)</td>
<td>(1,500,889)</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>(945,917)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(General only)</td>
<td>(2,204,771)</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>(1,490,555)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total all contributions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total primary only)</td>
<td>(3,338,185)</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>(2,216,080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total general only)</td>
<td>(4,358,464)</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>(3,117,179)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources of contributions analyzed fell into seven categories: contributions of $50 or less, which are unitemized on the reports and assumed to come from individuals, individuals giving over $25, PAC and party committee contributions over $50, money from the candidate and his or her immediate family, a miscellaneous grouping of several categories, and a residual category composed mostly of individuals giving between $50 and $250.

Contributions from Political Action Committees constitute the most significant category of contributor among those analyzed in Table 5. Just over one of every four dollars received came from a PAC. Contributions from individuals in amounts within the means of most citizens in Pennsylvania ($50 or less) accounted for one dollar in five. Candidates rely very little on "grass roots" support; even if some of the funds from party committees and miscellaneous sources initially came from small contributions, it is clear that less than one-third of all campaign funds come in small amounts. Individual contributions of more than $50 make up over a quarter of total receipts. Political party committees, on the other hand, give less than 10 percent of the total. The remaining significant category consists of money put into the campaign by the candidate and his or her immediate family. One dollar in eight came from candidates themselves--close to $950,000 in all.

Several differences in the sources of contributions to House versus Senate candidates emerged. Senate candidates rely less on small individual contributions and more on those above $50 (37 percent of Senate candidates' total versus 22 percent for House candidates). Senate candidates and their families give somewhat less, but party committees and PACs account for the same proportion of funds.
Table 5
Major Sources of Contributions to Legislative Candidates in Pennsylvania, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Contributions</th>
<th>All Candidates N=630</th>
<th>House Candidates N=566</th>
<th>Senate Candidates N=64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50 or less</td>
<td>1,571,858</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>1,261,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50.01 to $250</td>
<td>1,525,815</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>905,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving over $250</td>
<td>542,210</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>288,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate and immediate family</td>
<td>942,117</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>740,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Action Committees (PACs)</td>
<td>2,114,530</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>1,475,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Committees</td>
<td>663,868</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>453,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous**</td>
<td>384,279</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>249,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,744,677</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>5,375,627</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimate. This is a residual category, and amount remaining after all other types of contributions itemized in the schedule of contributions over $50 were calculated. I believe this is a good approximation of how much candidates received from individuals contributing in the $50.01 to $250 range.

**The sum of contributions from law firms, unincorporated businesses, other candidate committees and other miscellaneous sources (fund raisers, interest on deposits, refunds, etc.).
The Relationship Between Contributions and Major Candidate Characteristics

A number of reasonable hypotheses can be generated regarding the differences in the major sources of campaign funds relied upon by Democrats and Republicans. In a highly partisan state, where both business and labor are well organized, such differences should be no cause for surprise. Table 6 compares how Republican and Democratic candidates for the legislature raised contributions. The results are striking. Virtually no differences emerged whatsoever, with the possible exception that, on average, Republicans raised somewhat more.

This does not mean differences do not exist in the sources of contributions within categories. I will compare the types of PACs giving to each party’s candidates below, for example. But in broad terms, Republicans do not rely more heavily on their candidates’ personal wealth or on contributions exceeding $250 from individuals; Democrats do not rely more on small contributions of $50 or less. The existing system of legislative campaign finance overwhelms any potential differences based on party, resulting in each party’s candidates producing funds in very similar ways.

Contributions to incumbents versus non-incumbents, on the other hand, present a sharp contrast to the similarity in Democrats versus Republicans. In particular, the legislative campaign finance system significantly favors incumbents. They received on average 2.7 times as much as non-incumbents ($21,470 versus $7,962). Furthermore, important differences exist in the sources of their funds. Political Action Committees heavily favor incumbents, giving the 202 incumbents three times the total contributed to the 428 non-incumbents. Non-incumbents draw much more heavily on their own personal wealth and that of their family; over 21 percent of their funds came from this source; for incumbents, the percentage is less than five.
Table 6
Comparison of Sources of Campaign Contributions in the 1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Election: Democrats vs. Republicans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Democrats Amount</th>
<th>Democrats Percent</th>
<th>Republicans Amount</th>
<th>Republicans Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50 or less</td>
<td>799,341</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>770,982</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50.01 to $250</td>
<td>733,838</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>791,797</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving over $250</td>
<td>277,807</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>264,403</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates and immediate family</td>
<td>532,076</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>409,351</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Action Committees - PACs</td>
<td>1,075,395</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>1,039,135</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Committees</td>
<td>282,549</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>380,619</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>180,998</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>203,281</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,882,004</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,859,568</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Receipts</td>
<td>11,485</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,542</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7
Comparison of Sources of Campaign Contributions in the 1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Election: All Candidates (House and Senate Combined)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbents N=202</th>
<th>Non-incumbents N=42</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount  Percent</td>
<td>Amount  Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50 or less</td>
<td>774,098  17.9</td>
<td>797,760  23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50.01 to $250</td>
<td>994,060  22.9</td>
<td>531,755  15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving over $250</td>
<td>264,343  6.1</td>
<td>277,867  8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates and immediate family</td>
<td>213,069  4.9</td>
<td>729,048  21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Action Committees (PACs)</td>
<td>1,589,486 36.7</td>
<td>525,044  15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Committees</td>
<td>247,874  5.7</td>
<td>415,994  12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>253,913  5.9</td>
<td>130,366  3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,336,843 100.1</td>
<td>3,407,834 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>21,470</td>
<td>7,962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 summarizes the differences between incumbents and non-incumbents. Separate analysis of House and Senate candidates revealed essentially the same patterns reflected in the combined totals in Table 7. PACs strongly favored both Senate and House incumbents over non-incumbents, and non-incumbents drew far more heavily on family and personal wealth. The only difference large enough to warrant mention was the greater reliance of House candidates on contributions of $50 or less (21.4 percent and 25.9 percent for House incumbents and non-incumbents respectively) compared to the Senate (10.5 percent and 17.0 percent), and a concomitant heavier reliance by Senate incumbents and non-incumbents on individual contributions in the $50.01 to $250 range.

Note that the totals reported in Table 7 conceal two important facts: the number of incumbents and non-incumbents, reported receiving virtually no money. The first point demonstrates the need to examine the average received from each source. The second suggests that even averages can be misleading when they are lowered by the inclusion of candidates who ran futile, unserious campaigns that attracted no money.

Table 8 seeks to account for these complications by comparing the average contributions by source to incumbents and non-incumbents (column 1) and the average contribution for just those candidates who received any money (column 2) for the House of Representatives. For example, PACs gave $1,112,218 to the 181 incumbents, for an average of $6,145; for the 385 non-incumbents, $585,079 was given, for an average of $944. In absolute terms, incumbents received 3.06 times as much money as a group than non-incumbents (this ratio is presented in the last column of Table 8). But the ratio of the average contribution ($6,145/$944) listed in column 1 is 6.51 to 1, because the total given to non-incumbents was divided among more candidates. However, in practice, PACs selected very carefully to which non-incumbents they would give. In fact, only 175 of the 385 House non-incumbents received any money whatsoever from any political action committee. Thus, the average given by PACs when they gave anything ($2,076) was considerably higher than the group average of $944. This average is compared to the average given to those incumbents
who got any PAC money in column 2 (3.10). Interestingly, 173 of the 181 incumbents (96 percent) got PAC money, so their average contribution changed little (from $6,145 to $6,429). The fact that nearly every incumbent received some PAC money is noteworthy itself, so the percentage of incumbents and non-incumbents who reported getting any money from the categories listed in the rows of Table 8 are presented in columns 3 and 4.

Table 8 suggests that no matter how the figures are calculated, PACs heavily favor incumbents. As column two's entry suggests, even if we look at the average given to just those candidates who got money, PACs gave $3.10 to an incumbent for every dollar given to a non-incumbent. Several other interesting findings emerge from Table 8. Only 35 percent of incumbents gave to their own campaign or enticed family members to do so; 63 percent of non-incumbents did. This is the only category of contributor in Table 8 for which the proportion of non-incumbents receiving funds is higher than for incumbents. Though a higher proportion of incumbents received some party funds (77 percent versus 37 percent), the average amount of those contributions favored non-incumbents, the only instance in which non-incumbents were so advantaged.

Some significant conclusions about the fate of non-incumbents can be drawn from the analysis. First, they receive much less money than do incumbents. Second, interests with money to contribute support incumbents much more heavily, as reflected in the higher proportion of money from PACs (and the slightly lower dependence on small individual contributions). Third, non-incumbents must rely on personal sources of funds, support from party committees, and (to some extent) small contributions of $50 or less. PACs generally avoid non-incumbents, and when they do contribute to them, they give substantially less. Finally, non-incumbents' chances for success are slim when they challenge an incumbent.

An analysis comparing the sources of contributions (primary and general election figures combined) to winning and losing candidates for the House and for the Senate reveals patterns very much like those contrasting incumbents and non-
Table 8
Ratios of Average Contributions to Incumbents versus Non-incumbents by Sources of Contributions,
1982 Pennsylvania House Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Contributions</th>
<th>Ratio of Average For All Candidates Incumbent/Non-incumbent</th>
<th>Ratio of Average For Candidates Who Got Any Money: Incumbent/Non-incumbent</th>
<th>Percent Who Got Any Money: Incumbent/Non-incumbent</th>
<th>Ratio of Total Sum Contributed: Incumbent/Non-incumbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50 or less</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving $50.01 to $250</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals giving over $250</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate and immediate family</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Action Committees (PACs)</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Committees</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#Cannot be calculated since this category combines four separate categories.

*Ratio calculated by dividing average contributions received by incumbents by non-incumbents' averages. For example, incumbents got $2.08 on average from contributions of $50 or less to every $1 non-incumbents.
incumbents. This is not surprising, of course, since there is substantial overlap between being an incumbent and winning. Winners outspent losers about two to one in House races and two and a half to one in Senate races. Winners in both chambers got over one-third of their money from PACs; losers got 16.2 percent and 10.6 percent in House and Senate races respectively. One-fourth of Senate losers' money came from their own or family's pockets; for House losers, the figure was one-fifth. Because these patterns so closely resemble those found for incumbents and non-incumbents, no tables are presented here.

PATTERNS OF PAC CONTRIBUTIONS

Political Action Committees constitute the single largest source of funds to legislative candidates. Their relative importance to winners and to incumbents (who, as Table 7 shows, received over 36% of their funds from PACs) is even greater. The questions that have been raised about the motivations of PACs for contributing and the impact their largesse has on Congressional elections should be asked with equal persistence at the state level, especially given the recent expansion of national PAC participation in financing state elections referred to earlier.

The analysis of Pennsylvania's 1982 legislative elections permits examination of some of the important questions raised about PAC contributions. Some of these data provide more detail in describing the nature of PAC contributions. What sectors of society are represented by PACs who contribute to legislative races? How are their contributions related to whether a candidate is a Democrat or Republican, an incumbent or non-incumbent, or an eventual winner or loser? But some can take us beyond description to provide a basis for making inferences concerning the strategies PACs pursue. Do PACs differ in their participation in primary versus general election contests? Do some focus more on the Senate than the House? Is there interaction between party and incumbency? Finally, what is the relationship between the margin of victory or defeat and PAC contributions, and what does this
relationship suggest about the strategies pursued? Each of these questions will be examined below.

The Identity of PACs Contributing to Legislative Races in 1982

Classifying the nature of the interests represented by the PACs who gave to legislative candidates in 1982 requires playing an intriguing and often frustrating game of "name that PAC". It is not immediately obvious, for example, that the "Edward Douglass White PAC" and the "Marshall PAC" are both law firm PACs, or that they both are funded by attorneys from the same law firm. Unless you have an unusually deep knowledge of Pennsylvania businesses, you are unlikely to know how to classify the "Pitcairn PAC". Consequently, the classification of PACs is incomplete (as evidenced by the "miscellaneous" category) and undoubtedly includes some invalid assignments. The analysis reported here will utilize five broad categories: BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL, LABOR,IDEOLOGICAL, and MISCELLANEOUS.

Figure 1 depicts how much each of the five PAC categories contributed to the $2.1 million total given to legislative candidates in 1982. Business PACs clearly dominated, accounting for almost as much as the next two largest categories. Ideological PACs' contributions are barely visible. In examining the patterns of PAC contributions, the fundamental fact that ideological PACs (two-thirds of whose money came from women's groups) gave only 3.2% of all PAC money should be kept in mind.

Table 9, which includes Table 9A-9D, displays differences in how PACs apportion their contributions. Overall, neither party's candidates suffer a disadvantage when it comes to PAC giving (Table 9A). In fact, they split PAC receipts evenly. But substantial and predictable differences emerge in the choices of the PACs in each category. Business gave only 35% of its money to Democrats; labor gave Republicans but 16.5% of its funds. Ideological PACs distributed their limited funds three to one in favor of Democrats. Professional PACs, however, gave equally to both parties, and miscellaneous PACs nearly did so.
DISTRIBUTION OF PAC CONTRIBUTIONS BY CATEGORY, 1982 PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

TOTAL PAC CONTRIBUTIONS: $2,114,530

FIGURE 1
Table 9
Contributions of PACs by Category of PAC in Pennsylvania's 1982 Legislative Election by:
Party; Chamber; Incumbency; and Primary vs. General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All PACs Combined</th>
<th>Professional PACs</th>
<th>Labor PACs</th>
<th>Ideological PACs</th>
<th>Miscellaneous PACs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>amount</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>amount</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9A: Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>1,075,385</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>319,249</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>238,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>1,039,135</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>584,096</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>241,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9B: Chamber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>1,475,501</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>614,472</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>332,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>639,029</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>288,873</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>147,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9C: Incumbency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>1,589,486</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>717,172</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>410,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-incumbents</td>
<td>525,044</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>186,173</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>70,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9D: Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>714,766</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>289,743</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>166,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1,399,764</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>613,602</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>313,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All PACs</td>
<td>Professional PACs</td>
<td>Ideological PACs</td>
<td>Miscellaneous PACs</td>
<td>Party Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Business PACs</td>
<td></td>
<td>PACs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>6189</td>
<td>(83)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>1656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>6650</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>3678</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td>1708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Incumbents</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>(106)</td>
<td>1196</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Incumbents</td>
<td>2253</td>
<td>(69)</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although Table 10 presents average contributions, not totals, the basic patterns of all PAC contributions are the same. Democratic House candidates received as much as Republicans, and incumbents got far more than non-incumbents. The 106 non-incumbent Democrats who received any PAC money got an average of $1,961; 83 incumbents averaged $6,189. For Republicans, the comparable figures are $2,253 to 69 non-incumbents and $6,650 to 90 incumbents. It is worth noting that nearly all incumbents regardless of party, received some PAC money; a much smaller proportion of non-incumbents did so. Figure 2 presents these data in a bar graph.

The three largest categories of PACs (business, professional, and labor) maintained the disparity between incumbents and non-incumbents, but treated Republicans and Democrats very differently. Business PACs concentrated their money on incumbents, and gave the strong edge to Republicans ($3,678 to $1,947). Although they gave much less to non-incumbents, they still favored Republicans, but by a lesser margin. By contrast, labor favored Democrats even more strongly than business PACs favored Republicans. Democratic incumbents received an average of $1,947 to $702 for GOP incumbents; for non-incumbents, the figures are $1,193 and $304. Labor was only able to match the average contribution that business PACs gave to incumbent Democrats. In other words, Democratic incumbents received as much on average from business PACs as they did from labor PACs. But business PACs overwhelmed labor's contributions to Republicans $3,678 to $702.

PACs representing the professions displayed remarkable non-partisanship in their giving. Their motto appears to have been: "Democrats and Republicans are equal, but incumbents are more equal than non-incumbents." Incumbents received well over twice as much as non-incumbents, and the total given (as Table 9 showed) differed even more.
FIGURE 2
Ideological PACs departed radically from the other
categories by giving more to non-incumbents than incumbents. The number of candidates supported and the total given are modest. But the sharp break from the typical pattern suggests a fundamentally different strategy.

Table 10 also lists the average contribution made by all political committees associated with a political party. Party committees contributed less to incumbents than to non-incumbents, and supported more non-incumbents than did PACs. These differences between PACs and party committees anticipate the even sharper contrast discussed in the following section.

Table 11 duplicates the data in Table 10 for Senate candidates. Although many of the basic patterns in contributions to House candidates reported in Table 10 appear in Table 11 as well, several differences warrant attention. Business PAC favoritism toward Republican incumbents is less pronounced in the Senate. The ratio of average contributions by business to House GOP versus Democratic incumbents is 1.89 to 1 ($3,678/$1,947); for the Senate, it is 1.38 to 1 ($12,715/$9,223). Labor PACs, however, adopted the opposite strategy. They favor Democratic Senate incumbents more strongly than GOP incumbents ($6,451/$1,461, or 4.42 to 1) than in the House ($1,947/$702, or 2.77 to 1). Professional PACs treat Senate incumbents in both parties equally as they did with House incumbents. But they favor GOP non-incumbents over Democrats.

The distribution of party committee funds in Senate races contrasts with the House patterns in several notable ways. Democratic party committees poured resources into non-incumbent Senate candidates’ campaigns, favoring them over incumbents by a ratio of 3.13 to 1 ($5203/$1660) compared to 1.30 to 1 in the House ($1302/$998) Republican party committees pursued the reverse strategy, actually giving more on average to incumbents than non-incumbents. This is not only reversed the Democrats’ strategy, but contrasted with GOP party committee contributions to House candidates.
Table 1:
Average PAC Contribution to Candidates Who Received Any PAC Money by Party And Incumbency,
1982 Pennsylvania Senate Election: Primary and General Combined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All PACs Combined</th>
<th>Business PACs</th>
<th>Professional PACs</th>
<th>Labor PACs</th>
<th>Ideological PACs</th>
<th>Miscellaneous PACs</th>
<th>Party Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>23299 (10)</td>
<td>9223 (10)</td>
<td>5719 (10)</td>
<td>6451 (10)</td>
<td>908 (3)</td>
<td>1634 (10)</td>
<td>1660 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>22208 (11)</td>
<td>12715 (11)</td>
<td>5776 (11)</td>
<td>1461 (9)</td>
<td>667 (3)</td>
<td>2339 (11)</td>
<td>6853 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Incumbents</td>
<td>6716 (18)</td>
<td>2588 (12)</td>
<td>2750 (8)</td>
<td>3247 (17)</td>
<td>2100 (1)</td>
<td>1053 (10)</td>
<td>5203 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Incumbents</td>
<td>5109 (8)</td>
<td>4288 (6)</td>
<td>1213 (4)</td>
<td>567 (3)</td>
<td>300 (1)</td>
<td>1600 (5)</td>
<td>5419 (8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, labor PACs came out substantially behind business PACs in their total contributions to incumbent Senate Democrats. Table 10 showed that House Democratic incumbents received as much on average from labor as from business PACs. But incumbent Democratic Senators actually received an average of $2,772 MORE from business than from labor PACs ($9,223 versus $6,451). Of course, Republican incumbents received far more from business PACs ($12,715) than from labor PACs ($1,461).

Vote Margins and Contributions: PACs Versus Party Committees

Controversy surrounds the question of why Political Action Committees make political contributions and what effect such donations have on the political process. Because the answers to these questions themselves become ammunition for the participants in the debate over PACs, the public explanations offered by PACs must be discounted. Furthermore, generalizations about PAC behavior can always be challenged by citing specific counter-examples. Because a rich diversity of motives produces contributions, such counter-examples can always be found. Consequently, conclusive evidence about motives is unlikely to ever surface. There will be no "smoking gun."

Some inferences about motives can be made on the basis of patterns of contributions. Specifically, contribution patterns can be examined to help choose between two contrasting explanations for PACs' campaign contributions. The first, typically offered by PAC spokesmen and their academic and elected supporters, asserts contributions are made to assure the candidates favorably disposed to the interest represented by the PAC get elected. The strategy pursued according to this view is to maximize the number of favorably inclined officials elected. This strategy is presented as falling within the mainstream of the theory and practice of pluralist democracy. The second, presented by public affairs lobbying groups, public officials critical of PACs and their academic supporters, maintains that PACs seek at a minimum to purchase access, and beyond that to actually purchase influence. In their view, PACs are not so much interested in maximizing the number of
favorably disposed candidates elected, but rather seek to assure that those who are elected will be favorably disposed. For these critics, this subtle distinction is critical. It leads them to regard PACs not as in the mainstream of pluralist democracy, but as posing a serious threat through their power to purchase access and influence due to superior financial resources available to the organized and wealthy interests they represent. This view of PACs’ motives identifies their basic strategy as trying to maximize influence.

To state the obvious conclusion that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes really contributes little to our understanding. Where between the competing explanations does it lie? How might the strategies PACs pursue vary by jurisdiction or by the broad interests (for example, business or labor) represented by PACs? The data available in this study offer an opportunity to make some inferences about which explanation of PAC strategy best explains PAC contributions to Pennsylvania’s 1982 legislative elections.

The analysis rests on comparing PAC contributions with political party contributions made during the general election campaign period, depending on how close the election was. Only general election contributions and outcomes can be utilized since contributions made during the primary often anticipate the general election contest.

Party committees are hypothesized to pursue the first strategy, that is, maximizing the number of the party’s candidates elected. It made particular sense for party committees to adopt this strategy in Pennsylvania since control of both houses of the legislature hung in the balance in 1982. To implement such a strategy, one allocates more money to the closer races. It is irrational to squander scarce campaign funds on a sure winner or certain loser. The data presented below show that in fact party committees pursue the first strategy. The patterns of contributions made by party committees thus provide a standard against which one can access PAC contribution strategies. To the extent PACs match the pattern of party contributions by closeness of the election, we can infer they pursue the first strategy; to the extent they do not, we
can assume they are adopting the second (access and influence
maximizing) strategy.

Each general election candidate was placed in one of the
five categories of the "MARGIN" variable introduced in Table
3. Candidates placed in each of the five categories received
the following percentage of the vote: category 1 "close"--45%
to 55%; category 2 "competitive"--56% to 60% or 40% to 44%;
category 3 "safe"--61% to 70% or 30% to 39%; category 4
"assured"--71% to 99% or 1% to 29%; and category 5
"unopposed." Of course, the level of campaign spending helps
determine the margin of victory. But the categories of vote
margin are so broad that the problem of "circularity" (that
candidates win by such large margins BECAUSE and only
because they got so much money) is not a serious one.
Campaign expenditures in relatively low visibility legislative
races cannot ordinarily produce significant variation in votes
obtained. Any candidate who wins by more than 70% of the
vote comes into the contest with such an advantage that the
amounts spent are unlikely to affect the outcome substantially,
and both PACs and party committees are likely to know it.
The fact that party committees allocate little money to such
candidates confirms this line of argument.

Table 12 summarizes the relationship between vote margin
and political party committee contributions. The pattern is
clear and strong. Party committees direct their funds to
candidates in the first two categories--that is, candidates who
received between 40% and 60% of the vote. In absolute dollars,
63% of party funds given to House general election candidates,
and 89% given to Senate candidates went to those in these first
two categories. By contrast, these candidates received 46% and
54% respectively of the contributions given to all candidates
from all sources.

The patterns of PAC contributions contrast sharply with party
committees'. PACs gave only 40% of their contributions to
House candidates and 48% to Senate candidates in close or
competitive races. Tables 13 and 14 break down contributions
to candidates for the House and Senate in each of the five
ranges of vote margin by PAC category. The "drop off" in
average contributions as races become less close is much less
Table 12
Party Committee Contributions by Vote Margin in 1982 Pennsylvania General Election Legislative Races

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote margin</th>
<th>House Candidates*</th>
<th>Senate Candidates*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average contribution</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Close</td>
<td>3152 (41)</td>
<td>10076 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Competitive</td>
<td>2308 (56)</td>
<td>9587 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Safe</td>
<td>1109 (97)</td>
<td>1925 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Assured</td>
<td>650 (65)</td>
<td>2200 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unopposed</td>
<td>489 (9)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total All Candidates</td>
<td>1540 (268)</td>
<td>4898 (38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Average computed just for candidates who received any party committee money.
Table 13
Contributions* of PACs by type of PAC to 1982 Pennsylvania House General Election Candidates According to Vote Margin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All PACs Combined</th>
<th>Business PACs</th>
<th>Professional PACs</th>
<th>Labor PACs</th>
<th>Ideological PACs</th>
<th>Miscellaneous PACs</th>
<th>Party Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
<td>average N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close</td>
<td>4180 (40)</td>
<td>2600 (28)</td>
<td>927 (27)</td>
<td>996 (38)</td>
<td>564 (10)</td>
<td>803 (32)</td>
<td>3152 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>4198 (58)</td>
<td>2224 (44)</td>
<td>1061 (35)</td>
<td>1233 (53)</td>
<td>1058 (21)</td>
<td>751 (34)</td>
<td>2308 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe</td>
<td>3332 (97)</td>
<td>2111 (69)</td>
<td>1285 (63)</td>
<td>794 (79)</td>
<td>255 (22)</td>
<td>398 (47)</td>
<td>1109 (97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assured</td>
<td>3176 (71)</td>
<td>1638 (56)</td>
<td>1114 (59)</td>
<td>616 (58)</td>
<td>164 (14)</td>
<td>352 (33)</td>
<td>650 (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unopposed</td>
<td>2314 (25)</td>
<td>1059 (25)</td>
<td>765 (24)</td>
<td>391 (15)</td>
<td>200 (1)</td>
<td>239 (19)</td>
<td>489 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3496 (291)</td>
<td>1960 (223)</td>
<td>1092 (209)</td>
<td>946 (243)</td>
<td>529 (68)</td>
<td>522 (165)</td>
<td>1540 (268)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only contributions made during the general election period are included in the figures presented in this table. Candidates may have received PAC contributions in the Primary.
Table 14
Contributions* of PACs by type of PAC to 1982 Pennsylvania Senate General Election Candidates According to Vote Margin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All PACs Combined</th>
<th>Business PACs</th>
<th>Professional PACs</th>
<th>Labor PACs</th>
<th>Ideological PACs</th>
<th>Miscellaneous PACs</th>
<th>Party Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>average</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close</td>
<td>12697 (10)</td>
<td>8637 (8)</td>
<td>2860 (7)</td>
<td>1991 (10)</td>
<td>750 (1)</td>
<td>1911 (9)</td>
<td>10076 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>13750 (4)</td>
<td>6108 (3)</td>
<td>3183 (3)</td>
<td>9050 (2)</td>
<td>781 (4)</td>
<td>1475 (4)</td>
<td>9587 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe</td>
<td>7712 (20)</td>
<td>4465 (16)</td>
<td>3321 (12)</td>
<td>1871 (17)</td>
<td>300 (3)</td>
<td>854 (12)</td>
<td>1925 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assured</td>
<td>7436 (4)</td>
<td>3044 (4)</td>
<td>2850 (4)</td>
<td>1733 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>243 (4)</td>
<td>2200 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncounted</td>
<td>5525 (2)</td>
<td>1700 (2)</td>
<td>1675 (2)</td>
<td>2050 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>200 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average All Races</td>
<td>9425 (40)</td>
<td>5286 (33)</td>
<td>3006 (28)</td>
<td>2327 (34)</td>
<td>597 (8)</td>
<td>1151 (30)</td>
<td>4898 (38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only contributions made during the general election period are included in the figures presented in this table. Candidates may have received PAC contributions in the Primary.
steep than for party committees. Figure 3 depicts the difference in the rate of decline for House candidates. As Tables 13 and 14 show, the average PAC contribution received by candidates in the second ("competitive") category is actually slightly more than given to those in "close" races (category 1); the difference in average contribution given to candidates in categories 3 and 4 is very small.

Some differences emerged in the strategies the individual categories of PACs employed. Figure 4 depicts the differences in the contributions made to House candidates by PACs associated with business, labor, and the professions. Professional PACs exhibit virtually no concern for the closeness of the race when making contributions, with the exception of unopposed candidates. And even they, though absolutely assured of victory shy of intervention by the grim reaper, received an average of $765, not much below the $927 average given to candidates who just barely won or lost by a 5% margin!

The contrasting strategies pursued by PACs and party committees can be illustrated by examining the proportion of all funds candidates in each of the five categories of vote margin received from all PACs and all party committees. As Table 5 reveals, PACs accounted for about 27% of all receipts and party committees for a little less than 9%. But because party committees concentrate their limited funds in the closest contests, they provide one fifth of all receipts in "close" races compared to one-quarter provided by PACs. The proportion of funds each provides diverges increasingly without exception in House races as the contest becomes less competitive. Figure 5 presents this pattern graphically. The pattern in the Senate (see Figure 6) is similar.

Party committees abandon candidates virtually certain to win or lose. PACs provide an increasingly large share of the (albeit diminishing) sums big winners receive. Contributions to unopposed candidates provide the most dramatic evidence for the proposition that as a group, PACs pursue the second strategy. The two unopposed Senate candidates received an average of $5,525 from PACs; party committees give them nothing. The 25 unopposed House candidates all received some
PAC money, and they averaged over $2,300; just nine of them received contributions from party committees, and they averaged a modest $489.

Figure 3

- Based on Table 13
BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL AND LABOR PAC CONTRIBUTIONS
BY VOTE MARGIN 1982 PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE GENERAL ELECTION

FIGURE 4

* BASED ON TABLE 13
FIGURE 5

PROPORTION OF ALL RECEIPTS FROM ALL PACS AND PARTY COMMITTEES BY VOTE MARGIN 1982 HOUSE GENERAL ELECTION

ALL PACS

PARTY COMMITTEES

CLOSE COMPETITIVE SAFE ASSURED UNOPPOSED
FIGURE 6
CONCLUSIONS

Much analysis remains if we are to fully exploit the potential of these data. Multiple regression to predict total contributions, PAC contributions, and party committee contributions using margin, incumbency, chamber, and party, for example, can be performed with little difficulty. Once information of incumbents’ committee assignments and roll call voting behavior are added to the data set, many other interesting lines of analysis can be pursued.

However, the limited analysis reported here reveals much about legislative campaign finance in Pennsylvania. I will not summarize the many findings already presented, but rather conclude with some observations on what is perhaps the most significant and timely question -- the nature and role of Political Action Committee contributions.

First, it is clear that PACs play a prominent role in financing these elections, rivaling and even exceeding their participation levels in financing Congressional elections. Over 25% of the nearly $7,750,000 raised for the 1982 legislative elections came from PACs. More significantly, PACs accounted for almost 37% of incumbents’ receipts. They gave general election winners in the House 36% of all money raised; for the Senate, it was 34.8%.

Second, as a group, PACs appear to pursue a strategy of seeking to win access and influence rather than maximizing the number of favorably disposed candidates who win. Unlike party committees, PACs show little inclination to concentrate their contributions where additional funds are likely to have the greatest impact -- in the close elections. Rather, much of their money goes to candidates who would have won handily anyway. Apparently, they seek to favorably dispose winners to their entreaties.

Third, important differences emerge in the strategies different categories of PACs pursue. Ideological PACs resemble party committees, giving their money to those with the best chance of winning and caring little for supporting incumbents or winners. But the limited funds available to such
PACs are insufficient to shift the pattern for all PACs combined. Professional PACs appear especially eager to gain access and influence. They divide their money evenly among Republicans and Democrats, favor incumbents heavily, and barely adjust contributions according to the closeness of the election.

Finally, to the extent labor PACs have acquired a reputation for being "heavy hitters" who provide countervailing resources to those of business PACs, the reputation is ill-deserved. Business PACs contribute substantially more than labor PACs overall. They match labor's contributions to House incumbent Democrats and actually give more to Democratic incumbent Senators than does labor.
NOTES

1 The 1978 total given by Jaffe is $21 million.

2 Jaffe (1983) reports total spending in Michigan in 1982 as $8.0 million (compared to $3.8 million in 1980); in New Jersey, 1981's election saw $8.0 in expenditures (versus $4.0 million in 1977); Illinois spent $30.00 million in 1982, a 50% jump over 1978's 24.0 million.

3 Political scientist Ruth Jones told Jaffe (1983): "Companies are finding that they now have to pay close attention to regulations at the state level, particularly since you are seeing more deregulation at the federal level."

4 Some candidates failed to file the reports required by law and were referred by the Bureau of Elections to the Attorney General for prosecution. These candidates typically got very few votes and in all likelihood spent little or no money. The absence of data on their receipts and expenditures hardly affects the results reported here.

5 It is interesting to note that candidates for Governor in 1982 received even less grass roots financial support. Only 8% of the total both candidates raised came in amounts of $50 or less (based on unpublished research by the author).

6 The firm is Schnader, Harrison, et al. The Bureau of Elections list of Political Committees dated 7/21/83 only gives an address and treasurer's name for these PACs. The address and identity of the treasurer are identical for both PACs, but there is no obvious way of detecting this given the fact that over 1000 political committees appear on the list.

7 For example, those unopposed in the primary nonetheless receive some money from supporters who anticipate a strongly contested general election. Thus, contributions to unopposed primary candidates are not necessarily irrational or wasted when made by someone pursuing the first strategy (maximizing the number of favorably disposed legislators elected).
The use of ALL party committee contributions weakens the purity of the assumption since local party committees often provide support to local "sacrificial lambs" whereas legislative campaign committees do not. The House Democratic and Republican campaign committees, for example, gave $274,000 to candidates in the general election, 66% of the total from all party committees. Over two-thirds of this $274,000 went to candidates who received from 40% to 60% of the vote. All other party committees gave exactly one-half of their money to such candidates. Thus, the following analysis, which combines all party contributions, is conservative. Differences in party and PAC contribution patterns would have been even sharper had only the House and Senate party campaign committees' contributions been analyzed.

Though the data have not been presented, PACs conform to what logic suggests in allocating funds between "big winners" and "big losers." Theoretically, the PAC contributions to candidates in category 4 could have gone to losers who got 1% to 29% of the vote. But 84% of all PAC contributions went to winners in the general election, and some of the 16% that general election losers got came in the form of primary contributions. Party committees, by contrast, gave exactly 50% of their total contributions to general election losers.
REFERENCES


The 1987 meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association will be held on April 3-4 at Albright College in Reading, PA.

Section/panel chairs are:

Section I. American Government

A. National

1. Institutional emphasis:
   Thomas Baldino, Department of Political Science, Juniata College, Huntington, PA 16652

2. Politics and Public Policy emphasis:
   Joseph Melusky, Department of History and Political Science, St. Francis College, Loretto, PA 15940

3. Public Administration and Federalism:
   Patricia Crotty, Department of Political Science, East Stroudsburg University, East Stroudsburg, PA 18301

B. Regional, State and Local Governments:

Politics, Policy and Administration:
   Lloyd Woodruff, Pennsylvania State University at Harrisburg, Middletown, PA 17057

Section II. Political Theory and Philosophy:

W. Wesley McDonald, Department of Political Science, Elizabethtown College, Elizabethtown, PA 17022

Section III. Comparative Government and Politics

1. General

2. East European Regional and Soviet Politics
   Proposals for both areas should be sent to: Sachary Irwin, Department of Political Science, Behrend College, Pennsylvania State University, Erie, PA 16563

Section IV. International Relations

1. General

2. American Foreign Policy
   Proposals for both areas should be sent to: William Vocke, Department of Political Science, Juniata College, Huntingdon, PA 16652

Questions concerning the meeting programs in general and other suggestions for papers and panels that do not fit the listed categories should be sent to: Donald G. Tannenbaum, PPSA Program Chair, Box 563, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA 17325.

Thomas C. Brogan, Albright College, is in charge of arrangements for the meeting.