My next research strategy was to look at different secondary sources to get a read on what Hugh Dowding deserves credit for and what is slightly overblown in his contribution to British defense in the Battle of Britain. John Ferris wrote in The Journal of Military History that a lot of what Britain did in the Battle of Britain was already set in place a long time before. Ferris believes that it is a misconception that the air defense system of the RAF came out of nowhere and gives Fighting Area Headquarters (FAHQ) a lot of credit for what they were able to achieve in air defense during the First World War. He states that Britain’s air defense was already the most advanced at that time and simply built off what was already in place. Although he does admit that FAHQ would not have won the Battle of Britain, he says that they did what they had to do in the lead up to what eventually became radar. Another source I discovered is from the journal History in which an entry written by Niall Mackay and Christopher Price argues in favor of Dowding on the Big Wing controversy, which is still hotly debated. This is one of the things that led to Dowding leaving his position after the war, as many RAF advisors believed in the Big Wing strategy of meeting their opponents in large aerial battles whereas Dowding used a more conservative approach that aimed toward a war of attrition. Mackay and Price back my stance on Dowding as a hero who went against what many thought and was still successful in his strategy. They provide evidence as to why Dowding’s approach was more successful, as, not surprisingly, the use of more forces in conflicts led to more losses.